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denying Rule 54(b) certification solely because the dismissed claims arose from the same factual allegations as the pending claims of the remaining plaintiffs
Summary of this case from Reed v. Gulf Coast Enters.Opinion
Case No. 2:06-CV-99.
August 10, 2007
OPINION ORDER
This matter comes before the Court for consideration of a Motion for Entry of Final Judgment and for Immediate Interlocutory Appeal (Doc. # 76) filed by Plaintiff Amy Baden-Winterwood ("Plaintiff"), a memorandum in opposition (Doc. # 78) filed by Defendant Life Time Fitness ("Defendant"), and a reply. (Doc. # 79.) For the reasons that follow, this Court denies Plaintiff's motion. (Doc. # 76.)
A. Background
In this Court's July 10, 2007 Opinion and Order (Doc. # 75), this Court found that Defendant violated the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") for the pay periods of November 9, November 23, and December 9, 2005. This Court limited Plaintiffs' relief under the FLSA to the these three specific pay periods when actual deductions were taken from paychecks. The Opinion and Order dismissed the claims of ten other Plaintiffs.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), Plaintiff now asks this Court to certify its judgment as final as to the ten Plaintiffs whose claims this Court dismissed to allow for an interlocutory appeal. Additionally, Plaintiff seeks pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) for this Court to certify its judgment as final to allow an interlocutory appeal for the remaining Plaintiffs.
B. Discussion
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)The appellate jurisdiction of circuit courts is generally limited to reviewing a district court's final judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). Congress recognized, however, in exceptional circumstances "that the orderly administration of justice is frustrated when parties are forced to grind forward to final judgment before they can challenge the correctness of some isolated, but determinative, question of law." West Tennessee Chapter of Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1018 (W.D.Tenn. 2000); see also Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Ins. Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 825, 831 (N.D.Ohio 1998). To address these rare situations, Congress created the interlocutory appeal to permit immediate appellate review of an order that does not dispose of the case on its merits. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Thus, a court's power to certify a judgment to permit an interlocutory appeal under § 1292(b) should be sparingly applied. Cardwell v. Chesapeake Ohio Ry. Co. 504 F.2d 444, 446 (6th Cir. 1974) (noting that "[section 1292(b)] is to be used only in exceptional cases where an intermediate appeal may avoid protracted and expensive litigation and is not intended to open the floodgates to a vast number of appeals from interlocutory orders in ordinary litigation." (quoting Milbert v. Bison Laboratories, 260 F.2d 431, 433 (3rd Cir. 1958))).
Section 1292(b) states in pertinent part that:
[w]hen a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, That application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.
Therefore, under § 1292(b), a court may certify a judgment to allow an interlocutory appeal when its decision (1) involves a controlling question of law, (2) there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion about the controlling question, and (3) an immediate appeal would materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Vitols v. Citizens Banking Co., 984 F.2d 168, 170 (6th Cir. 1993) (per curium); see also West Tennessee Chapter of Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 2d at 1018.
With respect to prong one an issue is controlling if its resolution could materially affect the litigation's outcome. West Tennessee Chapter of Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 2d at 1018-19 (internal citations omitted); see also Rafoth v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 954 F.2d 1169, 1172 n. 8 (6th Cir. 1992). In addition, an issue may be considered controlling if its resolution on appeal has precedential value, if it is central to liability, if it could result in a reversal of a district court's final judgment, or if it would save the court and the litigants substantial time and resources. West Tennessee Chapter of Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 2d at 1018-19 (internal citations omitted); see also Rafoth, 954 F.2d at 1172 n. 8.
Here, the parties do not dispute that prong one is met. The issue Plaintiff seeks to appeal — whether this Court correctly limited Plaintiffs' relief under the FLSA to three specific pay periods — is a controlling question of law. Resolution on appeal implicates 29 C.F.R. § 541.603, the Department of Labor's ("DOL") most recent interpretation of the salary-basis test as defined by the Supreme Court in Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), and is central to Defendant's liability in this case.
In regard to prong two, the issue for the Court is whether there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion about the controlling question of law. Plaintiff contends that because this Court was the first to consider the DOL's most recent interpretation of the salary-basis test, a substantial ground for the difference of opinion exists. This Court disagrees.
There must be serious doubt as to how an issue should be decided in order for there to be a substantial ground for the difference of opinion. See Kraus v. Board of County Road Com'rs for Kent County, 364 F.2d 919, 921 (6th Cir. 1966); U.S. v. Atlas Lederer Co., 174 F. Supp. 2d 666, 669 (S.D.Ohio 2001). A substantial ground for difference of opinion exists only when (1) the issue is difficult and of first impression or (2) a difference of opinion exists within the controlling circuit, or (3) the circuits are split on the issue. West Tennessee Chapter of Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 2d at 1018 (internal citations omitted); see also Rafoth, 954 F.2d at 1172; Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 921 F.2d 21, 25 (2nd Cir. 1990); German v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp 896 F. Supp. 1385, 1399 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
The fact that this Court addressed an issue of first impression in its July 10, 2007 Opinion and Order (Doc. # 75) does nothing to demonstrate a substantial ground for a difference of opinion as to the correctness of that ruling. Atlas Lederer Co., 174 F. Supp. 2d at 669 (citing In re Flor, 79 F.3d 281, 284 (2nd Cir. 1996) (noting that "the mere presence of a disputed issue that is a question of first impression, standing alone, is insufficient to demonstrate a substantial ground for difference of opinion")); see Irridium Operating LLC v. Motorola, Inc. No. 99-45005 CB, 01-02952, M 47 WHP, 2003 WL 21507196, *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2003) (stating that a substantial ground for a difference of opinion is shown when "the issue is difficult and of first impression and involves more than just a strong disagreement among the parties"). Moreover, a substantial ground for a difference of opinion cannot be established when the relevant statute's text is unambiguous and the Court's decision adheres to the plain meaning of the statute. Atlas Lederer Co., 174 F. Supp. 2d at 670 (S.D.Ohio 2001) (finding that there is no room for a difference of opinion when "the words of the statute are unambiguous[, rather] "the judicial inquiry is at an end, and the plain meaning of the text must be enforced").
Here, the Court found that the issue regarding the period of time during which Plaintiffs may recover damages was not difficult. Rather this Court found that "the plain meaning of the new regulations, together with the deference given to the Secretary of Labor in Auer, provided ample guidance on how to decide the issue. (Doc. # 75 at 14.) In light of these considerations, there is no basis for this Court to find that there is a substantial ground for a difference of opinion and thus expect that the Sixth Circuit would reach a different conclusion.
Although, Plaintiff disagrees with this Court's conclusion regarding Plaintiffs relief, that does not constitute a substantial disagreement. Kelly v. Great Seneca Financial Corp., NO. 1:04-CV-615, 2005 WL 2372851, *3 (S.D.Ohio Sept. 27, 2005) (stating that a difference of opinion as to whether the case was correctly decided is not the legal test for determining whether a substantial ground for a difference of opinion exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)); see also Genesis Ins. Co. v. Alfi, No. 2:05-cv-401, 2007 WL 928664, *2 (S.D.Ohio March 27, 2007) (stating that "[A]lthough Defendants take issue with the application of the facts to the law, this does not transform the Court's decision into one warranting relief under § 1292(b))."
In light of this Court's finding that there is no substantial ground for a difference of opinion in the present case, this Court need not consider whether an immediate appeal would materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Atlas Lederer Co., 174 F. Supp. 2d at 671 (having found no substantial ground for a difference of opinion, the Court did not consider whether the other two requirements for certification of an immediate appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) were satisfied). This Court therefore denies Plaintiff's request under § 1292(b) for this Court to certify its judgment as final.
2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), Plaintiff also asks this Court to certify its judgment as final as the ten Plaintiffs whose claims this Court dismissed to allow for an interlocutory appeal. That rule provides:
(b) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
The rule is specifically "designed to facilitate the entry of judgment on one or more claims, or as to one or more parties, in a multi-claim/multi-party action." Solomon v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 782 F.2d 58, 60 (6th Cir. 1986). Certification for appellate review prior to the ultimate disposition of the case is only justified in extraordinary cases. Rudd Const. Equipment Co., Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 711 F.2d 54, 56 (6th Cir. 1983) (stating that it is an infrequent harsh case that justifies certification for appellate review under Rule 54(b)); see also General Acquisition v. Gencorp, Inc., 23 F.3d 1022, 1026-1027 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that "[A]lthough Rule 54(b) relaxes the traditional finality requirement for appellate review, it does not tolerate immediate appeal of every action taken by a district court.").
Rule 54(b) certification requires two independent findings. First, the Court must expressly "direct the entry of final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all the claims or parties" in a case. Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Second, the district court must "expressly determine that there is no just reason" to delay appellate review. Id.
The first step in certification is entry of partial final judgment. This step, sometimes termed "direction" of partial final judgment, is satisfied where there is more than one claim, more than one party or both, and there is some decision of the court that disposes of one or more but fewer than all the claims in a case. General Acquisition, Inc., 23 F.3d at 1026. Here, this Court's Opinion Order (# 75) dismissed the claims of ten Plaintiffs and limited the relief of the remaining Plaintiffs. Consequently, the first step of Rule 54(b) certification, is satisfied.
As stated above, the second step in a Rule 54(b) certification analysis also requires the Court to expressly determine that there is no just reason to delay appellate review. This step demands that the Court balance the needs of the parties against the interests of efficient case management.
In determining whether there is no just reason for delay, the Court may consider many legal and practical factors. A non-exhaustive list of factors that the Court should consider when making a Rule 54(b) determination include: (1) the relationship between the dismissed and pending claims; (2) the possibility that the need for review might or might not be mooted by future developments in the district court; (3) the possibility that the reviewing court might be obliged to consider the same issue a second time; (4) the presence or absence of a claim or counterclaim which could result in set-off against the judgment sought to be made final; (5) miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims, expense and the like. General Acquisition, 23 F.3d at 1030 (internal citations omitted).
The general rule disfavoring piecemeal federal appellate review allows only truly separable claims to be presented for review while others in the same case remain pending. Curtiss-Wright v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980) (stating that "[N]ot all final judgments on individual claims should be immediately appealable, even if they are in some sense separable from the remaining unresolved claims."); see also Justice v. Pendleton Place Apartments, 40 F.3d 139, 141 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting with respect to "the relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims-they should generally be separate and independent so that the appellate court will not have to consider the same issues again if a second appeal is brought"); Lowery v. Federal Exp. Corp., 426 F.3d 817, 823 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that the commonality in operative facts between dismissed and pending claims militated against immediate review).
Here, this Court finds that the dismissed claims arise from the same factual allegations as the pending claims of the remaining Plaintiffs. Judicial economy will be best served by delaying the appeal until the case is completed in order to present the case to the Sixth Circuit in a unified package. Solomon, 782 F.2d at 62 (stating that "[W]e think judicial economy will best be served by delaying appeal until all the issues can be confronted by this Court in a unified package. This is particularly true where the adjudicated and pending claims are closely related and stem from essentially the same factual allegations.").
This case does not present extraordinary circumstances that warrant a piecemeal review. Thus, the Court, after considering the above factors, and utilizing its discretion, cannot hold that there is no just reason to delay appellate review. The Court therefore also denies Plaintiff's Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) request.
C. Conclusion
For the reasons aforementioned, this Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion. (Doc. # 76.) This matter will be scheduled for a telephone status conference on September 5, 2007 at 9:00 a.m. Counsel for Defendant shall initiate the telephone call.
IT IS SO ORDERED.