Opinion
CA No. 9:19-cv-02086-HMH-MHC
01-05-2021
Charles Anderson, Plaintiff, v. Quality Correctional Health Care, Lt. Sweat, Sgt. Riddick, Ofc. Miller Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This action was filed by Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At the time he filed this action, Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee booked into the Sumter Lee Regional County Detention Center (the "Detention Center") on Robbery, Attempted Murder, Kidnapping, and Weapons charges. Plaintiff was initially placed in B pod, the closed cell maximum security pod, based on his charges and felony assault history. ECF No. 44-3 at 2 ¶ 8.
Plaintiff is no longer housed at the Detention Center. See ECF No. 73 (Notice of Change of Address to Kirkland Correctional Institution).
Plaintiff claims that during his time at the Detention Center, his Eighth Amendment rights were violated because the toilet in his cell did not flush properly and the Detention Center does not have a law library. ECF No. 1 at 4 ¶ D. He also asserts that he received inadequate mental health care from Defendant Quality Correctional Health Care ("QCHC"), ECF No. 1-1 at 1, which was under contract to provide all medical and mental health care to Detention Center inmates beginning on July 1, 2019, see ECF No. 44-3 at ¶ 20.
On June 5, 2020, Defendants Lt. Sweat, Sgt. Reddick, Ofc. Miller (collectively, the "Officer Defendants"), and Lt. Neal filed a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 44. Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, a Roseboro Order was entered by the Court on June 8, 2020, advising Plaintiff of the importance of a dispositive motion, of the need for him to file an adequate response, and that if he failed to respond adequately, the Officer Defendants' Motion may be granted, thereby ending his case. ECF No. 45. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion on June 24, 2020. ECF No. 48.
Sgt. Reddick's name is misspelled in Plaintiff's Complaint as "Riddick."
On September 15, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Defendant Lt. Neal from this action. ECF No. 64. Therefore, Lt. Sweat, Sgt. Reddick, and Ofc. Miller are the only remaining Officer Defendants.
On October 5, 2020, Defendant QCHC filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 69. A Roseboro Order was entered by the Court on October 6, 2020. ECF No. 70. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion on November 5, 2020, ECF No. 77. QCHC and the Officer Defendants filed Replies. See ECF Nos. 78 & 79.
Defendants' Motions are ripe for review. All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.). Because the Motions are dispositive, this Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the District Judge.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if a party "shows there is no genuine dispute as to any issue of material fact" and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Under the framework established in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the Court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324.
Under this standard, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Id. at 252. Likewise, conclusory or speculative allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. To survive summary judgment, the non-movant must provide evidence of every element essential to his action on which he will bear the burden of proof at a trial on the merits. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
DISCUSSION
I. The Officer Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 44)
In his unverified Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he informed each of the Officer Defendants that the plumbing system was inadequate but that they "didn't care if [he] had to suffer because the toilet didn't flush." ECF No. 1 at 4 ¶ D. He alleges that when he was first moved into his cell, it looked like it had not been cleaned in years. Id. at 5 ¶ B. He claims that he complained about his toilet not working for three weeks beginning in May 2019, and he requested a plunger and disinfectant spray. Id. at 5 ¶ D; ECF No. 1-1 at 15. He alleges that he "was brought the plunger and five napkins and some disinfect[ant] spray," but the toilet "still didn't function properly." ECF No. 1-1 at 15. According to Plaintiff, when he flushed, the water would not go all the way down, ECF No. 1 at 8 ¶ E.3, unless he "flush[ed] it like 10 to 15 time[s]," ECF No. 1-1 at 10. Plaintiff claims that he had to eat lunch with feces in the toilet. ECF No. 1 at 6 ¶ VI; ECF No. 1-1 at 13. He alleges that eventually an outside plumber fixed the problem, but Plaintiff was moved into a different cell with the same problem. Id. at 7 ¶ C; ECF No. 1-1 at 10.
In this Circuit, verified complaints by pro se prisoners are to be considered as affidavits when the allegations contained therein are based on personal knowledge. Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991). However, neither Plaintiff's Complaint nor his responses to Defendants' Motions are verified. See ECF Nos. 1, 48, 77.
Plaintiff further alleges that lead chips come out of the cold-water fixture, so he must drink warm water, and the wash rag turns brown in the water. ECF No. 1-1 at 2, 9. He alleges that he is allowed out of his cell only one hour, three days a week. Id. at 4.
Plaintiff also alleges that there is no law library and that he is charged for copies of information that he requests from Captain Lumpkins. ECF No. 1 at 4 ¶ D. He claims that because there is no law library, he cannot do his own research to help him fight for his freedom, and he further contends the he "shouldn't have to ask [his] lawyer." Id. at 6 ¶ VI.
Captain Lumkins is not a Defendant in this action.
Plaintiff contends that the conditions of his confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment and that the lack of a law library is a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Id. at ¶¶ B, D. Although he asserts that he has not suffered any physical injuries, he alleges that "mentally [he] wasn't right for weeks." Id. at 6 ¶ V. For relief, he would like for the Officer Defendants to be fired or suspended without pay, and he claims $2.5 million for mental suffering (or $250,000, if the Defendants are also fired). Id. at 6 ¶ VI.
The Officer Defendants have moved for summary judgment and dismissal of all claims alleged against them. In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, the Officer Defendants attached affidavits of Defendant Lieutenant Wheeler Sweat (ECF No. 44-2), Captain Chanae Lumpkin (ECF No. 44-3), Defendant Officer Franshon Miller (ECF No. 44-4), Lieutenant Marilyn Neal (ECF No. 44-5), and Defendant Lieutenant Monica Reddick (ECF No. 44-6).
In response to the Motion, Plaintiff produced seven pages of a "Resident Request Report." ECF No. 48-2 at 1-7. The Report shows that he made various complaints about being put on "max status" and assigned to B Pod, even though he had not had any infractions; Detention Center staff responded that his classification as a maximum custody inmate was because of the current charges on which he was arrested and his past history, and that his custody level could be changed only if there were a change in his current charges. Id. at 5 (Request #4392); see id. at 1 (Request #5455), 2-3 (Request #6799). Plaintiff also complained that his clothes come back from the wash dirtier than when he sent them (id. at 3 (Request #7320), that he was charged for copies of a document he did not need (id. (Request #7438)), and that his toilet was not working (id. at 6 (Request #4428)). Finally, the Report shows that Plaintiff made requests for the addresses of various agencies, including the state mental health department, the IRS, and the DMV, and Detention Center staff provided the requested information. Id. at 2.
Plaintiff also produced a series of petitions, apparently signed by various inmates of the Detention Center, which generally complain about the inmates' conditions of confinement in B pod (alleging moldy showers, inadequate plumbing and sewage, and limited time outside of their rooms), lack of access to a law library, and concerns related to COVID-19. See ECF No. 48-2 at 9-15. None of these purported petitions were signed under penalty of perjury. See id.
Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding any of his claims against the Officer Defendants.
A. Claims Against the Officer Defendants in their Official Capacities
As an initial matter, any claims against the Officer Defendants in their official capacities must be dismissed. Because the Officer Defendants were agents or employees of an arm of the State of South Carolina when acting in their official capacities, they are not subject to suit for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in their official capacities. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991) ("State officers sued for damages in their official capacity are not 'persons' for purposes of the suit because they assume the identity of the government that employs them. By contrast, officers sued in their personal capacity come to court as individuals.") (internal citation omitted); Will v. Michigan State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (explaining that "a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is . . . no different from a suit against the State itself"); see also Pennington v. Kershaw Cnty., S.C., C/A No. 3:12-1509-JFA-SVH, 2013 WL 2423120, at *4 n.2 (D.S.C. June 4, 2013) (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 4-1-10 and applying the Eleventh Amendment to a county as "a political subdivision of the State"); Chisolm v. Cannon, C/A No. 4:02-3473-RBH, 2006 WL 361375, at *5-6 (D.S.C. Feb. 15, 2006) (finding Charleston County Detention Center entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as an arm of the state); Cone v. Nettles, 417 S.E.2d 523, 525 (S.C. 1992) (holding that employees of a county Sheriff are state officials and thus not liable in their official capacities for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
However, "a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State." Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, in this instance, Plaintiff cannot seek injunctive relief because he is no longer housed at the Detention Center and has not presented any evidence showing a reasonable expectation that he will be detained at the Detention Center in the future, such that any claim for injunctive relief is moot. See ECF No. 73 (Pl.'s change-of-address notice); Slade v. Hampton Roads Reg'l Jail, 407 F.3d 243, 248-49 (4th Cir. 2005) (presuming that former detainee plaintiff will abide by the criminal laws in the future, finding no reasonable probability that he will return to the jail as a pretrial detainee, and holding that former detainee's request for injunctive relief was moot). Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff's claims seek relief against the Officer Defendants in their official capacities or seek injunctive relief, those claims should be dismissed.
B. Claims Against the Officer Defendants in their Individual Capacities
Although they cannot be sued in their official capacities, the Officer Defendants, as public officials, are subject to suit for money damages in their individual capacities in a § 1983 lawsuit. See Hafer, 502 U.S. at 27; Goodmon v. Rockefeller, 947 F.2d 1186, 1187 (4th Cir. 1991). However, for the reasons set forth below, the evidence is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether any named Officer Defendant violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights.
a. Claim Based on Conditions of Confinement
In his Complaint, Plaintiff complains that his toilet did not flush properly, brown water and lead chips came from his cold-water faucet, and he was permitted to leave his cell only three days a week. Conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees are evaluated under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than under the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 537 n.16 (1979); see Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 990 (4th Cir. 1992). Nonetheless, the "due process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as the [E]ighth [A]mendment protections available to the convicted prisoner." Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988).
Although "a pretrial detainee, not yet found guilty of any crime, may not be subjected to punishment of any description[,] . . . not every hardship encountered during pretrial detention amounts to 'punishment' in the constitutional sense." Hill, 979 F.2d at 991. To establish that a particular condition or restriction of detention constitutes constitutionally impermissible "punishment," a detainee must show either (1) an "expressed intent" to punish or (2) a lack of a reasonable relationship "to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective, from which a punitive intent may be inferred." Martin v, 849 F.2d at 870.
Prison officials act with the requisite culpable intent when they act with deliberate indifference to the inmates' suffering. Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1379. The test for whether a prison official acts with deliberate indifference is a subjective one: the official must "know[ ] of and disregard[ ] an excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the official must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
The plaintiff must prove that he was deprived a "basic need" and that this deprivation was attended by deliberate indifference on the part of the defendants. Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1379; see also Parrish v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 302 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating that the standard of deliberate indifference requires actual knowledge and disregard of a substantial risk of serious injury); Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Deliberate indifference is a very high standard—a showing of mere negligence will not meet it."). To demonstrate that the conditions deprived him of a basic human need, the plaintiff must demonstrate that officials failed to provide him with humane conditions of confinement, such as "adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and [taking] reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates." See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Further, the plaintiff must produce evidence of serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions to withstand summary judgment on a conditions-of-confinement claim. Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1380-81.
Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the conditions to which he was subjected at the Detention Center were either (1) imposed with an express intent to punish or (2) not reasonably related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective. See Hill, 979 F.2d at 991. First, there is no evidence that Plaintiff's placement in B pod was based on an intent to punish or was not reasonably related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective; to the contrary, Captain Lumpkin's undisputed affidavit testimony establishes that Plaintiff's classification as a Maximum Security inmate and placement in B pod were appropriate under Detention Center policy and procedures based on his current charges (Robbery, Attempted Murder, Kidnapping, and Weapons charges) and his history of prior felony assault. ECF No. 44-3 at 2 ¶¶ 5, 7-8.
Moreover, there is no evidence that Plaintiff's conditions of confinement were any different than the conditions experienced by other inmates in B pod. To the contrary, Plaintiff's own evidence suggests that many of his fellow inmates allegedly experienced similar conditions, and there is no evidence that Plaintiff was singled out or treated differently in any way. See ECF No. 48-2 at 9-15 (inmate petitions complaining of moldy showers, inadequate plumbing and sewage, limited time outside of their rooms, and lack of access to a law library).
With respect to Plaintiff's toilet complaints, the Officer Defendants produced testimony that complaints about toilet problems were common, and that when an inmate complains of a problem with his toilet, an officer or supervisor will respond and have the toilet checked either by the inmate at the jail with plumbing experience, the County employee who handles plumbing issues, or, if it is a bigger problem, an outside company. See, e.g., ECF No. 44-2 at 3 ¶¶ 13-17; ECF No. 44-6 at ¶¶ 5-7; ECF No. 44-4 at 2 ¶ 7-10. While the problem is being evaluated, the inmate may stay in his cell, be moved to another cell, or placed in the shower while the work is done. ECF No. 44-2 at 3 ¶¶ 13-17.
The evidence further demonstrates that Plaintiff's complaints were handled in accordance with this procedure. According to the record, the first time Plaintiff complained about any issues related to the toilet in his cell was on May 22, 2019, about ten days after he was placed in B pod. See ECF No. 44-2 at 3 ¶ 15. After he complained, he was moved to another cell while it was fixed and was then moved back to his cell. Id. Plaintiff filed a grievance on May 27, 2019, where he claims his toilet had not been working since he had been moved to B pod, and that no one had tried to fix it. See ECF No. 44-2 at 3 ¶ 15. Lieutenant Neal responded to this grievance on May 28, 2019, and also passed the information on to the supervisor. Id.; ECF No. 44-5 at 2 ¶ 8. Plaintiff was moved again to another cell on June 1, 2019. Id.; see also ECF No. 44-2 at 3 ¶ 18. There is no other evidence of further complaints by Plaintiff related to his toilet, and the evidence in the record is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation. See Crouchman v. Pickens Cnty. Council, No. CV 9:16-0804-CMC-BM, 2017 WL 767185, at *12 (D.S.C. Feb. 3, 2017) (pretrial detainee's "allegation in his Complaint that sometimes his toilet or sink would be broken 'for days' and that on occasion he had to be 'let out to use the common area bathroom because his toilet don't work' does not establish a constitutional violation."), adopted by, No. CV 9:16-804-CMC-BM, 2017 WL 749393 (D.S.C. Feb. 27, 2017).
Cf. Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that conditions described by inmate plaintiffs—that cells were unbearably hot, infested with vermin, smeared with human feces and urine, and flooded with water from a leaky toilet above; that food was served cold; that plaintiffs were not permitted to leave their cells more than three to four times per week and were not permitted outside recreation; and that plaintiffs did not receive clean clothing, linen, or bedding as required by regulations—were not "so atypical that exposure to them for six months imposed a significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life").
Further, Plaintiff has not produced any evidence that he sustained any serious or significant physical or emotional injury as a result of the alleged deprivations. Although his medical records show ongoing mental health issues, the records also show that these mental health issues predated Plaintiff's detention. See, e.g., ECF No. 69-1 at 2 (record of mental health assessment dated April 22, 2019, noting that Plaintiff reported feelings of depression and suicidal ideation); id. at 13 (record of suicide risk assessment performed on date Plaintiff was booked into the Detention Center in which Plaintiff reported hearing voices and that he attempted suicide the previous month). Thus, Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence of a serious injury that resulted from his confinement conditions, and this lack of any evidence of a compensable injury is fatal to Plaintiff's damages claim based on his conditions of confinement. See Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1380-81 (holding that "in order to withstand summary judgment on [a constitutional] challenge to prison conditions[,] a plaintiff must produce evidence of a serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions"); see also Miska v. Middle River Regional Jail, No. 09-172, 2009 WL 1916726 at *4 (W.D. Va. July 2, 2009) (finding that although the conditions of which the pretrial detainee complained (including, but not limited to, backed up sewer water in his cell and having to eat near his toilet despite being provided inadequate cleaning materials) were no doubt uncomfortable and frustrating, detainee's claim should be dismissed because he had not alleged facts indicating that the conditions were imposed on him with the intent to punish, or that he had suffered any significant serious injury).
The undersigned concludes that Plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine question of fact as to whether his conditions of confinement violated his due process rights. See Hazel v. Sanders, No. 1:09-cv-2543-RMG, 2011 WL 2413128, at *2 (D.S.C. June 13, 2011) (denying pretrial detainee's conditions-of-confinement claim because "Petitioner was never singled out as the only inmate denied showers and recreation; to the contrary, most, if not all inmates in A-Pod were subjected to the same restrictions," and "Petitioner fails to show the defendant's actions were not reasonably related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental interest"); see also Webb v. Nicks, No. CV 1:18-2007-HMH-SVH, 2019 WL 2896447, at *1-4 (D.S.C. June 4, 2019), adopted by, No. CV 1:18-2007-HMH-SVH, 2019 WL 2869626 (D.S.C. July 3, 2019) (denying pretrial detainee's conditions-of-confinement claim based on alleged exposure to black mold in the showers and bunks; brown, foul-smelling drinking water from rusty pipes; lead paint peeling from the walls; most of the bathrooms in the bunks not functioning, leading to a bad smell; poor ventilation system; and overcrowding). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the Officer Defendants be granted summary judgment on this claim.
To the extent Plaintiff's claims include accusations that one or more of the Officer Defendants improperly handled his grievances, that is not a claim cognizable in this Court in a § 1983 action, as there is no constitutional right to access a prison grievance procedure. See Booker v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 541 (4th Cir. 2017) (explaining that because "inmates have no constitutional entitlement or due process interest in access to a grievance procedure," an "inmate thus cannot bring a § 1983 claim alleging denial of a specific grievance process"); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994); see also cf. Johnson v. S.C. Dep't of Corrections, No. 06-2062, 2007 WL 904826, at *12 (D.S.C. Mar. 21, 2007) ("Plaintiff's allegation that defendants did not follow their own policies or procedures, standing alone, does not amount to a constitutional violation.") (citing Riccio v. Cnty. of Fairfax, Va., 907 F.2d 1459, 1469 (4th Cir. 1993) (if state law grants more procedural rights than the Constitution requires, a state's failure to abide by that law is not a federal due process issue)).
b. Claim of Denial of Access to Courts
In his Complaint, Plaintiff claims that he has been denied access to the court because there is no law library to do his own research and he is charged for copies. However, Plaintiff does not allege that any of the named Officer Defendants specifically caused this alleged denial. Therefore, Plaintiff has not stated a claim for denial of access to courts against any Officer Defendant. See Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 171 (4th Cir. 2018) ("To establish personal liability under § 1983, . . . the plaintiff must affirmatively show that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.") (citing Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (an official's "own individual actions" must have "violated the Constitution").
Even if Plaintiff had pled such a claim against the Officer Defendants, Plaintiff has failed to offer evidence that any Defendant's failure to provide him with law library or copying services violated any of his rights or prevented him from pursuing court actions. The record shows that the Detention Center has a kiosk where inmates can make requests for legal materials or other information. See ECF No. 44-3 at 2-3 ¶¶ 9-15. These requests are handled by shift supervisors and administrative staff. Id. The evidence shows that Plaintiff made several requests for information through the kiosk, ECF No. 48-2 at 2-3, and he was provided copies of materials on a number of occasions when he requested them, even though he had an attorney, ECF No. 44-3 at 2-3 ¶¶ 9-15.
It is undisputed that Plaintiff had counsel while he was housed at the Detention Facility, see ECF No. 1 at 6 ¶ VI; ECF No. 44-3 at 2 ¶ 11, and "[l]ongstanding case law in this circuit provides that if a pre-trial detainee has an attorney . . . he or she has no constitutional right of access to a law library or to legal materials," Straws v. Metts, C/A No. 4:07-00805-HFF-TER, 2007 WL 5289766, at *3 (D.S.C. Apr. 23, 2007) (citing United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358, 1360 (4th Cir. 1978)). Moreover, charging Plaintiff for copies does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1991) ("A denial of free photocopying does not amount to a denial of access to the courts.").
Further, to pursue a claim for denial of access to the courts, not only must Plaintiff allege facts sufficient to show that he was denied access to the courts by the Officer Defendants, but he must also demonstrate that he suffered some actual injury of specific harm as a result. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349-53 (1996) (inmate alleging denial of access to the courts must be able to demonstrate "actual injury" caused by the policy or procedure at issue); Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1317 (4th Cir. 1996) (dismissal of access-to-court claim proper where inmate relied on conclusory allegations and failed to identify any actual injury); see also Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1384 (4th Cir. 1993) ("A demonstration of inability to present a legal claim is an essential ingredient of a suit such as this because the prisoner must be able to show that the rules interfered with his entitlement (access to the courts) rather than with a mere instrument for vindicating an entitlement (access to books).") (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff neither alleged nor produced evidence that he suffered any actual injury related to this alleged denial of access to the courts, other than stating that he cannot do his own research to help him fight for his freedom. See ECF No. 1 at 6 ¶ VI. However, this allegation is insufficient to state a claim for denial of access to courts. See Jones v. Lexington Cnty. Detention Center, 586 F. Supp. 2d 444, 448-49 (D.S.C. 2008) (conclusory statements that inmate would have fared better in litigation or that inmate was unable to file other claims fail to state a claim as a matter of law). Because Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to a claim for denial of access to the courts, the Officer Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
c. The Officer Defendants are Entitled to Qualified Immunity
The Officer Defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity with regard to Plaintiff's claims against them. Pursuant to the doctrine of qualified immunity, "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 237 (4th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). "To overcome a defendant's claim of qualified immunity, the court must determine: (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct." Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 186 (4th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). As explained above, Plaintiff has failed to forecast evidence sufficient to establish that any of the Officer Defendants violated a constitutional right. Accordingly, the Officer Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.
The Officer Defendants also request that this case be designated as a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(1) and 1915A(b)(1), because the lawsuit is baseless and constitutes a waste of judicial resources. ECF No. 44-1 at 17-18. The in forma pauperis statute provides judges broad discretion "to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory," and those "claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72 (4th Cir. 1994). In this case, the undersigned recommends denying the Officer Defendants' request, as it appears that this is Plaintiff's first lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. § 1983, and the claims and facts alleged are not so clearly baseless as to constitute an indisputably meritless legal theory. See Davis v. Reynolds, No. CV51502398HMHKDW, 2016 WL 1358023, at *6 (D.S.C. Mar. 14, 2016), adopted by, No. CV 5:15-2398-HMH-KDW, 2016 WL 1321184 (D.S.C. Apr. 5, 2016) (recommending that action not be counted as a strike, even though Plaintiff's Complaint failed to comply with Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., and Plaintiff did not offer any evidence in support of his allegations); cf. Strickland v. Sanderson, No. CV 9:19-247-BHH, 2020 WL 6281649, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 27, 2020) (counting action as a strike where plaintiff repeatedly filed lawsuits alleging virtually identical claims at each correctional institution to which he was transferred).
II. QCHC's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 69)
QCHC also moves for summary judgment and dismissal of all claims alleged against it. In his Complaint, Plaintiff does not direct any allegations regarding the conditions of confinement or law library towards QCHC. Rather, Plaintiff alleges only that QCHC did not prescribe him certain medications previously provided by a prior medical services company. ECF No. 1-1 at 1.
Plaintiff generally alleges that "on July 1, 2019," QCHC knew "medication would be cut off" for "many inmates . . . on the mental health roster." ECF No. 1-1 at 1. Plaintiff alleges that he was "cut off completely by [QCHC]" from receiving medication for various mental health disorders, which allegedly include schizophrenia, bipolar depression, anxiety disorder, panic attacks, and post traumatic stress disorder. ECF No. 1-1 at 1. He claims that as of July 28, 2019, he still had not received his medication. Notably, Plaintiff affirmatively states he has not suffered any physical injury as a result of the alleged events, and the Complaint is devoid of any allegation of an injury. See ECF No. 1 at 6 ¶ V. As relief against QCHC, he asks for $3.5 million "for the suffering [he] and the rest of the mental illness inmates was forced to [e]ndure." Id. at 2.
In support of his claim, Plaintiff produces a memo from QCHC dated July 1, 2019, which announces that QCHC began providing health care to the Detention Center's inmates effective July 1, 2019. ECF No. 48-2 at 8. The memo further states that a QCHC doctor had reviewed all of the current medications and made some changes, which meant that inmates may not receive all of the medications they had been taking before and some medications may be changed. Id. The memo also lists the following medications that the QCHC formulary does not allow for use: "Narcotics of any kind, Neurontin, Seroquel, Wellbutrin, Muscle relaxers, [and] Sleep aids." Id. (further advising that if an inmate is "currently taking any of this medication, it may be changed or discontinued").
Plaintiff also produces copies of grievances he made on July 19 and 24, 2019, in which he complained to Detention Center staff that he was being charged for medical visits and that he had not received his medication. ECF No. 48-2 at 7. Detention Center staff responded, "All medical services are charged. All issues with medicine and medical staff must be addressed to medical." Id. Plaintiff does not point to any other evidence to support his claim against QCHC.
In support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, QCHC produces Plaintiff's medical records from the Detention Center dated May 14, 2019, to November 19, 2019, including records of health care which predated QCHC's tenure at the Detention Center. ECF No. 69-1 at 1-53. The records show that Plaintiff's mental health was assessed, and he was placed on suicide watch, on the day he arrived at the Detention Center. Id. at 10-16.
On July 1, 2019, the day QCHC began providing medical services to the Detention Center, Plaintiff was prescribed two medications. Id. at 31. On July 15, 2019, Plaintiff was referred for depression to a therapist with QCHC, who completed a Complete Mental Health Appraisal. Id. at 36-38. The therapist noted Plaintiff's previous psychiatric diagnoses of schizophrenia, posttraumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and bipolar disorder and Plaintiff's previously prescribed medications, Sinequan, Risperdal, benztropine, Cogentin, Haldol, Seroquel, and Remeron. Id. at 36. The therapist further noted that Plaintiff reported auditory hallucinations but no suicidal thoughts, and the therapist recommended that Plaintiff see a nurse practitioner or physician. Id. at 37. On July 17, 2019, a physician prescribed Plaintiff 20 mg of Celexa for ninety days. Id. at 32.
On July 30, 2019, Plaintiff had a follow-up mental health appointment with the therapist for treatment of Plaintiff's auditory hallucinations, where the therapist noted that Plaintiff was taking Celexa and referred Plaintiff to a nurse practitioner. Id. at 39-40. On August 1, 2019, Plaintiff reported that the coping skills taught by the therapist were helping him, and the therapist provided him with additional activities for his coping skills and noted he had been placed on the list to see a nurse practitioner. Id. at 41. On August 2, 2019, Plaintiff's Celexa was discontinued by physician's order because of Plaintiff's multiple refusals of the medication and upset gastrointestinal tract. Id. at 32. Instead, Plaintiff was prescribed 1 mg of Risperdal for ninety days. Id.
On August 13, 2019, Plaintiff had another follow-up mental health appointment for treatment of his auditory hallucinations. Id. at 42. Plaintiff reported depression and increased sleep since stopping a medication for depression and a decrease in auditory hallucinations. Id. The therapist noted that Plaintiff was taking Risperdal. Id. at 43. On August 21, 2019, Plaintiff was prescribed 25 mg of Seroquel for thirty days. Id. at 32. The records further show that Plaintiff continued to receive mental health care from QCHC through at least October 24, 2019. See id. at 44-53.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the undersigned concludes that summary judgment should be granted for QCHC.
A. Plaintiff Has Not Established That QCHC Was Deliberately Indifferent to His Serious Medical Needs.
"[D]enial-of-medical-care claims asserted by pre-trial detainees [under the Fourteenth Amendment] are governed by the [Eighth Amendment's] deliberate indifference standard." Patten v. Nichols, 274 F.3d 829, 834 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 575 (4th Cir. 2001) ("Pretrial detainees are entitled to at least the same protection under the Fourteenth Amendment as are convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment."). To state a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a plaintiff must show that, objectively, he had serious medical needs and that, subjectively, the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to those needs. Heyer v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 210-11 (4th Cir. 2017).
As to the first prong, a "serious medical need" is "one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008). As to the second prong, a claim of deliberate indifference requires a showing that the defendant actually knew of and ignored the plaintiff's serious need for medical care. See Young, 238 F.3d at 575. A claim of medical indifference requires more than a showing of mere negligence. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Moreover, an inmate's constitutional "right to treatment is limited to that which may be provided upon a reasonable cost and time basis and the essential test is one of medical necessity and not simply that which may be considered merely desirable." Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47-48 (4th Cir. 1977).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has failed to establish that QCHC, or any other Defendant, was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. To the contrary, the medical records show that Plaintiff was seen and treated by QCHC personnel on numerous occasions between July 1, 2019, and October 24, 2019. Plaintiff had multiple mental health appointments with a therapist and prescriptions for medications, and there is no evidence that Plaintiff was denied treatment for any serious medical need. Moreover, Plaintiff has not provided any medical evidence or filed any affidavits that indicate any lack of treatment caused him to suffer any serious medical need. Although Plaintiff may have desired a different medication than what he was prescribed, the Constitution requires only that an inmate receive adequate medical care; it does not guarantee Plaintiff treatment of his choice. See King v. United States, 536 F. App'x 358, 362-63 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing De'lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 526 (4th Cir. 2013); Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004)); see also Lee v. Loranth, No. 4:12-CV-02547-DCN, 2013 WL 2635843, at *7 (D.S.C. June 12, 2013) (explaining that the "type and amount of medical care is left to the discretion of prison officials as long as medical care is provided"), aff'd, 544 F. App'x 220 (4th Cir. 2013).
There are no factual allegations against the other Defendants supporting an allegation of deliberate indifference against them.
Overall, the actions taken by QCHC were in furtherance of addressing Plaintiff's medical concerns, and Plaintiff has failed to establish that there was deliberate indifference to a known serious medical need. See Parker v. S. Health Partners, No. CA 4:07-0287-MBS, 2008 WL 474193, at *7 (D.S.C. Feb. 20, 2008) (adopting R&R and granting summary judgment for defendant as to plaintiff's medical indifference claim where plaintiff's medical records revealed that plaintiff received examinations, medical tests, and medication, and where plaintiff failed to provide any medical evidence or file any affidavits indicating that a lack of treatment caused him to suffer any life-threatening medical problems). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment for QCHC on Plaintiff's § 1983 claim based on his medical care.
B. To the Extent Plaintiff Asserts a Claim for Medical Negligence, He Has Failed to Comply with Pre-Suit Statutory Filing.
To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to assert a cause of action for medical negligence, Plaintiff's Complaint fails as a matter of law. In South Carolina, a civil action alleging medical malpractice cannot commence without first satisfying certain statutory requirements. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-36-100 and § 15-79-110, et. seq.; Millmine v. Harris, No. CA 3:10-1595-CMC, 2011 WL 317643, at *1-2 (D.S.C. Jan. 31, 2011); Rotureau v. Chaplin, No. CIV.2:09-CV-1388-DCN, 2009 WL 5195968, at *6 (D.S.C. Dec. 21, 2009). Pursuant to those provisions, Plaintiff must file a "Notice of Intent to File Suit" accompanied by an expert affidavit supporting Plaintiff's allegations before he can bring a medical malpractice complaint. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-79-125.
Here, Plaintiff has not filed any expert affidavit or Notice of Intent to File Suit. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff alleges a medical negligence claim against QCHC, that claim must be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that the Officer Defendants' Motion (ECF No. 44) be GRANTED.
The undersigned further RECOMMENDS that QCHC's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 69) be GRANTED.
Finally, it is RECOMMENDED that this action be DISMISSED.
/s/_________
Molly H. Cherry
United States Magistrate Judge January 5, 2021
Charleston, South Carolina
The parties are directed to the next page for their rights to file objections to this
recommendation.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).