Summary
finding that because the Fair Labor Standards Act claim was separate and independent from the worker's compensation claim, the court had discretion under § 1441(c) to remand the worker's compensation claim as one wherein Alabama law predominates
Summary of this case from WHITNEY NATIONAL BANK v. COXOpinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:11-cv-75-MEF.
April 14, 2011
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
After being injured in a workplace accident, Plaintiff Ronald D. Baker ("Baker") brought suit against his former employer in the Circuit Court for Lee County, Alabama. In his suit, Baker complained not only of his injuries from the accident, but also of alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") arising out of the calculation of his overtime compensation during the time he was employed. The issue presently before this Court is whether the case was properly removed from that court to this one. By his Motion to Remand (Doc. # 13), Baker contends that because 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) specifies that a civil action arising under the workmen's compensation laws of a state may not be removed to federal court, this case must be remanded because it raises such claims. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the motion is due to be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Baker alleges that Defendant Quantegy Unlimited Investment Terminus, LLC, a business also known as Decorus Homes ("Quantegy") employed him as a foreman/laborer in Lee County. He further alleges that Defendant Jim Fulp ("Fulp") owns Quantegy. Baker alleges that during the entire time he worked for Quantegy he was require to perform his duties without being paid overtime compensation as the FLSA requires. Baker also alleges that on May 19, 2010, while working for Quantegy, he received injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment when he fell from a ladder. Baker alleges that as a result of the fall he suffers from a permanent total disability, but that Quantegy has failed to pay disability benefits to Baker. Baker also alleges that Quantegy has failed to pay his reasonable and necessary medical expenses.On December 23, 2010, Baker filed suit against Quantegy and Fulp in the Circuit Court for Lee County, Alabama. The Complaint sets forth two claims: one is a claim for overtime compensation under the FLSA and the other is a claim for benefits under the Alabama Worker's Compensation Act.
On January 28, 2011, Quantegy and Fulp filed a Joint Notice of Removal (Doc. # 1). In so doing, they invoked this Court's subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and asserted that the removal was proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(b) and (c). On February 25, 2011, Baker filed the instant motion asking the Court to remand the entire case to the Circuit Court for Lee County, Alabama because one of his claims cannot be removed to federal court as it arises under the Alabama Worker's Compensation Act. Defendants oppose remand arguing this Court may retain jurisdiction over both claims. In the alternative, they ask that the Court sever the claims and remand only the claim arising under the Alabama Worker's Compensation Act.
DISCUSSION
After a defendant removes a case to federal court invoking its subject matter jurisdiction over the action, the non-moving party may move for remand, which will be granted if "it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction." See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994); Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994); Wymbs v. Republican State Executive Comm., 719 F.2d 1072, 1076 (11th Cir. 1983). As such, federal courts only have the power to hear cases that they have been authorized to hear by the Constitution or the Congress of the United States. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377. Because removal jurisdiction raises significant federalism concerns, "removal statutes are construed narrowly; where plaintiff and defendant clash about jurisdiction, uncertainties are resolved in favor of remand." Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." To determine whether a claim arises under federal law, a court must examine the "well-pleaded" allegations of the complaint to determine whether those allegations present a federal question. Id. Thus, a suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States only when the plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon federal law or the Constitution. Id. Because Baker's Complaint asserts claims pursuant to the FLSA, this Court has original subject matter jurisdiction over it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Breuer v. Jim's Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691, 694 (2003) (explaining that district courts have original jurisdiction over FLSA claims pursuant to §§ 1331 and 1337(a)).
A civil action filed in state court may be removed to federal court under § 1441(b) if the claim is one "arising under" federal law. Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6 (2003). The United States Supreme Court has specifically recognized that FLSA claims may be removed to federal court. See Breuer, 538 U.S. at 695-700 (finding no federal prohibition on the removal of such claims despite the fact that the FLSA claims can also be litigated in state court and holding that FLSA case was properly removed under § 1441). Thus, the removal of this case because it plainly states a claim for relief pursuant to the FLSA was proper.
Specifically § 1441(b) provides in pertinent part as follows:
Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties.
Were the FLSA claim the sole claim for relief, the Court's inquiry would be at an end. Baker has, however, also stated a claim for benefits under the Alabama Worker's Compensation Act. Such a claim is not properly removable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c). Plainly then, this case presents a situation in which a removable claim has been joined with a non-removable claim.
§ 1445(c) provides that "[a] civil action in any State court arising under the workmen's compensation laws of such State may not be removed to any district court of the United States."
Congress addressed the joinder of removable and non-removable claims.
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action within the jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 of this title is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters in which State law predominates.28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). In order to determine whether this provision applies to the instant case, the Court must consider whether Baker's FLSA claim is "a separate and independent claim or cause of action." Baker's FLSA claim is one for allegedly improper payment of wages for overtime work. Baker's worker's compensation claim is one for medical expenses and disability benefits arising from a fall from a ladder during the course of Baker's employment. The Court finds that these claims are separate and independent within the meaning of § 1445(c). They arise from separate actionable wrongs and implicate different operative facts. Thus, the Court finds that the case was properly removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). Such a holding is buoyed by similar holdings in analogous unpublished decisions from district courts within this Circuit. See, e.g., Jackson v. Burke, 8:10-cv-766-T-27EAJ, 2010 WL 2179115 (M.D. Fla. June 1, 2010); Wilson v. Dominion Management, LLC, No. 10-00078-CG-N, 2010 WL 1542501 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 29, 2010).
Because the FLSA claim is separate and independent from the worker's compensation claim, this Court has discretion under § 1441(c) to remand the worker's compensation claim. While the FLSA claim has nothing to do at all with Alabama law, the worker's compensation claim is one in which Alabama law predominates. The worker's compensation claim is one intended to be determined by an Alabama state court. Accordingly, the Court will sever the two claims and remand the worker's compensation claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
1. Baker's Motion to Remand (Doc. # 13) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
2. Baker's claims against Quantegy and Fulp pursuant to the FLSA are SEVERED from his claims pursuant to the Alabama Worker's Compensation Act.
3. Plaintiff's claims pursuant to the Alabama Worker's Compensation Act, as set forth in Count Two of the Complaint, are REMANDED to the Circuit Court of Lee County, Alabama.
4. The Clerk is DIRECTED to take appropriate steps to effect the remand of the claims in Count Two, but the leave the case in this Court open with respect to the claims in Count One pursuant to the FLSA.
A copy of this checklist is available at the website for the USCA, 11th Circuit at www.ca11.uscourts.gov Effective on April 9, 2006, the new fee to file an appeal will increase from $255.00 to $455.00. CIVIL APPEALS JURISDICTION CHECKLIST1. Appealable Orders : Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291: 28 U.S.C. § 158Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre 701 F.2d 1365 1368 28 U.S.C. § 636 In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, 54Williams v. Bishop 732 F.2d 885 885-86 Budinich v. Becton Dickinson Co. 108 S.Ct. 1717 1721-22 100 L.Ed.2d 178LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc. 146 F.3d 832 837 Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a): Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5 28 U.S.C. § 1292 Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. 337 U.S. 541 546 69 S.Ct. 1221 1225-26 93 L.Ed. 1528Atlantic Fed. Sav. Loan Ass'n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp. 379 U.S. 148 157 85 S.Ct. 308 312 13 L.Ed.2d 199 2. Time for Filing Rinaldo v. Corbett 256 F.3d 1276 1278 4 Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1): 3 THE NOTICE MUST BE RECEIVED AND FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT NO LATER THAN THE LAST DAY OF THE APPEAL PERIOD — no additional days are provided for mailing. Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(3): Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4): Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6): Fed.R.App.P. 4(c): 28 U.S.C. § 1746 3. Format of the notice of appeal : See also 3pro se 4. Effect of a notice of appeal : 4
Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction conferred and strictly limited by statute: (a) Only final orders and judgments of district courts, or final orders of bankruptcy courts which have been appealed to and fully resolved by a district court under , generally are appealable. A final decision is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." , , (11th Cir. 1983). A magistrate judge's report and recommendation is not final and appealable until judgment thereon is entered by a district court judge. (c). (b) a judgment as to fewer than all parties or all claims is not a final, appealable decision unless the district court has certified the judgment for immediate review under Fed.R.Civ.P. (b). , , (11th Cir. 1984). A judgment which resolves all issues except matters, such as attorneys' fees and costs, that are collateral to the merits, is immediately appealable. , 486 U.S. 196, 201, , , (1988); , , (11th Cir. 1998). (c) Appeals are permitted from orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions . . ." and from "[i]nterlocutory decrees . . . determining the rights and liabilities of parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed." Interlocutory appeals from orders denying temporary restraining orders are not permitted. (d) : The certification specified in (b) must be obtained before a petition for permission to appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. The district court's denial of a motion for certification is not itself appealable. (e) Limited exceptions are discussed in cases including, but not limited to: , , , , , (1949); , 890 F.2d 371, 376 (11th Cir. 1989); , , , , , (1964). Rev.: 4/04 : The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. , , (11th Cir. 2001). In civil cases, Fed.R.App.P. (a) and (c) set the following time limits: (a) A notice of appeal in compliance with the requirements set forth in Fed.R.App.P. must be filed in the district court within 30 days after the entry of the order or judgment appealed from. However, if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 60 days after such entry. Special filing provisions for inmates are discussed below. (b) "If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later." (c) If any party makes a timely motion in the district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a type specified in this rule, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the date of entry of the order disposing of the last such timely filed motion. (d) Under certain limited circumstances, the district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(5), the time may be extended if a motion for an extension is filed within 30 days after expiration of the time otherwise provided to file a notice of appeal, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Under Rule 4(a)(6), the time may be extended if the district court finds upon motion that a party did not timely receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order, and that no party would be prejudiced by an extension. (e) If an inmate confined to an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with or a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid. Form 1, Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is a suitable format. Fed.R.App.P. (c). A notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant. A district court loses jurisdiction (authority) to act after the filing of a timely notice of appeal, except for actions in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to rule on a timely motion of the type specified in Fed.R.App.P. (a)(4).