Summary
noting that a "basic tenet of Ohio jurisprudence [is] that cases should be determined on their merits and not on mere procedural technicalities"
Summary of this case from In re Ar.C.Opinion
No. 87-762
Submitted March 9, 1988 —
Decided August 3, 1988.
Appellate procedure — Appeal from denial of motion for judgment n.o.v. treated as appeal from final judgment, when.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 52595.
Plaintiff-appellee, Raymond Barksdale, purchased a 1975 Lincoln Mark VII automobile from defendant-appellant, Van's Auto Sales, Inc. The record indicates that the car had been sold to plaintiff with a signed "as is — no warranty" purchase waiver, and that the car had an odometer reading of over 113,000 miles. Before the purchase, plaintiff test drove the car and inspected it. Upon plaintiff's inquiries concerning the transmission, the defendant-dealer informed him that the transmission needed a fluid change and a filter cleaning. Within two days of the purchase, the car broke down and was taken to a repair shop where a rebuilt transmission was installed at a price of $466.47.
On April 23, 1986, plaintiff commenced this action in the Cleveland Municipal Court, Small Claims Division, to compel the defendant to refund him the amount which it cost to repair the car's transmission. The court turned the matter over to a referee and a hearing was held.
On June 27, 1986, the referee rendered a report finding that although the car was sold "as is," there was an implied warranty of fitness of purpose which this car lacked, and that the "as is — no warranty" legend appearing on the vehicle would be voided as to the transmission only.
On July 3, 1986, the trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff in the amount recommended by the report of the referee.
On July 18, 1986, defendant filed objections to the referee's recommendations, and at that time, counsel for defendant allegedly discovered that the trial court had already entered judgment in the case on July 3, 1986. Therefore, on July 23, 1986, defendant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("n.o.v."), as well as a motion for a new trial.
Defendant claimed that the referee's findings were not mailed to it until July 10, 1986, and that it did not have the opportunity to object to the referee's report within the time period established in Civ. R. 53(E)(2).
On August 13, 1986, the trial judge filed an entry striking the motion for judgment n.o.v. and denied the motion for a new trial. With respect to the defendant's objections to the report of the referee, the court stated, "[o]bjections are admitted but overruled."
Upon appeal, the court of appeals affirmed in a split decision. With regard to defendant's assignment of error which stated: "The court erred in sustaining the recommendation of the referee which held that a sale `as is' and without warranty should have an exclusion of the `as is, without warranty' clause as to the transmission," the appellate court held that since defendant did not appeal directly from the July 3, 1986 judgment entry, it was not permitted to consider the merits of the assignment of error.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
William L. Blake, for appellant.
The defendant-appellant contends that where a sale of a motor vehicle under written contract provides an "as is — no warranty" clause, such language means exactly what it states. Defendant submits that in the absence of fraud, a court cannot subsequently hold that such language is meaningless as to a portion of the vehicle which the purchaser wishes to have warranted.
In the posture the cause sub judice is presented for our consideration, it is readily apparent that the court of appeals below did not review or decide the substantive arguments of defendant since the appeal perfected by defendant was from the trial court's denial of the motion for judgment n.o.v. and for a new trial. The appellate court held that it was not permitted to consider what is, in essence, the substantive portion of defendant's appeal because defendant did not appeal from the judgment entered by the trial court on July 3, 1986. We disagree.
In Maritime Manufacturers, Inc. v. Hi-Skipper Marina (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 257, 24 O.O. 3d 344, 436 N.E.2d 1034, this court was faced with a similar situation where the appellant appealed from the order denying a new trial and not from the final judgment on the merits. The court of appeals therein held that it could not consider the merits of the appeal because the notice of appeal mistakenly specified that the appeal was taken from the order denying the motion for a new trial rather than from the final judgment entered on the merits. This court, however, reversed that decision and held as follows:
"* * * [T]his court holds that any mistake in appealing from the order denying the motion for new trial rather than from the judgment should be treated as harmless error and that the appeal should be treated as if arising from the final judgment." Id. at 260, 24 O.O. 3d at 346, 436 N.E.2d at 1036.
Based upon this decision, we are compelled to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to that tribunal for a consideration of defendant's appeal on the merits. Additionally, it should be emphasized that our disposition herein reflects a basic tenet of Ohio jurisprudence that cases should be determined on their merits and not on mere procedural technicalities. See, e.g., State v. Herzing (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 337, 18 OBR 379, 481 N.E.2d 593; Perotti v. Ferguson (1983), 7 Ohio St.3d 1, 7 OBR 256, 454 N.E.2d 951; DeHart v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 189, 23 O.O. 3d 210, 431 N.E.2d 644.
Indeed, given this court's disposition in the subsequent case of Maritime Manufacturers, Inc. v. Hi-Skipper Marina (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 93, 19 OBR 255, 483 N.E.2d 144, it appears that defendant raises a legitimate, substantive argument.
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded for a review of the appeal on the merits.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, LOCHER, HOLMES, DOUGLAS, WRIGHT and H. BROWN, JJ., concur.