Opinion
D.D. No. 12
Decided January 18, 1961.
Attorneys at law — Conduct constituting moral turpitude — Conviction of offense of wire tapping — Violation of Canons of Professional Ethics — Disciplinary power of Supreme Court.
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline.
This matter comes before the court on the certified report of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline recommending the indefinite suspension from the practice of law in the courts of Ohio of one Jack C. Massengale, respondent, who, in 1953, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio.
The complaint filed by relator against the respondent contains four specifications which are substantially as follows:
1. Conviction in the United States District Court, Southern District of Ohio, on April 30, 1956, on two counts of wire tapping (Sections 501 and 605, Title 47, U.S. Code), which was affirmed on appeal and on which the respondent was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of two years and fined $1,500, respondent being incarcerated in the United States Federal Penitentiary at Terre Haute, Indiana, from which institution he was subsequently paroled, such conviction being of a crime involving moral turpitude.
2. Conviction on two charges of wire tapping, as stated in specification 1, the same constituting a violation of the recognized and accepted code of rules governing the legal profession and bringing discredit on the respondent, the courts, and the legal profession.
3. Sharing law offices with a private detective agency, of which he was the operator, in Cincinnati, Ohio, using the same telephone number, and otherwise associating himself with the agency, in violation of Canons 27 and 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.
4. Creating a corporation not for profit, under the laws of the state of Ohio, known as the "Ohio Crime Commission, Inc.," the principal place of business of which was in respondent's law office, for which corporation he was listed as attorney and statutory agent, and which corporation was used for the purpose of conducting correspondence with members of Congress and other public officials regarding respondent's conviction of the charges of wire tapping, said corporation being a legal fiction to do his bidding and in which he concealed himself as a principal to accomplish his ulterior motives of attacking the judgment of conviction in the United States District Court, in violation of Canon 22, requiring candor and fairness on the part of an attorney.
Subsequent to the filing of the original complaint, relator filed a supplemental complaint upon which no action was taken.
The matter was heard on testimony and exhibits before a panel of three members of the board. The board itself, upon the evidence presented, found respondent guilty of the misconduct charged in specifications 1, 2 and 4 of the complaint.
After making findings in substantial conformity with the allegations contained in specifications 1, 2 and 4 of the complaint, the board determined: "(1) The conviction for violation of the federal wire-tapping statute involves the commission and conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (2) in connection with his violation of the federal wire-tapping statute respondent was guilty of violations of Canons 29 and 32 of the Canons of Professional Ethics; (3) in the formation and operation of Ohio Crime Commission, Inc., respondent was guilty of violation of Canon 29 of the Canons of Professional Ethics; and it is, therefore, the considered recommendation of this board of commissioners that the respondent, Jack C. Massengale, should be suspended for an indefinite period from the practice of law pursuant to Section 6 (b) of Rule XXVII on disciplinary procedure of the Supreme Court of Ohio."
Mr. Joseph E. Rosen and Mr. Robert M. Dennis, for relator.
Mr. Clifford E. Adams and Mr. Robert Leggett, for respondent.
In the case of Cleveland Bar Association v. Pleasant, 167 Ohio St. 325, 148 N.E.2d 493, this court held as stated in the first two paragraphs of the syllabus:
"The Supreme Court of Ohio has inherent power as to the disciplining of attorneys admitted to practice in this state and may provide by rule the procedure with reference to such disciplining.
"Rule XXVII of the Supreme Court, as amended effective January 1, 1957, as it applies to procedure in reference to the exercise of original jurisdiction by the Supreme Court in the disciplining of attorneys, is constitutional."
Definitions as to those acts which constitute "moral turpitude" are numerous and sometimes conflicting. See 27 Words and Phrases (Perm. Ed.), 558, under the heading, "Moral Turpitude." In some cases it has been flatly held that anything done knowingly by an attorney which is contrary to justice, honesty or good morals constitutes moral turpitude. Be that as it may, in our opinion, an attorney who deliberately instigates a wire-tapping operation contrary to a federal statute and is indicted, tried and convicted of the offense engages in such conduct as reflects upon that attorney's moral fitness to continue the practice of law, and which may properly be classed as moral turpitude, warranting severe disciplinary measures.
We have read the transcropt of the evidence upon which the board made its report and are of the view that it justifies and substantiates the findings and determination made, and that nothing transpired in the course of the proceedings prejudicial to the rights of respondent. Respondent's endeavor to show that he was wrongly convicted of the wire-tapping charge was hardly permissible.
To preserve its prestige and standing, the legal profession should not and must not tolerate conduct on the part of its members which brings the profession as a whole into disrepute and invites public condemnation.
Therefore, the report of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline is confirmed, and judgment is rendered accordingly.
Report confirmed and judgment accordingly.
WEYGANDT, C.J., ZIMMERMAN, MATTHIAS, BELL, HERBERT and O'NEILL, JJ., concur.