Summary
In Aragon, the court stated that the dispatching of persons "to observe the progress and method of the work" does not rise to the necessary level of supervision to render a property owner liable for an accident occurring at a worksite.
Summary of this case from Serwatka v. Freeman Decorating Corp.Opinion
February 15, 1994
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Walter M. Schackman, J.).
In this personal injury and wrongful death action arising from the collapse of a scaffold on which plaintiff's decedent was performing brick restoration work on a residential apartment building, plaintiff was properly granted summary judgment on the issue of liability inasmuch as the collapse of a scaffold is prima facie evidence of a violation of Labor Law § 240 (1) which shifts the burden to defendants to raise a factual issue on liability (see, Bras v. Atlas Constr. Corp., 166 A.D.2d 401). Despite defendants' arguments, there is simply no evidence from which an inference could be made that the decedent had "refused" to avail himself of the available safety harness (see, Stolt v General Foods Corp., 81 N.Y.2d 918). Moreover, the duty to see that safety devices are furnished and employed rests on the employer in the first instance (Singh v. Barrett, 192 A.D.2d 378) and the proximate cause of the scaffold's collapse was the breaking of one of the supporting ropes, not the plaintiff's decedent's failure to wear a safety harness.
As to the cross-motion of 233 West 21st Street, it is settled that a property owner or contractor who is liable vicariously under the Labor Law is entitled to common law indemnification from the negligent party (Kelly v. Diesel Constr. Div., 35 N.Y.2d 1, 6).
Although triable issues of fact are presented regarding the condition of the rope prior to its breaking, as well as the extent of Cole's supervision of the worksite and whether Cole, the general contractor, or D.N.A., the subcontractor and plaintiff's decedent's employer, or both were negligent in the erection of the scaffold and supervision of decedent, there is no question that both Cole and D.N.A. had the authority to direct, supervise and control the brick restoration work giving rise to plaintiff's decedent's injuries and death. On the other hand, the fact that 233 West 21st Street may have dispatched persons to observe the progress and method of the work does not render it actively negligent inasmuch as this sort of activity does not bespeak supervision of the kind which would render a property owner liable at common law for the injuries sustained by plaintiff's decedent at the worksite (see, Curtis v. 37th St. Assocs., 198 A.D.2d 62). Furthermore, Cole is obligated to indemnify 233 West 21st Street pursuant to their contract.
We have considered the parties' other points and find them unpersuasive.
Concur — Ellerin, J.P., Wallach, Kupferman and Rubin, JJ.