Opinion
Civ. No. H-98-2429.
September 1999.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff James L. Anderson ("Anderson"), a black male, is a former employee of Lear Siegler Services, Inc. ("Lear Siegler"). In this civil action, he has sued his employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. and also under state law. In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant Lear Siegler discriminated against him on the basis of his race in violation of Title VII, wrongfully terminated his employment and intentionally inflicted emotional distress. Substantial compensatory and punitive damages are here sought by plaintiff.
Pursuant to a Scheduling Order entered by the Court, the parties have engaged in extensive discovery. Pending before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by defendant Lear Siegler. The parties have submitted lengthy memoranda and voluminous exhibits in support of and in opposition to the pending motion, including affidavits and excerpts from depositions taken during discovery.
Two hearings on the pending motion have been held in open court. With his memorandum filed in opposition to defendant's motion, plaintiff attached an affidavit submitted pursuant to Rule 56(f), F.R.Civ.P. Pursuant to that affidavit, plaintiff requested that defendant be directed to produce the personnel files of Bill Ginas and Tony Buendia. At the hearing held on June 6, 1999, the Court granted that request and permitted plaintiff to file an amended complaint. The documents in question were thereafter produced, an amended complaint was filed by the plaintiff, supplemental briefs were submitted, and another hearing was held on August 17, 1999. Following its review of the parties' memoranda and the extensive record in this case, the Court has concluded that defendant's motion for summary judgment should be denied as to the claims asserted by plaintiff under Title VII and that plaintiff's state law claims should be dismissed.
I Background Facts
Plaintiff Anderson has lived in Germany since 1978. When he retired from the Air Force in 1986 after a 26 year career, he chose to remain in Ramstein, Germany where he was then stationed. In 1987, he began working as a supply manager for Serv-Air, Inc. ("Serv-Air"), an American company which did work for the Air Force at the Ramstein Air Force Base ("the Base") under a military subcontract. Maintenance work on Air Force C-20 passenger jets located at the Base was performed by private companies under contracts with the Air Force. From 1988 to 1995, the primary contractor at the Base was E-Systems, Inc. ("E-Systems"), which subcontracted the supply function of the job to Serv-Air and the maintenance work to Gulf Stream Aerospace ("Gulf Stream"). Anderson worked for Serv-Air as the supply or so-called "COMBS" manager.
COMBS is an acronym for "Contractor Operated and Maintained Base Supply."
In 1995, the Air Force re-bid the contract for the servicing of its C-20 planes at the Base and awarded the contract to Sabreliner Corporation ("Sabreliner"). Sabreliner in turn subcontracted both the supply function and the maintenance work to defendant Lear Siegler which was then doing business under the name UNC Aviation Services. Lear Siegler elected to retain as its own employees both personnel who had formerly worked for Serv-Air and personnel who had formerly worked for Gulf Stream. While working as an employee of Serv-Air, Anderson had been the highest ranking representative of Serv-Air at the Base. During the time when E-Systems was the general contractor, Robert Chamlee, a white male, had been his counterpart and was the highest ranking representative of Gulf Stream at the Base. Anderson and Chamlee had independently reported to an on-site manager of the general contractor of E-Systems.
When Sabreliner was awarded the contract and Lear Siegler the subcontract, Anderson and Chamlee both became employees of defendant Lear Siegler. Chamlee became the Lear Siegler site manager with responsibility for both maintenance and supply functions while Anderson's responsibility over the COMBS function remained the same. Under the E-Systems contract, when there had been two separate subcontractors, Anderson and Chamlee had occupied equal and independent positions. However, under the new arrangement, Chamlee became Anderson's direct supervisor.
The new arrangement resulted in considerable tension between Anderson and Chamlee. Conflicts arose concerning their relative responsibilities, particularly insofar as the supply function was concerned. Anderson believed that Chamlee did not understand the supply function or its procedures, and he resented Chamlee's intrusion into his traditional area of responsibility. Chamlee objected to Anderson's signing the log as "COMBS Manager" and insisted that Anderson recognize that his position was now only "COMBS Supervisor". The two also clashed concerning the number of COMBS employees necessary for performing the work under the subcontract. Chamlee insisted that COMBS work could be done by fewer employees while Anderson opposed any reduction in personnel and refused to select one of the two other full time COMBS employees for a layoff. These two Lear Siegler employees were Bill Ginas and Tony Buendia, both of whom were white.
Anderson was employed by defendant Lear Siegler on September 7, 1995. On December 30, 1995, at the end of the first 90-day probationary period, Chamlee gave Anderson a performance review. Anderson received "average" ratings with one "above average" rating for attendance and dependability. In his second performance review dated June 13, 1996, Anderson received six "average" ratings and three "below average" ratings. With this June review, Chamlee gave Anderson a written counseling statement to which Anderson objected and submitted a detailed rebuttal.
Chamlee's immediate supervisor was Jerry Williams who is located in Pensacola, Florida. Anderson complained to Williams about the counseling statement. According to Anderson, Williams refused to hear him out and was not very cooperative.
Some two weeks later on July 9, 1996, Anderson telephoned Williams again and complained that Chamlee was out to get him because of his race. That same day, Chamlee sent Williams an e-mail which asked whether he could give Anderson a "two week notice or just fire him." Chamlee further told Williams that he did not know "if I can put up with this crap until October."
Several days later on July 12, 1996, Chamlee suspended Anderson for three days for "unsatisfactory quality and quantity of work." Anderson acknowledged receipt of the suspension letter but wrote on it that he did not know the reason for the action and felt that it was "unwarranted."
Questions arose during the summer of 1996 as to whether Anderson and other COMBS personnel were complying adequately with Sabreliner's property manual. Anderson was asked "to proof" the manual. According to Chamlee, Anderson did not promptly proof Sabreliner's property manual in July when he had been requested to do so.
"Proofing" meant evaluating whether the procedures detailed in the manual could reasonably be followed and making suggestions for improvements.
On August 15, 1996, Anderson sent a letter to Lear Siegler's Director of Human Resources protesting his suspension. The letter accused Chamlee of bias and claimed that Chamlee was disrespectful to Anderson and had singled him out for criticism and unfair discipline. Williams was asked by his supervisors to investigate Anderson's claim. In late August, Williams made a trip to Ramstein, Germany and met with Anderson, Ginas and Buendia. According to Williams, he told Anderson that if he failed to make improvements in procedures and documentation, he would be replaced. In early September, Williams became displeased when Anderson failed to meet a deadline for submitting a requested written report. Williams asked Claire Stewart, Director of Material for Sabreliner, to make an independent assessment of COMBS personnel as a part of Sabreliner's annual inventory. On October 4, 1996, Stewart reported to Williams that Anderson was "a dedicated employee and [was] very knowledgeable about specific inventory items. . . ." but, he noted that Anderson was not fluent in Sabreliner's computer system and procedures.
On October 9, 1996, Anderson was demoted to the position of "warehouse specialist." This decision was made by Williams and approved by personnel at Lear Siegler's home office. Anderson was given three counseling statements which Chamlee had either back-dated or had failed to give him previously. Ginas was at the time elevated to the position of COMBS leadman.
One was dated August 18, 1996, and the other two were dated September 10, 1996.
For some time, Chamlee had requested that the number of COMBS employees be reduced to two and that an additional mechanic should be hired. According to Williams, he realized in March of 1997 that COMBS could operate with only two employees. After Anderson received a counseling statement for allegedly violating a security procedure which he disputed and refused to sign, Williams discharged Anderson on March 21, 1997. According to Williams, he would have made the same decision even if Anderson had not received the counseling statement.
As proof that the adverse employment actions taken against him by Chamlee and Williams were motivated by racial animus, plaintiff relies on evidence of racial slurs uttered by Chamlee from time to time as well as on evidence of Chamlee's demeaning racial references to plaintiff in particular. William White was employed by Boeing Aerospace at the Base in 1995 and had contact with both plaintiff and Chamlee during the period when E-Systems was the principal contractor. Later, from September 1996 to October 1997 he had a position with defendant Lear Siegler and had direct contact with Chamlee. According to White, Chamlee made racial slurs and engaged in joke sessions which ridiculed blacks and other minorities. On occasion, Chamlee would mimic Anderson's slight country drawl and referred to him and a co-worker as "Amos and Andy."
II Plaintiff's Claims
The amended complaint contains three counts. In Count One, plaintiff alleges that defendant discriminated against him because of his race by suspending him, by thereafter demoting him, and by later terminating his employment, all in violation of Title VII. In Count Two, he alleges that his termination and discharge violated Maryland's established public policy against racial discrimination in employment. In Count Three, plaintiff asserts a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress under Maryland law.
In his opposition memorandum, plaintiff has also suggested that defendant discriminated against him by acting with a retaliatory motive. However, a proper Title VII claim of retaliation has been neither alleged nor proved by plaintiff. Plaintiff has therefore not been permitted to assert a claim of retaliation in this case.
Compensatory and punitive damages are sought in the amended complaint, as well as attorneys' fees and cost. Plaintiff has voluntarily agreed that if defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied as to Count One, Counts Two and Three may be dismissed.
III Summary Judgment Principles
The principles to be applied by this Court in considering a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, F.R.Civ.P., are well established. A party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 958 (4th Cir. 1984). Where, as here, the nonmoving party will bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, "the burden on the moving party [at the summary judgment stage] may be discharged by `showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
In Phoenix Sav. Loan, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. Co., 381 F.2d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 1967), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals summarized the principles applicable under Rule 56 as follows: "It is well settled that summary judgment should not be granted unless the entire record shows a right to judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy and establishes affirmatively that the adverse party cannot prevail under any circumstances."Id. Hence, the party opposing a motion for summary judgment is entitled to all favorable inferences which can be drawn from the evidence. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970); Cram v. Sun Life Ins. Office, Ltd., 375 F.2d 670, 674 (4th Cir. 1967).
The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact.Barwick, 736 F.2d at 958. This burden is met by consideration of affidavits exhibits, depositions and other discovery materials.Id. Nevertheless, "[t]he facts, and the inferences to be drawn from the facts, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Ballinger v. North Carolina Agric. Extension Serv., 815 F.2d 1001, 1004-05 (4th Cir. 1987), cert.denied, 484 U.S. 897 (1987) (citing Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 364 (4th Cir. 1985)).
Following its review of the extensive record developed in this case by the parties, this Court has concluded that the disputed issues that arise here under Title VII cannot be resolved before trial by way of defendant's pending motion for summary judgment. There is evidence of record which supports the positions of both parties. Where facts are disputed, a court, in considering a defendant's motion for summary judgment, must accept the plaintiff's version of the events if supported by deposition testimony, affidavits, exhibits or other documentary evidence.See Magnuson v. peak Technical Servs., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 500, 504 (E.D. Va. 1992). Insofar as plaintiff's Title VII claims are concerned, there are a number of disputed questions of material fact which cannot be determined as a matter of law on this record.
IV Discussion
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of such individual's . . . race." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1). Three claims are asserted under Title VII by plaintiff in this case: (1) that he was suspended because of his race; (2) that he was demoted because of his race; and (3) that his employment was terminated because of his race.
In order to prevail on each of his Title VII claims, plaintiff must prove that, but for defendant's motive to discriminate, he would not have been subjected to the adverse employment action alleged. Williams v. Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452, 458 (4th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff may meet this burden under ordinary principles of proof using direct or indirect evidence or, in the alternative, under the judicially created proof scheme established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) and reaffirmed in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993). See also Brumback v. Callas Contractors, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 929, 940 (D. Md. 1995).
On the record here, this Court concludes that plaintiff has not met his burden of proving discriminatory intent by direct evidence or by sufficiently probative indirect evidence. InGoldberg v. B. Green Co., Inc., 836 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1988), Judge Kaufman, writing for a panel of the Fourth Circuit, noted that in a case of this sort a plaintiff, in order to meet his burden under ordinary principles of proof, must produce direct evidence of defendant's stated purpose to discriminate and/or circumstantial evidence of sufficient probative force to reflect a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 848. It is difficult to prove discriminatory intent under ordinary principles of proof, and it was for that reason that the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas recognized that a plaintiff could more readily resort to a judicially created proof scheme in order to establish a Title VII violation. Id. at 849. Since the circumstantial evidence relied upon by plaintiff in this case is not of sufficient probative force to reflect a genuine issue of fact as to defendant's motive to discriminate on the basis of race, the Court must resort in this case to the McDonnell Douglas proof scheme to determine if plaintiff's Title VII claims should proceed to trial.
Pursuant to McDonnell Douglas, plaintiff must initially establish by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of employment discrimination. In order to make out a prima facie case that he was suspended and later demoted for racially discriminatory reasons, plaintiff must here establish: (1) that he is a member of a protected class; (2) that he suffered an unfavorable employment action by his employer; (3) that at the time of his suspension or demotion, he was performing his job at a level that met his employer's legitimate expectations; and (4) that following his demotion, his employer sought someone to perform the same work. Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230, 238-39 (4th Cir. 1982); Gilyard v. South Carolina Dept. of Youth Services, 667 F. Supp. 266, 269-70 (D. S.C. 1985). In a case like this one, where a job has been eliminated completely and where the plaintiff's employment has accordingly been terminated, the elements required to prove a prima facie case are (1) that the plaintiff was a member of the protected class; (2) that he suffered an unfavorable employment action; (3) that he was qualified to assume another position at the time of his discharge; and (4) that the employer did not treat race neutrally but instead discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of his race. Fink v. Western Electric Co., 708 F.2d 909, 915 (4th Cir. 1983); Gilyard, 667 F. Supp. at 270.
With reference to all three of the claims asserted by plaintiff in this case, if he has established a prima facie case of employment discrimination, then the defendant has the burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 84 F.3d 718, 719 (4th Cir. 1996). The articulation of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action rebuts the inference of discrimination raised by plaintiff's proof of a prima facie case. At that point, the ultimate burden shifts back to plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered explanation was a pretext and that defendant intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of his race. Id. In order to defeat defendant's pending motion for summary judgment at the third stage of theMcDonnel Douglas test, plaintiff Anderson must point to evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could infer that each of defendant's actions was based upon his race or that defendant's proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for each adverse employment action was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Tuck v. Henkel Corp., 973 F.2d 371, 375 (4th Cir. 1992).
Applying these principles to the facts of record here, this Court has concluded that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether plaintiff has established a prima facie case of suspension, of demotion and of discharge. In arguing that plaintiff has not as a matter of law made out a prima facie case as to any of the adverse employment actions alleged, defendant has not challenged several of the requirements of the McDonnell Douglas test. Plaintiff is a black male, and the record here establishes that he was suspended in July of 1996, and that when he was demoted in October of 1996, Ginas was elevated to the position of COMBS lead man. The record further establishes that plaintiff's employment was terminated in March of 1997 as a result of a reduction-in-force by defendant. Defendant contends, however, that plaintiff was not performing his job at a level which met defendant's legitimate expectations. The Court has concluded on the record here that this issue cannot be determined as matter of law by way of the pending motion for summary judgment.
There is indeed evidence that plaintiff Anderson resented the fact that Chamlee was his supervisor and that he ignored his supervisor's instructions. Although he was told by his supervisor in the fall of 1995 to lay off either Ginas or Buendia because two full time employees were not needed, Anderson refused to comply with Chamlee's order. Moreover, according to Williams, he had received complaints from a representative of Sabreliner that COMBS generally and Anderson in particular were not complying adequately with Sabreliner's property manual. There is evidence in the record that Anderson did not readily adapt to Sabreliner policies and procedures.
However, there is other evidence in this record indicating that Anderson was performing in an entirely satisfactory manner. While working for Serv-Air, he was routinely praised for his efforts and expertise and was recommended for merit pay increases. Gary Carlson, the former E-Systems site manager, wrote a letter to Lear Siegler when he became aware of problems which Anderson was experiencing as an employee of defendant. Carlson stated that he found it difficult to believe that Anderson's work performance would be any less for Lear Siegler under the new contract than it had been under the old E-Systems contract. Carlson further stated that he was convinced that any assessment or portrayal of Anderson's work performance or abilities as being any less under the new contract "must be clearly inaccurate." According to William White, a co-worker, Anderson had vastly more knowledge and experience than Chamlee in handling inventory and parts as well as in other COMBS procedures. White stated that Chamlee was not knowledgeable about supply procedures and attempted to disguise this fact by constantly criticizing Anderson in public. In view of this conflicting evidence, genuine issues of material fact exist in the record here concerning whether, when he was suspended, demoted and discharged, plaintiff was performing his job at a level which met his employer's legitimate expectations.
Ronald Taylor, another co-worker, has supported White's opinion that Anderson performed his duties in a competent manner.
A disputed issue of material fact also exists concerning whether Ginas and Buendia, the white males who were retained when Anderson was discharged, had comparable or worse performance histories than did Anderson. According to Williams, Ginas was not selected for termination because he was the new lead person and was performing satisfactorily. Williams also stated that he believed that between Anderson and Buendia, Buendia was the better all around performer by far. When Anderson was terminated, he was not replaced, and COMBS thereafter operated with only two employees. In spite of this evidence relied upon by defendant, the record discloses that Anderson's objective qualifications were superior to those of Buendia and Ginas. According to co-worker White, Ginas was not competent to take over for Anderson when the latter was demoted. Anderson had 26 years of experience in supply and logistics and had obtained a higher military rank than had Buendia who had only some 2 years of supply experience. As a result of evidence in this record of Anderson's satisfactory performance of his COMBS job over a period of many years and of the lack of Buendia's qualifications to handle the COMBS operation, there is a genuine dispute of fact as to whether Buendia or Anderson should have been terminated when Williams decided to reduce the number of personnel doing COMBS work.
Proceeding to the next step of the McDonnell Douglas proof scheme, this Court is satisfied that defendant has in this case indeed articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for suspending plaintiff, for demoting him and for terminating his employment as a result of a reduction in force. The ultimate burden therefore shifts back to plaintiff to prove that defendant's proffered explanations constituted a pretext and that defendant intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of his race. Tuck, 973 F.2d at 375. Summary judgment may not be granted if evidence exists of defendant's intention to discriminate "of sufficient probative force to reflect a genuine issue of material fact." EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936, 941 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting Goldberg, 836 F.2d at 848). Defendant argues that, even if plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence of a prima facie case to defeat its motion for summary judgment, plaintiff has not as a matter of law met his burden of proving that defendant's proffered explanations for the adverse employment actions were pretextual and that defendant intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of his race. On the record here, the Court must disagree.
Once again, there is conflicting evidence to support the positions of both plaintiff and defendant. It is quite apparent that interpersonal conflicts existed between Anderson and Chamlee. Anderson believed that Chamlee was not as knowledgeable about supply matters as he was and resented the fact that Chamlee had become his supervisor. Chamlee, on the other hand, objected to Anderson's insistence that he was the "COMBS manager" and to Anderson's reluctance to follow his orders as Anderson's supervisor.
However, there is evidence in the record here that the adverse employment actions taken by Chamlee were motivated by a discriminatory animus. In their affidavits, co-workers White and Taylor have both stated that the animus directed by Chamlee against Anderson was the product of racial bias. Determinations of the credibility of these two witnesses, as well as of the plaintiff, cannot be made by this Court in addressing a motion for summary judgment. Gray v. Spillman, 925 F.2d 90, 95 (4th Cir. 1991); Batchelor v. Legg Co., 52 F.R.D. 553, 561 (D. Md. 1971).
Taylor witnessed joking sessions when racial terms like "nigger" and "coon" were used by Chamlee. White heard Chamlee refer to Anderson and another employee as "Amos and Andy." Taylor observed Chamlee belittling Anderson but not other white employees. According to White, Chamlee clearly appeared to have a hatred for blacks and resented Anderson as an African-American who had superior knowledge in supply procedures. This evidence supports plaintiff's contention that Chamlee harbored a discriminatory animus toward plaintiff on account of his race. The routine use of racial slurs may constitute evidence that racial animus was a motivating factor in an employment decision.Brown v. East Mississippi Elec. Power Ass'n., 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1993).
Defendant argues that the adverse employment decisions at issue were ultimately made by Williams and not by Chamlee and that there is no evidence of racial animus on the part of Williams. However, Williams' actions were based not only on his own investigation but also on evaluations made by Chamlee. It will be for the jury to determine whether the decisions made by Williams were sufficiently influenced by Chamlee's racially-based evaluations to constitute violations of Title VII or whether they were made by Williams independent of racial motivation on his part or on the part of Chamlee.
Based on all the evidence of record, this Court concludes that plaintiff has produced evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that defendant's actions were based upon plaintiff's race and that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons given for the adverse employment actions constituted a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Under the circumstances, the issues in this case cannot be finally determined by way of the pending motion for summary judgment.
V Conclusion
For all the reasons stated, defendant's motion for summary judgment will be denied. Plaintiff has voluntarily agreed that if defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied as to Count One of the amended complaint, Counts Two and Three may be dismissed. Accordingly, it is this _____ day of September, 1999 by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland,
ORDERED:
1. That the motion for summary judgment of defendant Lear Siegler Services, Inc. as to Count One of the amended complaint is hereby denied;
2. That Count Two of the amended complaint is hereby dismissed; and
3. That Count Three of the amended complaint is hereby dismissed.