Opinion
2014-10422
08-12-2015
AURORA LOAN SERVICES, LLC, respondent, v. Mario LUCERO, et al., defendants, Rosa Soto, appellant.
Lizarraga Law Firm, PLLC, Jackson Heights, N.Y. (William R. Lizarraga of counsel), for appellant. Davidson Fink, LLP, Rochester, N.Y. (Larry T. Powell of counsel), for respondent.
Lizarraga Law Firm, PLLC, Jackson Heights, N.Y. (William R. Lizarraga of counsel), for appellant.
Davidson Fink, LLP, Rochester, N.Y. (Larry T. Powell of counsel), for respondent.
Opinion In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendant Rosa Soto appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Kitzes, J.), dated May 30, 2014, which denied her motion to vacate her default in appearing or answering and for leave to serve a late answer.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
“ ‘A defendant seeking to vacate a default in answering a complaint and to compel the plaintiff to accept an untimely answer as timely must show both a reasonable excuse for the default and the existence of a potentially meritorious defense’ ” (Emigrant Bank v. Wiseman, 127 A.D.3d 1013, 1014, 6 N.Y.S.3d 670, quoting Chase Home Fin., LLC v. Minott, 115 A.D.3d 634, 634, 981 N.Y.S.2d 757 ). Here, the defendant Rosa Soto failed to establish a reasonable excuse for her default. Soto's bare and unsubstantiated denial of service lacked the factual specificity and detail required to rebut the prima facie proof of proper service set forth in the affidavit of service of the plaintiff's process server (see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Quinones, 114 A.D.3d 719, 719, 981 N.Y.S.2d 107 ; Bank of New York v. Samuels, 107 A.D.3d 653, 653, 968 N.Y.S.2d 93 ; Reich v. Redley, 96 A.D.3d 1038, 1038, 947 N.Y.S.2d 564 ). Moreover, Soto's conclusory, undetailed, and uncorroborated allegation of law office failure did not constitute a reasonable excuse (see Neilson v. 6D Farm Corp., 123 A.D.3d 676, 679, 998 N.Y.S.2d 397 ; Forward Door of N.Y., Inc. v. Forlader, 41 A.D.3d 535, 836 N.Y.S.2d 440 ; Piton v. Cribb, 38 A.D.3d 741, 742, 832 N.Y.S.2d 274 ).
Since Soto failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse, it is unnecessary to consider whether she sufficiently demonstrated the existence of a potentially meritorious defense (see Emigrant Bank v. O. Carl Wiseman, 127 A.D.3d 1013, 1013, 6 N.Y.S.3d 670 ; HSBC Bank USA, v. Rotimi, 121 A.D.3d 855, 855, 995 N.Y.S.2d 81 ; Capital Source v. AKO Med., P.C., 110 A.D.3d 1026, 1026, 973 N.Y.S.2d 794 ; Trepel v. Greenman–Pedersen, Inc., 99 A.D.3d 789, 952 N.Y.S.2d 227 ; Tribeca Lending Corp. v. Correa, 92 A.D.3d 770, 771, 938 N.Y.S.2d 599 ).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying Soto's motion to vacate her default in appearing or answering and for leave to serve a late answer.
RIVERA, J.P., DICKERSON, HINDS–RADIX and BARROS, JJ., concur.