Opinion
Case No. 20020132-CA.
Filed July 17, 2003. (Not For Official Publication)
Appeal from the Seventh District, Moab Department, The Honorable Lyle R. Anderson.
David O. Black, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Craig C. Halls, Blanding, for Appellee.
Before Judges Jackson, Greenwood, and Thorne.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Jamie Ballard challenges the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law entered in a decree of divorce. We affirm.
I. Purchase Price of the Peach Farm
Jamie first challenges the trial court's factual finding regarding the purchase price of the peach farm. The trial court found that "[Brian] originally paid $240,000 from premarital assets for the farm." Jamie argues that this finding demonstrates that the trial court erroneously established the purchase price of the farm as $240,000, when in fact Brian purchased the farm for $300,000. Jamie misreads the trial court's finding. The court's finding that Brian paid $240,000 from premarital assets toward the purchase price of the farm was not inconsistent with the court's concomitant recognition that Brian had also borrowed $60,000 to complete the purchase. The trial court thus explicitly recognized that Brian owed approximately $63,000 on the trust deed obligation at the time of trial, which Brian was then ordered to pay. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in its finding. See Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah Ct.App. 1988) ("[T]he trial court has considerable latitude in adjusting financial and property interests," and we will not make changes unless "the evidence clearly preponderated against the findings.").
II. Equitable Division
Jamie next challenges the trial court's equitable determination that the peach farm was premarital property. In Naranjo, we summarized the law with respect to premarital property:
As a general rule, premarital property . . . may be viewed as the separate property of the parties. However, in appropriate circumstances, a party may be awarded property which the other spouse brought into the marriage. In fashioning an equitable property division, trial courts must consider all of the pertinent circumstances, including the amount and kind of property to be divided, the source of the property, the parties' health, the parties' standard of living and respective financial conditions, their needs and earning capacities, the duration of the marriage, what the parties gave up by the marriage, and the relationship the property division has with the amount of alimony awarded.
Id. at 1147-48 (emphasis added).
We find that the trial court's award of the peach farm to Brian was in compliance with the principles set forth in Naranjo. In its findings, the trial court expressly considered the "amount," "kind," and "source" of the property in its characterization of the property as a peach farm for which Brian originally had paid $240,000 from premarital assets. The trial court also considered the parties' "health," "standard of living," "financial conditions," and "needs and earning capacities" when it found Jamie to be "fit and proper" to have custody of the children, determined that her financial needs were $1250 per month, imputed income to Jamie, and awarded child support according to Brian's income. Moreover, at the divorce proceeding, the trial court heard testimony on the "duration of the marriage," as well as "what the parties gave up by the marriage."Id.
Finally, the trial court considered "the relationship" between "the property division" and "the amount of alimony awarded" when it awarded Jamie alimony after determining each party's post-divorce assets. Id. Thus, the trial court considered "all of the pertinent circumstances" anticipated by Naranjo, and we find no clear error in the trial court's award of the peach farm to Brian. Id.
Because the trial court did not err in awarding the peach farm to Brian as pre-marital property, we do not consider Jamie's remaining arguments regarding augmentation, commingling, and appreciation of the property.
III. Effect of Jamie's Contributions to the Peach Farm
Jamie next argues that the trial court erred in not awarding a share of the peach farm to her based upon her own physical contributions to its value. While Jamie did testify that she assisted in the orchard, pruned trees, took water turns, and went to seminars about the trees, Brian testified that Jamie had never watered, pruned, weeded, driven the tractor, or otherwise contributed to the peach farm. The trial court found Brian's testimony more credible, and we defer to this determination. See Johnson v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 696, 699 (Utah Ct.App. 1989) ("[W]e defer to the trial court's determination of the credibility of witnesses.").
IV. Income
Finally, Jamie challenges the trial court's factual finding that Brian's income was $4000 per month. We decline to consider this argument, however, because Jamie does not marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's finding, see West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah Ct.App. 1991) (noting that "[t]he challenging party must marshal all relevant evidence presented at trial which tends to support the findings and demonstrate why the findings are clearly erroneous"), nor does she cite any legal authority or analysis in support of her proposition. See State v. Garner, 2002 UT App 234, ¶ 12, 52 P.3d 467 ("`[R]ule 24(a)(9) [of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure] requires not just bald citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority.'" (quoting State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998))).
Accordingly, we affirm.
WE CONCUR: Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge, and William A. Thorne Jr., Judge.