Opinion
No. 12292.
February 6, 1987.
Appeal from Judgment entered in the Common Pleas Court County of Summit, Ohio Case Nos. CV 83 11 3447, CV 83 11 3509.
Timothy A. Shimko, Attorney at Law, 1500 Nat'l. City Bank Bldg., Cleveland, OH 44114 for Plaintiffs.
Nickolas Andreeff and Richard Cunningham, Attorneys at Law, 1100 First Nat'l. Tower, Akron, OH 44308 for Defendants.
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
This cause was heard upon the record in the trial court. Each error assigned has been reviewed and the following disposition is made:
[BAD TEXT]
to leave the School Board and become personnel supervisor at the AMHA. The testimony revealed that Friedman was assured by Levey that the job was non-political. He was also given a copy of the 1977 AMHA Employment Policy Manual which contained a clause providing that an employee could only be discharged for "just cause." (This Manual was amended in 1981.) No fixed durational period of employment was specified at this time. Friedman accepted the job. In August of 1982, Levey resigned under allegations of corruption. Purnell was hired to replace him. Friedman was terminated in November of 1982. His letter of termination stated that his "philosphy was not compatible with that of the executive director." Plaintiff's Exh. # 5; T. 214.
Appellee Bramlett had been employed as a maintenance superintendent at the Cathedral of Tomorrow in Cuyahoga Falls. He was solicited for his job at AMHA by a friend of the then legal counsel for AMHA, Herbert Newman. At a job interview with Levey and Newman, he was assured of the non-political nature of the position of AMHA Operations Administrator. He was also assured of job security and given a copy of the 1977 Employee Policy Manual. T. 807. He was not hired for any fixed or definite period of time. He left his job at the Cathedral to work at AMHA. On April 11, 1983, Janet Purnell terminated him and replaced him with someone who later obtained an architectural license.
At the time he was solicited to work for AMHA, appellee [BAD TEXT] Euclid National Bank. Like Friedman and Bramlett, he was assured of the non-political nature of the position and given a copy of the 1977 Manual. Also as in the case of his co-plaintiffs, no fixed duration of employment was specified. He left his job at Euclid National to become finance administrator at AMHA. He was terminated by Purnell alone with Bramlett, "for the good of the agency." T. 2237-38.
On November 22, 1983, Balbach and Bramlett filed [BAD TEXT] complaint against appellants. On November 30th, Friedman filed a separate action. The complaints contained counts for breach of implied contract, wrongful discharge, and libel and slander. The actions were subsequently consolidated and an amended complaint was filed including an additional count alleging violations of appellees' constitutional rights in contravention of Section 1983, Title 42 U.S. Code.
Attached to the appellees' complaint was a document entitled "AMHA Personnel Policy Manual." This manual was adopted by the AMHA Board of Trustees in 1981. It was an amended version of the 1977 manual which was in effect when appellees were hired. Appellees maintained that this document was part of a contract of employment which existed between themselves and appellant, AMHA. Pages fifteen and sixteen of the 1981 manual provide for a graduated disciplinary procedure to be followed prior to an employee's termination. Purnell did not observe this disciplinary procedure before terminating appellees, and they claimed that this constituted a breach of the purported contract.
Shortly before the trial, the judge held a motion hearing. At the commencement of this motion hearing, he made the following pronouncement:
"* * *.
"Subsequent to pretrial procedures, including a review of the admissions contained in the pleadings and briefs of Counsel, all Counsel requested that the Court advise them prior to trial as to whether the AMHA, by its executive director, had the unlimited authority to terminate the Plaintiffs' employment at will and without any proof of fault by an employee.
"Based upon a review of the current law, the Court makes the following finding.
"The Personnel Policy Manual, which was duly adopted by the Board of Directors, clearly recognizes and supports the inclusion (sic) that the Plaintiffs possess property rights in continued employment with the AMHA irrespective of any finding based upon current public policy.
"The Court finds that the Plaintiffs do possess such constitutionally protected property rights and they may not be deprived of such rights except pursuant to constitutionally adequate due process procedures.
"These require due notice of alleged wrongful acts, an opportunity to respond, and before discharge, a hearing and determination that the charges are true and support the proposed discharge.
"This is my ruling. This is and will be my ruling with respect to the matters requested by all Counsel for all the parties in this case, and this ruling is now being placed upon the record herein."
"* * *." Transcript of Motion Hearing at 2-3.
The case proceeded to trial. Near the conclusion of appellees' case, the libel and slander count was settled with appellants' insurer and voluntarily dismissed. At the close of all the evidence, appellees voluntarily dismissed their wrongful discharge claims. The trial court the entertained cross motions for directed verdicts. It granted the motion of appellees stating:
"* * *.
"First the motion of the Defendant for a directed verdict with respect to the claims to the — with respect to the claim of the Plaintiff, based upon some contract premise, is overruled.
"The Court finds that the Personnel Policy Manual which was duly adopted by the Board of Trustees or its directors of the AMHA and, obviously, was intended by the parties that would be the parties effective — it was intended by the employer that the Akron Metropolitan Housing Authority and the employees, that would be all employees, that this should form the basis of the relationship between the Akron Metropolitan Housing Authority and all employees; and that this clearly recognizes and supports the conclusion that the Plaintiffs herein, as do all other employees of the Akron Metropolitan Housing Authority, possess constituted (sic) protected property rights in continued employment, and they may not be deprived of such rights, except pursuant to constitutional adequate due process procedures.
"Now, the — really, the contention of the Defendants in this case is that this actual manual applies, apparently, to everybody else except the three plaintiffs in this case. They haven't said as much, but what it amounts to is that. In other words, practically every other employee there has the rights as provided for in the manual to not be discharged except to be by following the procedure set forth in the manual, and, really, based upon some failure to comply with some of the duties that they were to perform in connection with this case.
"I perceive, really, what the contention of the Defendants are that this really is a contract, the manual is a contract as it applies to all the other employees; but I think classified and enclassified, so that each of them would have the right to the enforcement of the provisions of this manual in law, provided they are not given them by the Akron Metropolitan Housing Authority directly. The manual itself specifies it applies to all employees, so that I find the matter of law that this manual really constitutes a contract as far as the employee — as far as the Plaintiffs are concerned in this particular case; that I see no place at all in the document that really speaks for itself that excludes them, and I am satisfied that they are included under the manual. So that, therefore, the — we find that the manual does constitute a contract and that the three Plaintiffs in this case actually are covered by and, therefore, part of that particular contract.
"So that the motion for the — by the Plaintiffs are made here and now will be sustained, and the jury will be so advised."
"* * *." T. 2447-2450.
Only the issue of damages was submitted to the jury. The jury returned verdicts in favor of all the appellees. It awarded all the appellees together a total of $597,500 in compensatory damages against appellants collectively; $150,000 in punitive damages against Purnell individually; and $60,000 in punitive damages against Fela individually.
Augmented by the trial court's post-trial award of prejudgment interest and attorney fees, the total damages came to $1,000,126.49. We reverse.
Assignments of error one and two both pertain to the trial court's disposition of the cross motions for directed verdicts and will therefore be addressed together.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
"I. The trial court erred in failing to grant defendants' motions for a directed verdict."
"II. The trial court erred in directing a verdict for plaintiffs on all issues of liability."
Ohio law follows the general rule that an employee who is hired for an indefinite term may be discharged at any time, with or without cause.Phung v. Waste Management, Inc. (1986), 23 Ohio St. 3d 100; Henkel v.Educational Research Council (1976), 46 Ohio St. 2d 249; Fawcett v. G.C. Murphy Co. (1976), 46 Ohio St. 2d 245; Peterson v. Scott Constr. Co. (1982), 5 Ohio App. 3d 203, and federal cases applying Ohio law —Hoopes v. Equifax, Inc. (C.A. 6, 1979), 611 F. 2d 134; Starr v. Rupp (C.A. 6, 1970), 421 F. 2d 999. However, this general rule has been seriously eroded by a host of recent decisions. These decisions allow for recovery under the alternative theories of implied contract, the violation of public policy and the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co. (1985), 19 Ohio St. 3d 100; Hedrick v. Center for Comprehensive Alcoholism Treatment (1982), 7 Ohio App. 3d 211; Day v. Good Samaritan Hospital (Aug. 17, 1983), Montgomery App. No. 8062, unreported; Helle v. Landmark, Inc. (1984), 15 Ohio App. 3d 1; Jones v. East Center for Community Mental Health, Inc. (1984), 19 Ohio App. 3d 19. (This is a non-exhaustive list of cases.)
At least fifteen states have found that an employee handbook or a personnel policy manual, containing a promise to terminate only for just cause or in accordance with certain procedures, may constitute an enforceable promise of continued employment by the employer. 1985 Employment-At-Will Reporter, 2001. These courts emphasize that such manuals constitute written obligations voluntarily undertaken by the employer when it decided to promulgate formal policies limiting its right to terminate at will. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill Inc. (N.Y.App. 1982), 457 N.Y.S. 2d 193; Pine River State Bank v. Mettille (Minn.App. 1983), 333 N.W. 2d 622. The Ohio Supreme Court in Mers, supra, joined this emerging trend in the law when it stated:
"* * * Employee handbooks, company policy, and oral representations have been recognized in some situations as comprising components or evidence of the employment contract. (cites omitted)
"* * * A priori, the facts and circumstances surrounding an oral employment-at-will agreement, including the character of the employment, custom, the course of dealing between the parties, company policy, and any other fact which may illuminate the question, can be considered by the trier of fact in order to determine the agreement's explicit and implicit terms concerning discharge. * * *" Id. at 104; see also fn. 3. (Emphasis added.)
Clearly, Ohio has recognized the significance that an employee manual may hold in the evidentiary equation necessary to establish an implied contract. However, such manuals or handbooks standing alone, absent evidence of consideration or detrimental reliance or forbearance, would seldom be sufficient to overcome the employment-at-will doctrine. Even assuming that this were not the case, the determination of the existence of the implied contract evinced by the handbook is one that is within the exclusive province of the jury. The trier of fact must necessarily determine "the agreement's explicit and implicit terms concerning discharge." Mers, supra.
[MISSING TEXT]
granted a directed verdict to appellees solely on the basis of the 1981 manual alone. This was error.
We recognize that this case involved novel issues on the cutting-edge of the law and that they might have seemed highly complex to the average juror. However, the trial court must make every effort not to invade the province of the jury. The determination as to whether the parties had entered into an employment contract involved many facts, the judging of the credibility of the witnesses, and the weighing of evidence constituting the component parts making up the agreement. These are the traditional functions of the trier of fact. Accordingly, we find assignment of error two well taken.
The trial court also ruled that appellees had been deprived of procedural due process. This ruling was contingent on the court's prior ruling finding that appellees had contractual rights under the prevailing state law. Appellees, the court found, had a property interest in their jobs (contractual rights) which could not be deprived without the observation of due process protections. Board of Regents v. Roth (1972), 408 U.S. 564; Perry v. Sindermann (1972), 408 U.S. 593. Because we have found error in the trial court's ruling on the implied contract, the court's ruling with respect to due process violations must also fall.
Appellants' motion for directed verdict was primarily based on the employment-at-will doctrine. We have already discussed the substantial in-roads that have been made upon the doctrine. The existence of these newly carved exceptions provided the trial court with sufficient reason for denying this branch of appellants' motion for directed verdict. However, appellants moved in the alternative. They requested the court to dismiss the individual defendants, Purnell and Fela, on the basis of the good faith qualified immunity defense. T. 2471. We find that this portion of appellants' motion should have been granted.
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982), 457 U.S. 800, at 818-19, the Supreme Court held that:
"* * * government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. * * *.
"Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established law, should avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment. On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine, not only the currently applicable law, but whether that law was clearly established at the time an action occurred. If the law at that time was not clearly established, an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said to `know' that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful. Until this threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed. If the law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct. Nevertheless, if the official pleading the defense claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard, the defense should be sustained. But again, the defense would turn primarily on objective factors."
Though the qualified immunity defense is best raised by way of a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment, we see no reason why it cannot be raised by way of Civ. R. 50(A)(1). The only issue presented by the defense is whether the public official violated the "clearly established" legal rights of the plaintiff. We find that the rights of appellees asserted in the instant case were far from clearly established, but were in fact inchoative, and remain so even today. Appellants Purnell and Fela could not have been expected to know that their actions violated legal rights just emerging and not previously recognized by many of the state's courts.
The law of employment relationships is in a state of flux. The newly carved exceptions to the at-will doctrine are still a matter of heated debate among legal scholars and the courts of this state. The Supreme Court of Ohio only recently placed its imprimatur on the use of employment manuals in proving an implied employment contract. Mers, supra. In sum, appellants Purnell and Fela were not charged with making sense out of a legal imbroglio before performing any of their official functions. Accordingly, assignment of error one is well taken in part. Purnell and Fela are shielded by the doctrine of qualified immunity and are dismissed from this action. App. R. 12(B).
Since we must reverse the trial court's directed verdict on liability and order a new trial, the majority of the remaining assignments of error have been rendered moot. While mindful of the literal language of App. R. 12(A), we are wary of rendering advisory opinions on possible controversies which may never ripen. However, we will address those assignments of error dealing with issues which must necessarily be confronted in the re-trial of this case, or which do not involve the discretion of the trial court.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V
"The trial court erred in refusing to submit defendants' interrogatories to the jury when the interrogatories were duly submitted pursuant to Rule 49(B), Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure."
Civ. R. 49(B) places a mandatory duty on the trial court to submit the interrogatories given to the court in accordance with the rule to the jury. The court does have the discretion to review the content of the interrogatories and to revise them, but they must be submitted. Ragone v. Vitali Beltrami, Jr., Inc. (1975), 42 Ohio St. 2d 161. Appellants' interrogatories were designed to test the jury's thinking on the issue of damages and determine the amount awarded under each theory of recovery — contract and constitutional violations. They had the right to have such interrogatories submitted and the trial court erred in refusing to do so. Accordingly, assignment of error five is well taken.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IX
"The trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest to plaintiffs under R.C. 1343.03(C)."
The only remaining defendant in this case is the AMHA. The AMHA is a creature of the State of Ohio created pursuant to R.C. 3735.27 et seq. Therefore, it cannot be held liable for prejudgment interest. See Lewis v. Benson (1979), 60 Ohio St. 2d 66. Accordingly, the assignment of error is sustained.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR X
"The trial court erred in consolidating the trials and not permitting separate trials for each of the plaintiffs."
The claims of Balbach, Bramlett and Friedman were identical. They all presented common questions of law and fact that arose out of the identical series of occurrences. The consolidation of the separate causes of action in a single trial promoted the economy of both the parties' and the court's resources. This was done without any conceivable prejudice to the defendants and in complete accord with common practice. See Staff Note To Civ. R. 42(A). Accordingly, assignment of error ten is not well taken.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR XII
"The trial court erred in holding the AMHA liable under a theory of implied contract."
Appellants maintain, and rightly so, that a municipality may not be held liable under a theory of restitution or quantum meruit. Village of Eastlake v. Davis (1952), 94 Ohio App. 71. However, the line of cases relied upon by appellants do not apply to cases where there exists evidence upon which a court or jury could find a contract. See En. 2,Cosmicoat, Inc. v. Galizio and the City of Akron (Mar. 19, 1986), Wayne App. No. 2109, unreported, at 3. Moreover, the instant case concerns the violation of appellees' constitutional rights. Thus, appellants cited case law is inapposite. Accordingly, assignment of error twelve is overruled.
The judgment of the trial court awarding damages, attorneys fees and prejudgment interest, is vacated and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and law.
The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this court, directing the County of Summit Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App. R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App. R. 22(E).
Costs taxed to appellees.
Exceptions.
Dahling, J. concurs.
(Dahling, J., Judge of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals and Cox, J., Judge of the Seventh District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment pursuant to Article IV, Section 5(A)(3), Constitution. Castle, J., retired Judge of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment pursuant to Article IV, Section 6(C), Constitution).
DISSENTING OPINION
A motion for a directed verdict does not present a question of fact or raise factual issues, but instead presents a question of law, eventhough in deciding such a motion it is necessary to review and consider the evidence. Ruta v. Breckenridge-Remy Co. (1982), 69 Ohio St. 2d 66, paragraph one of the syllabus. In the instant case the question presented to the trial court on the appellees' motion for directed verdict was a legal one — did the evidence show the existence of a contract between the AMHA and appellees sufficient to overcome the employment at-will doctrine? I would hold that it did and affirm the judgment.
In order for an employee to overcome the employment-at-will doctrine through the use of an employee manual or handbook he must be able to prove:
"(1) A promise to employ for a particular period of time or to terminate only for certain reasons or certain procedures;
"(2) The enforceability of the promise because consideration was givenor through a doctrine that avoids the requirement of consideration;
"(3) The breach of a promise, and
"(4) The enforceability of the contract not with-standing the statute of frauds. Perritt, Employee Dismissal Law and Practice (1984) 121 (Citing Corbin, Corbin on Contracts (1952), 937, Section 958)" (emphasis added).
Reasonable minds could not differ as to whether appellees satisfied the four elements above. First, a handbook or employee manual containing a promise of an employer to limit his power to fire at-will is sufficient to satisfy element one. There were two documents involved in the instant case. The 1977 Manual stated in pertinent part that:
"No employee shall be discharged without just cause." Plaintiffs' Exh. #1, Art. IX.
The 1977 Manual was in effect at the time appellees were hired. Each testified that he received a copy of the manual with oral assurances of continued employment in return for expected performance. Each testified that he left a previous job in reliance on these assurances. The 1981 Manual was drafted in part by appellees, with substantial input from them. Friedman testified that he used other organizations' policy manuals, such as the University of Akron, in putting together the manual. The appellees testified that the goal in drafting the 1981 Manual was to come up with a better definition of "just cause". The pertinent subsection of the manual recites:
"Termination may occur for a very serious misconduct, or repeated instances of misconduct. Termination notice must be issued by a Personnel Officer. Such notice shall state the cause for termination." Plaintiffs' Exh. #2, p. 16.
The 1981 Manual was in effect at the time the appellees were terminated. Its provisions for progressive disciplinary procedures were not followed. Appellees testified that they interpreted these provisions as a continuation of the promise of AMHA to terminate only for just cause. The 1981 Manual recited in pertinent part:
"When the performance or behavior is deemed severe, or when there are numerous instances of a less severe nature, one or more of the following steps may be taken.
"Probationary Status — A regular employee may be placed upon probationary status of not less than thirty (30) days, nor more than ninety (90) days. Such action must be taken by a Personnel Officer. The action is to be thoroughly documented, as to cause, duration, and expected behavior. Interim evaluation is to occur during the time of probationary status. At the expiration of the time of the probationary status, contingent upon employee performance, the employee may be removed from probationary status: NOTE: Probationary Status is not to be confused with the Probationary Period of a new employee.
"Suspension — Suspension may result from serious misconduct, or repeated instances of non-conformance to the AMHA rules and regulations. Suspension may be issued by a Personnel Officer; it would usually follow a conference between the Division Administrator and a Personnel Officer.
"An employee is to be given written notification of the cause for and duration of the suspension.
"Termination — Termination may occur for a very serious misconduct, or repeated instance of misconduct. Termination notice must be issued by a Personnel Officer. Such notice shall state the cause for termination. Id. (Emphasis added.)
This provision could reasonably be found to constitute a limitation on the employer's right to terminate at will. The trial court found this to be true "irrespective of any finding based on public policy." In other words, the trial court found this manual to be a promise enforceable at law. Combined with the oral representations made to plaintiffs with respect to job security, the trial court could reasonably have found that this promise was meant to induce detrimental reliance on behalf of plaintiffs. This is consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co. (1985), 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, and with the majority of other jurisdictions. The trial court did not usurp the function of the jury in finding that there was a contract.
Arizona, Arkansis, Colorado, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Virginia and Washington. (Citations omitted). See 1985 Employment-At-Will Reporter, 2001.
Second, the plaintiffs proved that they were induced into leaving their original jobs by the promise in the 1977 Manual that they would be discharged only for just cause This constitutes consideration from the appellees in return for the promise of AMHA, above and beyond the performance [BAD TEXT] ordinary job duties. After the 1981 Manual was adopted, the AMHA received the benefits of continued loyalty, performance, good morale, and the refusal of offers for other employment.Jones v. East Center for Community Mental Health, Inc. (1984), 19 Ohio App. 3d 19. The benefits of the 1981 Manual were intended to induce the employees to forego organizing, to promote labor peace and to insure the stability of the entire work force.
Third, the AMHA breached its promise. The important point here is that the trial court did not even have to reach the issue of whether plaintiffs were fired without just cause. Here, the AMHA through the 1981 Manual promised that Plaintiffs would not be dismissed until certain procedures were followed. The first question in regard to the breach is not, therefore, whether plaintiffs were justifiably terminated, but whether the procedures were followed. The record is indisputable; Janet Purnell [BAD TEXT] each plaintiff without observing the disciplinary procedures. Reasonable minds could come to no other conclusion.
Finally, plaintiffs easily overcame the statute of frauds. Generally, an oral contract for a specific term longer than one year violates the statute. However, an oral contract for an indefinite term is held not to violate the statute because it might be performed fully within a one-year period. 51 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d (1980) 245, Frauds Statute of, Section 95. Any of plaintiffs' contracts could have been performed in one year. Specifically, the events permitting their termination — the existence of cause for dismissal or exhaustion of pre-discharge procedures — could have occurred in one year.
A review of the personnel policy manuals, the pleadings, the testimony, and all other relevant evidence support the trial court's conclusion in denying the defendant's motions for a directed verdict. The court reaffirmed that conclusion by granting the plaintiffs' motion for a directed verdict on the liability question. This is because the plaintiffs satisfied their burden of proof with respect to the four elements previously mentioned: (1) A promise to terminate only in accordance with certain procedures; (2) the enforceability of that promise through the giving of adequate consideration; (3) the breach of that promise; and (4) overcoming the statute of frauds.
In Vinyard v. King, (C.A. 10, 1984), 728 F. 2d 428, the director of volunteer services of a public hospital was fired for alleged violation of a policy concerning confidentiality of personnel communications. She was given no hearing prior to discharge. At the time she was hired, there was no formal employees' policy manual. However, four years after commencement of her employment, she was given a copy of the hospital's employee handbook. The handbook included a non-exclusive list of twenty-three specific causes for discharge. The court construed this list as a promise that employees would be discharged only for cause.
The court then turned to the law of Oklahoma to determine whether the handbook constituted a contract that created a sufficient expectancy of continued employment to constitute a property interest, which must be afforded constitutionally guaranteed due process. Under Oklahoma law, the employee's consideration for the employer's promise could consist merely in continuing to work and foregoing the option of quitting. This was sufficient to create a property interest in the job subject to constitutional protection.
The facts in Vinyard are substantially similar to those of the instant case. Not only did the AMHA adopt the 1981 Manual limiting its power to fire at will while appellees were employees, the AMHA had given the 1977 Manual to each appellee when soliciting his employment. In addition, the 1981 Manual provided for disciplinary procedures, the hand-book inVinyard did not. Once the trial court determined that the 1981 Manual overcame the employment-at-will doctrine and constituted an implied promise of continued employment, it determined that the appellees had property rights in their jobs. See also, Whitfield v. Finn (C.A. 11, 1984), 731 F. 2d 1506.
The trial court in this case was justified in disposing of a highly complex legal issue by way of directed verdict. There was no error in this action requiring reversal.
The majority opinion states that:
"The trial court did not consider the evidence bearing on the issues of contract formation — promise, consideration (detriment or forebearance), etc." Id. at 9.
Further that:
"[T]he trial court must make every effort not to invade the province of the jury. The determination as to whether the parties had entered into an employment contract involved many facts, the judging of the credibility of the witnesses, and the weighing of evidence constituting the component parts making up the agreement. These are the traditional functions of the trier of fact. Accordingly, we find assignment of error two well taken."Id. at 10.
My reading of assignment of error two states that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for plaintiff on all issues of liability. This was done after a full trial and presentation of all the evidence from both parties.
I agree with the majority in their finding that Purnell and Fela are shielded by the doctrine of qualified immunity, in that the law at the time was in a state of flux, and they should not be charged with knowingly violating the employees' legal rights which were not then clearly established.
I dissent with the majority's opinion in assignment of error five. The trial court did submit to the jury interrogatories which were requested by the defendant. Others were excluded because they were not in the proper form, directed to issues that had been ruled on by the court, or had been withdrawn by the plaintiff.
I dissent with the finding of the majority in assignment of error nine. The majority is of the opinion that under Lewis v. Benson (1980), 60 Ohio St. 2d 66, AMHA is creature of the State of Ohio and therefore cannot be held liable for prejudgment interest. The Lewis case was decided in 1980. R.C. 1343.03 was revised and became effective in July of 1982. Under this law, the state may be immune in judgment is rendered against the state in the court of claims, or in an action under Chapter 4123 of the Revised Code, the Worker's Compensation Act.