Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:02-CV-041-L.
July 8, 2004
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and an order of the Court in implementation thereof, subject cause has previously been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge. The findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge are as follows:
I. BACKGROUND
A. Nature of the Case: This is a petition for writ of habeas corpus by a state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in which he challenges the application of certain work requirements to his sentence.
B. Parties: At the time he filed his petition, Petitioner Thomas E. Bailey was in custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division. Respondent Douglas Dretke is the Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. Procedural History : On January 8, 1998, Bailey pleaded guilty to failure to stop and render aid, and under a plea-bargain agreement, the trial court sentenced him to 10 years' community supervision. (51,079 State Habeas R. at 22.) On May 5, 2000, based on Bailey's subsequent conviction for felony driving while intoxicated, the trial court revoked his community supervision and sentenced him to three years' confinement. ( Id. at 26; Resp't Answer at Ex. A.)
On October 24, 2001, Bailey filed a state application for habeas corpus relief, challenging the requirement that he perform labor while confined. Bailey filed his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, on December 4, 2001. See Spotville v. Cain, 149 F.3d 374, 377 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (holding, under prison mailbox rule, pro se habeas petition filed when papers delivered to prison authorities for mailing). On January 15, 2002, Bailey filed an amended state habeas corpus application. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied Bailey's application without written order on January 30, 2002. Ex parte Bailey, No. 51,079-01 (Tex.Crim.App. Jan. 30, 2002) (not designated for publication). On January 3, 2003, Bailey was released from confinement because he had completely discharged his sentence. (Docket Entry No. 16; 6/30/04 phone call to TDCJ-CID.)
Although Bailey initially filed his federal petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Tyler Division, the petition was transferred to this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d).
D. Issues : In four grounds for relief, Bailey argues that (1) the failure to credit him with work-time credits violates his equal-protection, due-process, and liberty rights; (2) forcing him to work while incarcerated equates to unconstitutional involuntary servitude; (3) applying the work-time credit provisions of the Texas Government Code violates the separation of powers; and (4) the work-time credit provisions are unenforceable and violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
E. Exhaustion : Dretke argues that Bailey's claims regarding the Ex Post Facto Clause and the enforceability of the work-time credit provisions have not been exhausted and asserts that they have been procedurally defaulted; however, Dretke believes that Bailey's remaining allegations have been properly exhausted.
II. MOOTNESS
At the time he filed his federal petition, Bailey challenged as unlawful his then confinement, arguing that he was being denied proper credit against his sentence for work he performed while incarcerated and that TDCJ-CID's labor requirements were unconstitutional. Because he has completely discharged his sentence, the question of mootness must be addressed.
The federal courts may not entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by a state prisoner unless the petitioner is in custody in violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Here, Bailey meets the in-custody requirement because at the time he filed the petition, he was in custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. See Van Zant v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 104 F.3d 325, 327 n. 2 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (stating jurisdiction attaches at time petition is filed).
But jurisdiction further hinges upon whether the petitioner's challenge to the sentence is moot because there is no live case or controversy. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). A challenge to a criminal conviction itself presents a justiciable case or controversy even after expiration of the sentence that was imposed as a result of the conviction. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7. In cases involving a challenge to a criminal conviction, the Supreme Court has been willing to presume the existence of collateral consequences sufficient to satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement. Id. at 8. However, this presumption does not extend to other situations where a conviction is not being attacked. Id. at 7-8. Instead, an individual challenging the execution of his sentence and not the underlying conviction must show a concrete and continuing injury that flows from the alleged wrongful conduct. Id. at 12-14. Thus, Bailey must show that the labor requirements and the application of his work-time credits will cause or are still causing him to suffer some actual, future harm and that a writ of habeas corpus can prevent this harm. United States v. Clark, 193 F.3d 845, 847 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
In this case, Bailey has completely discharged his sentence; thus, there are no collateral consequences that could flow from his claims regarding work-time credits and labor requirements. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7-14; Weiss v. United States Board of Parole, 451 F.2d 1346, 1347 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Russell v. Cockrell, No. 2:01-MC-012, 2003 WL 21730571, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2003); Bronaugh v. Morrison, No. 4:02-CV-718-Y, 2002 WL 31422963, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2002). According, this case is moot.
Even if Bailey's petition were not moot, he would still not be entitled to habeas corpus relief. Bailey's claims that the work-time credit statutes are unenforceable and violate the Ex Post Facto Clause are unexhausted and, thus, procedurally defaulted. Finley v. Johnson, 243 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2001); Emery v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 969 (1998); Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409, 423 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1139 (1998). Bailey's remaining claims are not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. See, e.g., Ali v. Johnson, 259 F.3d 317, 318 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding meritless challenge to prison work requirement under the Thirteenth Amendment in § 1983 suit); Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (stating § 1983 appropriate way to attack conditions of confinement), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1059 (1996); Sheppard v. La. Board of Parole, 873 F.2d 761, 762 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (holding claim regarding reimbursement of supervision fees properly brought under § 1983);
III. EVIDENTIARY HEARING
Upon review of the pleadings filed and the proceedings held in state court as reflected in the state-court records, an evidentiary hearing appears unnecessary.IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction the request for habeas corpus relief brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.