Summary
In Atlanta Life Insurance Co. v. Mason, 89 Ga. App. 319 (79 S.E.2d 352) this court said: "Where a party offers himself as a witness in his own behalf, his testimony which is self-contradictory, vague or equivocal is construed most strongly against him."
Summary of this case from Phillips v. Royal Indemnity Co.Opinion
34901.
DECIDED DECEMBER 3, 1953.
Action on contract. Before Judge Alexander. Savannah City Court. August 19, 1953.
Lewis L. Scott, for plaintiff in error.
Michael J. Gannam, contra.
The defendant admitted the execution of the contract sued on and failed, by proof, to sustain his defense that the contract was void because he entered into its execution under duress; therefore, the evidence did not authorize a verdict for the defendant and the court erred in denying the plaintiff's motion for new trial.
DECIDED DECEMBER 3, 1953.
Atlanta Life Insurance Company sued A. A. Mason on an alleged contract. The petition alleged: "Plaintiff states that the defendant is indebted to it in the sum of $506.75 by reason hereof and as shown by a contract executed by said defendant on the 6th day of June, 1952. A copy of which contract is attached herewith and made a part hereof as if written wholly herein, marked exhibit `A'. Plaintiff states that the above sum is due and no part of which has been paid notwithstanding demands have been made upon the defendant for the payment of same." Exhibit A attached to the petition reads: "Be it known that I the undersigned, A. A. Mason, do agree to pay to the Atlanta Life Insurance Company at its office located at 705 1/2 West Broad Street, Savannah, Georgia, the sum of $506.75. The payments to be made as follows beginning August first, 1952. Twenty-three (23) installments of $21.11 and one payment amounting to $21.22. The payments to be made the first day of each month until the deficiency of $506.75 charged against me is cleared."
The defendant by answer denied the material allegations of the petition and by way of cross-action alleged as follows: "Plaintiff company is indebted to defendant in the sum of $452.73. That aforesaid indebtedness arose in the following manner: defendant's entire reserve fund consisting of $32.00 was confiscated by plaintiff company without cause; plaintiff illegally withheld $25.00 from defendant's final pay check, at the time he terminated his employment; $395.73 which defendant paid into the account in excess of collections from time to time by direction and upon the insistence of his employer, the company; plaintiff insisted that defendant make these payments covering lapsed and non-paid premiums in order to be allowed to continue on his job from November 5, 1951 to June 6, 1952, when defendant finally terminated his employment with the plaintiff company."
The defendant amended his answer as follows: "Defendant avers that the contract sued on, dated June 6, 1952, copy of which is attached to the petition is void, illegal, and of no force and effect in that it was procured under duress and coercion and is not supported by valid legal consideration. Defendant avers that he was coerced into signing said contract by threats of criminal prosecution and alleged larceny, which he denies, but at that time was not cognizant of his legal rights and was in fear of a criminal warrant being issued and arrested. Defendant shows that there was no defalcation on his part, that the sum claimed by plaintiff merely represented debits due by the insured and which were permitted by the plaintiff to accumulate and which sums were never collected by said defendant."
No demurrers were filed by either party. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant on the main action and for the insurance company on the defendant's cross-action. The plaintiff insurance company moved for a new trial, which motion was denied, and it excepts.
The defendant admitted the making of the contract, but claimed that he signed it under duress and that for this reason the contract is void. The defendant testified: "I am A. A. Mason and I worked for Atlanta Life Insurance Company, and I signed this contract because Mr. Law threatened to have me arrested for larceny after trust, if I did not make some arrangements. . . I knew what I was doing when I signed the contract. I knew what it was. I did it because I thought I would lose my job or be arrested as Mr. Law threatened to do." (Emphasis supplied.) Assuming for the sake of argument that the threatened prosecution testified to by the defendant in itself would constitute duress sufficient to void the contract, under the defendant's testimony he did not sign the contract because of the threatened prosecution but because he was afraid he would lose his job if he did not do so. Where a party offers himself as a witness in his own behalf, his testimony which is self-contradictory, vague, or equivocal is construed most strongly against him. Georgia Railroad c. Co. v. Flynt, ante; Tuten v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 4 Ga. App. 353 (1) ( 61 S.E. 511); Southern Ry. Co. v. Hobbs, 121 Ga. 428 (1) ( 49 S.E. 294); Steele v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., 123 Ga. 237 (1) ( 51 S.E. 438); Callaway v. Armour, 208 Ga. 136 (2a) ( 65 S.E.2d 585). A threat of causing the defendant to lose his job or his fear of such loss is not duress which would void the contract. Blalock v. Barrett, 28 Ga. App. 444 ( 111 S.E. 697).
The defendant having admitted the execution of the contract and having failed to show that it was entered into under duress which would void the contract, the evidence did not authorize a verdict in his favor.
Whether or not they are complete, it is not necessary to rule on the special grounds of the amended motion for new trial.
The court erred in overruling the motion for a new trial on the general grounds.
Judgment reversed. Sutton, C. J., and Quillian, J., concur.