Opinion
HHDCV186088961S
02-21-2018
Milly Arciniega et al. v. Giselle Feliciano et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
File Date: February 21, 2018
The parties presented evidence at a bench trial in this mandamus matter on February 15 and 16, 2018. Pursuant to a briefing schedule, in lieu of oral argument, the parties filed memoranda of law dated February 17, 2018. After consideration, the court issues this memorandum of decision.
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Shapiro, Robert B., J.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
ROBERT B. SHAPIRO JUDGE
I
Background
In their amended verified complaint (#104), the plaintiffs/counterclaim defendants, Milly Arciniega, and twelve other Hartford, Connecticut residents, allege that they have filed petitions to be candidates for the 6th District Democratic Town Committee (6th District) of the City of Hartford (Arciniega Slate). Defendants Giselle Feliciano and John V. Bazzano are, respectively, the Democratic Registrar of Voters, and the Town and City Clerk of the City of Hartford, and are responsible for accepting and verfiying petitions for the 6th District.
Defendants/counterclaim plaintiffs Alyssa Peterson and eight other individual residents of Hartford also allege that they have filed petitions to be candidates for the 6th District (Peterson Slate). The Peterson Slate’s motion to intervene was granted (#105) and they filed a counterclaim (#108).
The Democratic Town Committee primary election in the City of Hartford is to be held on March 6, 2018. Each Slate’s action is brought under General Statutes § 9-329a(a), which concerns contests and complaints in connection with any primary, and which provides, in relevant part, that any " candidate aggrieved by a ruling of an election official in connection with any primary ... may bring his complaint to any judge of the Superior Court for appropriate action ... If such complaint is made prior to such primary such judge shall proceed expeditiously to render judgment on the complaint ..." Section 9-329a(b) provides, in relevant part, " Such judge shall thereupon, if he finds any error in the ruling of the election official, any mistake in the count of the votes or any violation of said sections, certify the result of his finding or decision to the Secretary of the State before the tenth day following the conclusion of the hearing."
General Statutes § 9-329b provides, in relevant part, " At any time prior to a primary held pursuant to section ... 9-425 [which pertains to primaries for the election of town committee members,] the Superior Court may issue an order removing a candidate from a ballot where it is shown that said candidate is improperly on the ballot." " Viewing § 9-329b as it relates to § 9-329a, the former provision plainly and unambiguously further empowers the Superior Court to act on behalf of aggrieved parties when it is shown that candidates are improperly on the ballot." Kirkley-Bey v. Vazquez, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford at Hartford, Docket No. CV10 6007952 (March 1, 2010, Peck, J.).
In the complaint, the Arciniega Slate alleges that the circulator of certain petitions submitted by the Peterson Slate failed to fulfill the requirement, as stated on each petition form, in the Circulator’s Statement Of Authenticity Of Signatures, Section D, that " Each person whose name appears on this petition signatures page signed the same in person in my presence. I either know each such signer or such signer satisfactorily identified himself or herself to me." The Arciniega Slate alleges that various listed affiants, whose affidavits were annexed, had examined the petition forms attached and averred that it did not contain their signatures as certified by the circulator. See plaintiffs’ Exh. 8.
As part of its evidentiary presentation, certain affidavits were admitted at trial. See plaintiffs’ Exhibits 1, 3, and 4.
The Arciniega Slate alleges that these petitions, in conjunction with others, allowed the Peterson Slate to qualify for a Town Committee primary and that, absent these petitions, the Peterson Slate would have failed to qualify. The Arciniega Slate seeks the court to declare the challenged petitions to be invalid pursuant to General Statutes 9-410(c) and that the Peterson Slate is not qualified to run in the primary.
In its counterclaim, the Peterson Slate alleges that plaintiff/counterclaim defendant Jacqueline Nadal, and other members of the Arciniega Slate all signed a Statement of Consent of Candidates (Deft. Exh. A) (Statement of Consent) pursuant to General Statutes § 9-409, which Statement of Consent serves the purpose of instructing defendant Feliciano what names and addresses to put on petitions to qualify for the ballot. The Peterson Slate alleges that § 9-409 demands that candidates use their correct and proper residential address on the Statement of Consent.
The Peterson Slate alleges that, on the Statement of Consent Nadal listed her address as 646 New Britain Avenue. It also alleges that Nadal wrote 370 Freeman Street as her address on the Statement of Consent, but then it was changed in the original submitted to defendant Feliciano by using a white-out style corrective to conceal the Freeman Street address and that Nadal’s address was listed as 646 New Britain Avenue in Part A of the petitions for the primary. See Deft. Exh. B.
The Peterson Slate alleges that, while Nadal is registered to vote at 646 New Britain Avenue, Nadal does not actually reside at 646 New Britain Avenue, and has not lived there for at least eight months. The Peterson Slate alleges that Nadal lives at 370 Freeman Street. It contends that Nadal is falsely registered to vote at 646 New Britain Avenue pursuant to General Statutes § 9-357 and has perpetuated a fraud by maintaining her voter registration at 646 New Britain Avenue. Citing General Statutes § § 9-410(c), 9-412 and 9-368c, they assert that since Nadal used an incorrect address, the petitions circulated by the Arciniega Slate should be stricken.
Section 9-357 provides, " Any person who fraudulently procures himself or another to be registered as an elector shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned."
Sections 9-410 and 9-412 are discussed below.
Section 9-368c provides, " (a) No person shall intentionally misrepresent the contents of a petition circulated under title 9. (b) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a class D felony."
II
Discussion
" A writ of mandamus will be granted only where the plaintiff has a clear legal right to have done that which he seeks ... The writ is proper only when [1] the law imposes on the party against whom the writ would run a duty the performance of which is mandatory and not discretionary; [2] the party applying for the writ has a clear legal right to have the duty performed; and [3] there is no other specific adequate remedy." (Internal quotation marks omitted.). Butts v. Bysiewicz, 298 Conn. 665, 669 n.3, 5 A.3d 932 (2010).
" Even satisfaction of this demanding [three-pronged] test does not, however, automatically compel issuance of the requested writ of mandamus ... In deciding the propriety of a writ of mandamus, the trial court exercises discretion rooted in the principles of equity." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Sewer Commission of City of Milford, 270 Conn. 409, 417, 853 A.2d 497 (2004).
" Confidence in the integrity of our electoral processes is essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy. Voter fraud drives honest citizens out of the democratic process and breeds distrust of our government. Voters who fear their legitimate votes will be outweighed by fraudulent ones will feel disenfranchised." Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4, 127 S.Ct. 5, 7, 166 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006).
A plaintiff making a claim under General Statutes. § 9-329a " must show (1) there were substantial violations of the requirements of the [election] statute ... and (2) as a result of those violations, the reliability of the result of the election is seriously in doubt." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Caruso v. Bridgeport, 285 Conn. 618, 649, 941 A.2d 266 (2009).
A
Ruling By An Election Official
Defendants Feliciano and Bazzano argue that they made no rulings under General Statutes § 9-329a concerning either the signatures on the Peterson petitions or concerning Nadal’s address. As to the claims of the Arciniega Slate, they assert that the petitions were examined to verify whether the names on the petitions were registered voters and lived at the addresses indicated. Next, defendant Bazzano certified that there were enough qualifying signatures on the petitions for the slate to be on the primary ballot. They assert that it was not until after the petitions were certified that the plaintiffs raised the issue of inauthentic signatures.
As to the counterclaim of the Peterson Slate, they argue that there is no allegation or evidence that they have a duty to further investigate a candidate’s address beyond what is contained in relevant registration lists or databases. They also contend that, as to the Peterson Slate’s counterclaim, there do not appear to be any " substantial violations" of elections statutes as required by General Statutes § 9-329a. As discussed below, the court agrees that the Peterson Slate has not proved that there were substantial violations.
" [A]lthough statutes governing election contests generally are construed strictly, nothing in the language, genealogy or legislative history of § 9-329a(a) suggests that the legislature intended for the phrase ‘ruling of an election official’ to have a narrow, technical meaning ... Indeed, it appears that the legislature considered an improper action to be a type of ruling ... [W]e implicitly recognized in Wrinn [v. Dunleavy, 186 Conn. 125, 138-39, 440 A.2d 261 (1982)] that conduct of an election official may constitute a ruling within the meaning of § 9-329a(a) even though the election official had not actually ruled on the matter in any formal way. [E]lection officials generally do not conduct trial-type proceedings or issue formal decisions on matters that are presented to them. Instead, they administer the entire election process on a day-to-day basis to ensure that it is fair and orderly, and complies with the various statutory requirements. We see no evidence that the legislature intended to exclude from the scope of § 9-329a(a) improper actions by election officials that violate mandatory statutory requirements, but that do not constitute a ruling in some formal sense. Nor can we conceive of any reason that the legislature would have intended to exclude such conduct ..." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Caruso v. Bridgeport, supra, 285 Conn. 646-47.
" The Supreme Court previously has construed the phrase ‘ruling of [an] election official,’ as used in ... General Statutes § 9-329a to mean some act or conduct by the official that ... interprets some statute, regulation or other authoritative legal requirement, applicable to the election process ... The Supreme Court has held that this test is broad enough to include conduct that comes within the scope of a mandatory statute governing the election process, even if the election official has not issued a ruling in any formal sense ... Thus, [w]hen an election statute mandates certain procedures, and the election official has failed to apply or to follow those procedures, such conduct implicitly constitutes an incorrect interpretation of the requirements of the statute and, therefore, is a ruling." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wrotnowski v. Bysiewicz, 289 Conn. 522, 526-27, 958 A.2d 709, stay denied, 555 U.S. 1083, 129 S.Ct. 775 (2008).
In Wrinn v. Dunleavy, supra, 186 Conn. 138-39, the Supreme Court held that a claim was properly brought under § 9-329a where the plaintiffs complaint was " based on the casting of twenty-six absentee ballots which, according to the plaintiff, were void because they were improperly mailed. Thus, because the plaintiff would have won the primary had these ballots not been counted, he clearly [was] aggrieved by the ruling of an election official, such ‘ruling’ being the counting of the absentee ballots." Thus, there, " by counting [the] invalid ballots, the election officials implicitly had interpreted the provisions of ... § 9-146 regarding the casting arid mailing of absentee ballots." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Caruso v. Bridgeport, supra, 285 Conn. 645. All that is required under § 9-329a is that the alleged failure to comply with a statutory mandate colorably constitute a ruling of an election official. See id., 647.
General Statutes § 9-412 states that " [t]he registrar shall reject any page of a petition which does not contain the certifications provided in section 9-410, or which the registrar determines to have been circulated in violation of any other provision of section 9-410." (Emphasis added.)
General Statutes § 9-410(a) states, in relevant part, that each petition form shall include, " at the top of the form and in bold print, the following: WARNING IT IS A CRIME TO SIGN THIS PETITION IN THE NAME OF ANOTHER PERSON WITHOUT LEGAL AUTHORITY TO DO SO ..." Subsection (c) states that " Each separate sheet of such petition shall contain a statement as to the authenticity of the signatures thereon and the number of such signatures, and shall be signed under the penalties of false statement by the person who circulated the same, setting forth such circulator’s address and the town in which such circulator is an enrolled party member and attesting that each person whose name appears on such sheet signed the same in person in the presence of such circulator, that the circulator either knows each such signer or that the signer satisfactorily identified the signer to the circulator ..."
Thus, § 9-412 requires rejection of petitions circulated in violation of any provision of § 9-410 and § 9-410 makes it clear that forged signatures may not be included on petitions. Here, similar to the counting of the improper absentee ballots in Wrinn, the alleged approval of the Peterson Slate’s petitions when they included forged signatures colorably constitute rulings of election officials.
B
Peterson Slate Petitions
In a case tried to the court, " [t]he ... judge, as the trier of facts, is the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Michael T. v. Commissioner of Correction, 307 Conn. 84, 90-91, 52 A.3d 655 (2012). " [I]t is well established that it is the exclusive province of the trier of fact to make determinations of credibility, crediting some, all, or none of a given witness’ testimony." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gonzalez v. State Elections Enforcement Commission, 145 Conn.App. 458, 475, 77 A.3d 790, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 954, 81 A.3d 1181 (2013).
After trial, the court finds the following facts and credits the following evidence, except as noted. Seven witnesses testified that their signatures on petitions for the Peterson Slate circulated by Pamela Jackson (plaintiffs’ Exh. 8) were not signed by them. Each examined their alleged signature and testified that it was not in fact their signature. The following is a list of these witnesses and the page on Exhibit 8 concerning which they testified: 1. Hilda Negron, page 1; 2. Luis Sierra, page 2; 3. Beverly Fonfara, page 3; 4. Milly Arciniegas, page 5; 5. Maria Selgado, page 7; 6. Jane Grahn, page 7; and 7. Rodric K. McKone, page 9. Thus, there was in-court testimony that six sheets of Exhibit 8 contained false signatures.
On the petition, the name is spelled with an " s" at the end.
In addition, affidavits by Beverly Fonfara and McKone were admitted. See plaintiff’s Exhs. 1 and 3. The court sustained objections to the admission of other affidavits from individuals who did not testify in person. These other exhibits were marked for identification.
In addition, Arciniegas testified that she was familiar with her husband’s signature and that of her son and that both of their signatures were also falsified on page 5. Additionally, the affidavit of Walter Fonfara was admitted as a full exhibit as to the falsification of his signature. Therefore, eight individuals presented admitted evidence that six of the sheets in question contained forged signatures. Thus, two-thirds of the petitions submitted by Pamela Jackson (six of nine) contained signatures which were not those of the individuals who purportedly signed them.
The Peterson Slate presented no testimony to challenge this evidence. In its post-trial brief, the Peterson Slate concedes that the challenged signatures were " bad." The evidence of fraud is undisputed.
Defendant Feliciano testified that after petitions are submitted to the Registrar of Voters each signatory’s information is checked against the data base of registered members of the Democratic party to ensure that the signers are eligible to properly sign a petition in support of a slate of candidates. Therefore, though a sheet may contain a certain number of signatures, the certified number of signatures may be less than the total submitted on any given sheet. The sheets about which the witnesses testified (pages 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 and 9) contained the following number of signatures certified by defendant Feliciano: (1) Page 1 of Exhibit 8 contained 18 certified signatures; (2) Page 2 of Exhibit 8 contained 19 certified signatures; (3) Page 3 of Exhibit 8 contained 20 certified signatures; (4) Page 5 of Exhibit 8 contained 18 certified signatures; (5) Page 7 of Exhibit 8 contained 18 certified signatures; and (6) Page 9 of Exhibit 8 contained 19 certified signatures. In total, these pages contained 112 certified signatures.
Defendant Feliciano testified that each slate required 331 certified signatures to qualify for a Town Committee primary in the 6th District. Although the Arciniega Slate argues in its brief that the Peterson Slate was certified with 409 approved signatures, no evidence was presented as to that. " It is well settled that representations of counsel are not, legally speaking, evidence, and, as such, they cannot properly be considered by the finder of fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brady-Kinsella v. Kinsella, 154 Conn.App. 413, 419 n.5, 106 A.3d 956 (2014), cert. denied, 315 Conn. 929, 110 A.3d 432 (2015).
The court finds that the Arciniega Slate proved that at least six of the Peterson Slate’s petition sheets contained forged signatures and therefore were in violation of General Statutes § 9-410 in that they were (1) signed in the name of another person; (2) the statement as to the authenticity of the signatures contained on each of those petitions was a false statement; and (3) the " signer" was not in fact known to the circulator in that the " signer" was not in fact the individual the signature claimed to represent. Since these six petition pages were circulated in violation of the provisions of § 9-410, each should be rejected.
The court finds that extensive fraud occurred in the gathering of signatures for the Peterson Slate. The plaintiffs have proved that there were substantial violations of the requirements of the election statute and, as a result of those violations, the reliability of the result is seriously in doubt, meeting their burden under § 9-329a. See Caruso v. Bridgeport, supra, 285 Conn. 649.
In addition, the court finds that the requirements for the issuance of a mandamus are met, in that the Arciniega Slate has shown that Feliciano’s and Bazzano’s duty to reject the cited petitions is mandatory and not discretionary; it has a clear legal right to have the duty performed; and there is no other specific adequate remedy. In the exercise of its discretion, the court concludes that, in view of the compelling need to prevent election fraud, relief in the form of mandamus is warranted.
As set forth below, since these petition pages were circulated in violation of § 9-410, the court directs, in accordance with General Statutes § 9-412, that they are to be rejected.
C
Arciniega Slate Petitions
The Peterson Slate seeks decertification of all petitions circulated by Nadal, James Sanchez, Maly Rosado and Kathleen Kowalyshyn. They argue that the petitions collected or notarized by Sanchez, Kowalyshyn or Rosado should be decertified because they knew or should have known that Nadal had listed an incorrect address. Based on the claim that Nadal incorrectly listed her address at 646 New Britain Avenue, instead of at 370 Freeman Street, the Peterson Slate requests that the Court decertify all petition sheets circulated for the Arciniega Slate and that the Arciniega Slate be declared ineligible to run in the March 6, 2018 primary.
Both sides refer the court to decisions of the State Elections Enforcement Commission (Commission). " [W]hen a state agency’s determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny ... the agency is not entitled to special deference ... [I]t is for the courts, and not administrative agencies, to expound and apply governing principles of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sweetman v. State Elections Enforcement Commission, 249 Conn. 296, 305-06, 732 A.2d 144 (1999).
The Peterson Slate cites the Commission’s Declaratory Ruling 2007-04, concerning the " Citizen’s Election Program: ‘Residing in’ for Purposes of Qualifying Contributions." However, in that Ruling, page 3, the Commission stated, " Nothing in this ruling should be construed as determining what constitutes an individual’s ‘bona fide residence’ for purposes of qualifying as an elector or voting." Accordingly, the court disregards this Ruling by the Commission.
Both sides cite the Commission’s July 19, 2017 decision in In Re Peterson, 2016-106, where the Commission recently addressed voter residency requirements and where an elector’s " bona fide" residence is located. There, the Commission stated that " [a]n elector is eligible to register and vote in a particular town only if such voter is a bona fide resident of such town. See General Statutes § 9-12." In Re Peterson, p. 5. Here, it is undisputed that both addresses are located within the subject district in Hartford.
Section 9-12(a) provides, in relevant part, " Each citizen of the United States who has attained the age of eighteen years, and who is a bona fide resident of the town to which the citizen applies for admission as an elector shall, on approval by the registrars of voters or town clerk of the town of residence of such citizen, as prescribed by law, be an elector ... For purposes of this section ... a person shall be deemed to be a bona fide resident of the town to which the citizen applies for admission as an elector if such person’s dwelling unit is located within the geographic boundaries of such town."
The Commission also " previously determined that an individual’s bona fide residence is the place where that individual maintains a true, fixed, and principal home to which he or she, whenever transiently located, has a genuine intent to return ... In other words ‘bona fide residence’ is generally synonymous with domicile ... The Commission has concluded, however, that the traditional rigid notion of ‘domicile’ has ... given way somewhat but only to the extent that it has become an impractical standard for the purpose of determining voting residence (i.e. with respect to college students, the homeless, and individuals with multiple dwellings.)." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In Re Peterson, p. 6.
" The Commission has further held that, where an individual truly maintains two residences to which the individual has legitimate, significant, and continuing attachments, that individual can choose either one of those residences to be their bona fide residence for the purposes of election law so long as they possess the requisite intent ... Moreover, the Commission has concluded that if an individual has established residency at a location, ‘only the Respondent’s abandonment of the residence ... will extinguish [his or] her right as an elector in that town.’ Complaint of Carole Dmytryshak, Salisbury, File No. 2012-197. See also, Gold v. Gold, 100 Conn. 607 (Conn. 1924) (holding that for personal jurisdiction purposes ‘the essentials upon which the conclusion of a change of domicile must rest are intention to abandon the old domicile and to acquire a new one in another place where a residence has been established’) (citing Roxbury v. Bridgewater, 85 Conn. 196; Hoskins v. Matthews, 57 Eng. Ch. 12); Maksym v. Board of Education Com’rs of City of Chicago, Illinois Supreme Court, Docket No. 111773 (Jan. 27, 2011), 2011. WL 242421 at *8 (’[O]nce residency is established, the test is no longer physical presence but rather abandonment. Indeed, once person has established residence, he or she can be physically absent from that residence for months or even years without having abandoned it ...’)." (Emphasis in original.) In Re Peterson, pp. 6-7.
Intention to abandon one’s residence presents a question of fact. " It has long been the law that [i]n this jurisdiction, abandonment is a question of fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Simone v. Miller, 91 Conn.App. 98, 103, 881 A.2d 397 (2005). " ‘Abandonment’ is a question of fact which implies a voluntary and intentional renunciation. Nevertheless, the intent to abandon may be inferred as a fact from the circumstances ... The mere discontinuance of a use where there is no intent to abandon is not enough ... To establish abandonment, the intention on the part of the owner [must be] to relinquish permanently the ... use." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cummings v. Tripp, 204 Conn. 67, 93, 527 A.2d 230 (1987).
The Peterson Slate requests the court to draw adverse inferences based on Nadal’s, and Sanchez’s, and Arciniega Slate member Hyacinth Yennie’s alleged failures to be in court in response to subpoenas which allegedly were served, by abode service, on the eve of trial. Neither the subpoenas nor proof of service of the subpoenas was presented to the court. No request for the issuance of a capias was presented to the court. The court declines to draw the requested adverse inferences.
The evidence shows that Nadal has an ownership interest in both 646 New Britain Avenue and 370 Freeman Street. See defendants’ Exhibits M (June 20, 2017 Quit-Claim Deed concerning 370 Freeman Street) and N (August 18, 2009 Mortgage Deed concerning 646 New Britain Avenue). She lived in an apartment at 646 New Britain Avenue at least until the fall of 2017. She currently gets mail at, and is at least weekly seen at 646 New Britain Avenue. It is unclear who is currently living in the apartment. Also unclear is the extent to which Nadal may be attempting to rent it to others. Nadal also has been seen at 370 Freeman Street and told at least one witness that she was moving in there.
The Peterson Slate has not met the burden of proving abandonment of 646 New Britain Avenue by Nadal. The evidence showed that she still owns the residence. The court finds that her intent to relinquish permanently her use of 646 New Britain Avenue as her residence was not proved.
As stated above, both addresses are within the District. The use of 646 New Britain Avenue as Nadal’s address has not been shown to have an impact on either the ballots or the authenticity of the primary petitions. Even if Nadal’s address on the Statement of Consent and on the Arciniega petitions was found to be incorrect, the listing of 646 New Britain Avenue would not amount to a substantial violation of the requirements of the election statutes which would place the reliability of the result seriously in doubt.
In addition, under the circumstances here, there is no authority for striking the Arciniega Slate based on the use of the New Britain Avenue address. To do so would disenfranchise those voters who signed the petitions supporting the Arciniega Slate. The Supreme Court has recognized " the overarching policy that, in construing voting statutes, no voter is to be disfranchised on a doubtful construction, and statutes tending to limit the exercise of the ballot should be liberally construed in his [or her] favor ... We, therefore, take into consideration whether the failure of strict compliance was due to the conduct of the voter or of someone not within his or her control." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Election of U.S. Representative for Second Cong. Dist., 231 Conn. 602, 653, 653 A.2d 79 (1994).
CONCLUSION
Judgment may enter for the Arciniega Slate plaintiffs/counterclaim defendants and against the Peterson Slate defendants/counter claim plaintiffs on the amended verified complaint and on the counterclaim. In addition:
The court directs defendants Feliciano and Bazzano to reject all signatures submitted on behalf of the Peterson Slate which are contained on the above-cited pages of plaintiffs’ Exhibit 8: pages I, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 9.
If, as a result of the above order, the Peterson Slate has not submitted the required certified signatures to qualify for the primary, the court directs defendants Feliciano and Bazzano to remove the Peterson slate from the 6th District Democratic primary ballot.
Pursuant to General Statutes § 9-329a(b), a copy of this decision shall be sent to the Connecticut Secretary of the State.
It is so ordered.