No. 12-06-00128-CR
Opinion delivered May 16, 2007. DO NOT PUBLISH
Appeal from the 273rd Judicial District Court of Sabine County, Texas.
Panel consisted of WORTHEN, C.J., GRIFFITH, J., and HOYLE, J.
JAMES T. WORTHEN, Chief Justice.
Appellant Michael Edmond Bailey was convicted of murder and sentenced to ninety-nine years of imprisonment with a fine of $10,000.00. In six issues, Appellant appeals his sentence. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On May 27, 2005, Appellant drove to the home of Tommy Arnold. Appellant then persuaded Arnold to leave with him and travel to a cemetery in the woods. Once at the cemetery, Appellant confronted Arnold with allegations that Arnold had been making sexual advances toward M.O., Appellant's sixteen year old sister. Appellant then shot Arnold, once in the mid-section and once in the face. After the shooting, Appellant set out upon a plan to secretly dispose of Arnold's body by cutting him to pieces. Seeking aid in his endeavor, he contacted his mother's boyfriend, Tony Martin. Martin refused to help Appellant. Later, Appellant confessed to his mother, Barbara Orris. Martin and Orris, after discussing the matter between themselves, notified the Sabine County Sheriff's Department. Appellant was charged with one count of murder. Appellant pleaded guilty and was sentenced by a jury to ninety-nine years of imprisonment with a fine of $10,000.00. This appeal followed. REFUSALS TO GRANT A MISTRIAL
In his first and third issues, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying two motions for mistrial that followed trial testimony regarding Appellant's membership in the Aryan Brotherhood and questions by the prosecutor in which the prosecutor accused Appellant of breaking into his mother's gun cabinet to steal the murder weapon. Generally, in order for an appellant to argue on appeal that a trial court erred by allowing a party to pose a specific question to a testifying witness or party, he must have preserved the error at trial by making a proper objection and securing a ruling on the objection. See Ethington v. State , 819 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1 (describing the necessary steps to preserve error in Texas courts). An objection is "proper" where counsel specifically states the basis for the objection or the particular ground is apparent from the context. Ethington , 819 S.W.2d at 858. Where a trial court refuses to rule on an objection, an objection to the refusal is sufficient to preserve error. Id. An objection should be made as soon as the ground for objection becomes apparent. Lagrone v. State , 942 S.W.2d 602, 618 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). If a party fails to object until after an objectionable question has been asked and answered, and he can show no legitimate reason to justify the delay, his objection is untimely and error is waived. Id. Both instances complained of by Appellant involve instances where one or more of the prosecutor's questions had been asked and answered before any objection was made. Appellant has made no attempt on appeal to offer a reason to justify his delay in objecting to the questions. Further, no legitimate reason is apparent in the record. Appellant's objections and subsequent motions for mistrial were, thus, untimely, and he has failed to preserve error. See id. We overrule Appellant's first and third issues. FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In his second issue, Appellant challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's failure to find that, at the time of the murder, he was under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause. Section 19.02(d) of the Texas Penal Code provides that [a]t the punishment stage of a trial, the defendant may raise the issue as to whether he caused the death under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause. If the defendant proves the issue in the affirmative by a preponderance of the evidence, the offense is a felony of the second degree.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(d) (Vernon 2003). If a defendant does not meet this burden, the offense of murder is a felony of the first degree. Id. § 19.02(c). Standard of Review
The jury's failure to find that Appellant was under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause constituted a nonfinding on an issue in which Appellant, as the defendant, carried the burden of proof. See id. § 19.02(d). When we review jury nonfindings of this type for factual sufficiency, the standard of review is whether, after considering all the evidence relevant to the issue at hand, the judgment is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. See Meraz v. State , 785 S.W.2d 146, 154-55 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990). Although we are authorized to disagree with the jury's determination, even if probative evidence exists that supports the verdict, see Clewis v. State , 922 S.W.2d 126, 133 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996), our evaluation should not substantially intrude upon the jury's role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility of witness testimony. See Santellan v. State , 939 S.W.2d 155, 164 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). When there is conflicting evidence, the jury's verdict on such matters is generally regarded as conclusive. See Van Zandt v. State , 932 S.W.2d 88, 96 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1996, pet. ref'd). In this regard, we cannot declare that a conflict in the evidence justifies a new trial simply because we may disagree with the jury's resolution of the conflict. See Watson v. State , 204 S.W.3d 404, 417 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). Discussion
The evidence showed that Appellant and Arnold had been friends before the murder. Arnold, who was twenty-four years old, had often spent the night at Appellant's home, where he was allowed to sleep in the same bed as M.O., Appellant's sixteen year old sister. During one or more of these occasions, Arnold made sexual advances toward M.O., who rejected these advances. Appellant, suspicious that Arnold might have a sexual interest in M.O., confronted Arnold, and the two argued. On May 27, 2005, Appellant's suspicions were confirmed when he learned of Arnold's advances toward M.O. Appellant; his friend, Earnest Brown; and M.O. agreed to "go find" Arnold so that Appellant could "beat him up." The group first went to obtain illegal drugs, which they ingested. The group then traveled to Arnold's home, using a rental car known by Appellant to have a pistol under one of the seats. After reaching Arnold's home, Appellant convinced Arnold to leave with them, driving him to a cemetery in the woods. When they got to the cemetery, Appellant and Arnold exited the rental car. At first, the two engaged in a casual conversation during which Appellant revealed the pistol to Arnold. Eventually, Appellant pointed the pistol at Arnold and announced, "If you f**k with my family . . . I'm gonna kill you." Then, using the pistol, which he knew to be loaded, Appellant shot Arnold in the mid-section from approximately seven to eight feet away. Arnold stated, "I don't know what's going on, what's wrong Michael . . . [?]" and fell to the ground, screaming in pain. Appellant then approached Arnold, slowly pointed the pistol at Arnold's head, and shot him in the face at close range to make sure he was dead. Afterward, Appellant ordered Brown to help him put Arnold's body in the trunk of the rental car. On the drive away from the cemetery, Appellant told Brown and M.O. that he planned to cut Arnold's body into pieces to dispose of it. He drove to his grandmother's home to get a tarp to cover the body. He then drove to home where he lived with his mother and placed the body on the floor inside the home. Appellant was apprehended by law enforcement before he was able to cut up and dispose of the body. To reduce the charged offense to a second degree felony, Appellant had the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that at the time of the murder, he was under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(d). "Sudden passion" is defined in the Penal Code as "passion directly caused by and arising out of provocation by the individual killed or another acting with the person killed which passion arises at the time of the offense and is not solely the result of former provocation." Id. § 19.02(a)(2) (emphasis added). "Adequate cause" is defined as a "cause that would commonly produce a degree of anger, rage, resentment, or terror in a person of ordinary temper, sufficient to render the mind incapable of cool reflection." Id. § 19.02(a)(1). Appellant testified that he had not intended to shoot Arnold, only to threaten him. He claimed that he did not know there was a pistol in the rental car and had merely happened to find it on the way to Arnold's home. According to Appellant, it was Arnold's decision to drive to the cemetery. Appellant claimed that, once they began talking, Arnold admitted to Appellant that he had attempted to have sex with sixteen year old M.O. and that Arnold stated it was M.O.'s fault for "flirting" with him. At least two of these statements were controverted by other testimony. Brown testified that it was, in fact, Appellant who chose to drive to the cemetery. Also, Appellant's mother, Orris, testified that Appellant knew the pistol was in her rental car. The jury was free to disregard Appellant's version of his conversation with Arnold at the cemetery. See Jones v. State , 944 S.W.2d 642, 648-49 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). The jury could have reasonably inferred from the remaining evidence that Appellant had planned to murder Arnold and that neither shot had been fired by Appellant as the result of sudden passion. The evidence showed that Appellant fortified himself with drugs before leaving his home and that he had enlisted Brown and M.O. to assist him in his plan. Appellant chose a cemetery in the woods to perform the act and also armed himself with a loaded pistol. Once at the cemetery, Appellant confronted Arnold and then shot him. He shot Arnold a second time, this time in the face, to ensure that Arnold was dead. Afterwards, he embarked upon a plan to dispose of the body, but was apprehended before he could bring this plan to fruition. Absent Appellant's testimony about his conversation with Arnold, there was no direct evidence of a passion that "[arose] at the time of the offense and [was] not solely the result of former provocation." See Kelley v. State , 968 S.W.2d 395, 400 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1998, no pet.) ("If the jury found there was no provocative conduct, or at least none occurring at the time of the offense, then there was no finding of cause at all, much less `adequate cause.'"). Instead, the remaining direct evidence showed that Appellant had been aware of Arnold's sexual advances for some time, and, thus, had time to deliberate about his actions. See McKinney v. State , 179 S.W.3d 565, 570 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). After a neutral review of all the evidence, both for and against the jury's nonfinding of sudden passion, we conclude that the nonfinding was not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. See id. ; Kelley , 968 S.W.2d at 400. We overrule Appellant's second issue. REFUSAL TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL
In his fifth issue, Appellant argues that the trial court committed reversible error by denying his supplemental motion for a new trial. Appellant challenges only the trial court's denial on the ground contained in his supplemental motion for new trial, not the grounds contained in his original motion for new trial. Because the supplemental motion contained a wholly new ground, it was actually an amendment, and not a mere supplement, to the original motion. Cf. Mallet v. State , 9 S.W.3d 856, 865 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2000, no pet.) (treating untimely filed affidavits as an amendment to the defendant's motion for new trial). We must, therefore, determine whether this amendment was timely. The right to move for a new trial in a criminal case is purely statutory. State v. Lewis , 151 S.W.3d 213, 217 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2004, pet. ref'd) (citing Drew v. State , 743 S.W.2d 207, 223 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987)). Such a motion must be pursued in the manner prescribed by statute. Id. The time for filing motions for new trial and amended motions for new trial in criminal cases is governed by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 21.4. See TEX. R. APP. P. 21.4. We have previously interpreted Rule 21.4 to preclude a defendant from amending a motion for new trial later than thirty days after the trial court imposes or suspends that defendant's sentence in open court. Lewis , 151 S.W.3d at 218. A trial court is powerless to extend this deadline by granting leave of court. Id. (citing Drew , 743 S.W.2d at 222-23). The statutory provisions for filing motions for new trial and amended motions for new trial are mandatory and exclusive and must be complied with in all respects. Lewis , 151 S.W.3d at 219 (citing Drew , 743 S.W.2d at 223). The trial court has limited jurisdiction when exercising its particular authority to rule on motions for new trial. Id. A late amended motion for new trial fails to vest the trial court with jurisdiction over the issues included in the amended motion. Lewis , 151 S.W.3d at 219 (citing Beathard v. State , 767 S.W.2d 423, 433 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989)). In this case, the trial court imposed Appellant's sentence in open court on February 28, 2006. Appellant filed his amendment, designated as a supplemental motion for new trial, on May 12, 2006 and thus filed it untimely. See TEX. R. APP. P. 21.4; Lewis , 151 S.W.3d at 218. Therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the new ground contained in his supplemental motion. See Lewis , 151 S.W.3d at 219. Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear Appellant's untimely amendment, the trial court did not err by failing to grant a new trial based upon the new ground presented in his supplemental motion. See Beathard , 767 S.W.2d at 433. We overrule Appellant's fifth issue. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
In his fourth and sixth issues, Appellant claims that his first and second court appointed attorneys were ineffective. For clarity, we note that Appellant's initial counsel moved to withdraw once he learned that a plea agreement would not be reached in the case. The trial court granted his motion and appointed a second attorney, Appellant's trial counsel. Standard of Review
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are evaluated under the two step analysis articulated in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 674 (1984). See Hernandez v. State , 988 S.W.2d 770, 772-74 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). The first step requires an appellant to demonstrate that trial counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. See Strickland , 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. At this step, an appellant must identify the acts or omissions of counsel alleged to be ineffective assistance and affirmatively prove that they fell below the professional norm for reasonableness. See McFarland v. State , 928 S.W.2d 482, 500 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). Under the second step of the Strickland analysis, an appellant must show prejudice from the deficient performance of his attorney. See Hernandez , 988 S.W.2d at 772. To establish prejudice, an appellant must prove that but for counsel's deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. See Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. A "reasonable probability" is defined by the Supreme Court as a "probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. Any allegation of ineffectiveness must be firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness. Thompson v. State , 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). In this regard, an appellant is required to establish his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Tong v. State , 25 S.W.3d 707, 712 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). Further, a reviewing court will not find ineffectiveness by isolating any portion of trial counsel's representation, but will judge the claim based on the totality of the representation. See Strickland , 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S. Ct. at 2069. Discussion
In his fourth issue, Appellant alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to file a motion to transfer venue. In his sixth issue, Appellant argues that his first attorney was ineffective because he allegedly failed to communicate a plea offer to him in a timely manner. Venue. The record reflects that, at the time of Appellant's trial, his trial counsel was under indictment in Angelina County, Texas for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Despite the fact that there is no evidence in the record which directly shows the jury knew of this indictment, Appellant argues that we can infer both that the jury knew of the indictment and that this knowledge prejudiced their decision on sentencing. Even if we assume, arguendo, that members of the jury were aware of the indictment and that counsel's failure to file a motion to transfer venue fell below the professional norm for reasonableness, we cannot assume that this prejudiced Appellant. The record shows that counsel announced to the jury during voir dire that he had been appointed by the trial court to represent Appellant. Absent some additional evidence, we have no reason to believe that a jury would hold an unproven criminal indictment of an out of town court appointed attorney (an attorney who was chosen for, and not by, the client) against Appellant. Because Appellant has presented no such additional evidence, he has failed to meet his burden to prove prejudice by a preponderance of the evidence and, therefore, has failed to prove his counsel was ineffective in not filing a motion to transfer venue. See Tong , 25 S.W.3d at 712. Plea Agreement. The record reflects that Appellant's first attorney sought to withdraw from the case after he was unable to reach a plea bargain agreement with the State. It does not, however, reflect why counsel was unable to reach such an agreement. Appellant contends in his brief an agreement was not reached because counsel failed to notify him of the State's offer until it had already been withdrawn. However, to comply with Strickland , Appellant was required to present proof sufficient to establish this fact by a preponderance of the evidence. See Tong , 25 S.W.3d at 712. Because the record does not include any evidence of the omission Appellant relies upon to establish his ineffective assistance claim, Appellant has not met his burden under the first step of the Strickland analysis and has failed to prove counsel was ineffective. See id. We overrule Appellant's fourth and sixth issues. DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court's judgment.