Opinion
No. 00 Civ. 4508 (CBM).
June 30, 2003.
Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, Michael De Larco, of Counsel, Attorney for Defendant City of New York, Nicholas Scopetta, Imeh Umoh and John and Jane Doe.
Gloria B. Dann, Quirk and Bakalor, P.C., Attorney for Defendant Graham Windam, Inc., and Paul Jensen.
Sandor D. Krasass. Esq., Fasulo, Shalley DiMaggio, LLP., Attorney for Plaintiff.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Edward L. Baca is an HIV-positive homosexual man who served admirably as a foster parent to three young children (Miguel, Efrain and Andrew, collectively, "the children") under the supervision of defendant Graham Windham, Inc. ("GW"), an agency to whom defendant City of New York ("the City") contracts out some of its foster care services. By order of the New York State Family Court for New York County ("the Family Court"), the biological grandmother was awarded custody of the children after having been in plaintiff's care for more than a year. Mr. Baca has sued GW and its chief executive officer, Poul Jensen, the City of New York ("the City") and Nicholas Scopetta, the Commissioner of the Administration for Children's Services ("ACS"), the City agency responsible for overseeing children in foster care. In addition, Mr. Baca has sued Imeh Umoh, the ACS/GW employee who completed the Court Ordered Investigation reports ("COIs") requested by the Family Court. Plaintiff claims that all of the defendants discriminated against him based on his sexual orientation, and he brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985(2), 1985(3), 1986 as well as New York City Human Rights Law, Section 8-107 of the New York City Administrative Code.
For the reasons that follow, the court grants defendants' motion and dismisses plaintiff's federal claims in their entirety.
BACKGROUND
The facts recited below are drawn from the complaint as well as plaintiff's Statement of Disputed Facts Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1 ("56.1 Statement"). The court notes that plaintiff's 56.1 Statement is difficult to follow as several of the statements therein are not supported by the materials cited.See, e.g., Pl.'s 56.1 Statement, ¶ 125 (citation to page six of Pl.'s Ex. J, which is only four pages long); id., ¶ 65 (citation to page 3 of Pl.'s Ex. 13, which is one page long, and appears to be the wrong document); id., ¶ 76 (citation to page 35 of Ex. O, which has no page 35; in addition, it appears to be deposition transcript, but there is no identification of the person being deposed). The court has disregarded those facts not supported by the materials.
This action arises out of the series of interactions between plaintiff and defendants during the period of time he was entrusted with the care of the children as their foster father, under the supervision of GW.
Mr. Baca came to know the family in question in 1992 through one of his employees, Efrain D. Efrain D. was living with Jacqueline Nieves, the biological mother of the children, who at the time had only one child, Miguel. Efrain D. and Ms. Nieves lived with plaintiff from time to time, when they were thrown out of the home of Jacqueline's mother, Iris Perez. Plaintiff assisted Efrain D. and Ms. Nieves in finding temporary housing. They in turn asked Mr. Baca to be Miguel's godfather, and he agreed. Two years later, Ms. Nieves gave birth to Efrain Jr.
Efrain D. is mentioned only in the Complaint, which referred to individuals related to this case only by their first names in order to protect the privacy of the minor children. Plaintiff's 56.1 statement, however, used full names.
Efrain D. was incarcerated in 1996, and Ms. Nieves commenced a relationship with another man, Heribierto. In 1997, plaintiff bought a three family house on West 110th Street and invited Ms. Nieves to live there with Miguel and Efrain Jr. She accepted his invitation. Mr. Baca developed a close relationship with the children. Heribierto did not live in the house with Ms. Nieves but came by frequently, over Mr. Baca's objection.
During the time that he knew the children, Mr. Baca had been concerned about bruises and cuts that appeared on their persons, and he called ACS on more than one occasion. ACS investigated several times but determined the reports to be without foundation and so took no further action. In January of 1998, however, after plaintiff reported another instance of abuse, this time at Ms. Nieves's hands, ACS removed the children and placed them in temporary foster care. Ms. Nieves attempted to have the children placed with her mother, Ms. Perez, but ACS refused, according to plaintiff, because Ms. Perez was living with a drug dealer. The children were moved more than once, finally resulting in a temporary placement with a foster mother, Leticia Correra. Ms. Nieves gave birth to her third child, Andrew, who was placed with Ms. Correra as well.
In March of 1998, plaintiff filed a custody petition in Family Court, which was granted on September 11, 1998. According to plaintiff, GW treated him in a discriminatory fashion from the start. After the petition was granted but before he actually took the children in, the GW caseworker assigned to the children, Joy Felix inquired of him how living with "a person like you," a homosexual, would affect the children. Ms. Felix wrote to plaintiff telling him that he needed to procure a crib, for which he would be reimbursed by GW, and that he would be provided with the children's school information. Neither the crib funds nor the school data appeared. When plaintiff called GW to inquire about the times for training sessions (required of all prospective foster parents) he was told he would be notified of the next session. GW did not so-notify him and instead, he called to inquire without giving his name, was told the time for the next session and simply showed up.
When plaintiff arrived to pick up the children on September 17, 1998, GW provided no documentation or clothing for them. Later, GW failed to assist plaintiff in processing applications for funds available from the Agency for Child Development (ACD) or the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC). Ms. Felix, according to plaintiff, denied Mr. Baca reimbursement for the children's clothing, transportation and health care. Furthermore, GW did not cover the full cost of Andrew's room and board and eventually the Family Court ordered it to do so.
All of the parties to this action referred to these programs in their papers by their acronyms only. The court located the actual names on the internet and assumes them to be correct.
The relationship between Ms. Felix and Mr. Baca continued to deteriorate. On one of her home visits, she interviewed the children, asking about whether plaintiff brought men home, whether he had sex in front of them and whether he had molested them. On March 4, 1999, Ms. Felix and GW filed a notice of intent to remove the children ("notice of removal") from Mr. Baca's home within ten days. This notice of removal did not inform Mr. Baca of the reason for the action, and he subsequently requested an independent review regarding the removal of the children. The ACS Decision After Independent Review questioned why Mr. Baca was not provided a reason for the removal, but also expressed "grave concerns about the foster father." DeLarco Decl., Ex. 6 ("Independent Review") at 7. Apparently, Mr. Baca had sent Andrew, the infant, to live with Ms. Correra for several days at a time. Id. at 5-6. Whereas Mr. Baca described this as akin to "hiring a nanny," the Independent Review described it as "farm[ing] this child out."Id. at 7.
On May 17, 1999, ACS sent Mr. Baca a letter informing him that he was being investigated based on reports that he had abused Andrew. This report was later determined to be unfounded. On June 11, 1999 Ms. Perez, the children's maternal grandmother, petitioned for their custody. Three separate court ordered investigations were conducted and each resulted in a report. The first was presumably prepared by an ACS caseworker but does not indicate the identity of its author, Krauss Decl., Ex. 6 ("anonymous COI"); the second two were prepared by Mr. Umoh. DeLarco Decl., Ex.s 11, 13 ("COI" and "updated COI" respectively). Each recorded the remarks of both Ms. Perez and Ms. Nieves disapproving, in offensive terms, of Mr. Baca's sexual orientation, and Mr. Umoh's updated COI recommended that the children be placed in the care of their grandmother. After considering the petition and the COI's and expressing her disapproval of GW's treatment of Mr. Baca on the record, Family Court Judge Sarah Schechter awarded custody of the children to Ms. Perez.
Plaintiff asserts that the author of the anonymous COI is Raquel Wallen, an ACS caseworker, but provides no support for that claim beyond citing the unsigned document. Pl.'s 56.1 Statement, ¶ 62 (citing only Pl.'s Ex. 6, the anonymous COI).
LEGAL STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment should only be granted when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c);Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 n. 4 (1986). "[G]enuineness runs to whether disputed factual issues can reasonably be resolved in favor of either party, [while] materiality runs to whether the dispute matters, i.e., whether it concerns facts that can affect the outcome under the applicable substantive law." Mitchell v. Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
In order to prove that a genuine issue of material fact exists, a plaintiff "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleading[s]," but must by affidavit or otherwise "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324; Twin Lab, Inc. v. Weider Health Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1990). In this vein, the Second Circuit has noted that "conclusory statements, conjecture or speculation by the party resisting the motion will not defeat summary judgment."Kulak v. City of New York, 88 F.3d 63, 71 (2d Cir. 1996). Of course, this standard applies with equal force in discrimination cases as it would in any other case in the federal courts. See Ashton v. Pall Corp., 32 F. Supp.2d 82, 87 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) ("the salutary purposes of summary judgment — avoiding protracted, expensive and harassing trials — apply no less to discrimination cases than to commercial or other areas of litigation" (internal quotations and citation omitted)). Thus, courts within the Second Circuit "have not hesitated to grant defendants summary judgment in such cases where . . . plaintiff has offered little or no evidence of discrimination." Scaria v. Rubin, 1996 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 9659, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (Peck, M.J.),aff'd, 117 F.3d 652 (2d Cir. 1997).
In assessing the record to determine whether genuine issues of material fact are in dispute, courts must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Nora Beverages. Inc. v. Perrier Group of Am., Inc., 164 F.3d 736, 742 (2d Cir. 1998). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of genuine issues of material fact. See Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1997). However, if the m moving party meets its initial burden, the non-moving party may not rely on conclusory allegations or speculation to create factual disputes. Instead, the non-moving party "must produce specific facts indicating that a genuine issue of fact exists. If the evidence [presented by the non-moving party] is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Scotto Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (alteration in original).
DISCUSSION
Mr. Baca's claims can be roughly categorized into four areas: first, defendants discriminated against him in failing to provide services and funds in connection with his care for the children; second, defendants discriminated against him by filing a ten day notice of removal and by investigating reported instances of child abuse, in both instances refusing to provide the basis for their actions; third, defendants discriminated against him in reports submitted to the family court (the COIs); and finally, defendants exposed him to a hostile work environment by not addressing the offensive comments and behavior of the childrens' other caretakers (Ms. Nieves, Ms. Perez and Ms. Correra) and by assigning to supervise him a caseworker, Ms. Felix, who asked the children inappropriate and offensive questions and who otherwise made clear her distaste for Mr. Baca's sexual orientation. The first three claims of discrimination sound under the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the final claim is brought pursuant to New York City Human Rights Law.
Defendants have moved for summary judgment, raising a number of arguments in their defense. They have raised a jurisdictional defense under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; the court will address that issue first, moving on to the remaining substantive arguments thereafter.
The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The City argues that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Under that doctrine, developed from two Supreme Court cases, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust, 263 U.S. 413 (1923) andDistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), a federal district court lacks jurisdiction over cases that effectively seek direct or indirect review of state court judgments. Only the United States Supreme Court can hear appeals from state court judgments; federal district courts may not consider claims to reverse or modify state court holdings, as well as claims "inextricably intertwined with" prior state court determinations. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n. 16. In addition, under New York law "the party against whom the doctrine is asserted [must have] had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first proceeding." Phifer v. City of New York, 289 F.3d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 2002); Moccio v. New York State Office of Court Administration, 95 F.3d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1996). In the instant case, the Family Court decided that the children should live with their maternal grandmother, the City asserts, and so plaintiff's claim for money damages as a result of losing custody is barred. Allowing it to go forward would represent a challenge to the Family Court's determination.
The court is guided in its analysis primarily by the Second Circuit's recent decision in Phifer, which applied theRooker-Feldman doctrine in the context of Family Court custody disputes. In that case, the plaintiff was the biological mother of a child, Amkia, who was sent to the hospital in urgent need of a blood transfusion. Phifer, 289 F.3d at 53. The medical staff at the hospital, concerned that Phifer was trying to take Amkia home before it was safe to do so, filed two successive reports of suspected child mistreatment with ACS.Id. When the case was heard in Family Court, both in a section 1028 hearing (required pursuant to section 1028 of the Family Court Act within three days after a child has been removed from the custody of her parent) and a subsequent habeas hearing, the judge found that Phifer had neglected Amkia and that she would be in imminent risk to her health and life if she were returned to her mother's care. Phifer sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the Consitution. Id. at 54. The district court dismissed Phifer's claims pursuant to theRooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. at 55.
The court also found Judge Sand's thorough and thoughtful decision in Park v. The City of New York, 2003 WL 133232, at 10-11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2003) to be quite helpful. That decision applies the Phifer analysis to a broad set of claims.Id. at 7.
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling with respect to Phifer's claims which called into question the Family Court's custody determination, id. at 57, but reversed with respect to Phifer's claims of discrimination in the City's initial decision to remove the children, prior to the Family Court hearing. Id. at 58. In the instant case, unlike inPhifer, plaintiff does not directly challenge the Family Court's custody decision. Rather, he seeks damages based on Mr. Umoh's COI and updated COI upon which the court presumably relied in making its final determination which, plaintiff claims, is evidence of Mr. Umoh's anti-gay bias. The amended COI contains Ms. Perez's accusation that while the children were in Mr. Baca's care they were exposed to a drag show, to a man who "opened his pants from the waist (and) looked inside his pant [sic] and said, `Oh where is my thing, I might have missed it somewhere,'" as well as Ms. Perez's allegation that she saw one of her children "stick out his tongue and lick the air close to his brother's bottom." Updated COI at 1. The updated COI concludes with the recommendation that "for the best interest and welfare of the subject children . . . ACS recommends that petitioner, Ms. Iris Perez (MGM) be awarded custody of all the three subject children." There is nothing further in the updated COI.
Putting aside momentarily the question of whether the updated COI is in fact evidence of discrimination (since it merely reports Ms. Perez's comments and makes a recommendation in the best interest of the children), the court must first determine whether the recommendations in the updated COI are distinguishable from the Family Court's final determination in its order awarding custody of the children to Ms. Perez. The Family Court's order states that its first consideration was whether the placement of the children with Ms. Perez "is in the children's best interests. . . ." DeLarco Decl., Ex. 15 ("Family Court Order") at 2. To the extent that the updated COI and the Family Court order list the same reasons for placing the children with Ms. Perez, to challenge the updated COI with respect to its recommendation would be to challenge the Family Court Order. Rooker-Feldman prohibits that sort of challenge.See Park, 2003 WL 133232. Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel at the Family Court hearing prior to the issuance of the Family Court Order, had a full and fair opportunity to litigate this custody question in Family Court. See DeLarco Decl., Ex. 15 (Transcript of Family Court Hearing, March 14, 2000) at 1 (cover sheet showing that Mr. Baca was present and represented by counsel); see also Family Court Order at 2 ("Notice of the [grandmother's custody] petition having been duly given to the foster parent, . . . the agency . . . and all such persons appearing have been given an opportunity to he heard. . . .") Accordingly, plaintiff's claims against Mr. Umoh, GW and the City based on losing custody are barred in this action.
Equal Protection Claims
That the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents Mr. Baca from seeking damages based on losing custody does not end this case, however; it does not even end the inquiry into whether Mr. Baca has an Equal Protection claim against the defendants, including Mr. Umoh. Both Phifer and Park declined to dismiss, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, those claims that were not considered by the Family Court. See Phifer, 239 F.3d at 58-59;Park, 2003 WL 133232, at *12-13. In the instant case, while Mr. Baca had an opportunity to litigate the issue of whether Mr. Umoh's report came to a proper and fair recommendation with respect to the custody issue, he was not entitled to argue that the COI or the updated COI violated his rights to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, the Family Court does not have jurisdiction over such claims. See N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 13.
Plaintiff has satisfied the most basic prerequisites of a section 1983 claim: "(1) the defendant[s] acted under color of state law; and (2) as a result of the defendant[s'] actions, the plaintiff suffered a denial of [his] federal statutory rights, or [his] constitutional rights or privileges." Annis v. County of Westchester, 136 F.3d 239, 245 (2d Cir. 1998). Neither the City nor GW disputes that it is a state actor. Both parties deny, however, that plaintiff has a valid equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court agrees.
Services and Funds
"To state a claim for an equal protection violation, [plaintiffs] must allege that a government actor intentionally discriminated against them on the basis of race, national origin or gender." Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1999). More specifically, when there is a claim of selective treatment, plaintiffs must show that "they were selectively treated compared with other similarly situated" individuals. Knight v. Connecticut Dep't of Public Health, 275 F.3d 156, 166 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740, 750 (2d Cir. 2001) (selective treatment claim must show that "(1) the person, compared with others similarly situated was selectively treated; and (2) that such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations. . . ." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
With regard to plaintiff's claims that defendants failed to provide him services and funds, specifically, the funds for Andrew's crib and the children's clothing, assistance filling out ACD and WIC applications, the cost of room and board, and school information, plaintiff has failed to offer even a single heterosexual foster parent who received those or similar services and funds from defendants. Counsel for plaintiff argued that "we do not have the names of non-homosexual foster parents, but I don't think it is incumbent on my client to get those names considering that it's implicit that if Graham Windham followed their own rules and regulations, they were to provide these benefits to homosexuals or non-homosexuals." Tr. of Oral Argument, May 7, 2003 at 26-27. Whether GW in fact violated its rules is a matter of dispute, but even assuming that it did, such a violation alone does not implicate the Fourteenth Amendment. As counsel for GW observed, "[Mr. Baca] was treated the way every other foster parent was treated. And that's not to say that the bureaucracy moves the applications along with lightning speed, but there is absolutely no evidence . . . that anything that was delayed was delayed because of [Mr. Baca's] sexual orientation." Id. at 18.
In light of plaintiff s failure to cite a similarly situated non-homosexual individual who was treated differently, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to plaintiffs' claims that he was denied services and funds.
Notice of Removal and Reports of Abuse
Plaintiff's claims that he suffered discrimination when GW filed the notice of removal and investigated reports of child abuse without providing him the basis for their actions are supported neither by the facts nor the law. With regard to the notice of removal, while it is true that the notice itself does not provide a reason, Mr. Baca had been notified previously by letter that "[i]f you continue to disregard the agency rules and regulations [by boarding Andrew with Ms. Correra] this may result [in] the removal of the children from your home." Dunn. Affirmation, Ex. X. With respect to the allegations of abuse, it is clear that GW and Ms. Felix are entitled to immunity from civil liability under New York law. See N.Y. Soc. Serv. § 419;Diaz v. Montefiore Medical Center Henry Lucy Moses Div., 299 A.D.2d 254, 255 (1st Dep't 2002); see also Miller v. Beck, 82 A.D.2d 912, 913 (2d Dep't 1981) ("Section 419 provides immunity from civil liability when the report is made in good faith, which, under the statute, is presumed . . . Where, as here, a defendant's statements are presumptively privileged, either by statutory mandate or at common law, they are actionable only if the plaintiff can prove their falsehood and that the defendant was motivated by actual malice or ill-will. Plaintiff, in support of this burden, must submit evidence; suspicion, surmise or accusations will not suffice" (citations omitted)). Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to the notice of removal and reports and investigations of child abuse.
Court Ordered Investigations
Plaintiff claims that the COIs submitted to the court were biased against him as a homosexual to the extent that they included the accusations of Ms. Nieves and Ms. Perez without verifying the truth of those accusations. Defendants, however, ably demonstrate that Mr. Umoh had no obligation to explore the truth of those allegations, since the purpose of the investigation was to determine whether Ms. Nieves or Ms. Perez would be suitable care-givers to the children, not to evaluate Mr. Baca. None of the homophobic comments made in the COI or the updated COI originated with Mr. Umoh. Rather, they were made by the two subjects of the investigations, Ms. Perez and Ms. Nieves. In fact, those comments constitute relevant evidence for a Family Court judge to consider in evaluation potential guardians. Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to the COIs. Remaining Federal Claims
Additionally, Mr. Umoh is likely entitled to absolute immunity, to the extent that his acts in investigating and submitting the COIs were "intimately associated" with the judicial process. See Ernest v. Child and Yourth Services of Chester County, 108 F.3d 486 (3d Cir. 1997). The Second Circuit has not yet ruled on whether ACS caseworkers engaged in court ordered investigations are entitled to absolute immunity. But cf. Dorman v. Higgins, 821 F.2d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that probation officers preparing presentence reports are entitled to absolute immunity). The Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits are in accord with the Third Circuit's decision in Ernest. See Ernest, 108 F.3d 495 (collecting cases from other circuits).
Plaintiff concedes that his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and 1986 are not cognizable. See Pl.'s Mem. in Opp. at 25 n. 5. Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to those claims.
In fact, plaintiff concedes only that his claims under section 1985(3) and 1986 are not cognizable; he makes no reference to his claims under section 1985(2), which section is listed under his third and sixth cause of action. Complaint, pp. 18, 19. Plaintiff has not offered any facts which would constitute a violation of section 1985(2) (which relates to the obstruction of justice or tampering with witnesses or jurors); he did not allege any such facts in his complaint; and he does not oppose defendants' motion relating to section 1985(2). The court concludes that it was a clerical error to include it in the complaint. In any event, defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) is granted without opposition and on the merits.
Hostile Environment Claims
The court has now granted summary judgment in favor of defendants with respect to every one of plaintiff's federal claims. Mr. Baca's remaining claims of a hostile environment are brought pursuant to New York City Human Rights Law. See Complaint, ¶ 95-100. It is within the court's discretion to decide whether or not to exercise jurisdiction over pendent state law claims. Tops Market. Inc. v. Quality Markets, Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 103 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)). "The Supreme Court in Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988), announced that when all federal claims are eliminated in the early stages of litigation, the balance of factors generally favors declining to exercise pendent jurisdiction over remaining state law claims and dismissing them without prejudice." Tops Market, Inc., 142 F.3d 103. Accordingly, the court declines to exercise pendent jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims brought pursuant to section 8-107 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York. Those claims are dismissed without prejudice. See Morse v. University of Vt., 973 F.2d 122, 128 (2d Cir. 1992).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants the motions for summary judgment by the City and GW defendants with respect to all of plaintiff's federal claims, and dismisses those claims in their entirety. The court declines to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims brought under the Administrative Code of New York City.