Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, William H. Highberger, Judge. Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC343061
Law Offices of Joseph M. Lovretovich, Joseph M. Lovretovich and D. Aaron Brock for Plaintiff and Appellant.
McGuireWoods and Michelle R. Walker for Defendant and Respondent.
PERLUSS, P. J.
Eileen Anderson appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of her former employer, MCI Communications Services, Inc. (MCI), in Anderson’s action for wrongful termination. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Anderson’s Work History with MCI and Her Complaints About Inflated Estimated Sales Figures
Anderson began working as an at-will employee for one of MCI’s predecessor companies in the telecommunications industry in August 1992, eventually became an MCI employee as a result of corporate acquisitions and worked for MCI until June 3, 2005 when she was discharged, purportedly as part of an on-going, company-wide reduction of its workforce. During her nearly 13 years of employment Anderson worked as a sales manager, national account manager and client executive. As a client executive Anderson was responsible for managing and building a base of existing accounts and developing and acquiring new accounts. For her performance to be considered satisfactory in this position, Anderson was expected to meet monthly sales quotas.
In early 2003 Anderson learned of certain accounting irregularities at MCI, specifically the inflation of estimated sales (“estimated revenue values” or “ERVs”) and the booking of false orders by Karen Smollins, a sales manager and Anderson’s direct supervisor, and by several of Anderson’s coworkers. Anderson refused to participate in the scheme when asked to do so by Smollins. In addition, between February and April 2003 Anderson and one of her coworkers, Alison Elliot, complained to MCI’s internal ethics office about these improper sales reporting practices, which appeared to be in violation of MCI’s internal policies. Anderson explained at her deposition she believed the inflation of ERVs was unethical and it also made the employees who engaged in the practice appear to be more successful than those who were having difficulty making sales.
An investigation by MCI’s ethics office in July 2003 substantiated Anderson’s complaints. Smollins and several other MCI employees were terminated.
In August 2003 Anderson made a new complaint to the ethics office, asserting she and Elliot were the objects of retaliation as a result of their earlier complaints about inflated sales estimates. Anderson described the alleged retaliation as coworker gossip, dirty looks and “cold shoulder” treatment from sales director Carmen Martinez, who had supervised Smollins. In addition, Anderson complained work was being taken away from her by Martinez, making it difficult for her to reach her monthly sales quotas. Following an investigation -- the extent and nature of the investigation is disputed -- Anderson’s claim was determined to lack merit.
In her opposition papers responding to MCI’s motion for summary judgment, Anderson admitted Martinez never asked her to engage in any illegal conduct and never spoke with her about the internal ethics office investigation or issues relating to that investigation.
In January 2005 Anderson made another complaint to MCI’s ethics office, again asserting she was the object of retaliation because of her 2003 sales reporting complaints. Specifically, Anderson objected she had been unfairly put on a “performance development plan” (PDP) in October 2004, notwithstanding that during the prior four-month period (June through September 2004) she had never achieved more than 40 percent of her monthly sales quota. (Under MCI’s policies and procedure a client executive who failed to meet his or her quotas for three consecutive months could be placed on a PDP. As Anderson knew, an employee’s failure to demonstrate immediate and significant improvement while on a PDP could result in further corrective action up to, and including, immediate termination.) Anderson complained her failure to satisfy her quotas was the product of the poor quality of her account assignments following her voluntary transfer from a downtown Los Angeles office to a newly-opened MCI office in Sherman Oaks, which she also attributed to retaliation for her 2003 ethics office complaints. The January 2005 complaint was investigated by MCI’s employee relations services unit, which did not substantiate Anderson’s retaliation claim.
Anderson’s 2004 performance year annual evaluation, conducted in January 2005, resulted in an overall rating of “unsatisfactory” based on her failure to meet sales quotas. In February 2005 Anderson was placed on “final notification” PDP as a result of her ongoing inability to meet sales quotas and her failure to reach any of the goals set for her in the October 2004 PDP.
During 2005 MCI conducted several workforce reductions. In March 2005 Martinez’s position was eliminated, and she was terminated, at least in part based on her own poor work performance. In approximately May 2005 the director of the Sherman Oaks branch was notified that office needed to reduce a number of employee positions. The director ranked the branch employees, using work performance as the most important factor. Anderson was at the top of the list for possible layoff due to her history of performance deficiencies. On June 3, 2005 the director advised Anderson her position was being eliminated as part of a workforce reduction.
No one was hired to replace Anderson after her termination; in fact, the Sherman Oaks office was closed in July 2005. Elliot, Anderson’s coworker who had also complained in 2003 about the practice of inflating sales estimates, remained employed by MCI at least through the time Anderson’s lawsuit was pending in the trial court.
2. Anderson’s Complaint for Wrongful Termination; MCI’s Motion for Summary Judgment
On November 15, 2005 Anderson filed a complaint against MCI for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, fraud, negligent misrepresentation and violation of Labor Code section 1102.5, alleging, in part, she was discharged in retaliation for her reports to the internal ethics office of unlawful activity by coworkers and in violation of numerous representations made to her when she was hired that company employees would act ethically and not engage in illegal conduct and that Anderson would not suffer retaliation for making complaints regarding illegal conduct. Former MCI sales director Martinez was also named as a defendant in all but the wrongful termination cause of action. After MCI demurrered and moved to strike portions of the complaint, but prior to a court hearing, Anderson filed a first amended complaint asserting the same four causes of action. MCI again demurred and moved to strike portions of Anderson’s pleading. Martinez filed her own demurrer and joined MCI’s motion to strike. The trial court granted both defendants’ motion to strike Anderson’s punitive damage allegations with respect to the negligent misrepresentation claim without leave to amend and sustained the demurrers to several of the causes of action, granting Anderson leave to amend except with respect to the cause of action for violation of section 1102.5 as to Martinez and negligent misrepresentation as to MCI.
Statutory references are to the Labor Code unless otherwise indicated.
Anderson’s second amended complaint, the operative pleading, was filed August 31, 2006 and asserted causes of action for wrongful termination in violation of fundamental public policy against MCI, fraud against MCI and Martinez and negligent misrepresentation against Martinez. MCI and Martinez again filed demurrers. On November 30, 2006 the court sustained the demurrers to the fraud and negligent misrepresentation causes of action without leave to amend, ending the action as to Martinez and leaving only the wrongful termination claim against MCI.
MCI answered the remaining cause of action and on January 5, 2007 moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of issues. Following full briefing and oral argument, on March 23, 2007 the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and also granted the alternative motion directed to the punitive damages claim.
The court found Anderson had not engaged in any legally protected conduct, a necessary element of her claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy: “I think the defendant employer as moving party has sufficiently shown that there’s no triable issue of fact that the conduct engaged in by the plaintiff in making an internal complaint of a suspected violation of certain employer ethics guidelines did not rise to the level of conduct which is protected by our statutes or common law which requires that the report be a good faith report internally or to an outside agency of suspected illegal conduct. And the dispute here about how certain coworkers’ sales productivity was being measured or reported does not in any way demonstrate a suspected illegality.” The court further explained there was no competent evidence in the record indicating what happened to the inflated internal sales estimates once they had been given by Anderson’s coworkers to management and, in particular, no evidence any false or inaccurate numbers were reflected in the corporation’s public disclosures or filings.
The trial court also indicated MCI may have made a sufficient showing that Anderson’s termination was for a valid reason, and not as a pretext for retaliation. However, it emphasized that would be “a separate and independent basis to reach the same conclusion . . . . Even if, in fact, that second, alternative basis for granting summary judgment is inaccurate, the first basis holds, because if the circumstances of alleged retaliation for her reporting are what leads her to lose her job, but she has no protection for reporting, then whatever moral injustice there was here -- and, at a moral level, this may well be an extreme moral injustice -- . . . based on what the law protects, it doesn’t seem she did anything that the law protects.”
Judgment was entered on May 2, 2007. Anderson filed a timely notice of appeal.
MCI moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely because the notice of appeal was not filed until July 5, 2007, more than 60 days after MCI had served Anderson with a file-stamped copy of the March 23, 2007 order granting summary judgment. An order granting summary judgment is not an appealable order (see, e.g., Mukthar v. Latin American Security Service (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 284, 288; Levy v. Skywalker Sound (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 753, 761, fn. 7); the appeal is from the judgment. Accordingly, Anderson’s appeal is timely, and we denied the motion to dismiss.
CONTENTION
Anderson contends the trial court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, her complaints to MCI’s internal ethics office did not constitute legally protected activity for purposes of a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. She does not challenge on appeal the trial court’s dismissal of her causes of action for fraud and negligent misrepresentation or its grant, in the alternative, of MCI’s motion for summary adjudication as to her claim for punitive damages.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of Review
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo and decide independently whether the parties have met their respective burdens and whether facts not subject to triable dispute warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law. (Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1348; Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 344 (Guz); Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (c), (p)(2).) We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party, liberally construing the opposing party’s evidence and strictly scrutinizing the moving party’s. (O’Riordan v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance Co. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 281, 284.) “‘Any doubts about the propriety of summary judgment . . . are generally resolved against granting the motion, because that allows the future development of the case and avoids errors.’” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839.)
When a defendant moves for summary judgment in a situation in which the plaintiff would have the burden of proof at trial by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant may, but need not, present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action. Alternatively, the defendant may present evidence to “show[] that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established” by the plaintiff. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853.) “[T]he defendant must present evidence that would preclude a reasonable trier of fact from finding that it was more likely than not that the material fact was true [citation], or the defendant must establish that an element of the claim cannot be established, by presenting evidence that the plaintiff ‘does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.’” (Kahn v. East Side Union High School Dist. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 990, 1003.) Once the defendant’s initial burden has been met, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate, by reference to specific facts not just allegations in the pleadings, there is a triable issue of material fact as to the cause of action or defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar,at p. 849.)
2. The Trial Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment in Favor of MCI
The cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy is an exception to the general rule that an employer has an unfettered right to terminate an at-will employee: Although an employer has the right to terminate at-will employees for any or no reason, even an arbitrary or irrational reason, the employer does not have the right to terminate an employee in violation of a substantial and fundamental public policy. (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 335; Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 889-890 (Stevenson); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 169-170.) “‘“‘To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that she engaged in protected activity, that she was thereafter subjected to adverse employment action by her employer, and there was a causal link between the two.’”’” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 287-288; see also Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042 [plaintiff establishes a prima face case for retaliation under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) by showing he or she engaged in a protected activity, the employee suffered an adverse employment action and a causal link exists between the protected activity and the employer’s action].)
As it explained in Stevenson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pages 889 to 890, the Supreme Court has established a set of requirements that a policy must satisfy to sustain a tortious discharge claim. “First, the policy must be supported by either constitutional or statutory provisions. Second, the policy must be ‘public’ in the sense that it ‘inures to the benefit of the public’ rather than serving merely the interests of the individual. Third, the policy must have been articulated at the time of the discharge. Fourth, the policy must be ‘fundamental’ and ‘substantial.’” (Accord, Esberg v. Union Oil Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 262, 272.) “[T]ethering public policy to specific constitutional or statutory provisions serves not only to avoid judicial interference with the legislative domain, but also to ensure that employers have adequate notice of the conduct that will subject them to tort liability to the employees they discharge.” (Stevenson, at p. 889; accord, Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 79 [“wrongful termination cases involving a Tameny cause of action are limited to those claims finding support in an important public policy based on a statutory or constitutional provision”]; see Casella v. SouthWest Dealer Services, Inc. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1139-1140; Carter v. Escondido Union High School Dist. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 922, 929.)
The common law cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, first recognized by the California Supreme Court in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 27 Cal.3d 167, is often referred to as a Tameny claim.
In her second amended complaint (as well as the two prior iterations of the complaint) and her opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Anderson asserted her own refusal to participate in a scheme to inflate sales estimates and her complaints to MCI’s internal ethics office about her coworkers’ and supervisor’s improper sales reporting practices constitute activity protected by the public policy expressed in, and embraced by, section 1102.5, subdivisions (b) and (c). Section 1102.5, subdivision (b), provides, “An employer may not retaliate against an employee for disclosing information to a government or law enforcement agency, where the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state or federal statue, or a violation or noncompliance with a state or federal rule or regulation.” Section 1102.5, subdivision (c), provides, “An employer may not retaliate against an employee for refusing to participate in an activity that would result in a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation or noncompliance with a state or federal rule or regulation.” (See Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 287 [“section 1102.5 is a whistleblower statute, the purpose of which is to ‘encourag[e] workplace whistle-blowers to report unlawful acts without fearing retaliation’”].)
An uncodified statement of legislative purpose accompanying amendments made to section 1102.5 in 2003 provides, “The Legislature finds and declares that unlawful activities of private corporations may result in damages not only to the corporation and its shareholders and investors, but also to employees of the corporation and the public at large. The damages caused by unlawful activities may be presented by the early detection of corporate wrongdoing. The employees of a corporation are in a unique position to report corporate wrongdoing to an appropriate government or law enforcement agency. [¶] The Legislature finds and declares that it is the public policy of the State of California to encourage employees to notify an appropriate government or law enforcement agency when they have reason to believe their employer is violating laws enacted for the protection of corporate shareholders, investors, employees, and the general public.” (Stats. 2003, ch. 484, § 1, p. ___; see Historical and Statutory Notes, 44 West’s Ann. Lab. Code (2008 supp.) foll. § 1102.5, p. 129.)
Acknowledging that section 1102.5, subdivision (b), prohibits only retaliation for disclosures of suspected illegal activity to government or law enforcement agencies, Anderson relies on the analysis in Collier v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1117 (Collier), in which Division Four of this court held public policy supports a tort action for wrongful discharge not only when an employer retaliates against an employee for reporting illegal conduct to a government agency but also when an employer retaliates against an employee for internally reporting violations of the law that harm the public as well as the employer. (Id. at pp. 1119-1120.) “Even though [section 1102.5] addresses employee reports to public agencies rather than to the employer and thus does not provide direct protection to petitioner in this case, it does evince a strong public interest in encouraging employee reports of illegal activity in the workplace.” (Id. at p. 1123.)
In Collier, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d 1117 the plaintiff alleged he had been terminated because he reported to his employer, a music production company, that a large number of records were being shipped for promotional purposes with no notation forbidding the recipient from selling them. (Id. at p. 1120.) The employee was concerned the records would be illegally sold, depriving recording artists of royalty payments, evading federal and state tax reporting requirements and creating a competitive disadvantage among other sellers of the employer’s records. Although decided the year before Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1095, overruled in part by Green v. Ralee Engineering, Co., supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 80, fn. 6, in which the Supreme Court first articulated the principle that employees who assert Tameny claims must show the important public interests they seek to protect are grounded in fundamental policies “delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions,” the Collier court held the “fundamental public interest in a workplace free from illegal practices” was directly invoked by the plaintiff’s reports of misconduct: “[T]he public interest is in a lawful, not criminal, business operation. Attainment of this objective requires that an employee be free to call his or her employer’s attention to illegal practices, so that the employer may prevent crimes from being committed by misuse of its products by its employees.” (Collier, at p. 1125.) The court cited Penal Code sections declaring unlawful acts of embezzlement and commercial bribery, as well as the criminal prohibitions in the federal antitrust laws, to underscore the fundamental public interest at issue. (Id. at p. 1127.)
Reports to an employer about coworkers’ violations of internal policies and practices, on the other hand, do not implicate a fundamental public policy embodied in a statute or constitutional provision. (Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1257 [“The tort of wrongful discharge is not a vehicle for enforcement of an employer’s internal policies . . . . Turner’s failure to identify a statutory or constitutional policy that would be thwarted by his alleged discharge dooms his cause of action.”]; Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 670 [“[n]o enactment expressly requires an employee to report relevant information concerning other employees to his employer, and none prohibits discharge of the employee for so doing”]; see Carter v. Escondido Union High School Dist., supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 933 [teacher’s report to school’s athletic director that football coach had recommended a student use a weight-gain protein drink containing creatine did not disclose a violation of state or federal statute or a violation or noncompliance with a state or federal rule or regulation and therefore could not support a tort claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy].)
For example, in Patten v. Grant Joint Union High School Dist. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1378 the Court of Appeal rejected in substantial part a junior high principal’s lawsuit alleging retaliatory discharge under section 1102.5. The principal alleged she had been fired because she had disclosed to her supervisors four legal violations including forwarding student complaints that a male physical education teacher at her junior high school was peering into the girls’ locker room and reporting that a male science teacher had made an off-color remark to a female student. The court held the principal’s disclosures regarding the two teachers were made in “the context of an internal personnel matter . . . rather than in the context of a legal violation.” (Id. at p. 1385.) “To exalt these exclusively internal personnel disclosures with whistleblower status would create all sorts of mischief. Most damagingly, it would thrust the judiciary into micromanaging employment practices and create a legion of undeserving protected ‘whistleblowers’ arising from the routine workings and communications of the job site.” (Ibid.)
In contrast, the Patten court held the principal’s report to school district personnel and other government officials, including a state legislator, that she had been asked to sign blank transfer-of-funds forms to permit reassignment of expenditures from one educational program to another in order to use unspent funds awarded for specified underperforming school programs -- that is, disclosing the allegedly unauthorized use of public assets -- constituted legally protected activity. (Patten v. Grant Joint Union High School Dist., supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1385-1386.) Reversing the trial court on this one ground, the Court of Appeal found the principal had raised a triable issue of material fact whether she had been subjected to adverse employment actions in retaliation for engaging in this protected conduct. (Ibid.)
We are left, then, with the question whether Anderson’s 2003 complaints to MCI’s ethics office were disclosures of illegal conduct that implicated a fundamental public policy embodied in a statute or regulation (for example, federal disclosure and reporting requirement for publicly traded companies) or were instead simply reports of violations of internal policies and practices. MCI argued in its motion for summary judgment the improper inflating of estimated sales figures, although a clear breach of corporate policy, violated no federal or state law. In support of its motion MCI presented excerpts from Anderson’s deposition testimony in which she characterized her complaints to the ethics office about her coworkers’ inflation of sales estimates as concerning “unethical behavior” prohibited by internal policies and acknowledged the phantom sales estimates apparently did not generate actual billings to customers and produced no actual revenues to MCI. (Anderson explained someone should have had the responsibility for checking estimated sales against the actual billings and revenue received, but she did not know whose responsibility that was.) Accordingly, MCI asserted it had conclusively negated an essential element of Anderson’s cause of action for wrongful termination by establishing that any retaliation by MCI was not in response to Anderson’s participation in legally protected conduct.
Challenged by MCI’s moving papers -- and again by the trial court at the hearing on the motion -- to identify any law actually violated by the sales representatives’ overstatement of their sales on internal MCI reports, Anderson’s counsel repeatedly labeled the practice “illegal” and speculated in argument the scheme was designed “to pad MCI’s bottom line,” but cited no federal or state statute or regulation arguably violated by the practice and adduced no admissible evidence that raised a triable issue of material fact whether the violation of MCI’s internal practices and procedures also violated the law. Similarly, although Anderson is certainly correct that an employee need not prove an actual violation of the law -- “it suffices if the employer fired him [or her] for reporting his ‘reasonably based suspicions’ of illegal activity” (Green v. Ralee Engineering Co., supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 87) -- Anderson never testified she believed the conduct she was asked to participate in and that she ultimately reported to the MCI ethics office was unlawful, let alone establish that any such belief or suspicion on her part would have been reasonable.
Paragraph 11 of Anderson’s second amended complaint alleged the false sales estimates “would ultimately result in increases [sic] revenues for MCI although no such revenue was generated. Said conduct was in violation of state and federal laws.” That same language, including the typographical error, appears in the introduction to Anderson’s memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to the motion for summary judgment without citation to Anderson’s separate statement or any supporting evidence. The trial court properly sustained MCI’s objection to Anderson’s use of pleading allegations to oppose the summary judgment motion. (See, e.g., College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 720, fn. 7 [“a party cannot rely on allegations of his [or her] own pleadings, even if verified, to make or supplement the evidentiary showing necessary in the summary judgment context”].)
Anderson answered “no” when asked at her deposition if she had ever engaged in any illegal conduct while at MCI. She was then asked, “And other than Karen Smollins making the comments that you testified about earlier, did anyone at MCI ever ask you to engage in illegal conduct?” Anderson responded, “Karen Smollins had asked us to put in orders that were untrue orders, yes.” Counsel then stated, “I’m asking you to exclude those. Other than those, did anybody at MCI ever ask you to engage in any illegal conduct?” Anderson answered, “No.” From this exchange there can be no doubt Anderson believed the inflation of estimated sales and booking of false orders by Smollins and others were improper and unethical. However, contrary to Anderson’s contention at oral argument, Anderson’s testimony does not constitute evidence she reasonably believed it amounted to unlawful activity.
Finally, Anderson does not appear to contend MCI retaliated against her because she refused Smollins’s direction to inflate her own estimated sales figures, rather than because she reported the improper practices of other sales representatives and Smollins. For example, in paragraph 23 of her second amended complaint Anderson alleged the various adverse employment actions leading to, and including, her termination occurred “in retaliation for plaintiff’s complaints regarding [MCI’s] fraudulent sales practices.” In any event, because the improper inflation of sales estimates did not violate federal or state law, refusing to participate in that activity cannot support a cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.
In sum, the trial court properly determined Anderson did not engage in legally protected activity as defined by Stevenson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pages 889 to 890 and Green v. Ralee Engineering Co., supra, 19 Cal.4th at page 79, and, therefore, could not, as a matter of law, establish a prima facie case of wrongful termination in violation of public policy. (See Carter v. Escondido Union High School Dist., supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 929 [whether plaintiff’s conduct is legally protected activity sufficient to support liability for claim of wrongful termination in violation of public policy is question of law].) As Judge Highberger observed during the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, MCI’s treatment of Anderson (at least as she perceived it) may have been unfair or even immoral, but it was not actionable. (See generally Stephen K. v. Roni L. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 640, 642 [“[i]t does not lie within the power of any judicial system . . . to remedy all human wrongs”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. MCI is to recover its costs on appeal.
We concur: WOODS, J., JACKSON, J.