Opinion
Civil No. JFM 00-558.
November 29, 2000.
MEMORANDUM
On Sunday, May 23, 1999, the Baltimore Sun Company ("the Sun") conducted a training exercise to determine if its supervisors and managers were prepared to operate the presses in the event of a strike by the Baltimore Newspaper Graphic Communications International Union ("the Union"), whose members usually operate the presses. The Sun worried that members of the Union might engage in a sympathy strike if another union, the Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild, went on strike when its contract expired on June 22, 1999. The Union filed a grievance, claiming that the supervisors and managers could not operate the presses without bargaining unit members being present (and compensated). It asked that the Sun make whole those Union members who should have been present. The Union invoked paragraph 4 of the collective bargaining agreement ("the Agreement"), which gives the Union exclusive jurisdiction of pressroom floor work. The Sun argued that under the "operating emergency" exception to this provision, it had the right to train supervisors and managers before the potential strike.
The relevant provision in the Agreement reads: "The jurisdiction of the Union is defined as all of that class of work in the pressrooms pertaining to pre-makeready and makeready and operation of printing presses for newspapers or newspaper supplements, handling and preparation of newsprint rolls inside the plant, handling of plates in the pressrooms and flying off and such other work in and around the pressrooms as may be assigned by the pressroom manager according to the terms of this Contract. This Contract extends over all printing presses employed in such pressrooms, including but not limited to offset printing presses. The Contract includes repair work performed by journeymen machinists in and around the pressrooms on presses and associated equipment within the jurisdiction of Local 31. In the event of an operating emergency, this restriction will be waived. In any other circumstance, work by journeymen machinists beyond this jurisdiction will be performed subject to the mutual consent of the Publisher and the Union." Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Cross Mot. Summ. J. Ex. C § 4(b).
Pursuant to the Agreement, the matter was arbitrated by Joseph M. Sharnoff ("the Arbitrator"), who ruled in the Union's favor. In the accompanying award and opinion ("the Opinion"), the Arbitrator read the "operating emergency" exception to provide the Sun a right to train supervisory personnel on the presses. But this right did not imply the ability to exclude bargaining unit workers from the pressroom during such training; the Sun's right existed with, but did not replace, the Union's jurisdiction. The Opinion also states: "The Arbitrator also is not persuaded that the record in this case demonstrates that the exercise held on May 23, 1999, referred to by the Company as `Emergency Preparedness Training,' in fact, was a training exercise." Op. at 18 (emphasis original). The exercise resembled an "experiment" more than a "training" session because there was no evidence that instruction occurred or that supervisors obtained skills that they did not already possess. Id. In the end, the Arbitrator required the Sun to make whole those bargaining unit members who should have been present on May 23, 1999.
The Sun filed this action to vacate the arbitration award. The case is pending before the court on the Union's motion for summary judgment and the Sun's cross motion for summary judgment; there are no material facts in dispute. The Sun raises two legal arguments. First, it argues that the Arbitrator's award depended on the resolution of an issue — whether or not training actually occurred on May 23, 1999 — that exceeded the scope of the issue submitted. Second, it argues that the Arbitrator's conclusion that the Sun cannot conduct training exercises without the Union members did not derive from the essence of the Agreement.
I.
Because an arbitrator's authority derives from contract, an arbitrator may resolve only those issues that the parties have agreed to submit to it. Bowater Carolina Co. v. Rock Hill Local Union No. 1924, 871 F.2d 23, 25 (4th Cir. 1989); International Chem. Workers Union, Local No. 566 v. Mobay Chem. Corp., 755 F.2d 1107, 1110 (4th Cir. 1985). "The submission is `the source and limit' of the arbitrator's power." Mobay, 755 F.2d at 1110 (citation omitted). The Arbitrator stated the issue: "Did the Employer, the Baltimore Sun Company, violate the Parties' 1995-2002 Agreement, when it used Pressroom equipment for the purpose of training Management personnel, and, if so, what is the appropriate remedy?" Op. at 2. This statement assumed that the May 23, 1999 exercise was training and the parties now agree that the character of the exercise was not at issue. The Union argues that, even if the Arbitrator improperly considered the issue, the award should not be vacated because the language was unnecessary to the holding. It was, in essence, an arbitrator's equivalent of dicta. The Sun argues that the award was based, in part, on the discussion.
The Union originally claimed that it had not agreed to this statement during the arbitration. Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 2. In its response, however, it admits that it did. Def.'s Mem. Opp'n Cross Mot. Summ. J. at 2 n. 1. The transcript of the arbitration is clear that the Union agreed to this statement of the issue. Tr. at 7.
I agree with the Union. "A mere ambiguity in the opinion accompanying an award, which permits the inference that the arbitrator may have exceeded his authority, is not a reason for refusing to enforce the award." United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960). Vacating awards on this ground would chill arbitrators from writing opinions, which engender confidence in the collective bargaining process. Id. In his Opinion, the Arbitrator found that training exercises must be "supplementary to" the normal operation of the presses. Op. at 18. Thus, even though the Sun had the implied right to train supervisors for an operating emergency, it could not exclude bargaining unit members when it did so. Op. at 18. This holding resolves the dispute. Even if the parties had presented evidence on whether the exercise constituted training, and the Arbitrator then had concluded that it was, the Union still would have prevailed since the Sun excluded bargaining unit members from the press equipment during the May 23rd training. I will not vacate the award because the Arbitrator exceeded his authority in this portion of the Opinion.
The Sun relies on Bowater, which is distinguishable. In Bowater, the submission asked the arbitrator to decide whether an employer had violated a certain provision of a collective bargaining agreement by not allowing an injured worker to return to work. 871 F.2d at 24. The arbitrator ruled that the employer had not violated the provision because it did not apply to the case's facts. Id. at 25. The arbitrator then decided, based on evidence presented on the submitted issue, that the employer should have allowed the worker to return to work since he was capable of performing the job. Id. The court vacated the award, holding that the arbitrator's resolution of the submitted issue "completely resolved" the case. Id. at 26. In Bowater, unlike in the present case, the arbitrator's unauthorized ruling provided the only ground for the award.
II.
The Sun also challenges the Arbitrator's holding that the Sun could not exclude union members from the pressroom floor during training. A court's deference to an arbitrator's decision is substantial. The court "must determine only whether the arbitrator did his job — not whether he did it well, correctly, or reasonably, but simply whether he did it." Mountaineer Gas Co. v. Oil, Chem. Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 76 F.3d 606, 608 (4th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted); see also Yuasa, Inc. v. International Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Mach. Furniture Workers, Local 175, 224 F.3d 316, 320-21 (2000). Accordingly, an arbitration award may be overturned only if the award violates well-settled public policy, fails to draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement or reflects the arbitrator's own notions of right and wrong. Mountaineer Gas, 76 F.3d at 608; Yuasa, 224 F.3d at 321. The Sun challenges the Arbitrator's decision on the second and third grounds.I conclude that the award should be upheld. "[A]s long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority," an arbitration award should be upheld. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987); see also Yuasa, 224 F.3d at 320. The Arbitrator's decision derives from the Agreement's jurisdiction provision. The Opinion states: "The Arbitrator . . . finds that, under the Union's Jurisdiction provision, such training is to be supplementary to the normal operation and is not to be used as a means of replacing or excluding bargaining unit employees in the Press Room operations when such training is provided." Op. at 18 (first emphasis added; other emphasis original). He also considered a previous arbitrator's construction of that provision. Op. at 19. Moreover, the Arbitrator referenced past practice to shed light on the parties' understanding of the Agreement. Op. at 18. Accordingly, I find that the Arbitrator's decision derives from the essence of the contract and does not merely reflect his own notions of right and wrong.
The Sun cites Mountaineer Gas and Island Creek Coal Co. v. District 28, United Mine Workers of Am., 29 F.3d 126 (4th Cir. 1994), both of which are distinguishable. In Mountaineer Gas, the arbitrator reinstated an employee after he was terminated by a public utility for failing a drug test; he converted the discharge into a "disciplinary suspension." 76 F.3d at 607. He did so even though the collective bargaining agreement reserved the company's right to institute drug policies, state and federal directives mandated them and the collective bargaining agreement did not provide for converting the employee's discharge into a disciplinary suspension. 76 F.3d at 610. In Island Creek Coal, the arbitrator improperly awarded punitive damages in a case in which the collective bargaining did not provide for them. 29 F.3d at 131. In the present case, the Arbitrator construed a provision in the collective bargaining provision, in light of a previous arbitrator's construction of that provision and past practice. There is no evidence that the decision reflected the Arbitrator's own sense of industrial justice.
For the foregoing reasons, I grant the Union's motion for summary judgment and deny the Sun's cross-motion for summary judgment. An order effecting this memorandum will be entered herewith.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the foregoing memorandum, it is, this 29th day of November, 2000, hereby ORDERED that:1. The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
2. The Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
3. Judgment is entered for the Defendant.