Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. NS022508, Dennis Carroll, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.).
Bennie Ray Townsel, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Collins, Collins, Muir & Stewart, Nicole Davis-Tinkham and Eric Brown for Plaintiff and Respondent.
KRIEGLER, J.
Defendant and appellant Bennie Ray Townsel appeals from a permanent injunction issued under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 prohibiting him from harassing plaintiff and respondent Lynn Anderson. Townsel contends that there is no evidence to support the trial court’s finding that he committed a violent act, a threat of violence, or a course of conduct constituting harassment under section 527.6. We agree, and therefore, we reverse.
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise stated.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Anderson is the property manager for the Carmelitos Housing Development, which is owned and operated by the Housing Authority of the County of Los Angeles. Townsel has been a resident of Carmelitos since June 2001.
On April 23, 2010, Anderson petitioned for a restraining order against Townsel. The petition stated that Townsel had committed, or had threatened to commit, acts of violence against her. In addition, Townsel engaged in a course of conduct that harassed her and caused her substantial emotional distress.
In support of the petition, Anderson filed a declaration stating that on April 21, 2010, she left the management office at 5:15 p.m. to drive home. Driving eastbound on the street in front of her home, she turned her car around to park in front of her house, facing westbound. She saw Townsel slowly driving eastbound on her street and looking at her.
Anderson was concerned to see Townsel because “he has expressed negative feelings toward me due to my course of work and has expressed fears that my employer, the Housing Authority, is trying to compromise his health by the mulch placed throughout the Carmelitos Housing Development.” She did not want Townsel to see her enter her home.
She immediately drove away from her home. She turned her car around and drove eastbound after Townsel to see if he had left the area. When she came to a stop sign, she saw Townsel stopped at the curb on the cross-street Obispo Avenue. Anderson drove past Townsel on Obispo Avenue and turned on a street parallel to her street. She turned her car around and drove back to see if Townsel had left the area. Instead, she saw Townsel had moved his truck and stopped in a different location on Obispo Avenue. Anderson turned on Obispo Avenue and drove to another parallel street. She turned her car around again and saw Townsel was still stopped on Obispo Avenue.
Anderson called the maintenance supervisor at Carmelitos and told him that Townsel was following her. She returned to Obispo Avenue and turned on Greentop Street. On Greentop Street, she turned her car around. As she was driving back to Obispo Avenue, Townsel turned from Obispo Avenue to Greentop Street.
When the cars were facing each other, Anderson asked, “What are you doing Bennie?” Townsel responded, “Why are you following me?” Anderson told him that he had been behind her the entire time and she was the one being followed. She told him to leave her alone and said goodbye.
Anderson did not feel comfortable parking her vehicle at her house. She drove in another direction and arranged to meet her husband at another location. Once they returned home, she called the local sheriff’s station. A sheriff’s deputy came to her home and she described the incident. The deputy advised Anderson to obtain a restraining order against Townsel and told her that additional patrolling would be done around her location.
Anderson’s husband and one of her children were at the house during the incident. Anderson felt Townsel was angry about her work in her capacity as property manager. She was concerned for her safety and the safety of her family. Her employer relocated her to another work location pending her effort to obtain a restraining order.
A temporary restraining order was issued. A hearing was held on May 13, 2010, on the issue of a permanent injunction. Anderson appeared with counsel and Townsel appeared in pro. per. The court had reviewed the moving papers and Anderson’s declaration.
Townsel testified, “First of all, this is a coincidence, purely a coincidence; and Ms. Anderson and I have had a long-going tug of war for over six years over landscaping and different issues at the Carmelitos, and I truly believe she’s trying to use this purely coincidence as a ground to have me legally evicted from Section 8 housing. [¶] She lives within one mile from this complex. I’ve lived there for nine years, and I have never but one time bumped into her. This purely was a coincidence. I don’t know where she lives. I was in no way trying to pursue or follow her or anything.”
“I’ve written numerous amounts of letters to her supervisor about her attitude and the way she handles things over here at... Carmelitos. Because of her actions, I’ve been hospitalized twice. I’ve seen doctors. I’ve given her doctor reports. She chooses to ignore them, and she says I’m full of—I’m a joke. This thing has been ongoing.”
“So when a representative from the Supervisor’s office came to review the situation and when I spoke to, I guess, Ms. Lynn and/or her supervisor whatever, then all of a sudden the next day on the 23rd I get served with a restraining order about me bumping into her accidentally on the 21st. She was afraid for her safety or feel I was following her.
“Why didn’t she call 911 on the 21st? If you read her statement there, your Honor, she[’s] the one that start[ed] following me. I’m the one, after she followed me for six blocks, [who] pulled over and asked her, ‘Why are you pursuing me? I’m going on about my business. I have no interest in talking to you, contacting you. I contact you through mail, ’ which I have all the letters here. [¶]... [¶] It’s [a] coincidence where she’s trying to blow it into a major event only because she adamantly hates for anyone to oppose her authority or go above her head to disagree with the decision that she makes.”
Townsel attempted to discuss events that had occurred seven years prior. The trial court stopped him and stated, “I’ve got the picture. You said it was a mistake or coincidence and that you do not believe a restraining order should be rendered.”
Anderson’s counsel explained that after the temporary restraining order was issued, Anderson returned to her regular employment location. No further incidents had taken place between the parties. Anderson was seeking a permanent injunction as to her residence only. The trial court suggested that a different Housing Authority employee respond to Townsel’s complaints and Anderson’s counsel agreed.
The trial court entered a permanent injunction ordering Townsel to have no contact with Anderson and to stay at least 100 yards away from her, her home, and her workplace for three years. If Townsel had property management issues, he was to contact certain specified Housing Authority employees by mail or telephone. The employees must meet Townsel at a different location, rather than Anderson’s place of business, in order to avoid misunderstandings. Townsel filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
“The trial court’s decision to grant a permanent injunction rests within its sound discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion.” (Shapiro v. San Diego City Council (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 904, 912.) “However, to the extent the trial court had to review the evidence to resolve disputed factual issues, and draw inferences from the disputed facts, an appellate court will review such factual findings under a substantial evidence standard. Our power in this regard ‘begins and ends with the determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the finding of fact. [Citations.] [¶] When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
Harassment
Townsel contends the trial court abused its discretion by issuing the restraining order against him in this case, because there was no evidence to support finding that he committed an unlawful act of violence, threatened violence, or engaged in a course of conduct constituting harassment under section 527.6. We agree.
Section 527.6 establishes a procedure for expedited injunctive relief to persons suffering harassment. (Schraer v. Berkeley Property Owners’ Assn. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 719, 730 (Schraer).) If the trial court finds by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists, the court must issue a permanent injunction for a term of not more than three years. (§ 527.6, subd. (d).) “[T]he trial court cannot issue an injunction unless it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that unlawful harassment already exists in fact.” (Schraer, supra, at p. 733.)
“Harassment” is defined as “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the plaintiff.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b).)
“Section 527.6 does not define the phrase ‘substantial emotional distress.’ However, in the analogous context of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the similar phrase ‘severe emotional distress’ means highly unpleasant mental suffering or anguish ‘from socially unacceptable conduct’ [citation], which entails such intense, enduring and nontrivial emotional distress that ‘no reasonable [person] in a civilized society should be expected to endure it.’ [Citations.]” (Schild v. Rubin (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 755, 762-763.)
“Unlawful violence” is defined as “any assault or battery, or stalking as prohibited in Section 646.9 of the Penal Code....” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1).) A “credible threat of violence” is “a knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that would place a reasonable person in fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(2).)
Under Penal Code section 646.9, the crime of stalking is committed when a person “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or willfully and maliciously harasses another person and makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family[.]” (Pen. Code, § 646.9, subd. (a).)
A “course of conduct” is defined as “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an individual, making harassing telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing correspondence to an individual by any means, including, but not limited to, the use of public or private mails, interoffice mail, fax, or computer e-mail. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of ‘course of conduct.’” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).)
To support finding a course of conduct under section 527.6, the evidence must show a series of acts over a period of time, however short. (Leydon v. Alexander (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1, 4 (Leydon).) A “‘series’” is “‘a number of things or events of the same class....’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) A single incident does not establish a course of conduct. (Ibid.)
In Leydon, supra, 212 Cal.App.3d at page 4, the court held that a single incident of harassment is insufficient to meet the statutory requirement of a “course of conduct” under section 527.6 as a matter of law. In that case, an employee who had sued his employer based on his termination, returned to the workplace years later and verbally harassed his former supervisor for five minutes. Other than that single incident, the only contact that the former employee had had with the employer was the constitutionally protected activity of filing a lawsuit.
In this case, there is no evidence to support finding that Townsel engaged in “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct” that constituted harassment under section 527.6. The evidence was undisputed that prior to April 21, 2010, Townsel’s interactions with Anderson were for the legitimate purpose of addressing his complaints about property management decisions. Anderson declared that Townsel was angry about her property management decisions and he “expressed negative feelings toward her” based on her performance of her job. However, in the absence of further explanation, simply expressing negative feelings does not constitute an unlawful act of violence or a credible threat of violence that would put a reasonable person in fear for his or her safety. There was no evidence that Townsel’s expression of negative feelings toward Anderson prior to April 21, 2010, constituted harassment, and Anderson does not argue otherwise on appeal.
In the context of this case, the single incident that took place on April 21, 2010, was not sufficient to establish harassment under section 527.6. Townsel did not commit a violent act on that date or make any statement threatening Anderson with violence. The one incident was not sufficient to establish a course of conduct as a matter of law and cannot support issuance of an injunction. The judgment must be reversed.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed, and the injunction issued against appellant Bennie Ray Townsel on May 13, 2010, is dissolved. Appellant Townsel is awarded his costs on appeal.
We concur: ARMSTRONG, Acting P. J., KUMAR, J.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.