Opinion
2:04-cv-0970-MCE-EFB.
March 8, 2007
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Through the present action, Plaintiff Kathleen Ball alleges Defendants Los Rios Community College District ("LRCCD"), Eunyoung Hwang, Marissa Sayago, Richard Booth, and Bruce Werner ("Defendants") violated her rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"), and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"), Cal. Gov't Code § 12900 et seq. A number of Plaintiff's original claims have been dismissed through earlier proceedings. Plaintiff's ADA claim against LRCCD, her Section 1983 claims against the individual defendants in their individual capacities, and her FEHA claim against all Defendants remain. Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on those remaining claims. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion is denied in part and granted in part.
Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Kathleen Ball, was diagnosed with Hepatitis-C in December 1997. Despite her condition, Plaintiff pursued and earned a Master of Fine Arts degree by December 1999. Immediately thereafter, she sought and received a position with Los Rios Community College District as an adjunct art professor. While Plaintiff was able to perform her duties and received favorable evaluations, both in the Spring and Fall semesters of 2001, one of the two classes she was assigned to teach was cancelled due to low enrollment. Similarly, in the Spring 2002 semester, both of her assigned classes were cancelled due to low enrollment. By Fall 2002, enrollment in art courses showed an increase prompting LRCCD to reassign Plaintiff to again teach several art courses. This arrangement continued until November 2003, when LRCCD terminated Plaintiff's employment.
During the years between her initial hire and ultimate termination, Plaintiff's medical condition worsened. This progression caused her to undergo increasing grades of drug therapy which, in turn, caused Plaintiff's energy and stamina to deteriorate. During the Fall semester of 2003, Plaintiff failed to attend over one-quarter of her assigned classes prompting complaints from students. Plaintiff alleges these absences were due to her illness and that she had notified the campus in advance that she would be absent for instruction, albeit not in accord with LRCCD's notice procedure.
In late October 2003, LRCCD concluded that it would not offer Plaintiff any further classes. LRCCD alleges its decision was based on Plaintiff's failure to give proper notice of her numerous absences; her decision to teach an Introduction to Drawing class without a textbook; an allegedly false claim that she had audited a class taught by Defendant Hwang; an alleged misrepresentation regarding her background and suitability to teach an Art History class; and her tendency to create hostility and tension in Art Department meetings.
Plaintiff denies the foregoing are the reasons for her termination and instead contends her termination was based on discrimination. Plaintiff further contends she requested accommodations which LRCCD denied including: 1) storage space for art supplies, 2) authorization to teach all classes at one campus, 3) to be informed of all required meetings by telephone, 4) no Saturday and evening teaching requirements, and 5) appropriate time off as required by her medical condition. LRCCD disputes Plaintiff requested the foregoing accommodations and, to the extent requests for accommodation were made, LRCCD states that all of the requests were met.
Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on January 26, 2004, alleging discrimination based on her medical condition. Plaintiff then received a Notice of Right to Sue from the United States Department of Justice dated February 20, 2004. That same EEOC complaint was then referred to the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH") which issued an additional Notice of Right to Sue letter based on California law.
STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary judgment when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
One of the principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary adjudication on part of a claim or defense. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) ("A party seeking to recover upon a claim . . . may . . . move . . . for a summary judgment in the party's favor upon all or any part thereof."); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madan, 889 F. Supp. 374, 378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1995); France Stone Co., Inc. v. Charter Twp. of Monroe, 790 F. Supp. 707, 710 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
The standard that applies to a motion for summary adjudication is the same as that which applies to a motion for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), 56(c); Mora v. ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d. 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323 (quoting Rule 56(c)).
If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-87 (1986); First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968).
In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party must tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52 (1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of W. Pulp and Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). Stated another way, "before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary question for the judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442, 448, 20 L.Ed. 867 (1872)). As the Supreme Court explained, "[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87.
In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
ANALYSIS
1. Americans with Disabilities Act
The ADA's general rule against disability discrimination is found in 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) wherein the statute provides:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
The term "Discriminate" is given definition in 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) wherein the statute provides:
not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity.See also Sanders v. Arneson Prods., 91 F.3d 1351, 1353 (9th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff alleges both that she was treated disparately and that LRCCD refused to make the reasonable accommodations she requested in violation of the ADA.
In a disparate treatment case under the ADA, the Court is to apply the burden shifting analysis set forth in the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green case. 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973); see also Snead v. Metro. Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801. Specifically, a plaintiff must show that she: (1) is disabled; (2) is qualified; and (3) suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability. Snead, 237 F.3d at 1087. The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the employer meets this burden, the presumption of intentional discrimination disappears, but the plaintiff can still prove disparate treatment by, for instance, offering evidence demonstrating that the employer's explanation is pretextual. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105, 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000).
In the present action, LRCCD first seeks summary judgment on the ground that all claims arising from conduct occurring more than one hundred and eighty (180) days in advance of Plaintiff's EEOC filing should be dismissed as time barred. LCRRD further moves on the ground that Plaintiff cannot make a prima facie showing of discrimination entitling them to summary judgment.
a. Time Bar
A plaintiff must file a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC as a prerequisite to maintaining an ADA action. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (incorporating the enforcement procedures set forth at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) requires that a complainant file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the last act of alleged discrimination, unless the complainant initially institutes proceedings with a state or local agency, in which case the EEOC charge must be filed within 300 days. Plaintiff originally brought her charges of discrimination with the EEOC, consequently, the 180-day time limit applies in this case.
Because the ADA adopts the procedural requirements of Title VII, including the EEOC filing requirement, the principles governing Title VII claims hold equally true for ADA suits when the EEOC charge is filed outside the prescribed period. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). See Santa Maria v. Pac. Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff alleges discrimination based on numerous acts occurring from March 2001, through her ultimate termination in December 2003. If a plaintiff, as is the case here, chooses to seek relief based on a series of discrete acts flowing from a systematic, discriminatory practice, the plaintiff cannot succeed in establishing an employer's liability for acts occurring outside the limitations period. Specifically, the Supreme Court has determined that each incident of discrimination, whether or not related, constitutes a separate actionable unlawful employment practice. See AMTRAK v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 112 (2002); Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1107 (9th Cir. 2002). The Court further held that "discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges." Morgan, 536 U.S. at 112.
It is undisputed that Plaintiff filed her claim with the EEOC on January 26, 2004. Given the 180 day filing time limit, all acts of alleged discrimination arising before July 30, 2003, are time barred. Accordingly, LRCCD's Motion for Summary Judgment as to all claims grounded in events occurring prior to July 30, 2003, is granted.
LRCCD does not challenge the veracity of Plaintiff's prima facie case. This election shall not be construed by the Court as an admission. Nonetheless, the Court will not address the issue of Plaintiff's prima facie case as that issue is not before us.
LRCCD alleges Plaintiff cannot show that its proffered reasons for terminating Plaintiff are pretext. In fact, Plaintiff bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that her disability "actually played a role in [LRCCD's decisionmaking] process and had a determinative influence on the outcome." Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141 (citations omitted); see also Snead, 237 F.3d at 1093 (holding that the traditional framework for analyzing Title VII cases applies in ADA cases). Plaintiff may meet her burden by "showing that [LRCCD's] proffered explanation," here that she was terminated based on absenteeism, failure to assign a textbook, false statements, misrepresentation and hostility, is "unworthy of credence." Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143.
Plaintiff can prove pretext indirectly, by showing a defendant's proffered explanation is internally inconsistent or otherwise not believable, or directly, by showing that unlawful discrimination more likely motivated the employer. Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court should consider all of this evidence, whether direct or indirect, cumulatively. Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1127. When the only evidence challenging the veracity of the employer's proffered motives is circumstantial, however, the plaintiff must produce "specific, substantial evidence of pretext" to create a triable issue of fact. Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 1998).
Plaintiff concedes that she missed a number of her scheduled classes in the Fall 2003 school semester. See Plf.s' Decl., ¶ 14. Plaintiff does not point to any evidence, either general or specific, that LRCCD's proffered explanation that her termination was, in fact, due to her medical condition as opposed to her absences. Rather, Plaintiff merely declares that "[n]othing said in the first paragraph of page 6 of the defendants' memorandum of points and authorities i[s] true. All of the facts stated in my second amended complaint [are] true and correct." Id. at ¶ 10-11. Such a general and conclusory statement does not raise an issue of material fact as to whether LRCCD's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. As noted above, Plaintiff carries the burden of production in showing either that LRCCD's statements regarding her termination are inconsistent or that her termination was more likely than not due to her disability.
The Court finds Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden. Plaintiff does not show any inconsistency in LRCCD's statements nor does she present any facts from which the Court could conclude that she was terminated because she was ill. Instead, LRCCD terminated Plaintiff less than a month after learning from a student that Plaintiff had repeatedly failed to appear to teach her assigned class. Given Plaintiff's failure to meet her burden, LRCCD's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's claim of disparate treatment in violation of the ADA is proper and hereby granted.
2. California Fair Employment and Housing Act
California's FEHA prohibits discrimination based on a person's physical disability. Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(a). Specifically, FEHA explains that it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer, because of physical or mental disability, to discriminate against a person in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. See id.
a. Time Bar
A prima facie case for discrimination under FEHA requires a showing that: (1) plaintiff suffers from a disability; (2) plaintiff is a qualified individual; and (3) plaintiff was subjected to an adverse employment action because of the disability. Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank, 85 Cal. App. 4th 245, 254, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 55 (2000) (citing Brundage v. Hahn, 57 Cal. App. 4th 228, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 830 (1997)).
Plaintiff has alleged LRCCD engaged in disparate treatment discrimination when they terminated her employment based on her medical condition. LRCCD again responds that any claims for injury occurring more than a year prior to the filing of her DFEH complaint are time barred. Indeed, employees who believe they have suffered discrimination under FEHA may file complaints with the DFEH within a one-year period. Cal. Gov't Code § 12960; see also Schifando v. City of L.A., 31 Cal. 4th 1074, 1081-1082 (Cal. 2003). For the reasons set forth in section 1.a. above, Plaintiff's claims arising as a result of events occurring outside this one year limitations period, are time barred. Accordingly, LRCCD's Motion for Summary Judgment for claims based on events occurring before January 26, 2003, is granted.
b. Failure to Accommodate
Under California's FEHA section 12940(m), it is an unlawful employment practice "[f]or an employer . . . to fail to engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process with the employee or applicant to determine effective reasonable accommodations, if any, in response to a request for reasonable accommodation by an employee or applicant with a known physical . . . disability." The statute provides a failure to accommodate as an independent basis for liability. Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 140 Cal. App. 4th 34, 61 (2006).
Indeed, an employer's duty to accommodate is inextricably linked to its obligation to engage in a timely, good faith discussion with an applicant or employee whom it knows is disabled, and who has requested an accommodation, to determine the extent of the individual's limitations. Id.
Plaintiff has alleged that she began requesting accommodations from LRCCD in July 2001, as confirmed in her DEFH application. See Plf.s' Decl. ¶ 12. Plaintiff further alleges LRCCD failed entirely in its' duty to accommodate her based on her medical disability. LRCCD rebuts that it was not informed of the existence of Plaintiff's medical condition nor were accommodations sought until after the date Plaintiff was notified of her termination.
Plaintiff has put forth sufficient evidence to create a material issue of fact regarding whether LRCCD was aware of her disability and whether LRCCD met its statutory duty to engage in a timely, good faith discussion with Plaintiff regarding accommodations. Consequently, LRCCD's Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim is denied to the extent it alleges acts occurring within the one year statutory period that evidence a failure to accommodate under California law.
3. Section 1983
Plaintiff claims that LRCCD's termination of her employment violated her property rights in her position as an adjunct art professor. She brings this claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
To have a property interest protected under § 1983, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. She must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. She must, instead, have "a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
Plaintiff alleges the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between LRCCD and the Los Rios College Federation of Teachers, Local 2279, creates her entitlement to continued employment. As support for this position, Plaintiff cites Article 27, 27.1.1 of the CBA wherein it states: "A faculty member shall not be dismissed, suspended or reprimanded without just cause." LRCCD clarifies, however, that Section 4.8.1 expressly provides otherwise. In fact, Section 4.8.1 provides: "Adjunct faculty are `temporary employees' in accordance with the California Education Code. Nothing contained in this section nor in any article of this Agreement places a legal obligation on the District to provide continuing employment for adjunct faculty. . . ." CBA, § 4.8.1 (emphasis added).
Given that this section clearly limits Plaintiff's entitlement to continued employment, she fails to meet her burden and summary judgment is appropriate. Accordingly, LRCCD's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's § 1983 claim is granted.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, LRCCD's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's ADA claim is granted in its entirety. LRCCD's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's FEHA claim for discrimination is granted in its entirety. LRCCD's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's FEHA claim for failure to accommodate is denied for acts occurring within the one year statutory period. LRCCD's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's section 1983 claim is granted in its entirety.IT IS SO ORDERED.