Opinion
No. CIV. S-05-1685 WBS KJM.
March 8, 2006
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Nancy Appleton's second amended complaint ("SAC") seeks an injunction staying the disbursement of funds resulting from a judicial sale authorized by the Superior Court of California in and for the County of Sacramento. Plaintiff also seeks general damages. Defendants County of Sacramento, the District Attorney of Sacramento County, and court-appointed receiver David L. Ray move to dismiss plaintiff's SAC, pursuant to Rule 12 (b) (6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On July 11, 2001, the state court found Alden J. Appleton (Jonathon Appleton) guilty of fraudulent business practices.State v. Appleton, No. 99AS00592, slip op. at 2 (Cal.Super.Ct. July 11, 2001). The state court ordered civil penalties in the amount of $1,250,000 and determined that a receiver would accomplish restitution. Id. at 10. On or about August 14, 2001, the court appointed defendant David L. Ray to fill the position of receiver. (SAC ¶ 14.)
In February 2004, over objections that plaintiff lodged with the state court, Ray obtained an order authorizing the sale of a residence at 4347 Vintage Oaks Lane, Fair Oaks, California ("the property"). (Id. ¶ 16.) With the help of a real estate agent and with leave of the court, Ray completed the sale of the property on or about August 23, 2005 for the purchase price of $860,000. (Id. ¶¶ 17-19.)
During the course of these events, plaintiff, a trustee of The 4347 Vintage Oaks Lane J N Appleton Trust of 1999, was not a party to the state court action. (Compl. ¶ 15.) She never "intervene[d], move[d] for reconsideration, or appeal[ed] the court's decision[s]." (Aug. 24, 2005 Order (per Chief Judge Levi) (denying plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order ("TRO")).) However, "on August 19, 2005, plaintiff filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in federal court." (Id.) As the sale was still pending, she immediately filed for a TRO, arguing that "a decision of the state court permitting sale of the residence [would] violate her constitutional rights because she [had] not had a sufficient opportunity to participate in the state court action to defend her property rights." Id.
Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order was "denied principally because it [was] untimely." (Id.) Judge Levi further explained that
[t]here [was] no reason why this . . . request for stay should not have been filed [earlier]. By waiting to file this action until the state court was prepared to issue a final ruling, plaintiff . . . misused the temporary restraining order. E.D. Cal. L.R. 65-231 (b).
Furthermore, the showing on the merits [was] not persuasive. It [was] unclear whether plaintiff ha[d] any interest in the property. The state court [had] recently found the claim "meritless" in a tentative ruling.
(Id.) Following suit, this court denied plaintiff's second motion for a TRO, which sought to enjoin the disbursement of the proceeds of the sale. Appleton v. County of Sacramento, No. S-05-1685, 2005 WL 2643174, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2005).
Shortly thereafter, defendants moved to dismiss this action for failure to state a claim. The court granted those motions without prejudice on December 23, 2005 and gave plaintiff 30 days to file a SAC to remedy the deficiencies in her pleadings. Appleton v. County of Sacramento, No. S-05-1685, 2005 WL 3555470, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2005). Presently before the court are defendants' motions to dismiss the SAC, again for failure to state a claim.
II. Discussion
In its December 23, 2005 order, the court made the following determinations: (1) the District Attorney was absolutely immune from a § 1983 suit for damages based on activities "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process"; (2) to the extent that plaintiff sought to enjoin some conduct of the District Attorney, this court should abstain based on Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); (3) receiver Ray, acting within the scope of his authority as provided by valid court orders, was entitled to derivative judicial immunity; and (4) plaintiff had not stated a claim against the County because she had failed to identify a policy or custom of the County, the execution of which deprived of her constitutional rights. To survive the instant motion to dismiss, plaintiff's SAC must address these shortcomings.
Significantly, plaintiff failed to identify, and still has not named, a county official that deprived her of her constitutional rights. Appleton, 2005 WL 3555470, at *5 (observing that "none of the actors identified by name in the complaint are subject to defendant County's control").
A. Legal Standard
On a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the pleader. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). Dismissal is appropriate only when "it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Van Buskirk v. CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added); see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The court does not, "however, necessarily assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations." W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). "[A] simple declaration that defendant's conduct violated the ultimate legal standard at issue . . . does not suffice." Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 692 (2d Cir. 2001); see Conley, 355 U.S. at 47-48 ("[A complaint must] give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." (emphasis added)).
Additionally, although the court may not consider material other than the facts alleged in the complaint when deciding a motion to dismiss, it may rely on matters of public record.Anderson v. Angelone, 86 F.3d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 1996) ("A motion to dismiss . . . must be treated as a motion for summary judgment . . . if either party . . . submits materials outside the pleadings in support or opposition to the motion, and if the district court relies on those materials."); Mack v. S. Bay Beer Distribs., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated on other grounds by Astoria Fed. Sav. Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991) (holding that reliance on matters of public record "does not convert a Rule 12 (b) (6) motion to one for summary judgment"). As the court observed in its previous order dismissing plaintiff's first amended complaint ("FAC"), the several orders issued by the state court and submitted for this court's consideration here, including those entering judgment against Mr. Appleton and authorizing the actions of the court-appointed receiver, are matters of public record, on which the court can rely. See Kent v. Daimlerchrysler Corp., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1219 (N.D. Cal. 2002) ("[L]egal decisions by California courts . . . are matters of public record. . . .").
B. District Attorney of Sacramento County
In her SAC, plaintiff adds the following facts to support her claims against the District Attorney: (1) the District Attorney accompanied the county officers when they executed a warrant for Jonathon Appleton's arrest "with guns drawn", and (2) "during the State Court Action," the District Attorney "performed a document inspection at Jonathon Appleton's office and brought officers with weapons onto Mr. Appleton's business premises." (SAC ¶¶ 25, 27 (emphasis added).) Plaintiff asserts that these actions were taken "for the purpose of harassing and intimidatingMr. Appleton." (Id. ¶ 27 (emphasis added).)
Plaintiff also stresses that the orders obtained by the District Attorney, which established "that every entity with any relation to Jonathon Appleton was an alter ego of each other," were allegedly procedurally defective. (SAC ¶ 26.) However, the court has already established that the District Attorney's filing of claims that resulted in the sale of the property constituted acts that were "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process" and therefore within the scope of prosecutorial immunity. Appleton, 2005 WL 3555470, at *2 (quoting Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976))). Plaintiff's suggestion that the District Attorney was overreaching by going after assets over which the state court allegedly had no jurisdiction does not impact the applicability of this immunity doctrine. See Broam v. Bogan, 230 F.3d 1023, 1029 (9th Cir. 2003) ("If the action was part of the judicial process, the prosecutor is entitled to the protection of absolute immunity whether or not he or she violated the civil plaintiff's constitutional rights.").
It is unclear what plaintiff hopes to accomplish by including these additional facts. The court recognizes that a prosecutor is afforded only qualified immunity when performing investigatory or administrative functions, rather than the absolute immunity applicable to traditional prosecutorial duties. Broam, 320 F.3d at 1028 (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430 andBuckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993)). Thus, when the District Attorney allegedly participated in search and seizure activities and "essentially function[ed] as a police officer or detective," he was entitled only to qualified immunity. Id.; see also Barbera v. Smith, 836 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1987) ("Absolute immunity . . . does not apply when the prosecutor . . . assists in the execution of a search and seizure. . . .").
However, the allegations do not suggest that the District Attorney deprived plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution when he undertook these activities. Significantly, a third party cannot claim "a `derivative' . . . violation [of constitutional rights] on the basis of an intrusion of another's privacy or property." Wilkinson v. F.B.I., 99 F.R.D. 148, 153 (C.D. Cal. 1983); see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139-41, 150 (1978) (holding that evidence seized during an unreasonable search of one person can be used against another person because the constitutional right allegedly violated is a personal one). Thus, even if the District Attorney was entitled only to qualified immunity for allegedly assisting with searches and seizures, affording him such immunity under these circumstances is proper. Broam, 320 F.3d at 1028 ("A state actor . . . is entitled to qualified immunity in an action filed under § 1983 if his or her conduct during a criminal investigation . . . does not violate a federal constitutional right [of the claimant]."). Plaintiff has not alleged facts that support a cognizable legal theory for the District Attorney's liability for damages.
In its previous order, the court also declined to entertain claims against the District Attorney for injunctive relief pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine, which counsels federal courts to abstain from cases when there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding that implicates an important state interest and offers an adequate opportunity to raise federal questions. Lebbos v. Judges of Superior Court, 883 F.2d 810, 814 (9th Cir. 1989). In such cases, federal court interference is inappropriate unless "bad faith, harassment, or other exceptional circumstances dictate to the contrary." Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 437 (1982);World Famous Drinking Emporium, Inc., v. City of Tempe, 820 F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 1987). This court consequently held that Younger abstention was applicable because plaintiff had failed to allege that the state court proceedings were "initiated with and . . . animated by a retaliatory, harassing, or other illegitimate motive." Appleton, 2005 WL 3555470, at *3 (quotingDiamond "D" Const. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir. 2002)).
Plaintiff has since added such allegations to her complaint; however, she still fails to state a claim against the District Attorney for injunctive relief. Significantly, the court notes that it undertook the Younger abstention analysis "assuming that there is some action by the District Attorney that the court might enjoin. . . ." Id. But like the FAC, the SAC does not identify an activity of the District Attorney that the court might enjoin. The complaint only seeks an injunction "to prohibit (a) the disbursement of the proceeds of the sale of the Subject Property; and (b) the transfer, directly or indirectly, of the proceeds of the sale of the Subject Property." (SAC (Prayer for Relief).) These assets are not under the control of the District Attorney and the court cannot award the relief sought against this particular defendant. Therefore, plaintiff has not stated a claim against the District Attorney for injunctive relief.
C. State Court Receiver David L. Ray
Plaintiff likewise has failed to remedy the deficiencies in her claims against defendant Ray. In its previous order, the court found that Ray's activities as a receiver appointed by the state court were covered by the doctrine of derivative judicial immunity. Specifically, the court noted that "[b]ecause a receiver `functions as an arm of the court by making decisions . . . the judge otherwise would have to make,' he is, like a judge, entitled to immunity when he performs an act that is judicial in nature and he does not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction." Appleton, 2005 WL 3555470, at *3 (quoting New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d 1298, 1302, 1303 n. 6 (9th Cir. 1989)) (alterations in original).
In her SAC, plaintiff attempts to show that Ray acted "in clear absence of all jurisdiction" by adding allegations that he "included in his damages claim and accounting in the State Court Action, improper and unverified items including emotional distress and other forms of relief in which the claimants are not entitled." (SAC ¶ 29; Pl.'s Opp'n to Ray's Mot. for Summ. J. 8.) Plaintiff claims that these actions were "in excess of Defendants Ray's and Superior Court's jurisdiction." (Compl. ¶ 29.) However, in making these assertions, plaintiff misconstrues the jurisdiction requirement for judicial immunity.
The Ninth Circuit has determined that judicial immunity should be "freely granted and the exceptions . . . narrowly drawn."Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, "[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority." New Alaska Dev. Corp., 869 F.2d at 1301-02 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978)). "Judicial immunity is a defense so long as `the judge's ultimate acts are judicial actions taken within the court's subject matter jurisdiction.'" Id. at 1302 (quoting Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1078).
In other words, even if Ray improperly requested, and the state court allowed him to award, forms of relief to which Jonathon Appleton's judgment creditors were not entitled, this does not constitute conduct "in clear absence of all jurisdiction." Rather, plaintiff's allegations at most suggest that Ray and the state court judge erred in applying California law or perhaps acted in excess of authority. In exercising control over the res of The 4347 Vintage Oaks Lane J N Appleton Trust of 1999, defendants did not stray from thesubject matter over which they have jurisdiction. See Appleton, 2005 WL 3555470, at *4 (identifying the various statutes that empower California state courts to appoint and authorize the activities of receivers). Consequently, because Ray acted pursuant to valid court orders that the court had jurisdiction to issue, he is entitled to derivative judicial immunity despite plaintiff's allegations that these orders were defective.
As Ray notes, plaintiff's claim that he exceeded his authority by allowing claimants to request emotional distress and other unauthorized forms of relief is refuted by Ray's "Petition for Instructions Re: Allowed and Disallowed Claims", which was submitted to the state court to obtain an order approving Ray's assessment of the claims and to this court for judicial notice. (Ray's Feb. 6, 2006 Request for Judicial Notice Ex. 1 (Petition at 10).) The petition specifically states that Ray "disallowed that portion of a claim that sought attorneys fees, damages for emotional distress and other speculative damages. . . ." (Id.) As indicated above, however, the court does not need to question the truth of plaintiff's allegations in order to grant Ray's motion to dismiss.
The Supreme Court has previously distinguished between "lack of jurisdiction" and "excess of jurisdiction":
[I]f a probate judge, with jurisdiction over only wills and estates, should try a criminal case, he would be acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction and would not be immune from liability for his action; on the other hand, if a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction and would be immune.Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 n. 7 (1978). In other words, [If a criminal judge] should sentence a party convicted to a greater punishment than that authorized by the law upon its proper construction, no personal liability to civil action for such acts would attach to the judge, although those acts would be in excess of his jurisdiction. . . .
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 352 (1871);Sadoski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2006) (same).
Such errors are the proper focus of collateral review on appeal, not a § 1983 case against the acting judicial officers.See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988) (reasoning that it is acceptable to liberally apply judicial immunity because "[m]ost judicial mistakes or wrongs are open to correction through ordinary mechanisms of review, which are largely free of the harmful side-effects inevitably associated with exposing judges to personal liability.").
Similarly, plaintiff's additional allegations that the state court acted without jurisdiction over the Trust do not pierce the veil of judicial immunity. (See SAC ¶ 28.) Even assuming arguendo that plaintiff's allegations are true, the Ninth Circuit has held that "a judge is entitled to immunity even if there was no personal jurisdiction over the complaining party." Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1076; New Alaska Dev. Corp., 869 F.2d at 1076 (same).
Regarding Ray's immunity from suit for injunctive relief, the court's prior order noted that, assuming plaintiff's complaint seeks such relief from Ray, "Younger abstention, as discussed above, would lead to the dismissal of any claims against Ray for injunctive relief, even if he was not protected from the claims against him by the cloak of judicial immunity."Appleton, 2005 WL 3555470, at *4 n. 3 (emphasis added). Plaintiff now alleges that the defendants engaged in a "conspiracy" to retaliate against Jonathon Appleton and harass the entire family, including plaintiff. (Compl. ¶ 23.) While such allegations may be sufficient to qualify for an exception to the Younger abstention doctrine, Younger was not the only ground on which the court based its holding regarding Ray's immunity from suit for injunctive relief. The court only mentioned Younger in passing as an additional reason for dismissing the complaint in case the judicial immunity discussed did not extent to claims for injunctive relief against Ray.
Plaintiff's SAC does not address the court's prior observation that:
Plaintiff's claims against Ray appear to be in his individual, rather than official, capacity and are thus assumedly for damages. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Fish Game Comm'n, Idaho, 42 F.3d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Where state officials are named in a complaint which seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is presumed that the officials are being sued in their individual capacities" if "the complaint is silent as to capacity. . . .").Appleton, 2005 WL 3555470, at *4 n. 3.
Significantly, according to the plain language of § 1983, the cloak of judicial immunity that affords Ray protection from a personal suit for damages also guards against suits for injunctive relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("[I]n any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable."); Kuhn v. Thompson, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1322 (M.D. Ala. 2004). The fact that plaintiff has alleged a conspiracy to deprive her of due process has no bearing on this application of judicial immunity as long as the harm "was inflicted [through judicial] acts to which absolute immunity would apply. . . ." Holloway v. Walker, 765 F.2d 517, 523 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980); Dorman v. Higgins, 821 F.2d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 1987). Because the only claims against Ray are for judicial actions taken pursuant to court orders, he is immune from a suit for damages and injunctive relief based on the facts alleged in the SAC.
Congress added this provision in 1996 in response toPulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984), where the Court held that judicial immunity does not apply in suits against judges for injunctive relief. Plaintiff has not alleged that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable. Moreover, it appears that declaratory relief would have been available, had plaintiff sought it. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1060 ("Any person . . . who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties . . . in respect to, in, over or upon property . . . may, in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an original action or cross-complaint in the superior court for a declaration of his or her rights and duties in the premises. . . . He or she may ask for a declaration of rights or duties, either alone or with other relief. . . .").
D. County of Sacramento
As the court noted in its order dismissing the FAC, to bring a § 1983 claim against the County of Sacramento, "plaintiff must allege that [she] suffered a constitutional deprivation that was the product of a policy or custom of the local government unit."Collins v. County of Kern, 390 F. Supp. 2d 964, 976 (E.D. Cal. 2005); see also Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). The court also expressed doubt "that a local policy, custom, or practice of the County resulted in plaintiff's deprivation of due process [in this case,] when no agent or representative of the County capable of carrying out this policy [had yet] been identified." Appleton, 2005 WL 3555470, at *5 (explaining that despite their proper names, the Superior Court in and for the County of Sacramento, the receiver appointed by that court, and the District Attorney of Sacramento County are not agents of the County).
Plaintiff's SAC likewise fails to identify any agent of the County who deprived her of a constitutional right. She only provides a conclusory allegation that she "is informed and believes and, on that basis, alleges that a local policy, custom or practice of Defendant County of Sacramento resulted in [her] deprivation of due process." (Compl. ¶ 30.) This bald assertion does not sufficiently state a claim against the County. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 47-48 ("[A complaint must] give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." (emphasis added)).
The SAC does appear to allege involvement of County officers in the arrest and investigation of Jonathon Appleton. (Compl. ¶¶ 25-27.) However, as explained above, plaintiff cannot base her § 1983 claim on the alleged violation of another's constitutional rights.
III. Conclusion
In its December 23, 2005 order, the court gave plaintiff 30 days to file an amended complaint that addressed the deficiencies in her FAC. The court must assume that the SAC is the best plaintiff can do to state a claim against defendants. For the reasons discussed above, plaintiff is obviously unable to remedy the shortcomings in her pleadings.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants' motions to dismiss the SAC for failure to state a claim be, and the same hereby are, GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE.
"If judicial and prosecutorial immunity bar recovery," as they do in this case, "no amendment [can] cure the deficienc[ies]" and dismissal, without leave to amend, is warranted. Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075.