Opinion
HHDCV16671643S
11-09-2018
Hugo ANGELES, Administrator of the Estate of Athena Angeles et al. v. State of Connecticut, DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Dubay, J.
The present action arises from a dispute between the plaintiff, Hugo Angeles, individually, as administrator of the estate of his late daughter, Athena Angeles (decedent), and as parent and next friend of his minor daughter, Artemisa Angeles (Artemisa), and the defendant, the state of Connecticut Department of Children and Families (department), regarding the department’s alleged negligence in failing to investigate and/or otherwise act on reports of abuse and neglect suffered by the decedent and Artemisa while in the care and custody of their mother and their mother’s live-in boyfriend. Currently before the court is the department’s motion for summary judgment, on counts one and three of the plaintiff’s complaint. In support or its summary judgment motion, the department claims that, under the so-called "private person standard" established by General Statutes §§ 4-159(c), 4-160(a), and 4-160(c), it cannot be liable for the alleged negligence in the present case because a private person in like circumstances would have no duty-whether arising from statute or common law-to investigate and/or otherwise act on a report of suspected child abuse or neglect. For the reasons set forth subsequently in this memorandum, the department’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
DISCUSSION
The court begins by setting forth the well settled legal standard governing summary judgment motions. Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Practice Book § 17-49. "The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Jones, 220 Conn. 285, 295-96, 596 A.2d 414 (1991).
"In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court’s function is not to decide issues of material fact ... but rather to determine whether any such issues exist." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) RMS Residential Properties, LLC v. Miller, 303 Conn. 224, 233, 32 A.3d 307 (2011). "So extreme a remedy as summary judgment should not be used as a substitute for trial or as a device intended to impose a difficult burden on the non-moving party to save his [or her] day in court unless it is clear that no genuine issue of fact remains to be tried ... A judge’s function when considering a summary judgment motion is not to cull out the weak cases from the herd of lawsuits waiting to be tried; rather, only if the case is dead on arrival, should the court take the drastic step of administering the last rites by granting summary judgment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mott v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 139 Conn.App. 618, 631, 57 A.3d 391 (2012).
The court now turns to the department’s claim in the present case. As stated previously, the department claims that it cannot be liable for the alleged negligence in the present case because, under the private person standard established by §§ 4-159(c), 4-160(a), and 4-160(c), a private person in like circumstances would have no duty to investigate and/or otherwise act on a report of suspected child abuse or neglect. In support of this claim, the department argues that a private person would owe no such duty to the decedent and Artemisa pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-101g because, although this statute authorizes the department to investigate reports of suspected child abuse or neglect and to remove a child from his or her home if such abuse or neglect is suspected, § 17a-101g does not authorize or require a private individual to undertake such endeavors. The department also argues that, pursuant to common-law principles, a private person would owe no duty to the decedent and Artemisa to investigate and/or otherwise act on a report of suspected child abuse or neglect.
The department also claims that § 17a-101g does not waive the state’s immunity from liability and, therefore, cannot serve as a predicate for tort liability. In so doing, however, the department overlooks the fact that, in the present case, the state’s immunity from both liability and suit; see Tuchman v. State, 89 Conn.App. 745, 751, 878 A.2d 384, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 920, 883 A.2d 1252 (2005); has already been waived by the Claims Commissioner. "The claims commissioner has discretionary authority to pay or reject claims [against the state], to make recommendations to the legislature with regard to claims, and to authorize suit against the state. Specifically, the claims commissioner can approve the payment of any claim for less than $7, 500 in damages ... If the claim exceeds $7, 500, the claims commissioner must make a recommendation to the General Assembly suggesting payment or rejection, and the General Assembly may accept, reject or alter the claims commissioner’s recommendation ... The claims commissioner also may authorize suit against the state in Superior Court." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Envirotest Systems Corp. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 293 Conn. 382, 398-99, 978 A.2d 49, 60 (2009). Accordingly, the court concludes that the department’s additional claim is without merit.
The following legal principles are relevant to the department’s claim. Sections 4159 and 4-160 are located in chapter 53 of the General Statutes, which "establishes the general process by which an individual may bring claims against the state." Martinez v. Dept. of Public Safety, 258 Coml. 680, 687, 784 A.2d 347 (2001). Section 4-159 provides in relevant part: "© The General Assembly may grant the claimant permission to sue the state under the provisions of this section when the General Assembly deems it just and equitable and believes the claim to present an issue of law or fact under which the state, were it a private person, could be liable ..." (Emphasis added.) Alternatively, § 4-160(a) provides in relevant part that "[w]hen the Claims Commissioner deems it just and equitable, the Claims Commissioner may authorize suit against the state on any claim which, in the opinion of the Claims Commissioner, presents an issue of law or fact under which the state, were it a private person, could be liable ..." (Emphasis added.)
Read together, these statutes "authorize actions against the state either upon a vote of the General Assembly ... or with the approval of the claims commissioner ... In both statutes the standard for allowing suit is the same; viz., when the General Assembly or the claims commissioner believes the claim to present an issue of law or fact under which the state, were it a private person, could be liable." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burgess v. State, 52 Conn.Supp. 562, 567-68, 74 A.3d 581 (2012). Indeed, in each action authorized by either the Claims Commissioner pursuant to § 4-160(a) or the General Assembly pursuant to § 4-159(c), "[t]he state waives its immunity from liability and from suit ... and waives all defenses which might arise from the eleemosynary or governmental nature of the activity complained of. The rights and liability of the state in each such action shall be coextensive with and shall equal the rights and liability of private persons in like circumstances ..." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 4-160(c); see also Sullivan v. State, 189 Conn. 550, 557, 457 A.2d 304 (1983).
Importantly, "[t]he sole purpose of § 4-160 ... is to remove the bar of sovereign immunity when the claims commissioner determines that it would be just and equitable to permit a claimant to seek redress against the state." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chotkowski v. State, 240 Conn. 246, 270, 690 A.2d 368 (1997). Our Supreme Court has explained, moreover, that "there is no indication that the legislature, in empowering the claims commissioner to waive the state’s immunity from suit, intended to enhance or otherwise to modify a plaintiff’s substantive rights." Similarly, "§ 4-159(c) merely addresses the standard under which the General Assembly will decide whether to waive sovereign immunity. In other words, the reference to a private person in the statute only pertains to the preliminary determination made by the legislature in deciding whether to grant permission to sue, i.e., whether it is just and equitable and whether the state could be held liable if it were a private person." Perez v. University of Connecticut, 182 Conn.App. 278, 288-89, 189 A.3d 664 (2018).
With these principles in mind, the court concludes that the department’s claim is without merit. The private person standard merely eliminates the jurisdictional bar that sovereign immunity otherwise imposes on civil actions brought against the state. Contrary to the department’s claim, the private person standard does not operate as a de facto no-duty rule, as a waiver of sovereign immunity by the Claims Commissioner or the General Assembly does not modify a plaintiff’s substantive rights.
This conception of the private person standard accords with the plain language of § 4-160(c). As a general matter, private individuals do not enjoy the protections provided by the doctrine of sovereign immunity-only the state and its agents do. See Tuchman v. State, 89 Conn.App. 745, 751, 878 A.2d 384, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 920, 883 A.2d 1252 (2005) ("The doctrine of sovereign immunity protects the state, not only from ultimate liability for alleged wrongs, but also from being required to litigate whether it is so liable." [emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted]). Through the removal of sovereign immunity by the Claims Commissioner or the General Assembly, the rights and liability of the state become coextensive with those of a private person, i.e., an individual who would not be immune from suit and liability. Accordingly, because the department’s claim lacks merit, the court concludes that the department has not met its burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle it to a judgment as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth previously in this memorandum, the department’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.