Opinion
CASE NO. CV F 06-1162 OWW LJO.
September 22, 2006
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS ACTION
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Michael L. Banks ("plaintiff") is incarcerated and proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("section 1983"). Plaintiff proceeds with a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("section 1983") form complaint ("complaint") to name as defendant Michael J. Yracebrun ("Mr. Yracebrun"), Supervising Deputy District Attorney with the Kern County District Attorney's Office ("DA's Office"). The complaint indicates that the DA's Office denied plaintiff's request for detailed information and statisitics regarding "parolees of Bakersfield and Kern County from 1994 to 2006, who had prior strikes and suffered a new felony conviction solely drug violations [sic] and they were returned to California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation." The complaint seeks an order for the detailed parolee information and statistics. Plaintiff attaches to his complaint copies of California court records to suggest California courts denied him relief sought her and his requests for information under the California Public Records Act.
DISCUSSION Standards For Screening
This Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). This Court must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, which "is frivolous, malicious or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted" or "seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2). Moreover, "[a] trial court may dismiss a claim sua sponte under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). . . . Such dismissal may be made without notice where the claimant cannot possibly win relief." Omar v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987); see Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 361-362 (9th Cir. 1981). Sua sponte dismissal may be made before process is served on defendants. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989) (dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) are often made sua sponte); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1226 (9th Cir. 1984) (court may dismiss frivolous in forma pauperis action sua sponte prior to service of process on defendants).Since plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, this Court, notwithstanding any filing fee that may have been paid, shall dismiss a case at any time if the Court determines the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); 2 Schwarzer, Tashima Wagstaffe, California Practice Guide: Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial (2006) Attacking the Pleadings, para. 9:226.1, pp. 9-69. A court need not accept as true factual allegations in in forma pauperis complaints and may reject "completely baseless" allegations, including those which are "fanciful," "fantastic" or "delusional." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 1733 (1992).
A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325; Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227-1228. A federal court may dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
The test for maliciousness is a subjective one and requires the court to "determine the . . . good faith of the applicant." Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Squab Co., 236 U.S. 43, 46 (1915); see Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 968 n. 1 (11th Cir. 1986). A lack of good faith is found most commonly in repetitive suits filed by plaintiffs who have used the advantage of cost-free filing to file a multiplicity of suits. A complaint is malicious if it suggests an intent to vex defendants or abuse the judicial process by relitigating claims decided in prior cases. Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Phillips v. Carey, 638 F.2d 207, 209 (10th Cir. 1981); Ballentine v. Crawford, 563 F.Supp. 627, 628-629 (N.D. Ind. 1983); cf. Glick v. Gutbrod, 782 F.2d 754, 757 (7th Cir. 1986) (court has inherent power to dismiss a case demonstrating "clear pattern of abuse of judicial process"). A lack of good faith or malice also can be inferred from a complaint containing untrue material allegations of fact or false statements made with intent to deceive the court. See Horsey v. Asher, 741 F.2d 209, 212 (8th Cir. 1984).
A complaint, or portion thereof, may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99 (1957)); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). "[W]hen a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint, before the reception of any evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support claims." Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1688 (1974); Gilligan v. Jamco Development Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997).
As explained below, the complaint reflects deficiencies to prevent plaintiff to offer evidence for the complaint's vague, unsupportable claims.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and lack inherent or general subject matter jurisdiction. Federal courts can adjudicate only those cases in which the United States Constitution and Congress authorize them to adjudicate. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 1677 (1994); Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 109 S.Ct. 2003, 2008 (1989). Federal courts are presumptively without jurisdiction over civil actions, and the burden to establish the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377; 114 S.Ct. at 1677. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is never waived and may be raised by the court sua sponte. Attorneys Trust v. Videotape Computer Products, Inc., 93 F.3d 593, 594-595 (9th Cir. 1996). "Nothing is to be more jealously guarded by a court than its jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is what its power rests upon. Without jurisdiction it is nothing." In re Mooney, 841 F.2d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1988).
F.R.Civ.P. 8 establishes general pleading rules and provides in pertinent part:
(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks.
. . .
(e) Pleading to be Concise and Direct; Consistency.
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise and direct.
The complaint fails to allege a proper basis for this Court's jurisdiction and appears to use section 1983 as a subterfuge to attempt to invoke this Court's jurisdiction. The complaint fails to allege facts to support this Court's jurisdiction and merely addresses plaintiff's attempts to seek state parolee information from a county entity.
The complaint appears to challenge state court orders to deny plaintiff the relief he seeks here. A federal court is not the proper forum to attack state court orders. Federal courts lack jurisdiction to review or modify state court judgments under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Company, 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303 (1983). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1257 which grants the United States Supreme Court jurisdiction to review decisions of the highest state courts for compliance with the federal Constitution. See Rooker, 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149; Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303. The doctrine provides that "lower federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review a case litigated and decided in state court; only the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to correct state court judgments." Gottfried v. Medical Planning Services, 142 F.3d 326, 330 (6th Cir. 1998). "This is equally true in constitutional cases brought under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983, since federal courts must give 'full faith and credit' to the judicial proceedings of state courts.'" Gottfried, 142 F.3d at 330 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738). "Federal district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review such final adjudications or to exclude constitutional claims that are 'inextricably intertwined with the state court's [decision] in a judicial proceeding.'" Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 296 (3rd Cir. 1992) (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483, n. 16).
Moreover, a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review final determinations of state courts and claims "inextricably intertwined" with final state court decisions, even if such "inextricably intertwined" claims were not raised in state court. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483-487 and n. 16 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Olson Farms, Inc. v. Barbosa, 134 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional). A federal district court is a court of original jurisdiction and has no authority to review final determinations of state courts. Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1986); Dubinka v. Judges of Superior Court of State of Cal. for County of Los Angeles, 23 F.3d 218, 221 (9th Cir. 1994). "[A] losing party in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States District Court, based on the losing party's claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser's federal rights." Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-1006 (1994).
In short, the complaint reveals no grounds to properly invoke this Court's jurisdiction. An attempt at amendment is unwarranted.
Pleading Deficiencies
A pleading may not simply allege a wrong has been committed and demand relief. The underlying requirement is that a pleading give "fair notice" of the claim being asserted and the "grounds upon which it rests." Conley, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103 (1957); Yamaguchi v. United States Dept. of Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1481 (9th Cir. 1997). Although a complaint need not outline all elements of a claim, "[i]t must be possible . . . for an inference to be drawn that these elements exist." Walker v. South Cent. Bell Telephone Co., 904 F.2d 275, 277 (5th Cir. 1990); Lewis v. ACB Business Service, Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 405-406 (6th Cir. 1998).
Despite the flexible pleading policy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). A plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt facts which defendant engaged in to support plaintiff's claim. Jones, 733 F.2d at 649. Here, the complaint fails to comply with F.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) to provide fair notice of a cognizable claim against Mr. Yracebrun and to demonstrate that plaintiff is entitled to relief as to Mr. Yracebrun. To extent the complaint attempts to allege section 1983 claims, the complaint fails to set forth specific acts, omissions or wrongs to give rise to a cognizable claim against Mr. Yracebrun. The complaint fails to allege with requisite degree of particularity specific overt acts of Mr. Yracebrun and in turn, resulting damages from Mr. Yracebrun's alleged overt acts. The complaint points to nothing Mr. Yracebrun did or did not do. Because the complaint fails to satisfy F.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) requirements, it must be dismissed, and under the circumstances, an attempt at amendment is unwarranted.
The Complaint's Section 1983 Deficiencies
The Civil Rights Act, under which this action is purportedly filed, provides:
Every person who, under the color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress.42 U.S.C. § 1983.
To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must plead that: (1) defendants acted under color of state law at the time the complained of act was committed; and (2) defendants deprived plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986). The complaint fails to state colorable claims (or any claims for that matter) against Mr. Yracebrun in that it fails to point to Mr. Yracebrun's specific conduct. The complaint fails to demonstrate that Mr. Yracebrun acted under color of state law in connection with relief which plaintiff seeks. The complaint articulates no deprivation of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Section 1983 requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of defendant and deprivation allegedly suffered. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that "[a] person 'subjects' another to deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made." Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). The complaint fails to satisfy the linking requirement as to Mr. Yracebrun and to articulate how Mr. Yracebrun deprived plaintiff of constitutional rights and resulting harm.
Malice
This Court is concerned that plaintiff has brought this action in absence of good faith and attempts to take advantage of cost-free filing to vex Mr. Yracebrun, whose letters denied plaintiff's requested information and statistics. Such attempt provides further grounds to dismiss plaintiff's complaint.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS to DISMISS this action without prejudice on grounds that the complaint: (1) fails to establish this Court's subject matter jurisdiction, to satisfy pleading requirements and to allege cognizable section 1983 claims; and (2) appears intended to vex Mr. Yracebrun.
These findings and recommendations are submitted to the district judge assigned to this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and this Court's Local Rule 72-304. No later than October 27, 2006, plaintiff may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on the magistrate judge in compliance with this Court's Local Rule 72-304(b). Such a document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." The district judge will then review the magistrate judge's ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
Plaintiff is admonished not to attempt to file an amended complaint as plaintiff's recourse is to object to these findings and recommendations. Plaintiff is further admonished this Court will strike any papers to attempt to file an amended complaint unless this Court specifically grants plaintiff permission to file an amended complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED.