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dismissing constitutional claims of incarcerated pro se plaintiff challenging restriction on telephone calls and mail communications that lasted up to thirteen days
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11 Civ. 4222 (LAP)
09-25-2012
DESHAWN BANKS, Plaintiff, v. WARDEN ROSE ARGO and MENTAL HEALTH CLINICIAN ROSENTHAL, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
:
This is one of several actions Deshawn Banks ("Plaintiff"), a prisoner incarcerated at all relevant times in the Segregated Housing Unit (the "SHU") in the George R. Vierno Center at Rikers Island ("GRVC"), has brought pro se against various New York State prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In this case, Plaintiff sues two employees of GRVC: Warden Rose Argo ("Argo"), warden of GRVC, and Mental Health Clinician Rosenthal ("Rosenthal"), a mental health clinician at GRVC (collectively, "Defendants").
The allegations in Plaintiff's complaint stem from his stay in the SHU. From April 29, 2011, until the drafting of his complaint, dated May 11, 2011, Plaintiff resided in a mental observation box within the SHU, that is, a personal cell wherein Plaintiff is constantly observed through a window by correctional staff. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 3, 6.) Plaintiff alleges that during his detainment in the mental observation box he was denied the following rights: access to law library materials, showers, telephone calls, family correspondence, recreation time, access to a barber, and consultation with an attorney.
Plaintiff filed the instant action on May 26, 2011. On December 8, 2011, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that (1) Plaintiff fails to allege the personal involvement of either Defendant in the alleged violations of his rights, (2) Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which this Court may grant relief, and (3) Plaintiff is not entitled to the relief he seeks. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motion to dismiss [Dkt. Nos. 10, 13] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. I. BACKGROUND
Defendants filed their motion to dismiss on December 8, 2011. On December 28, 2011, this case was referred to Magistrate Judge Maas for general pretrial case management, along with a number of other cases Plaintiff has initiated involving events that occurred while Plaintiff was incarcerated at Rikers Island. Following a June 18, 2012, telephone conference Judge Maas held with all parties in the referred cases, Plaintiff was ordered to respond to all pending motions to dismiss by July 9, 2012 [see Dkt. No. 21]. Despite the ample opportunity to respond, Plaintiff has failed to oppose the instant motion to dismiss.
The Court takes as true the following factual allegations in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff. See Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 2008).
On April 29, 2011, Plaintiff was removed from his general inmate housing location in GRVC and held at the "intake holding pens" after being "treated by medical." (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 3, 6.) Plaintiff alleges that while "left in the intake holding pens [he] became very schipopentic [sic], and paranoid relative to his diagnosis by history" and "then begin [sic] to inflict self mutilation across his arm." (Id. ¶ 4.) "Upon physically harming himself, plaintiff was escorted from the intake holding pens, and was taken to the clinic within the C-73 building." (Id. ¶ 5.)
Later that same day, Plaintiff alleges he was "drafted" to the SHU to serve a sixty-five-day penalty for violating institutional rules. (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff was moved to reside in a mental observation box and was assigned to mental health counselor Rosenthal. (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff claims that the observation box, wherein he was confined twenty-four-hours-a-day, is seven-feet-by-nine-feet. (Id. ¶ 8.) He further claims that he was observed by correctional staff from a distance of eleven feet through a four-by-four square foot window. (Id.)
Plaintiff contends that after consulting with Rosenthal on May 5, 2011, he became "schipopentic [sic], and paranoid, and mad with counselor Rosenthal." (Id. ¶ 10.) He then began to inflict additional self harm, including "cutting open a main artery vain [sic] in his upper left arm while being on 'observation.'" (Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff was then rushed to surgery and upon completion was returned to the mental observation box "without a referral . . . by his mental health counselor Rosenthal to have Plaintiff Banks seen by a mental health psych ward doctor." (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) Plaintiff claims being deprived of the following rights while he was confined in the mental observation box: "law library materials, showers, telephone calls, family correspondence, one hour recreation, barbrashop [sic], consulting with attorney." (Id. ¶¶ 15-16.)
Plaintiff states he filed a grievance with "social service[s] at Rikers Island GRVC SHU box," in which he grieved the "[Department of Correction] policy" and "mental health defective counsel treatment." (Id. § IV.) He claims he did not receive a response to his grievance. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks five hundred thousand dollars in punitive damages as relief in the instant action. (Id. § V.) II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
In assessing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept all non-conclusory factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 56. To survive the motion, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A pleading that offers "labels and conclusions" or "a formalistic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'" Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In the case of a pro se litigant, the Court reads the pleadings leniently and construes them to raise "the strongest arguments that they suggest." McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). This guidance applies with particular force when the plaintiff's civil rights are at issue. See McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Flaherty v. Lang, 199 F.3d 607, 612 (2d Cir. 1999). Nevertheless, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a pro se plaintiff's factual allegations must be "enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
B. Analysis
1. Substantive Section 1983 Claims
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 2007). In addition, "'personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.'" Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 484 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Wright v. Smith, 21 F. 3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994)).
Plaintiff fails to point to a specific constitutional or federal right that has been violated as a result of his time spent in the mental observation box. Construed liberally, however, Plaintiff's complaint implicates the due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Indeed, claims of prison deprivations are typically analyzed in light of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, which applies to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296-97 (1991).
Two of Plaintiff's alleged deprivations—telephone calls and family correspondence—also implicate Plaintiff's First Amendment free speech rights. See infra Part II.B.1(d). In addition, Plaintiff's allegations of being denied access to the law library and an attorney, see infra Part II.B.1(c), implicate his constitutional right of access to courts, however unsettled the law may be as to the precise source of such right. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 & n.12 (2002) (noting the Supreme Court has, at different times, grounded the right of access to courts in the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the First Amendment Petition Clause, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses).
To succeed on the merits of a prison deprivation—or deliberate indifference—claim, a plaintiff must show both objective and subjective violations. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) ("[A] prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met. First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious; a prison official's act or omission must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities . . . . The second requirement follows from the principle that only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment. To violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, a prison official must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind." (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); see also Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298.
As discussed infra Part II.B.2, Plaintiff does not sufficiently plead either Defendant's individual participation in the claimed deprivations and thus cannot satisfy section 1983's requirements (or the second prong of the test laid out in Farmer requiring that he establish a prison official's sufficiently culpable state of mind). But even assuming Plaintiff adequately pleaded the individual participation of the named Defendants, his claims of being denied showers, a barber, and recreation time would still fail as a matter of law because these alleged deprivations do not meet the "objectively sufficiently serious" prong of Farmer. With respect to the claims of being denied access to the law library and an attorney, telephone calls, and family correspondence, the Court will provide Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint. The Court assesses each of Plaintiff's claimed deprivations below.
a) Access to Showers and Barber
Plaintiff appears to allege being denied access to the showers and a barber. (Compl. ¶ 16.) But without providing further details Plaintiff's claims fall short of the standard set out in Farmer that the claimed deprivation "must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." 511 U.S. at 298. For example, Plaintiff does not specify how long he was denied the right to shower or claim he had no other means of cleaning himself. As a result, Plaintiff's threadbare allegation must fail. Cruz v. Jackson, No. 01 Civ. 3133, 1999 WL 45348, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1997) ("The caselaw does not support an Eighth Amendment claim based on temporary deprivation of shower privileges, so long as minimal hygienic needs are met.").
But even assuming prison officials denied Plaintiff shower access for the entire time alleged in his complaint—thirteen days—his claim still fails as a matter of law. See McCoy v. Goord, 255 F. Supp. 2d 233, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("[A] two-week suspension of shower privileges does not suffice as a denial of 'basic hygienic needs.'"). Similarly, the claimed denial of ordinary access to a barber, as a matter of law, fails to amount to the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. See Black v. Cuomo, No. 95-2678, 1996 WL 146507, at *1 (2d Cir. Apr. 1, 1996) ("[The] denial of haircuts . . . fall[s] short of the degree of seriousness demanded by the Eighth Amendment."). Accordingly, Plaintiff's alleged shower and haircut deprivations do not give rise to a valid section 1983 claim. These claims are therefore dismissed with prejudice.
b) Recreation Time
Both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have held that the right to exercise is a basic human need protected by the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1991); Williams v. Greifinger, 97 F.3d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1996). However, Plaintiff's bare allegation that he was denied "one hour recreation," without any supporting facts, falls well short of an actionable section 1983 violation. See, e.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 534. Indeed, "[s]poradic infringement of the right to exercise does not rise to the level of . . . a constitutional deprivation." Gamble v. City of N.Y., No. 04 Civ. 10203, 2009 WL 3097239, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2009); see also Davidson v. Coughlin, 968 F. Supp. 121, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Although a prisoner may satisfy the objective component of the Eighth Amendment test by showing that he was denied meaningful exercise for a substantial period of time, temporary denials of exercise may be constitutional." (citations omitted)).
Here, Plaintiff does not specify how long he was denied recreation time. But even assuming he was denied all recreation time for the full thirteen days he spent in the mental observation box, his claim would still fail as a matter of law. See Davidson, 968 F. Supp. at 131 (holding that denial of outdoor exercise for fourteen consecutive days for inmate temporarily housed in "keeplock" did not violate the Eighth Amendment). Accordingly, Plaintiff's alleged deprivation of recreation time does not allow for relief under section 1983. This claim is therefore dismissed with prejudice.
c) Attorney and Law Library Access
Plaintiff also claims that while he was confined in the mental observation box he was denied access to an attorney and the law library. (Compl. ¶ 16.) It is well-settled that meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental constitutional right. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). "[T]he fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." Id. at 828. However, the Supreme Court has clarified that a plaintiff who alleges inadequate access to an attorney or a law library must also allege that he suffered an actual injury as a result. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996) ("[T]he inmate . . . must . . . demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim."); see also Bourdon v. Loughren, 386 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 2004).
Here, Plaintiff provides no details as to his claimed denial of access to the GRVC law library and to an attorney. But even assuming he was denied outright access to both, Plaintiff fails to allege that such denials caused him an actual injury by "hinder[ing] his efforts to pursue a legal claim." Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. Nevertheless, because a district court should provide a pro se plaintiff the opportunity "'to amend his complaint prior to its dismissal for failure to state a claim, unless the court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would succeed in stating a claim,'" Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999)), the Court denies Defendants' motion to dismiss these claims.
Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to detail his claims for denial of access to his prison law library and his attorney. Plaintiff must state, in his amended complaint, "what non-frivolous underlying legal claim was hindered by [Defendants'] actions and the precise nature of the relief he is seeking." Certified Order at 1, Johnson v. Captain John Does, No. 11-4664 (2d Cir. Mar. 1, 2012).
d) Telephone Calls and Family Correspondence
Lastly, Plaintiff alleges he has been deprived of telephone calls and family correspondence, (Compl. ¶ 16), although he again fails to plead any specifics of these allegations. Even though "[a] prison inmate's rights to communicate with family and friends are essentially First Amendment rights subject to § 1983 protection," Morgan v. LaVallee, 526 F.2d 221, 225 (2d Cir. 1975), "[p]risoners do not have an absolute right to make phone calls." Fair v. Weiburg, No. 02 Civ. 9218, 2006 WL 2801999, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, "[t]he regulation of inmates' mail by state prison officials . . . is a matter of internal prison administration with which this Court will not interfere, absent a showing of a resultant denial of access to the courts or of some other basic right retained by a prisoner." Argentine v. McGinnis, 311 F. Supp. 134, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). This is so because, as the Supreme Court has recognized, prison officials require sufficient discretion to ensure prison security:
[W]e have been sensitive to the delicate balance that prison administrators must strike between the order and security of the internal prison environment and the legitimate demands of those on the "outside" who seek to enter that environment, in person or through the written word. . . . Acknowledging the expertise of these officials and that the judiciary is "ill equipped" to deal with the difficult and delicate problems of prison management, this Court has afforded considerable deference to the determinations of prison administrators who, in the interest of security, regulate the relations between prisoners and the outside world.Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407-08 (1989).
In light of these considerations, the Supreme Court has stated that regulations concerning incoming mail to inmates "are 'valid if [they are] reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.'" Id. at 413 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)) (alteration in original). With respect to prison regulations concerning outgoing correspondence from inmates a "least restrictive analysis" applies because the implications of this type of correspondence "are of a categorically lesser magnitude than the implications of incoming materials." See id. at 413-14.
In addition, the Supreme Court has held "[i]n a number of contexts . . . that reasonable time, place and manner regulations (of communicative activity) may be necessary to further significant governmental interests, and are permitted." Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 826-27 (1974) (discussing the limitations prison officials may place on outsiders' face-to-face communication with inmates). Thus, it is clear that "[s]ome curtailment" of the right to visitation "must be expected in the prison context." Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003).
Here, Plaintiff neither clarifies exactly which type of family correspondence he has been denied nor points to any prison regulations regarding inmates' communication with outsiders and explains why they are unconstitutional. Plaintiff also does not plead any resulting injury. Because inmates do not have an absolute right to make telephone calls, and prison regulations may reasonably restrict mail and face-to-face communications between inmates and outsiders, without providing supporting factual allegations Plaintiff fails to plead an actionable claim under section 1983.
The Court will, however, provide Plaintiff the opportunity to amend his complaint with respect to these claims. Accordingly, Plaintiff must state with particularity exactly which types of family correspondence he was denied (e.g., incoming mail, outgoing mail, or both), the precise scope and extent of his being denied telephone calls and correspondence (i.e., whether he was denied these forms of communication on individual occasions or for the entire thirteen days he was confined in the mental observation box), why such denials were unreasonable, what specific injuries Plaintiff suffered as a result of the denials, and the precise nature of the relief he seeks.
The Court notes that Plaintiff presumably was placed in a mental observation unit because he posed a danger to himself and possibly to others. Thus, certain restrictions, such as barring personal visits with Plaintiff for the thirteen days Plaintiff was in the observation unit, might have been warranted under the circumstances. Indeed, all the alleged deprivations in the complaint might have been necessary to ensure Plaintiff's safety in light of his demonstrated ability to do serious harm to himself. Nevertheless, the Court is unable to make such a determination at this initial stage of the litigation.
2. Section 1983's Personal Involvement Requirement
As the Court previously noted, "personal involvement of defendants . . . is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983." Wright, 21 F.3d at 501. The Court of Appeals has "construed personal involvement for these purposes to mean direct participation, or failure to remedy the alleged wrong after learning of it, or creation of a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or gross negligence in managing subordinates." Black v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1996). Thus, "where the complaint names a defendant in the caption but contains no allegations indicating how the defendant violated the law or injured the plaintiff, a motion to dismiss the complaint in regard to that defendant should be granted." Dove v. Fordham Univ., 56 F. Supp. 2d 330, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the complaint contains no allegations against Defendants that would suggest their personal involvement in Plaintiff's claimed deprivations. In fact, Defendant Argo is not mentioned anywhere in the complaint other than in the caption. Additionally, neither of the allegations against Defendant Rosenthal amount to the direct participation required under Black. Plaintiff alleges Rosenthal acts as Plaintiff's mental health counselor and that after consulting with Rosenthal Plaintiff became "schipopentic [sic], and paranoid, and mad with counselor Rosenthal." (Compl. ¶¶ 9-10.) Additionally, Plaintiff alleges Rosenthal returned him to the "observation box . . . without . . . being seen by a mental health psych ward doctor." (Id. ¶ 13.) These bare allegations that Rosenthal was Plaintiff's mental health counselor and that at one point Plaintiff was mad at Rosenthal in no way show that Rosenthal did anything wrong and certainly do not implicate Rosenthal's participation in any of the claimed deprivations while Plaintiff was confined in the mental observation box.
As stated above, the Court grants as a matter of law Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims of being denied showers, a barber, and recreation time and dismisses these claims with prejudice. With respect to those claims the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend—namely, the claims of being denied access to the law library and an attorney, telephone calls, and family correspondence—Plaintiff must state with particularity Defendants' personal involvement in such deprivations. With respect to each Defendant, Plaintiff must indicate whether the Defendant directly participated in the alleged deprivations, failed to remedy the alleged wrongs after learning of them, created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or acted with gross negligence in managing subordinates. Black v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d at 74.
3. Relief Sought
Finally, even were the Court to find merit in Plaintiff's claims, he is not entitled to the relief he seeks as the complaint is currently drafted. Plaintiff seeks five hundred thousand dollars in punitive damages. (Compl. § V.) The Court of Appeals has stated that "evidence of the 'evil motive or intent' or 'callous indifference' [of a defendant's conduct] . . . is essential to an award of punitive damages." Ivani Contracting Corp. v. City of N.Y., 103 F.3d 257, 262 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, (1983)). But Plaintiff has not adequately alleged either Defendant's involvement in the claimed deprivations let alone pleaded particular facts that suggest they acted with an "evil motive" or with "callous indifference." Nor would Plaintiff be entitled to compensatory damages as he does not claim any physical injury resulted from the alleged prison deprivations. See Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 416 (2d Cir. 2002).
With respect to those claims Plaintiff is granted leave to amend, Plaintiff must either (1) plead particular facts from which the requisite culpable state of mind for the Defendants may be inferred so as to allow for the recovery of punitive damages, (2) request only nominal damages, or (3) request specific injunctive or declarative relief. See id. at 418. III. CONCLUSION
Though the prospect of injunctive or declaratory relief may be slim at best given that Plaintiff presumably no longer is confined in the mental observation box, the Court at this stage will not foreclose all possibility that such relief properly may be requested in an amended complaint. --------
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss [Dkt. Nos. 10, 13] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff's claims that he was denied showers, a barber, and recreation time are dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff is hereby granted leave to amend his complaint with respect to the claims that he was denied access to the law library and an attorney, telephone calls, and family correspondence. The amended complaint must (1) cure the deficiencies as detailed in this order, (2) be submitted to the Court within sixty days of the date of this order, (3) be captioned as an "Amended Complaint," and (4) bear the same docket number as this order. An Amended Civil Rights Complaint form, which Plaintiff should complete as specified above, is attached to this order. If Plaintiff fails to comply with the Court's directive and cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the Court will dismiss the case with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). SO ORDERED. Dated: New York, New York
September 25, 2012
/s/_________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE __________ (In the space above enter the full name(s) of the plaintiff(s).)
-against-
__________ (In the space above enter the full name(s) of the defendant(s). If you cannot fit the names of all of the defendants in the space provided, please write "see attached" in the space above and attach an additional sheet of paper with the full list of names. The names listed in the above caption must be identical to those contained in Part I. Addresses should not be included here.) AMENDED COMPLAINT
under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Jury Trial: [ ] Yes [ ] No
(check one)
___ Civ. __________ ( )
I. Parties in this complaint:
A. List your name, identification number, and the name and address of your current place of confinement. Do the same for any additional plaintiffs named. Attach additional sheets of paper as necessary. Plaintiff's Name__________
ID#__________
Current Institution__________
Address__________ B. List all defendants' names, positions, places of employment, and the address where each defendant may be served. Make sure that the defendant(s) listed below are identical to those contained in the above caption. Attach additional sheets of paper as necessary. Defendant No. 1 Name __________ Shield #___
Where Currently Employed __________
Address __________ Defendant No. 2 Name __________ Shield #___
Where Currently Employed __________
Address __________ Defendant No. 3 Name __________ Shield #___
Where Currently Employed __________
Address __________ Defendant No. 4 Name __________ Shield #___
Where Currently Employed __________
Address __________ Defendant No. 5 Name __________ Shield #___
Where Currently Employed __________
Address __________
II. Statement of Claim:
State as briefly as possible the facts of your case. Describe how each of the defendants named in the caption of this complaint is involved in this action, along with the dates and locations of all relevant events. You may wish to include further details such as the names of other persons involved in the events giving rise to your claims. Do not cite any cases or statutes. If you intend to allege a number of related claims, number and set forth each claim in a separate paragraph. Attach additional sheets of paper as necessary. A. In what institution did the events giving rise to your claim(s) occur?
__________ B. Where in the institution did the events giving rise to your claim(s) occur?
__________ C. What date and approximate time did the events giving rise to your claim(s) occur?
__________ D. Facts:__________
III. Injuries:
If you sustained injuries related to the events alleged above, describe them and state what medical treatment, if any, you required and received. __________ IV. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), requires that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." Administrative remedies are also known as grievance procedures. A. Did your claim(s) arise while you were confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility?
Yes ___ No ___If YES, name the jail, prison, or other correctional facility where you were confined at the time of the events giving rise to your claim(s). __________ B. Does the jail, prison or other correctional facility where your claim(s) arose have a grievance procedure?
Yes ___ No ___ Do Not Know ___C. Does the grievance procedure at the jail, prison or other correctional facility where your claim(s) arose cover some or all of your claim(s)?
Yes ___ No ___ Do Not Know ___D. Did you file a grievance in the jail, prison, or other correctional facility where your claim(s) arose?
If YES, which claim(s)?
__________
Yes ___ No ___E. If you did file a grievance, about the events described in this complaint, where did you file the grievance?
If NO, did you file a grievance about the events described in this complaint at any other jail, prison, or other correctional facility?
Yes ___ No ___
__________
1. Which claim(s) in this complaint did you grieve?F. If you did not file a grievance:
__________
2. What was the result, if any?
__________
3. What steps, if any, did you take to appeal that decision? Describe all efforts to appeal to the highest level of the grievance process.
__________
1. If there are any reasons why you did not file a grievance, state them here:
__________
2. If you did not file a grievance but informed any officials of your claim, state who you informed, when and how, and their response, if any:G. Please set forth any additional information that is relevant to the exhaustion of your administrative remedies.
__________
__________ Note: You may attach as exhibits to this complaint any documents related to the exhaustion of your administrative remedies.
V. Relief:
State what you want the Court to do for you (including the amount of monetary compensation, if any, that you are seeking and the basis for such amount). __________
VI. Previous lawsuits:
A. Have you filed other lawsuits in state or federal court dealing with the same facts involved in this action?
Yes ___ No ___B. If your answer to A is YES, describe each lawsuit by answering questions 1 through 7 below. (If there is more than one lawsuit, describe the additional lawsuits on another sheet of paper, using the same format.)
1. Parties to the previous lawsuit:C. Have you filed other lawsuits in state or federal court otherwise relating to your imprisonment?
Plaintiff __________
Defendants __________
2. Court (if federal court, name the district; if state court, name the county) __________
___3. Docket or Index number __________
___4. Name of Judge assigned to your case __________
5. Approximate date of filing lawsuit __________
6. Is the case still pending? Yes ___ No ___
If NO, give the approximate date of disposition__________
7. What was the result of the case? (For example: Was the case dismissed? Was there judgment in your favor? Was the case appealed?) __________
Yes ___ No ___D. If your answer to C is YES, describe each lawsuit by answering questions 1 through 7 below. (If there is more than one lawsuit, describe the additional lawsuits on another piece of paper, using the same format.)
1. Parties to the previous lawsuit:
Plaintiff __________
Defendants __________
2. Court (if federal court, name the district; if state court, name the county) __________
___3. Docket or Index number __________
___4. Name of Judge assigned to your case__________
5. Approximate date of filing lawsuit __________
6. Is the case still pending? Yes ___ No ___
If NO, give the approximate date of disposition__________
7. What was the result of the case? (For example: Was the case dismissed? Was there judgment in your favor? Was the case appealed?) __________
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Signed this ___ day of __________, 20___.
Signature of Plaintiff __________
Inmate Number __________
Institution Address __________ Note: All plaintiffs named in the caption of the complaint must date and sign the complaint and provide their inmate numbers and addresses. I declare under penalty of perjury that on this ___ day of __________, 20___, I am delivering this complaint to prison authorities to be mailed to the Pro Se Office of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
Signature of Plaintiff: __________