Opinion
No. 1-15-2197
02-24-2016
In re Estate of CATHERINE J. O'BRIEN, Deceased. Citation re: Dorothy A. Baker Margaret Ann Baker, for Dorothy A. Baker to return $389,516.00 to the Estate DENNIS O'BRIEN and MARY KAY O'BRIEN, Petitioners-Appellants, v. DOROTHY A. BAKER, and MARGARET ANN BAKER, Respondents-Appellees.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, County Department, Probate Division. No. 2007 P 3059 The Honorable Susan Coleman, Judge Presiding. JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Mason and Justice Lavin concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The circuit court's order denying the petitioners' citation to recover certain assets from a retirement savings plan distributed to one of the respondents was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The record reveals that under that retirement savings plan's default beneficiary rules, the respondent was the proper default beneficiary. The petitioners failed in their burden to establish that the decedent was not on notice of those rules prior to her death. ¶ 2 The petitioners, Dennis O'Brien and Mary Kay O'Brien, appeal from an order of the probate court of Cook County, following a bench trial, finding that that $389,516 in assets from an employee benefits savings plan that the decedent earned during her lifetime were properly distributed to her only living sibling, the respondent Dorothy Baker (hereinafter Dorothy), with the help of the executrix, the respondent Margaret Ann Baker (hereinafter Margaret), and were not improperly withheld from the estate. The petitioners contend that the probate court's finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 Neither party acknowledges the complex procedural history of this case. For purposes of clarity, however, we set forth all the pertinent facts and procedural history. The cause arises from the circuit court's admission into probate the will of the deceased, Catherine J. O'Brien (hereinafter Catherine) on May 11, 2007. Catherine died on April 14, 2007. Her will was executed on February 12, 2007, and named 36 legatees, including the respondents and the petitioners. The will bequeathed Catherine's estate including, inter alia, "her home, her personal effects, her household goods, automobiles, furnishings, stocks, bonds and bank accounts" in varied shares to all of them. Catherine's niece, the respondent, Margaret was appointed as independent executrix of the estate. ¶ 5 After the will was admitted to probate, certain assets ($389,516) from an employee benefit savings plan that Catherine earned during her lifetime employment with AT&T (hereinafter the AT&T savings plan) were distributed to her only living sibling, the respondent, Dorothy. On September 29, 2010, the petitioners, Catherine's nephew and niece, Dennis O'Brien and Mary Kay O'Brien, filed two petitions for a citation to issue for the appearance before the court of Margaret and Dorothy, so as to recover the assets. The first petition, against Margaret, alleged that in her capacity as executrix, she improperly withheld those assets from the estate and instead helped her mother, Dorothy, acquire them. ¶ 6 The second petition, against Dorothy, alleged that the distribution of these assets to her was "contrary to the decedent's beneficiary designation," which specifically named Catherine's mother, Catherine T. O'Brien (hereinafter Catherine T.) and her sister, Mary O'Brien (hereinafter Mary), as the primary and contingent beneficiaries. In addition, the petitioners argued that according to the AT&T beneficiary designation forms, in the event that both named beneficiaries predeceased Catherine, the assets in the account were to be paid out to Catherine's estate. ¶ 7 In support of these allegations, the petitioners attached numerous documents including, inter alia: (1) copies of different AT&T employee benefit plans' beneficiary designation forms signed by Catherine during her lifetime; (2) a copy of the federal estate tax return filed upon Catherine's death, reporting $389,516 from the AT&T savings plan as income, and attaching as proof one of Catherine's AT&T savings plan statements, dated April 17, 2007-April 18, 2007, and addressed to her home address; and (3) a deposition of Edward B. Pierucci, the certified public accountant (CPA) who prepared the estate tax return. ¶ 8 On October 18, 2011, Dorothy responded to the petition against her by filing a motion for summary judgment. Therein she asserted that the petitioners incorrectly relied upon irrelevant beneficiary designation forms from other benefit savings programs that Catherine had enrolled in while working at AT&T and which differed from the AT&T savings plan. Dorothy argued that the $398,516 in assets were properly distributed to her because under the AT&T savings plan's default beneficiaries rules, which are governed by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) (29 U.S.C. §1001 et seq. (2006)), as Catherine's only living sibling, she was the designated default beneficiary, entitled to the assets in the event that the two named beneficiaries predeceased Catherine. ¶ 9 In support, Dorothy attached, inter alia: (1) all relevant beneficiary designation forms signed by Catherine during her employ at AT&T, including the AT&T savings plan beneficiary designation form executed by Catherine in June 10, 1969; and (2) a copy of the "AT&T Rules for Employee Beneficiary Designations" (hereinafter the AT&T rules), dated January 1, 2008, which among other things, set forth the proper default beneficiaries in the event that the named beneficiaries predeceased the employee. ¶ 10 On March 30, 2012, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Dorothy, denying the petitioners' request that she return the assets in the AT&T savings plan to the estate. The court first found that there was a difference between the other benefit savings programs and the AT&T savings plan and that each plan had its own beneficiary designation forms. Accordingly, the court only looked to the AT&T savings plan and forms to determine the rightful beneficiary. The court next found that the AT&T savings plan was governed by the AT&T rules, which in turn were governed by ERISA (29 U.S.C. §1001 et seq. (2006)). Looking to those rules, the court concluded that since both named beneficiaries had predeceased Catherine, as Catherine's sole living sibling, Dorothy was the rightful default beneficiary. The petitioners appealed. ¶ 11 While the appeal was pending in this court, on August 28, 2010, the petitioners proceeded with a bench trial on their petition against Margaret. The trial court, however, refused to consider the petition against Margaret finding that it was without jurisdiction to do so while the appeal as to the petition against Dorothy was pending before the appellate court. In that respect, the court explained that even though the parties were different, the court was being asked to address the same exact issue, namely whether the assets from the AT&T savings plan rightfully belonged to Dorothy or the estate. The petitioners appealed this ruling as well. ¶ 12 On January 31, 2013, we issued a decision on the petition against Dorothy. In re Estate of Catherine O'Brien, 2012 IL App (1st) 121280-U. On review, we reversed the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Dorothy, finding that there remained genuine issues of material fact as to whether the AT&T savings plan was a probate or nonprobate asset. In re Estate of Catherine O'Brien, 2012 IL App (1st) 121280-U, ¶ 21. Specifically, we held that while it was clear that under the current rules of the AT&T savings plan, Dorothy would have been the default beneficiary, because the record only contained a copy of the AT&T rules that became effective on January 1, 2008, after the decedent's death, there remained genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether those rules governed Catherine's AT&T savings plan; and (2) whether she had ever been placed on notice of those rules so as to have knowingly designated her default beneficiary. In re Estate of Catherine O'Brien, 2012 IL App (1st) 121280, ¶¶ 21-22. ¶ 13 On June 28, 2013, we issued a decision on the petition against Margaret. In re Estate of Catherine O'Brien, 2012 IL App (1st) 122873-U. In doing so, we affirmed the trial court's judgment that it was without jurisdiction to consider the petition against Margaret on the issue of the AT&T savings plan assets while the appeal on the petition against Dorothy was pending before this court. In re Estate of Catherine O'Brien, 2012 IL App (1st) 122873-U, ¶ 28. In addition, we further found that we, ourselves, were without jurisdiction to readdress the issue, since we had reversed and remanded that issue to the circuit court with respect to Dorothy's petition. See In re Estate of Catherine O'Brien, 2012 IL App (1st) 122873-U, ¶ 29 ("Until proper discovery is made on this issue and a new order, disposing of it in its finality is entered by the trial court, and then appealed to us, we are without jurisdiction to readdress it."). ¶ 14 Subsequently, the parties proceeded with further discovery on the issue and on July 1, 2015, the cause proceeded to a bench trial on both petitions and against both Margaret and Dorothy. ¶ 15 At trial, the petitioners only called the two respondents, Margaret and Dorothy, as hostile witnesses pursuant to section 2-1102 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1102 (West 2012)). Margaret admitted that Catherine was hospitalized at St. Francis Hospital between January 16, 2007, and March 12, 2007, after which she was in a rehabilitation program before her death on April 14, 2007. Margaret admitted that in that time period, she was responsible for collecting Catherine's mail from her home and delivering it to her. ¶ 16 Margaret was next asked to identify group exhibit No. 6, which is a copy of the AT&T rules governing the AT&T savings plan effective January 1, 2007. Margaret stated that she had never seen those documents before. The parties then stipulated to the introduction of this exhibit into evidence. ¶ 17 The AT&T rules, effective January 1, 2007 (hereinafter the 2007 AT&T rules), set forth the proper default beneficiaries in the event that the employee either does "not make a designation" of a beneficiary, or has "no surviving beneficiaries." Relevant to this cause, those rules provide that if an employee is "not survived by a spouse, legally recognized partner, child or parent," "all proceeds from each program in which [the employee] participate[s] will be distributed to *** [the employee's] surviving sibling or siblings (including half blood) in equal amounts." ¶ 18 The AT&T rules also specifically list the AT&T savings plan as one of the AT&T employee benefit plans that has explicitly adopted the rules, as well as state that the rules are governed by ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (2006)) and the Internal Revenue Code (Code) (26 U.S. C. § 1 et seq. (2006))). The rules further provide that "[i]f there is a conflict between the [rules] and any provision of the Code, [or] ERISA, *** then the provisions of the Code or ERISA *** involved will supersede the conflicting term, condition or application of the [rules.]" ¶ 19 At trial, Margaret was asked whether she ever brought a copy of these rules to Catherine prior to her death and Margaret responded that she could not remember. She also stated that she did not know whether Catherine had a copy of these rules, but testified that it was possible. Margaret, however, admitted that she herself never observed Catherine with the documents in her hand. Finally, Margaret admitted that she and Catherine discussed Catherine's financial affairs while Catherine was in the hospital. She, however, denied speaking to Catherine about how she wanted the AT&T savings plan disbursed. ¶ 20 Margaret next admitted that after being appointed executrix of Catherine's estate on May 11, 2007, she helped her mother in obtaining the assets from the AT&T savings plan, without seeking approval from the probate court for such a distribution. ¶ 21 Margaret explained that in that vein, on about April 25, 2007, she spoke to a representative of the administrator for the AT&T savings plan (hereinafter the plan administrator), Michael Curtis (hereinafter Curtis), and informed him of Catherine's death. Curtis notified Margaret of Catherine's AT&T savings plan beneficiary designation form and explained to her that Catherine had named her mother (Catherine T.) as her primary beneficiary, and her sister, Mary, as her contingent beneficiary. Margaret admitted that, at this time, she was aware that that Dorothy's name was not on the beneficiary form. ¶ 22 Margaret testified, however, that Curtis explained to her that the AT&T rules provided for a hierarchy of default beneficiaries, i.e., who would collect the assets if there was no primary or contingent beneficiary. Margaret testified that it was her understanding that under these rules, if the named (primary and contingent beneficiaries) predeceased Catherine, the assets would first go to the spouse. If there was no spouse, they would go to the children; if there were no children, they would go the parents; if there were no parents, they would go to the siblings; and if there were no siblings they would revert to the estate. ¶ 23 Margaret averred that when she spoke to Curtis she was aware that both Catherine's mother and her sister, Mary, were deceased. She testified that Catherine was never married and had no children. She also testified that both of Catherine's parents were deceased, and that of her five siblings, only one, Dorothy was living. Margaret testified that as such, she believed that the money should be distributed to Dorothy. ¶ 24 Margaret testified that after her telephone conversation with Curtis, Curtis sent her a packet in the mail, including various claim forms and asked her to complete and return them. At trial, Margaret identified group exhibit No. 4 as the forms and records she received and then returned to Curtis. These include, inter alia: a beneficiary checklist, letters to Curtis, a copy of Dorothy's utility bill proving an address, death certificates for the decedent, the decedent's mother, Catherine T., and the decedent's sister Mary, a birth certificate for the decedent's sister, Dorothy, a copy of Dorothy's state identification and social security cards, and several beneficiary affidavits signed by Dorothy. Margaret acknowledged that Catherine lived at the same address since 1969. Margaret testified that she submitted these documents to the AT&T Survivor Benefit Service Center on May 15, 2007. Subsequently, $389,516 in assets from that plan were distributed to Dorothy. ¶ 25 Dorothy next testified that beginning in January 2007, she and Margaret were responsible for collecting Catherine's mail and delivering it to her in the hospital. Dorothy explained that she did not "scrutinize" the mail but just placed it in a bag and brought it to the hospital for Catherine. As such, she did not know whether the 2007 AT&T rules were in the mail. ¶ 26 Dorothy was next asked to identify exhibit No. 5, the AT&T beneficiary designation form executed by Catherine on June 10, 1969. The form designates the recipients of the AT&T savings plan's assets in the event of Catherine's death. The form includes two sections: Section A, which is to be filled out if the employee chooses to designate a single primary and multiple contingent beneficiaries; and Section B, which is to be filled out if the employee chooses to designate multiple primary beneficiaries. Catherine completed Section A (and left section B empty), designating her mother, Catherine T., as her primary beneficiary, and her sister, Mary, as her contingent beneficiary. Once the document was identified it was admitted into evidence. ¶ 27 At trial Dorothy acknowledged that the beneficiary designation form shows that Catherine named her own mother and her sister Mary as the beneficiaries. She further testified that she remembered having a conversation with Catherine about the AT&T savings plan. At that time, Catherine told her that she had nothing to worry about and that there would be no need to "notify anybody about anything" because this was "an automatic situation." Dorothy explained, on cross-examination, however, that this conversation took place before Mary died. ¶ 28 After hearing closing arguments by both parties, the circuit court took the case under advisement. On July 1, 2015, in a written order, the court ruled in favor of the respondents, finding that $389,516 in assets from the decedent's AT&T savings account were properly distributed to Dorothy. In doing so, the circuit court noted that when the matter was originally heard on the motion for summary judgment, the court was provided with a copy of the AT&T rules that became effective January 1, 2008, after the date of the decedent's death. The court noted that since then, at trial, it was provided with a copy of those same rules, but effective January 1, 2007, prior to the decedent's death. The court held that there could be no doubt that according to the AT&T rules, being Catherine's only surviving sibling, Dorothy was the default beneficiary. ¶ 29 With respect to notice to Catherine, the court acknowledged that there was no evidence presented at trial as to when the AT&T rules were originally amended to provide for default rules in the event that an employee's named beneficiaries predeceased her. The court, however, noted that group exhibit 6 established that those rules "were in effect prior to the decedent's death." In addition, the court held that the AT&T rules were governed by ERISA, which "requires plans to provide participants with information regularly and automatically." The court noted that the decedent resided at that same address since 1969 and that her AT&T savings plan statements, as attached to the estate's tax returns, were mailed to her at the same address as late as April 2007, the month of her death. Accordingly, the court concluded that there was "a reasonable inference that [the] decedent consistently received regular notices" form the AT&T savings plan, so as to have knowingly designated her default beneficiary. ¶ 30 The petitioners now appeal contending that the trial court's findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence.
We note that when Catherine began working for the company it was known as Illinois Bell Telephone. The company was subsequently known as Ameritech, and then SBC before becoming AT&T. For purposes of consistency, we shall refer to it simply as AT&T.
We note that this plan was initially known as the Bell System Savings Plan for Salaried Employees. For simplicity, we will refer to it as the AT&T savings plan.
Both petitions were amended on October 14, 2010.
The petitioners' attorney also attempted to introduce into evidence the fact that during the initial discovery process, the respondents did not produce a copy of the AT&T rules governing the AT&T savings plan in effect prior to the decedents' death, but rather provided the court with rules which became effective on January 1, 2008 (nearly 9 months after the decedent's death). The circuit court, however, indicated that this line of questioning was inappropriate and irrelevant because the sole issue before the court was whether there were AT&T rules in place prior to the decedent's death and whether she had notice of them. Accordingly, for purposes of clarifying the record, the court noted that exhibit No. 6 was a copy of the AT&T rules effective January 1, 2007, prior to the decedent's death. --------
¶ 31 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 32 At the outset, we note that "the objectives of a citation proceeding are to obtain the return of personal property belonging to the estate but in the possession of, or being concealed by others, or to obtain information to recover estate property." In re Jousten's Estate, 100 Ill. App. 3d 376, 380 (1981). In a citation proceeding, the burden of proof is generally on the petitioner to show that the asset in question is a probate asset. In re Estate of Elias, 408 Ill. App. 3d 301, 315 (2011) (citing In re Estate of Casey, 155 Ill. App. 3d 116, 121-22 (1987)); see also In re Estate of Shanahan, 59 Ill. App. 3d 269, 273 (1978). Only if the petitioner establishes a prima facie case that the property belongs to the decedent's estate, the burden shifts to the respondent to prove his or her right to possession by clear and convincing evidence. In re Estate of Elias, 408 Ill. App. 3d at 315. A circuit court's finding that certain property belongs or does not belong to the estate will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Estate of Elias, 408 Ill. App. 3d at 316. A judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence only where " 'the opposite conclusion is apparent or when findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence.' " Chicago's Pizza, Inc. v. Chicago's Pizza Franchise Ltd. USA, 384 Ill. App. 3d 849, 859 (2008) (citing Buckner v. Causey, 311 Ill. App. 3d 139, 144 (19999)). ¶ 33 On appeal, the petitioners first contend, albeit inartfully, that the trial court's findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence because the decedent's AT&T beneficiary designation form executed on June 10, 1969, trumps the AT&T default beneficiary rules. In support of this argument, the petitioners point to language in the AT&T beneficiary designation form which states: "If any beneficiary sharing unequally has predeceased me, his share shall be to my estate." ¶ 34 A careful and full reading of that beneficiary designation form, however, reveals that the language cited to by the petitioners makes no provision as to the distribution of the savings' plans assets in the event that both named beneficiaries predecease Catherine, and far less that such assets should automatically revert to the estate. First, the cited language pertains solely to section B of the form, which permits an employee to designate multiple primary beneficiaries with equal and unequal shares. The cited language is located at the bottom of Section B and reads in full: "Beneficiaries sharing equally who are living at the time of my death shall share and share alike. If any beneficiary sharing unequally has predeceased me, his share shall be to my estate." As such, this provision only makes clear that where there are multiple named primary beneficiaries sharing unequally, and one predeceases the other, the assets from the beneficiary sharing unequally shall revert to the estate. It does not provide that assets will revert to the estate for multiple primary beneficiaries sharing equally, nor does it provide that the assets will revert to the estate automatically if all named beneficiaries predecease the employee. ¶ 35 What is more, in contrast to section B, section A, which permits an employee to designate one primary and multiple contingent beneficiaries (and which Catherine filled out, while leaving Section B blank) contains no such language. Instead the bottom of section A reads in full: "Such contingent beneficiaries living at the time of my death, shall share and share alike." Accordingly, section A makes no provision whatsoever as to the distribution of the AT&T's savings plan assets in the event that the named beneficiaries predecease the employee. ¶ 36 Rather, as the the trial court properly concluded in such a situation, the AT&T rules set forth the proper hierarchy of default beneficiaries. The AT&T rules explicitly list the AT&T savings plan as one of the AT&T employee benefit plans that has adopted the rules, and explain that the default hierarchy is triggered when either the employee makes no beneficiary designation or is not survived by a named beneficiary. Relevant to this appeal, the rules provide that where an employee is not survived by "a spouse, legally recognized partner, child or parent," all proceeds would be distributed to the employee's surviving sibling or siblings in "equal amounts." Since it is uncontested that Dorothy is Catherine's only living sibling, the trial court properly concluded that Dorothy was entitled to the plan's assets. ¶ 37 The petitioners next argue, rather incomprehensibly, that "the beneficiary designation form is not preempted by ERISA," and that "ERISA is not the governing issue, ERISA is preempted by the beneficiary designation." Contrary to this incoherent assertion, a beneficiary designation form cannot preempt ERISA. A beneficiary designation form is not a state law, but merely a form designed by the administrator of an employee benefit plan to comply with that plan. ¶ 38 As such, the petitioners citations to Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141 (2001) and Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings and Investment Plan, 555 U.S. 285 (2009), are completely misplaced. In those decisions the courts were asked to determine whether very specific provisions of explicitly identified state (divorce) statutes, which would have designated a different beneficiary to a retirement savings plan than that provided under the plan and governed by ERISA, could trump the federal statute. The petitioners here have made no such contention. To the extent that they are attempting to argue, albeit very poorly, that the AT&T beneficiary designation form is governed by Illinois law rather than ERISA, and that somehow under Illinois law Dorothy is not the proper default beneficiary, they have failed to cite to any provision of any Illinois statue that governs or applies to the AT&T savings plan and the beneficiary designation form, or that, for that matter, would somehow preempt ERISA. It is well-settled that an appellant must provide this court with both an articulate argument and citations to authority to support each of its claims of error and the failure to do so will render the argument forfeited. See Levy Co. v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Com'n, 2014 IL App (1st) 131338WC, ¶9; see also Holmstrom v. Kunis, 221 Ill. App.3d 317, 325 (1991) (Statements unsupported by argument or by citation of relevant authority need not be considered); see also Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. July 1, 2008) (providing that arguments must be supported by citations to authority and that arguments not properly presented in an appellant's brief are forfeited). Since the petitioners have not supported their unintelligible two-sentence assertion by either argument or citation to relevant authority, we need not consider their contention on appeal. ¶ 39 The petitioners next argue that regardless of whether the AT&T rules governed here to permit Dorothy to take possession of the AT&T savings plan assets as the default beneficiary, the record is devoid of any proof that Catherine was placed on notice of these rules so as to have knowingly designated her default beneficiary. In support, they contend that there is no evidence in the record that the AT&T rules were ever mailed to Catherine prior to her death. In addition, they point out that neither Dorothy, nor Margaret testified to having viewed Catherine with the AT&T rules, even though they delivered the mail to her. For the reasons that follow, we disagree. ¶ 40 With respect to notice requirements for changes to employment savings plans governed by ERISA, federal courts have made clear that the receipt of notice of such changes is not relevant. Rather, what is relevant is whether the notice was sent by the plan administrator in an attempt to ensure that notice is delivered. See Custer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 503 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 2007) (acknowledging that it is not the actual receipt of notice that is relevant, but the acts of the fiduciary in attempting to ensure that notice is delivered); see also Bidwell v. University Medical Center, Inc., 685 F.3d 613 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that actions of retirement contribution plan administrator and retirement services company in distributing notice about changes to the retirement savings plan were not deficient under ERISA, even though participants claimed they did not receive notice of change; administrator provided correct addresses to retirement services company for distribution of notice by first-class mail, and there were records indicating that latter sent out correct number of letters as directed). ¶ 41 In Bidwell, the court addressed this very issue. See Bidwell, 685 F.3d at 620. In that case the plaintiffs, participants in a retirement contribution plan, argued that they had not received proper notice of changes to their plan as they were entitled to under ERISA, because they never actually received the notice. Bidwell, 685 F.3d at 620. In rejecting this argument, the Bidwell court held: "Under ERISA, a fiduciary is obligated to take measures 'reasonably calculated to ensure actual receipt of the material by plan participants.' 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104b-1(b)(1). ***[The plan administrator's] actions were 'reasonably calculated to ensure actual receipt' and it was reasonable for [the plan administrator] to rely on the dependability of the first-class-mail system and [retirement services company's] proof that the correct number of letters were sent out. See Id. ('Material distributed through the mail may be sent by first, second or third-class mail.'). Indeed, [the plaintiffs] do not appear to allege that [the plan administrator] took inadequate actions in issuing the notice; they focus only on the fact that they did not receive the notice. Because the focus of our inquiry is on [the plan administrator's] action, their arguments are insufficient to substantiate their claim." Bidwell, 685 F.3d at 620. ¶ 42 In the present case, the trial court found that the because Catherine resided at the same address since 1969 and her AT&T savings plan statements, as attached to the estate's tax returns, were mailed to her at that same address as late as April 2007, the month of her death, "a reasonable inference" could be made that the decedent "consistently received regular notices" from the AT&T savings plan. In light of Bidwell, we find nothing manifestly erroneous in this conclusion. Bidwell, 685 F.3d at 620. ¶ 43 Contrary to the petitioners' position, the fact that the decedent's death preceded the April 17, 2007-April 18, 2007, statement, referred to by the trial court, does not make that statement irrelevant, nor the trial court's reliance on it erroneous. The trial did not rely on this monthly statement to establish that Catherine actually received it during her lifetime. Rather, the court used the statement to infer that as late as April 2007, the plan administrator sent monthly statements to Catherine's address, the same address that she had been using for the past 38 years. In contrast to the existence of the mailed monthly statement, the petitioners provided no evidence whatsoever to show that the plan administrator had failed to take actions that were " 'reasonably calculated to ensure actual receipt' " of the AT&T rules. Bidwell, 685 F.3d at 620 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104b-1(b)(1) (West 2006)). Instead, they focused on whether Catherine actually received those rules between her hospitalization in January 2007 and her death in April 2007. As such, their arguments were insufficient and the trial court properly inferred that Catherine had notice of the AT&T rules, so as to have knowingly chosen her default beneficiary. See Bidwell, 685 F.3d at 620; Custer, 503 F. 3d at 419. ¶ 44 The petitioners nevertheless point out that after Catherine died, on May 3, 2007, the AT&T savings plan issued a dividend check to Catherine's estate, as evidenced by the estate tax return. They contend that this proves that the AT&T plan administrator was aware that the estate was the proper default beneficiary. We disagree. ¶ 45 The evidence at trial established that Margaret approached a representative of the plan administrator around April 25, 2007 to inform him of Catherine's death. The representative informed Margaret of the hierarchy of default beneficiaries under the AT&T rules and asked her to provide him with certain documents. Margaret submitted those documents to the plan administrator on May 15, 2007, and subsequently assets from the plan were distributed to Dorothy. Contrary to what the petitioners would have us believe, the fact that prior to reviewing the documents submitted by Margaret, including the death notices of the two named beneficiaries, the plan administrator issued a dividend check (for $26.98) to the estate in no way negates that Dorothy was the rightful beneficiary. If nothing else, it establishes that the plan administrator acted with due diligence, waiting until it was provided with all the documents (including Dorothy's claim to the assets and death notices of both named beneficiaries) before distributing the assets in accordance with its default beneficiary rules.
¶ 46 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 47 Accordingly, for all of the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. ¶ 48 Affirmed.