Opinion
D082258
10-17-2023
EZEQUIEL ARTEAGA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA RESTAURANTS, INC., et al., Defendant and Respondent; ELLIOT STONE, Respondent.
Rastegar Law Group, Farzad Rastegar and Douglas W. Perlman, for Plaintiff and Appellant. No appearance for Defendants and Respondents California Restaurants, Inc. et al. Stone, Elliott H. Stone and Robert S. Throckmorton, for Respondent Elliot Stone.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Riverside County No. RIC1307692, Sunshine Sykes, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
Rastegar Law Group, Farzad Rastegar and Douglas W. Perlman, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
No appearance for Defendants and Respondents California Restaurants, Inc. et al.
Stone, Elliott H. Stone and Robert S. Throckmorton, for Respondent Elliot Stone.
CASTILLO, J.
Ezekiel Arteaga appeals the denial of his motion for sanctions against defendants California Restaurants, Citrus City Grille Corona Corporation, and their counsel. Arteaga's notice of appeal was filed before a final judgment was entered in the trial court, and he does not purport to appeal from the final judgment. We conclude the order denying Arteaga's motion for sanctions is not immediately appealable as a collateral order because it does not direct the payment of money or performance of an act. We therefore dismiss the appeal.
I.
In 2013, Arteaga filed a class action lawsuit against the defendants alleging various violations of the Labor and Business and Professions Code. After the parties reached a settlement agreement, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss in which they contended the statutory time to commence trial had lapsed. The trial court denied the motion. Arteaga then filed a motion for sanctions against the defendants and their counsel pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 128.7 (further undesignated references are to the Code of Civil Procedure), alleging that the motion to dismiss was objectively unreasonable and frivolous, and filed with the intent to harass or cause unnecessary expense or delay. The trial court denied the motion for sanctions, and Arteaga appealed.
II.
A.
In his briefing on appeal, Arteaga states that a final judgment was entered in the trial court after he filed the notice of appeal. However, the record on appeal does not include documentation of the entry of judgment. On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the register of actions in the trial court pursuant to Evidence Code sections 452, subdivision (d), and 459, subdivision (a), and note that a final judgment was entered in the trial court on August 5, 2022.
B.
After the parties submitted their briefing on appeal, we issued an order asking the parties to discuss whether this appeal should be dismissed as being from a nonappealable, interlocutory order. The parties submitted letter briefs addressing this issue and we have considered the arguments in their letter briefs in deciding this appeal.
C.
"The existence of an appealable judgment [or order] is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal." (Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126.) "There are three categories of appealable judgments or orders: (1) final judgments as determined by case law, (2) orders and interlocutory judgments made expressly appealable by statute, and (3) certain judgments and orders that, although they do not dispose of all issues in the case are considered 'final' for appeal purposes and are exceptions to the one-final-judgment rule." (Conservatorship of Rich (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1235.) "[A]n appeal from a judgment or order that is not appealable must be dismissed." (In re Marriage of Deal (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 71, 78.)
Under California's one final judgment rule, aside from orders made appealable by statute,"' "interlocutory or interim orders are not appealable, but are only 'reviewable on appeal' from the final judgment." [Citation.] The [one final judgment] rule was designed to prevent piecemeal dispositions and costly multiple appeals which burden the court and impede the judicial process.' [Citation.]" (In re Marriage of Grimes &Mou (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 406, 418 (Grimes).) However, a limited exception to the one final judgment rule-the collateral order doctrine-allows for the appeal of a collateral order "even though other matters in the case remain to be determined." (Lester v. Lennane (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 536, 561 (Lester).)
Under the collateral order doctrine," '[w]here the trial court's ruling on a collateral issue "is substantially the same as a final judgment in an independent proceeding" [citation], in that it leaves the court no further action to take on "a matter which . . . is severable from the general subject of the litigation" [citation], an appeal will lie from that collateral order even though other matters in the case remain to be determined.'" (Grimes, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 418.)
Our Supreme Court in Sjoberg v. Hastorf (1948) 33 Cal.2d 116 (Sjoberg) "stated the minimum conditions for the appealability of a collateral order: 'It is not sufficient that the order determine finally for the purposes of further proceedings in the trial court some distinct issue in the case; it must direct the payment of money by [the] appellant or the performance of an act by or against him [or her].'" (Lester, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 561, quoting Sjoberg, at p. 119.)
Since Sjoberg was decided over 60 years ago, California courts have repeatedly limited the right to directly appeal from an interlocutory order to those orders that are "collateral to the main issue, dispositive of the rights of the parties in relation to the collateral matter, and [direct the] payment of money or performance of an act." (In re Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, 368 (Skelley); see also Apex LLC v. Korusfood.com (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1016 (Apex) ["To qualify as appealable under the collateral order doctrine, the interlocutory order must (1) be a final determination (2) of a collateral matter (3) and direct the payment of money or performance of an act."].) Several of the cases reaffirming Sjoberg's requirement that a collateral order must direct the "payment of money or performance of an act" are from our Supreme Court. (Skelley at p. 368; see also Bauguess v. Paine (1978) 22 Cal.3d 626, 634, fn. 3 ["The order imposing sanctions is appealable as a final order on a collateral matter directing the payment of money."]; I.J. Weinrot &Son, Inc. v. Jackson (1985) 40 Cal.3d 327, 331 [an order imposing sanctions is appealable" 'because it is a final order on a collateral matter directing the payment of money. [Citations.]' "].)
D.
In this case, the trial court's order denying Arteaga's motion for sanctions was not statutorily designated as an appealable interlocutory order. (See § 904.1.) Although section 904.1, subdivision (a)(12), allows a party to appeal from an order imposing sanctions in an amount over $5,000, it does not permit an appeal from an order denying such a motion. (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(12).) Nor does an order denying a motion for sanctions constitute a final appealable judgment. (Wells Properties v. Popkin (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1055 ["[D]enial of a motion for sanctions is not a judgment and is therefore not appealable."].) Thus, the trial court's order is only appealable, if at all, under the collateral order doctrine.
Although Arteaga appropriately acknowledges the many cases that echo Sjoberg's appealability requirements under the collateral order doctrine, he discusses a split of authority regarding whether an interlocutory order must direct the payment of money or performance of an act to be appealable. (Compare Muller v. Fresno Community Hospital &Medical Center (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 887 (Muller) [permitting the direct appeal from a prejudgment order denying a motion for sanctions] and Henneberque v. City of Culver City (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 837, 842, fn. 3 [recognizing that the payment of money or performance of an act has not been observed in some cases] with Longobardo v. Avco Corporation (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 429 (Longobardo) [concluding that a collateral order is not immediately appealable unless it directs the payment of money or performance of act].) Arteaga urges us to adopt the holdings from cases that allow for the direct appeal from an interlocutory order, regardless of whether the order directs the payment of money or performance of act, so long as we conclude the order is truly "collateral and final as to the collateral matter." (Muller, at p. 903.) We decline to depart from longstanding precedent that holds that an interlocutory order must direct the payment of money or performance of an act to be independently reviewable from the final judgment.
In Muller, our sister court in the Court of Appeal for the Second District, Division Eight, called into question whether the third element of the collateral order doctrine remains intact. (Muller, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at pp. 898-899.) The Muller court pointed to decisions after Sjoberg in which the Supreme Court "disregarded the limitations on the collateral order doctrine that the order must require the payment of money or performance of an act." (Id. at pp. 899, 901 [citing to Meehan v. Hopps (1955) 45 Cal.2d 213; Southern Pacific v. Oppenheimer (1960) 54 Cal.2d 784 786; McClearen v. Superior Court (1955) 45 Cal.2d 852, 855; and Takehara v. H.C. Muddox Co. (1972) 8 Cal.3d 168].) Opining that any apparent inconsistencies in the Supreme Court's decisions could be reconciled by a focus on the nature of the interlocutory order, the court concluded: "[w]hen the order does not require a payment of money or the performance of an act, the Supreme Court will find the order appealable without reference to these limitations, as long as the court is satisfied that the order is truly collateral." (Muller, at p. 902.) The court perceived the payment of money or performance of an act to be "indications that the order in question is collateral to the main action," but not a categorical prerequisite to appealability. (Ibid.)
The Muller court concluded that the order at issue in its case-an order denying a motion for sanctions-was independent of the underlying cause of action and likely to evade appellate review, and therefore that it was independently reviewable on appeal prior to the entry of judgment. (Muller, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 905.) However, the Muller court appeared to limit its holding to the facts before it. (Ibid.) The court explained, "[w]e do not hold that generally all orders denying motions for sanctions are appealable as collateral orders. In this case, there is no judgment and there may never be a judgment. Under these circumstances, the order denying the motion for sanctions is appealable as a collateral order." (Ibid.)
In a recent decision departing from Muller, the court in Longobardo concluded an order denying a motion for summary judgment was not appealable because it did not direct the payment of money or performance of an act. (Longobardo, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 434.) Although the Longobardo court recognized potential inconsistencies in Supreme Court decisions addressing the collateral order doctrine, it concluded that "only limited exceptions" within these cases allowed for appellate review of interlocutory orders not directing the payment or money or performance of an act. (Ibid.) Citing to a litany of cases issued post-Muller, the Longobardo court noted, "California courts describing the collateral order doctrine have largely continued to recite all three elements, often without acknowledging the split in authority or taking a side." (Ibid. [citing Sanchez v. Westlake Services, LLC (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1100, 1107-1108; Dr. V Productions, Inc. v. Rey (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 793, 798; Reddish v. Westamerica Bank (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 275, 278; Curtis v. Superior Court (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 453, 464; Hanna v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 493; Apex, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1015-1016; Krikorian Premiere Theatres, LLC v. Westminster Central, LLC (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1084-1085].) The Longobardo court concluded that the third element of the collateral order doctrine-the payment of money or performance of an act-was still required, explaining that "the Supreme Court has set forth a rule governing the application of the collateral order doctrine, expressly and repeatedly. Those decisions bind us unless and until the Supreme Court or the Legislature overturns them." (Longobardo, at p. 434.)
We agree with Longobardo that our Supreme Court has set forth a rule, binding upon us, that requires an interlocutory order to direct the payment of money or performance of an act to be immediately appealable. To the extent that later Supreme Court decisions have not strictly adhered to this rule, we also agree that "those cases create only limited exceptions to the general [collateral order doctrine] rule." (Longobardo, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 434.) Consequently, in accordance with Supreme Court precedent that we are bound to follow, we conclude that the collateral order doctrine requires an interlocutory order to direct the payment of money or performance of an act to be independently appealable from a final judgment. Because the trial court's interlocutory order denying Arteaga's motion for sanctions directs no such payment or performance of any act, it is not independently reviewable from the final judgment.
Moreover, even had we adopted Muller's approach to the application of the collateral order doctrine, the order at issue in this case would not have been independently reviewable. In Muller, the court was uncertain if a judgment would ever be reached in the trial court based of the procedural posture of the case before it. (Muller, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 905 ["In this case, there is no judgment and there may never be a judgment."].) Without a final judgment, the court expressed concern that the order denying sanctions would evade appellate review. (Ibid.)
Here, unlike Muller, the parties entered a settlement agreement, and the trial court issued a final judgment. Arteaga was permitted to appeal from the order denying his motion for sanctions as part of an appeal from the final judgment, but he elected not to do so. (See Rao v. Campo (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1557, 1565 [interim or interlocutory orders are" 'reviewable on appeal' from the final judgment"].) Although Arteaga argues the appellate waiver within the settlement agreement precluded an appeal from the final judgment, we presume that he voluntarily entered into the settlement agreement and appellate waiver therein. (Village Northridge Homeowners Assn. v. State Farm Fire &Casualty Co. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 913, 930 ["A settlement agreement is considered presumptively valid ...."].) Thus, the trial court's order does not inherently evade appellate review; rather it is Arteaga's own agreement to waive his appellate rights that limits appellate review.
We recognize authority that would allow us to treat Arteaga's appeal as a petition for writ of mandate under "unusual circumstances." (See Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 401 [though we "have power to treat [a] purported appeal as a petition for writ of mandate, we should not exercise that power except under unusual circumstances].) Under the circumstances of this case, we find no such unusual circumstances. Arteaga's motion for sanctions involved a single allegation of a purportedly frivolous motion to dismiss. The motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court and the settlement agreement was able to proceed between the parties.
Accordingly, because we lack jurisdiction to consider the trial court's interlocutory order, we must dismiss.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: BUCHANAN, Acting P. J., RUBIN, J.