KING, Associate Judge:

This appeal stems from the trial court's dismissal of a three-count complaint filed by John M. Atkins against Industrial Telecommunications Association, Inc. ("ITA"), his former employer, in which he claimed his discharge from employment was both in violation of public policy (Count I), and a breach of a contract of employment (Count II; he also claimed he was defamed (Count III). ITA moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, pursuant to Super.Ct.Civ.R. 12(b)(6) ("Rule 12(b)(6)"), as to each count, and in the alternative, as to Count III, for summary judgment pursuant to Super.Ct.Civ.R. 56 ("Rule 56"). ITA also moved for dismissal of all three counts on grounds of forum non conveniens.

The trial court dismissed Counts I and II pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and Count III, as discussed infra, note 15, pursuant to both Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56. As to Count I, the trial court ruled that Atkins failed to state a cause of action for discharge of an at-will employee in violation of public policy because he failed to plead facts within the narrow exception established by Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 229 Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985) and Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., 234 Va. 462, 362 S.E.2d 915 (1987). As to Count II, the trial court held that because Atkins was not discharged for a work deficiency, he was not entitled to a pre-termination warning, thus there was no breach of contract. Finally, the court dismissed the two defamation claims contained in Count III, because, with respect to the staff memo, the trial court concluded that Atkins failed to sufficiently allege the falsity of assertions made, and, as to the termination letter, neither District of Columbia nor Virginia law recognized a cause of action for defamation based on compelled self-publication. We affirm with respect to Counts I and II and that portion of Count III relating to the termination letter delivered by ITA to Atkins. We reverse the dismissal of the defamation claim relating to the staff memo circulated by ITA's president to the employees of the company.

I. A. Background

Appellee-defendant, Industrial Telecommunications, Inc. (ITA — formerly SIRSA) is a non-profit organization incorporated in the District of Columbia, with its principal place of business in Arlington, Virginia, where Atkins was employed. Atkins was also a Virginia resident. Spectrum Management Systems, Inc. ("Spectrum") was a wholly-owned subsidiary of ITA, also incorporated in the District of Columbia. ITA employed appellant for almost seventeen years, and at the time of his termination, he was First Vice-President of ITA and a member of the Board of Directors of Spectrum.

B. Events Leading up to Atkins's Termination

At a September 1991 Spectrum Board meeting, Mr. Mark Crosby, ITA's president and Atkins's immediate supervisor, became displeased with Atkins because Atkins did not vote for Crosby's choice for the Chairmanship of Spectrum's Board of Directors. In December of the same year, during a performance review, Crosby informed Atkins he would not receive a bonus. Crosby elaborated that the no-bonus decision was influenced by Atkins's failure to support Crosby's candidate; it was not performance-based, but was intended to deter future insubordination. Crosby also stated Atkins was "stupid" and "a disgrace" to have supported the other candidate and, by doing so, had done himself irreparable harm in his employment. Crosby terminated Atkins on May 19, 1992, providing him with a copy of a memorandum ("staff memo"), previously circulated to the entire staff. This was followed a few days later by transmission of a letter to Atkins ("termination letter"), signed by Crosby, which set forth the reasons for the termination. Atkins claims the staff memo was defamatory. He also claims that the grounds given for his discharge in the termination letter, which he has been compelled to disclose to prospective employers, are false and defamatory, have damaged his reputation, and have hampered his search for employment.

II. A. Scope of Review

In reviewing the grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, this court applies the same standard as the trial judge, viz: we accept the allegations of the complaint as true, and construe all facts and inferences in favor of the plaintiff. McBryde v. Amoco Oil Co., 404 A.2d 200, 202 (D.C. 1979). Rule 12(b)(6) tests only the "legal sufficiency of the complaint." Vincent v. Anderson, 621 A.2d 367, 372 (D.C. 1993) (citing American Ins. Co. v. Smith, 472 A.2d 872, 873-74 (D.C. 1984)). Dismissal is warranted under this rule only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Owens v. Tiber Island Condominium Ass'n, 373 A.2d 890, 893 (D.C. 1977) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)); accord, Vincent, 621 A.2d at 372; Aronoff v. Lenkin Co., 618 A.2d 669, 684 (D.C. 1992). Any uncertainties or ambiguities involving the sufficiency of the complaint must be resolved in favor of the pleader, and generally, the complaint must not be dismissed because the court doubts that plaintiff will prevail. Amoco Oil, supra, 404 A.2d at 203.

Summary judgment is proper if, in construing all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 41-42 (D.C. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078, 100 S.Ct. 1028, 62 L.Ed.2d 761 (1980), the record shows there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Super.Ct.Civ.R. 56(c). The burden of showing the absence of any factual issue is borne by the moving party. Id. On appeal we determine whether the trial court properly concluded the movant has met its burden of proving that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Clay Properties, Inc. v. Washington Post Co., 604 A.2d 890, 893 (D.C. 1992) (en banc).

B. Choice of Law

As a preliminary matter, a brief discussion of the choice of law to be applied is necessary to place the parties' contentions in context. ITA argues that, pursuant to Hercules Co. v. Shama Restaurant Corp., 566 A.2d 31, 40 (D.C. 1989), Virginia's law, as the jurisdiction with the most significant relationship to the events, should apply to each claim. The trial court, however, agreeing with Atkins, applied Virginia law to Counts I and II, and assumed, without deciding, that both Virginia and District of Columbia law applied to Count III. Choice of law issues are normally treated as questions of law subject to de novo review by this court, id., meaning, we make an independent determination of which state law to apply.

Virginia has significant contacts to this case, see Estrada v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 488 A.2d 1359, 1361 n. 2 (D.C. 1985), and we conclude the trial court properly applied Virginia law to Counts I and II. We can discern no basis, however, for applying District of Columbia law to Count III, as the trial court assumed might be the case; therefore we will apply Virginia law in our analysis. That choice should not affect the result, however, because as we have said, "there are few discernible differences between Virginia and District of Columbia defamation law." Sigal Constr. Corp. v. Stanbury, 586 A.2d 1204, 1208 (D.C. 1991).

III.

Count I — Discharge in violation of public policy

Atkins claims his discharge from ITA's employ violated the public policies of Virginia and the District of Columbia because as a corporate director, he had a fiduciary duty to exercise his vote in the best interest of the company, free from duress and intimidation. In the trial court, Atkins contended, relying on Bowman and Gulledge v. Dyncorp Inc., 24 Va. Cir. 538, 541 (1989), an opinion by a Virginia circuit court judge, that he need only prove his discharge was retaliatory, not that he was coerced or threatened before he cast his vote. The trial court rejected Atkins's reliance on Bowman because Atkins did not claim Crosby attempted to control his vote, before the vote was cast, as was the case with the Bowman employees. Bowman involved two employees, also stockholders in the employer corporation, who were terminated for failing to vote their stock in accordance with the directives of management which had been conveyed to the employees before they cast their vote. The Virginia Supreme Court held the terminations violated public policy in that Va. Code § 13.1-32 guarantees a stockholder the right to cast one vote for each share of stock held, without fear of intimidation. Bowman, supra, 331 S.E.2d at 801.

The trial judge also rejected Atkins's reliance on Gulledge, in which a Virginia circuit judge extended Bowman to an employee, also a member of the Board of Directors, who contended his employment contract was terminated after he failed to vote, as a member of the Board, in favor of a corporate merger desired by management, even though there was no evidence that management instructed him how he should vote before the vote took place. The trial judge, declined to follow Gulledge because the judge in Gulledge ultimately held that the employee was in fact hired pursuant to a contract, and therefore, the public policy exception for at-will employees did not apply. Gulledge, supra, 24 Va. Cir. at 542. Judge Graae thus concluded that the purported "holding" in Gulledge, that Bowman applied to the circumstances presented, was in fact dicta. We do not decide this issue on the same basis as the trial judge because, as explained infra, we are not at all convinced, for the reasons stated, that the Virginia Supreme Court would extend the Bowman exception to the circumstances of Atkins's discharge.

First, Virginia courts have consistently followed the rule which holds: "where no specific time is fixed determining the duration of the employment, it is presumed to be an employment at-will," terminable at anytime by either party. This rule was established nearly a century ago in Stonega Coal Coke Co. v. Louisville Nashville Railroad, 106 Va. 223, 55 S.E. 551 (1906). See Marshall Wicker, The Status of the At-Will Employment Doctrine in Virginia After Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 20 U.RICH.L.REV. 267, 280 (1986), (quoting Hoffman Specialty Co. v. Pelouze, 158 Va. 586, 164 S.E. 397, 399 (1932)). Years after Stonega, the Virginia Supreme court reiterated its commitment to this rule, but because of "the unique facts" of the Bowman case, applied one of the "recognized exceptions" to the employment at-will doctrine. Bowman, supra, 331 S.E.2d at 801. The legislative basis of the Bowman public policy exception is Virginia Code § 13.1-32, which the court construed to:

[confer] on these plaintiffs as stockholders the right to vote, for each outstanding share of stock held. . . . In order for the goal of the statute to be realized and the public policy fulfilled, the shareholder must be able to exercise this right without fear of reprisal from corporate management which happens also to be the employer. Because the right conferred by statute is in furtherance of established public policy, the employer may not lawfully use the threat of discharge of an at-will employee as a device to control the otherwise unfettered discretion of a shareholder to vote freely his or her stock in the corporation.

Id. (emphasis added). Although the Bowman court did not explain its idea of a "narrow exception," the cases cited for authority all recognized that any exceptions, which purport to uphold a legislatively mandated policy, would be extremely be rare.

Two years later, the same court in Miller declined to extend Bowman when it affirmed the dismissal of a claim by an employee who contended she was terminated in retaliation for appearing as a witness at a fellow employee's grievance hearing. The court observed:

The employment-at-will doctrine is a settled part of the law of Virginia. Parties negotiating contracts for the rendition of services are entitled to rely on its continued stability. Serious policy considerations, affecting countless business relationships, are involved in any change that may be contemplated. We therefore think it wise to leave to the deliberative process of the General Assembly any substantial alteration of the doctrine.

Miller, supra, 362 S.E.2d at 919. Further support for a narrow reading of Bowman is provided by a United States District Court judge who observed that in Virginia the exception to the at-will doctrine is "triggered only when the discharge is in response to the employee's refusal to commit an unlawful act or in the employee's exercise of a statutory right." Haigh v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of America, 676 F. Supp. 1332, 1351 (E.D.Va. 1987).

Second, ITA argues, and we agree, that the statutes upon which Atkins relies do not appear to confer on directors the light to exercise their vote free of any corporate management's influence, unlike the statutes relating to shareholders' rights as considered in Bowman. Notwithstanding, even if there is a generalized right of a board member to vote free of managerial influence, we think it unlikely, in light of Virginia's employment at-will tradition, that the Virginia Supreme Court would extend protection to a discharged employee who was a member of the Board of Directors of a wholly-owned subsidiary as a result of his employment with the parent company, who was terminated because he exercised his vote in a manner contrary to the interests expressed by the parent company's chief executive officer, who was also the employee's immediate supervisor.

Finally, Gulledge is the only Virginia decision, state or federal, that holds "the voting rights of directors are similar to those of shareholders and should also be protected by public policy." Gulledge, supra, 24 Va. Cir. at 541. We note that federal courts determining state law pursuant to the Rules of Decision Act, under the doctrine of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1930), apply state law as either declared by its legislature, or by its highest court — not a lower court. King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am., 333 U.S. 153, 68 S.Ct. 488, 92 L.Ed. 608 (1948). "[W]hile the decrees of lower state courts should be attributed some weight, the decisions [are] not controlling where the highest court of the State has not spoken on the point." Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Atlantic Research Corp., 847 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.Va. 1994). We think it sound policy to follow the same approach and in doing so we conclude that the Gulledge decision is "not controlling [and we therefore] . . . proceed to make our own determination of what the . . . [Virginia Supreme Court] would probably rule in a similar case." King, supra, 333 U.S. at 161, 68 S.Ct. at 492-93 (federal court is not bound to follow state trial court decisions where those decisions are binding only on the parties to the action). That conclusion, as we have said, is that the Virginia Supreme Court would not recognize the exception to the at-will firing doctrine presented in this case. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing that count of the complaint.

Count II — Breach of Contract

Atkins alleges ITA's Employee Manual and its employment practices created a binding employment contract which ITA breached by failing to terminate him in accordance with its established practices and procedures. We affirm the trial court's dismissal because, as a matter of law, this Employee Manual, which was incorporated into the complaint by reference, does not constitute an employment contract. See Graham v. Central Fidelity Bank, 245 Va. 395, 428 S.E.2d 916, 918 (1993).

Employee handbooks and manuals can, under some circumstances, create binding contracts, Hercules Powder Co. v. Brookfield, 189 Va. 531, 53 S.E.2d 804, 808 (1949), but the presence of disclaimers generally preclude the creation of any contractual rights not already vested. See Graham, supra, 428 S.E.2d at 918. ITA's Employee Manual, in three separate places, contains unequivocal disclaimers stating the manual is not a contract and that an "at-will" relationship exists between ITA and its employees. We reject Atkins's contention that it is for the jury to determine the significance of the ITA disclaimers, and instead conclude that the Virginia courts would determine the term "at-will," and similar disclaimers, are terms of art, the meanings of which are questions of law for the court. See Graham, 428 S.E.2d 916; Goos v. Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors, 715 F. Supp. 2 (D.D.C. 1989); Nettles v. Techplan Corp., 704 F. Supp. 95 (D.S.C. 1988).

Atkins concedes that a clear and unambiguous disclaimer may serve to prevent an employee manual from being treated as a contract. See, e.g., Miller, supra, 362 S.E.2d at 918. Nonetheless, he argues that where the employer attempts to confuse, rather than clarify, the employer/employee relationship, which he asserts was the case here, the courts have left it to the jury to determine whether the manual could be construed as a contract. See Sanchez v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc., 855 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Wyo. 1993) (employees should not have to hire a lawyer to learn that under the employment relationship, they could be fired at any time for any, or no reason); Morriss v. Coleman Co., 241 Kan. 501, 738 P.2d 841, 848-49 (1987) (summary judgment unwarranted if language of employee manual is ambiguous). Atkins maintains that ITA's manual is carefully written to avoid any such clear statement, using "legalese" that may alert an attorney that no rights were being given to the employees, but which provided no such notice to lay persons. However, based on the unambiguous language of the disclaimers and Atkins's acknowledgement that "I . . . understand . . . the handbook . . . do[es] not create any contractual commitments by [ITA]," see note 12 supra, we find Atkins's reliance on Sanchez and Morriss to support his ambiguity claim unpersuasive. Thus we reject Atkins's claim that the jury could find that a contract of employment was created by the Employee Manual.

Count III — Defamation

Finally, Atkins alleges ITA defamed him in two ways: (1) in a May 19, 1992, "staff memo" from Crosby circulated to ITA's staff members, and (2) in a June 23, 1992, "termination letter" which Atkins contends he was compelled to publish in response to inquiries from prospective employers asking of the reasons for his leaving ITA.

The trial court dismissed this count, ruling that Atkins failed to state a cause of action for defamation because: (1) with respect to the staff memo, Atkins did not allege that anything stated in the memo was false, and (2) with respect to the termination letter, neither the District of Columbia nor Virginia recognize a cause of action for defamation based on compelled self-publication.

The May 19, 1992 Memo

To be actionable, Atkins must show the memo was false and defamatory. Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 325 S.E.2d 713, 725, cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032, 105 S.Ct. 3513, 87 L.Ed.2d 643 (1985). Atkins's version of events, contained in his affidavit, contradicts virtually every assertion contained in the staff memo and affidavit of one Andre Cote, submitted by ITA in support of its motion to dismiss. Specifically, Atkins contends the numerous raises, bonuses and the Staff Achievement Award he received are evidence that he was loyal to the organization and was an asset to ITA because he faithfully performed his duties at all times. The affidavit also avers that many of the statements Cote attributed to Atkins were made by Cote himself, and, Cote lied when he claimed Atkins tried to prevent TELEFAC from affiliating with ITA because TELEFAC was already managed by Spectrum, the wholly-owned subsidiary.

Viewed in the light most favorable to Atkins, the assertions in his affidavit were sufficient to establish the existence of disputed material facts precluding summary judgment and the contentions in the complaint were sufficient to resist the motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). McBryde, supra, 404 A.2d 200; Davis v. Gulf Oil Corp., 485 A.2d 160 (D.C. 1984); Swann v. Waldman, 465 A.2d 844 (D.C. 1983). Atkins's factual allegations, if established, would prove that the memo was false. Leichtman v. Koons, 527 A.2d 745 (D.C. 1987); Alger Corp. v. Wesley, 355 A.2d 794 (D.C. 1976) (reversal warranted where genuine factual dispute exists). Therefore, dismissal or entry of summary judgment on that basis would not lie.

Finally, ITA contends the alleged defamatory remarks in the staff memo were not specifically directed at Atkins and, in any event the comments were privileged, and thus non-defamatory. First, we conclude that a reasonable jury could find by a preponderance of the evidence, the memo's subject, "John's departure," sufficiently identified Atkins to meet the Gazette "of or concerning test." See Gazette, supra, 325 S.E.2d at 738 (the test is met if plaintiff "shows that the publication was intended to refer to him and would be so understood by persons reading it who knew him.") (citation omitted). Second, although a defamatory communication to other employees of the reason for a co-worker's discharge may be privileged in some circumstances, Kroger Co. v. Young, 210 Va. 564, 172 S.E.2d 720 (1970), the communication is nonetheless actionable when the privilege is abused or where malice is established, see Peoples Life Ins. Co. v. Talley, 166 Va. 464, 186 S.E. 42 (1935); Gazette, supra, 325 S.E.2d at 727; Montgomery Ward Co. v. Nance, 165 Va. 363, 182 S.E. 264, 271 (1935), — factors sufficiently in dispute here to be appropriately determined by the fact-finder. See Smalls v. Wright, 241 Va. 52, 399 S.E.2d 805, 807 (1991). Thus both of those issues must be resolved in the trial court.

For all of the reasons stated, we hold the trial court erred in granting summary judgment and in dismissing the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

The June 23, 1992 Letter

Atkins alleges he was defamed in the termination letter and there was actionable publication when he was compelled to disclose the reasons stated in this letter for his dismissal, to prospective employers. ITA contends, even if the letter was defamatory, there was no publication to anyone other than Atkins. To prevail on this claim, Atkins must show, among other elements, that the defamatory statement was published by the defendant, without privilege, to a third party. See Gazette, supra, 325 S.E.2d 713.

Atkins maintains the doctrine of compelled self-publication creates an exception to the rule that the defendant cannot be held accountable if a plaintiff voluntarily republishes a defamatory statement. Where this exception is recognized, it may be applied when "the originator of the defamatory statement has reason to believe that the person will be under strong compulsion to disclose the contents of the defamatory statement to a third person," Elmore v. Shell Oil Co., 733 F. Supp. 544, 546 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (citations omitted), such as in employment cases where a terminated employee is forced to repeat the stated reasons for his or her termination to prospective employers. See Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 389 N.W.2d 876, 886-88 (Minn. 1986) (fabrication of reasons for termination is an unacceptable alternative).

Only a minority of jurisdictions have recognized a defamation claim based on compelled self-publication, and those so holding do not agree on the basis on which to ground liability. Yeitrakis v. Schering-Plough Corp., 804 F. Supp. 238, 250 (D.N.M. 1992). For example, some hold the originator liable if he believed the defamed person will be compelled to disclose the content of the defamatory statements to third persons. See Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336 (Colo. 1988); Colonial Stores v. Barrett, 73 Ga. App. 839, 38 S.E.2d 306, 308 (1946) (employee required by government to disclose libelous statement on application for employment). The remaining jurisdictions find actionable publication where:

the circumstances indicated the communication to a third party is likely . . . [or] if a reasonable person would recognize that an act creates an unreasonable risk that the defamatory matter will be communicated to a third party. . . .

First State Bank of Corpus Christi v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696, 701 (Tex. 1980) (citations omitted).

Those jurisdictions that have rejected the doctrine have done so either because: (1) the element of compulsion was missing, or the absence of a casual link between the action of the originator and the damage caused by the publication, see, e.g., Church of Scientology of California, Inc. v. Green, 354 F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Ritter v. Pepsi Cola Operating Co., 785 F. Supp. 61 (M.D.Pa. 1992); or (2) the theory had not gained widespread acceptance. See, e.g., De Leon v. St. Joseph Hosp., Inc., 871 F.2d 1229 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 825, 110 S.Ct. 87, 107 L.Ed.2d 52 (1989); Yeitrakis, supra, 804 F. Supp. at 238.

While we are skeptical of ITA's contention that Atkins lacked the compulsion requirement because the employer gave him the option to classify his termination as a resignation, see Lewis, supra, 389 N.W.2d at 886-88, we do not believe the Virginia Courts would adopt the self-publication theory for several reasons. First, there is no basis on which to ground liability. Atkins has not alleged any specific instance in which he was denied employment because of the publication of the defamatory statements, and even had he done so, we do not think the Virginia Courts would be inclined to open the "pandora's box" which would "visit liability for defamation on every . . . [Virginia] employer" whose former employee failed to secure employment following his or her termination. De Leon, supra, 871 F.2d at 1237.

Second, the self-publication theory has not been widely accepted and we cannot predict on what basis, if any, the Virginia Courts would recognize it as viable. In affirming the trial court's dismissal of Atkins's claim, we share the hesitancy and restraint expressed by the Yeitrakis court (a federal district court interpreting New Mexico's law)

In the absence of any clear indications . . . [Virginia] would recognize such a claim . . . [we feel] constrained to dismiss. . . . There simply is not the historical and judicial context at this time to predict . . . that the Supreme Court of . . . [Virginia] would adopt this tort of self- . . . [publication] as the law of . . . [Virginia]. . . . Unless the judicial landmarks are so clearly evident as to point in a single direction on that subject, this court should not presume upon functions of the Supreme Court of . . . [Virginia] with regard to the proper development of the common law in . . . [Virginia] (emphasis added).

Yeitrakis, supra, 804 F. Supp. at 250 (citation omitted).

Accordingly, we remand the case to the trial court with instructions to vacate its order dismissing the defamation count as it relates to the office memo. With respect to all other claims, we affirm.

Affirmed in part Reversed in part.