Opinion
Case No. 99-4 12 GMS.
November 21, 2000.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Nathaniel Bagwell is a pro se litigant who is currently incarcerated at Gander Hill Prison which is located in Wilmington, Delaware. He has appeared before this court several times in the past for a variety of claims and also has another action currently pending in this court for violation of his due process and other constitutional rights stemming from the trial which eventually led to his conviction. The present case involves Bagwell's claims for mental and emotional distress and bodily harm suffered as a result of a correctional officer's alleged false statements against Bagwell. Presently before the court is Bagwell's motion for the judge to recuse himself from all of Bagwell's present cases and any future cases that may appear before the court because of the court's prior unfavorable rulings against him.
The following reasons set forth the basis for the denial of Bagwell's motion. The standard for determining whether a judge must recuse himself is an objective one. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000) (A judge "shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."). Thus, the focus is whether there is a reasonable factual basis for doubting the judge's impartiality. United States v. Nobel, 696 F.2d 231, 235 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Conover v. Shovhn, No. 87-6624, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6831, at *2 (ED. Pa. June 1, 1990) (recusal is warranted if a reasonable man, were he to know all the circumstances, would harbor doubts abut the judge's impartiality). Furthermore, an affidavit in support of plaintiffs motion for recusal must state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (2000). While factual allegations must be accepted as true, conclusory allegations need not be. Conover, 1990 U.S. DIST. LEXIS 6831, at *3.
Federal judges are not required to recuse themselves from matters simply because they made a ruling which a party dislikes. See Jaffree v. Wallace, 837 F.2d 1461, 1465 (11th Cir. 1988) (stating that a party "must show more than a disagreement with the judge's judicial philosophy" and, instead, "point out personal, extra-judicial bias"). Judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion. United States v. Mizell, 88 F.3d 288, 299 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that not all unfavorable disposition towards an individual suggests bias or prejudice); see also United States v. Edwards, 39 F. Supp.2d 692, 698 (M.D. La. 1999) ("matters arising out of the course of judicial proceedings are not a proper basis for recusal.").
The only basis for Bagwell's motion is that the court's earlier rulings showed that [the judge] "will not let justice prevail in [Bagwell's] case's [sic]" and that [the judge's] "activities against [Bagwell were] very bias[ed]." Even if the court were to assume that this contention was correct, it would only provide the basis for a successfUl appeal. It would not warrant the recusal of the judge. See Jaffree, 837 F.2d at 1465. Consequently, Bagwell's motion for recusal will be denied.
The grounds urged for recusal in this case consist ofjudicial rulings occurring in the course of judicial proceedings. Bagwell failed to set forth any allegation sufficient to show pervasive bias or prejudice by otherwise inappropriate judicial conduct. There is no indication of any sort that my impartiality will be reasonably questioned by the parties or any other reasonable person.
For these reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiffs Motion for Recusal (DI. 4) is DENIED.