Opinion
August 2, 1993
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Jackson, J.).
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the facts and as a matter of discretion, with costs, the motion is granted, so much of the order dated January 4, 1991, as granted the plaintiff's motion for leave to enter a default judgment against the appellant is vacated, and the appellant's answer is reinstated.
Since there has been no showing that the City's failure to comply with the court's disclosure order was deliberate, contumacious, or due to bad faith, the court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the City's motion pursuant to CPLR 5015 to vacate so much of its prior order as granted the plaintiff leave to enter a default judgment against the City (see, CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Nudelman v New York City Tr. Auth., 172 A.D.2d 503; Tschernia v Embanque Capital Corp., 161 A.D.2d 585, 586-587; Rubin v Pan Am. World Airways, 128 A.D.2d 765). Thompson, J.P., Sullivan, Miller, Ritter and Santucci, JJ., concur.