Opinion
No. CV-03-0177457 S
August 16, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This is a decision on the defendants' motion to strike, dated March 28, 2005, which seeks to strike the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth counts of the plaintiff's complaint.
On December 27, 2004, the plaintiff, Walter D. Andrews, filed a six-count complaint against the defendants, Bernadette Teele and A-1 Car Rentals.
The plaintiff alleges in the first count that he was injured as the result of being involved in a rear end collision with the defendant on February 8, 2004. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that his vehicle was struck as the plaintiff slowed and attempted to turn left into a private driveway near 42 Pine Street in the city of Waterbury. He alleges that the accident and resulting injuries were as a result of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by the defendant, Bernadette Teele (Teele).
In the second count, the plaintiff seeks vicarious liability against the owner, A-1 Car Rentals (A-1), for common-law negligence. In the third count, the plaintiff claims statutory recklessness against Teele pursuant to C.G.S. § 14-295. In the fourth count, the plaintiff claims statutory recklessness against A-1 pursuant to C.G.S. § 14-295. The fifth count claims common-law recklessness against the driver, Teele. The sixth count seeks vicarious liability against the owner, A-1, for common-law recklessness.
The defendants have moved to strike the third, fourth, fifth and sixth counts claiming that they fail to state sufficient facts to support recklessness claims. They also seek to strike the fourth and sixth counts and claim that those counts which are based upon vicarious liability are impermissible because Connecticut law does not support punitive damages against a non-operating owner. A-1 also seeks to strike the fourth count CT Page 11953-al and claims that C.G.S. § 14-295 does not permit cause of action against a non-operating owner of a rented or leased vehicle.
The plaintiff objects to the motion and has filed a memorandum in opposition, dated April 4, 2005.
I.
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any [complaint] . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates, 244 Conn. 269, 270, 709 A.2d 558 (1998). The role of the trial court in ruling on a motion to strike is "to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997). "In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., supra, 240 Conn. 580. "[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied . . . Moreover . . . [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lombard v. Edward J. Peters, Jr., P.C., 252 Conn. 623, 626, 749 A.2d 630 (2000).
II.
The defendant, Teele claims that the third count of the complaint should be stricken as it fails to set forth sufficient facts to constitute a claim for statutory recklessness.
There is a split of authority among the judges of the superior court in Connecticut as to the requirements for a plaintiff to sufficiently plead statutory recklessness. As stated by Judge D'Andrea in Bell v. Harrow, No. CV980167961S (Nov. 29, 2001) 2001 Ct.Sup. 15776:
the appellate courts have not indicated what facts a plaintiff must plead in order to establish a cause of action pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295, and there is a split of authority in the Superior Court on this issue. The first line of Superior Court cases requires a plaintiff to plead specific facts to support a claim of recklessness at common law in addition to alleging a violation of one of the CT Page 11953-am enumerated statutes in § 14-295. See, e.g., Pitka v. Ullrich, Superior Court, judicial district of New London at New London, Docket No. 530000 (November 16, 1994, Austin, J.) ( 13 Conn. L. Rptr. 32) (simple allegation that defendant deliberately or recklessly violated certain motor vehicle statutes is insufficient to support claim under § 14-295); Lezotte v. Hanover Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury at Waterbury, Docket No. 112067 (January 6, 1993, Sylvester, J.) ( 8 Conn. L. Rptr. 199, 200) (same); Gaudet v. Ziobran, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex at Middletown, Docket No. 061126 (June 10, 1992, Austin, J.) ( 6 Conn. L. Rptr. 862, CT.Sup p. 15780).
The second line of cases holds that a plaintiff must only allege that the defendant violated one or more of the motor vehicle statutes enumerated in § 14-295 and that this violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries. See, e.g., Nelson-Hlebogiaxmis v. Lee, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 167571 (May 17, 1999, Hiller, J.); Price v. Paccar Leasing Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of New London at New London, Docket No. 538888 (February 19, 1997, Booth, J.); St. George v. Connecticut Car Rental Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford/New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 554923 (February 27, 1996, Spada, J.).
This court has sided with the second line of cases and has held that a plaintiff must only allege that the defendant violated one or more of the motor vehicle statutes enumerated in § 14-295 and that this violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries. Since the plaintiff has so alleged that the defendant, Bernadette Teele violated C.G.S. §§ 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, and 14-240a which are enumerated in § 14-295, the defendants' motion to strike the third count is denied.
III.
The defendant, A-1 claims that the fourth count of the complaint should be stricken for three reasons. First, CT Page 11953-an it claims the count should be stricken as it fails to set forth sufficient facts to constitute a claim for statutory recklessness. The court has addressed that issue in Part II above, and will not strike the count on those grounds. Second, the defendant claims that § 14-295 does not permit cause of action against a non-operating owner of a rented or leased vehicle. Third, the defendant claims that Connecticut law does not support a claim for punitive damages against a non-operating owner.
Regarding the defendant's second claim, the court need not look past the clear statutory language of § 14-295. General Statutes § 14-295 provides: "In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a, 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property. The owner of a rental or leased motor vehicle shall not be responsible for such damages unless the damages arose from such owner's operation of the motor vehicle." (Emphasis added.)
"It is well settled that in construing statutes, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature . . . and that [t]he meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wallingford v. Werbiski, 274 Conn. 483, 489 (2005).
In Chetty v. Pallay, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 02 0471200 (August 16, 2004, Arnold, J.) ( 37 Conn. L. Rptr. 719) the court CT Page 11953-ao noted that in enacting No. 03-250 of the 2003 Public Acts, the legislature repealed the previous incarnation of § 14-295 and added the last sentence to the statute. Public Act 03-250 became effective on October 1, 2003, and applies to causes of action, such as the plaintiffs here, that accrued on or after that date. The last sentence of the plain language of the statute precludes the plaintiff from alleging statutory recklessness against A-1 as per § 14-295. " The owner of a rental or leased motor vehicle shall not be responsible for such damages unless the damages arose from such owner's operation of the motor vehicle." (Emphasis added.)
In addition, the court in Chetty, supra, 37 Conn. L. Rptr. 719, stated: "This court agrees with and adopts the reasoning in Aurio v. Allstate Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 02 0175465 (November 26, 2003, Gallagher, J.) ( 36 Conn. L. Rptr. 39), which states, `It appears that the legislature has clarified its original intent by the addition of the last sentence,' and `finds that neither General Statutes § 52-182 nor § 52-183 permits imposing liability for double or treble damages on the nonoperator owner of a motor vehicle.' Section 14-295 of the statutes unambiguously applies to vehicles operated by a defendant. Punitive damages are therefore inappropriate given the language of the law which authorizes them. The purpose of statutory punitive damages is to deter egregious conduct and imposing them in his case could not serve to deter the owner from conduct in the manner of `operation' of the motor vehicle by the driver which, albeit wrongful, the owner did not cause or have reason to know about or expect. Aurio v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra." (Emphasis added.)
Since the plaintiff alleges, in count four, that A-1 was the lessor of the motor vehicle Teele was operating, and the plaintiff specifically prays for treble damages under § 14-295 as to the fourth count, count four is governed by the language of that statute and the motion to strike count four and the accompanying prayers for relief is granted.
IV. CT Page 11953-ap
The defendant seeks to strike the plaintiff's fifth count which makes a claim based upon common-law recklessness. Negligent conduct and reckless conduct are not the same. Recklessness involves more than a failure to exercise reasonable care to avoid danger to others, or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injuring another. Mooney v. Wabrek, 129 Conn. 302, 308 (1942). Recklessness is more than negligence, or even gross negligence. Bordonaro v. Senk, 109 Conn. 428, 432 (1929). It involves a disregard of the consequences of one's actions, and a disregard of the rights of others. Duby v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 532 (1988); Markey v. Santengelo, 95 Conn. 76, 78 (1985).
"Recklessness requires a conscious choice of a course of action either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable man, and the actor must recognize that his conduct involves a risk substantially greater . . . than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent." (Citations omitted.) Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 832 (2003). "(W)illful, wanton reckless conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent . . . it is at least clear . . . that such aggravated negligence must be more than any mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement, or confusion, and more than mere thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or simply inattention." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312, 343-43 (2003). Negligence, on the other hand, involves a failure to use the degree of care and skill which the ordinarily prudent person would use under the circumstances. Hoelter v. Mohawk Services, Inc., 170 Conn. 495, 501 (1976).
After examining the fifth count, and construing the same in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court concludes that the plaintiff has pled a cause of action sounding in common-law recklessness. The plaintiff has alleged that the defendant operated her vehicle with reckless or deliberate disregard for others on the highway, and in violation of the reckless driving CT Page 11953-aq statute, § 14-222. He further alleges that the defendant, Teele, did not look at the roadway ahead of her while following the plaintiff closer than was reasonable, and at an unreasonable rate of speed. Those allegations are sufficient to support a claim for recklessness. Further, the allegations are definitive enough to notify the court and opposing counsel that a claim of recklessness is being made.
V.
In the sixth count, the plaintiff seeks to hold A-1 vicariously liable for recklessness. The allegations do not state that A-1 engaged in reckless conduct. Rather, citing C.G.S. §§ 52-183 and 14-154a, the plaintiff alleges that A-1 was the owner of the vehicle involved in this incident, and that Teele either was acting with the permission of and as its agent, servant, employee, or that A-1 was the owner or lessor of vehicle when Teele recklessly caused the accident.
Sec. 52-183. In any civil action brought against the owner of a motor vehicle to recover damages for the negligent or reckless operation of the motor vehicle, the operator, if he is other than the owner of the motor vehicle, shall be presumed to be the agent and servant of the owner of the motor vehicle and operating it in the course of his employment. The defendant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption.
Sec. 14-154a. (a) Any person renting or leasing to another any motor vehicle owned by him shall be liable for any damage to any person or property caused by the operation of such motor vehicle while so rented or leased, to the same extent as the operator would have been liable if he had also been the owner . . .
In the motion to strike, the defendant, A-1 claims that Connecticut does not recognize multiple or enhanced damages under General Statutes § 52-183 against the owner of a motor vehicle for the reckless conduct of the nonowner operator. In Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 840, 841 (2003), our Supreme Court stated: "(i)n light of the language and limited purpose of § 52-183, we are not persuaded that it reasonably can be construed to authorize an award of punitive damages on the basis of vicarious liability. Nothing in the statute suggests that the nonoperator owner of a motor vehicle may be held liable for any damages other than those customarily assessed against an employer for the tortious conduct of an employee, namely, compensatory damages [T]here is nothing in the statutory language [of § 52-183] to suggest that the liability of the vehicle's owner for the negligent or reckless conduct of the vehicle's operator is any greater than that of an employer for the tortious conduct of his employee. Because an employer is not vicariously liable for punitive damages arising out of the conduct of his employee, we see no reason to conclude that § 52-183 impliedly gives rise to such liability on the part of a nonoperator owner of a motor vehicle." As such, it is improper to award punitive or CT Page 11953-ar multiple damages against someone who is only liable vicariously. This court believes that the same rationale be applied not only to § 52-183, but to other statues in which non-operating owners potentially face enhanced damages, including § 14-154a, see Aurio v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra.
The plaintiff, in her prayers for relief, seeks punitive damages in the fifth and sixth count. The plaintiff does not distinguish between the extent of liability of an owner and operator, but rather seeks both punitive damages and monetary and compensatory damages from both of the defendants. Thus, count six of the complaint and its accompanying prayers for relief are stricken as to A-1, because the plaintiff is attempting to impose punitive and enhanced damages on the owner of the motor vehicle involved in this accident.
V.
In conclusion, the motion to strike counts three and five are denied. The motion to strike counts four and six are granted.
Matasavage, J.