Opinion
J-A32024-17 No. 868 MDA 2017
02-08-2018
ANGELA ANDERSON, JAMES ANDERSON, AND LINDA HARTER v. JODIE EVANS Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment Entered June 26, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Civil Division at No(s): 2015-4847 BEFORE: OTT, J., DUBOW, J., and STRASSBURGER, J. MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
Appellant, Jodie Evans, appeals from the entry of Judgment following a non-jury verdict in favor of Appellees, Angela Anderson, James Anderson, and Linda Harter, in this action for Specific Performance and Quantum Meruit/Unjust Enrichment. After careful review, we affirm on the basis of the trial court's Opinion.
Appellees Angela Anderson and James Anderson are spouses. Appellee Linda Harter is Angela Anderson's mother.
The facts, as found by the trial court and confirmed by our review of the record, are as follows. This dispute arises in the context of an oral real estate rent-to-own arrangement. Appellant is the current owner of the property, which includes a residence, located in Liberty Township, Centre County. The property is encumbered by a mortgage issued to Appellant by PHH Mortgage.
In January 2013, the parties began negotiating the terms of an oral rent-to-own agreement, including the price and down payment amount, through Facebook, email, and text messages. On April 15, 2013, the Andersons entered into an oral rent-to-own agreement for a total purchase price of $105,000.00. Under the terms of the agreement, Appellees also agreed to pay the outstanding balance due on Appellant's mortgage over a period of up to 10 years, and to pay all real estate taxes, utilities, and insurance on the property. Appellees paid Appellant a $5,000.00 deposit on February 1, 2013; thus, the outstanding balance on the agreement was $100,000.00.
Ms. Harter did not participate in any of the negotiations. Her only involvement in this matter was to assist the Andersons financially.
Appellees made monthly mortgage payments directly to Appellant's mortgage company, and paid the utility bills directly to the utility providers.
In February or March 2013, Appellees began renovating the residence on the property, and on April 15, 2013, they moved in. At this time, Appellant's mortgage was three months in arrears. Beginning in May 2013, Appellees made payments of $1,000.00, a portion of which was allocated to arrears, directly to the mortgage company. By May 2014, Appellant's mortgage was no longer in arrears. Once the mortgage became current, the parties agreed to modify the oral agreement to reduce the monthly payment amount to approximately $850.00 per month.
During their time in possession of the property, Appellees attempted to secure financing to purchase the property outright, but were unsuccessful. Appellees made approximately $34,628.89 worth of renovations and improvements to the property, investing approximately 775 hours of their own labor into the renovations and improvements.
Two years later, in early 2015, Appellant attempted to change the terms of the parties' agreement. In a series of emails dated between March 20, 2015, and April 22, 2015, Appellant explained to Appellee Angela Anderson that Appellant needed a written and signed document evidencing the parties' agreement by April 22, 2015, "in order to get her ex-husband's name off of the title to the [p]roperty." On April 20, 2015, Appellant emailed the written document evidencing their oral arrangement to Appellee Angela Anderson. Appellant instructed Appellee Angela Anderson to sign and backdate the document by two years to May 1, 2013. The written agreement is dated May 1, 2013, and contains the signatures of Appellant and Appellees Angela Anderson and James Anderson. Appellee Angela Anderson testified, and the trial court found credible, that she received only the signature page of the agreement via email, and signed her own name and that of Appellee James Anderson without first consulting him.
Trial Ct. Op., 11/29/16, at 3.
The terms of the written agreement that Appellant sent on April 20, 2015, differ from those of the parties' oral agreement. The written agreement indicates a purchase price of $115,000.00, including a $5,000.00 down payment, with Appellees paying the remaining $110,000.00 in monthly installments of $1,000.00. The written agreement also states "On or Before January 1, 2015[,] Buyer will obtain financing to [fulfill] payment in the full amount." This term decreased the terms of the oral agreement from ten years to 19½ months, ending on January 1, 2015, four months before Appellant sent Appellee Angela Anderson the written agreement.
The parties agree that the purchase price stated in the written agreement was incorrect. The undisputed purchase price of the property is $105,000.00, with a $5,000.00 deposit.
According to Appellees, the oral agreement required them to make monthly payments over the course of 10 years, or until they had paid the mortgage in full.
In October 2015, Appellant filed a Landlord Tenant Action at a separate docket number to evict Appellees from the property. On December 15, 2015, Appellees filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction to prevent their eviction. That same day, Appellees also filed the instant Complaint seeking to enforce the terms of the parties' oral agreement to purchase the property.
On December 21, 2015, the court entered an Order directing Appellant to cease all attempts to terminate the oral agreement and to evict Appellees pending the outcome of this action. The court also ordered Appellant to discontinue her Landlord Tenant action.
The court amended this Order on March 23, 2016, to require Appellees to post a $2,000.00 bond.
On August 22, 2016, Appellant filed an Answer, New Matter, and Counterclaim. On August 24, 2016, Appellees filed a Reply to New Matter and Counterclaim and New Matter to Counterclaim.
On August 31, 2016, the court held a bench trial, following which the parties submitted Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. On November 29, 2016, the court entered a verdict in favor of Appellees on their claim for Specific Performance. The court concluded that the parties' oral agreement constituted a valid, enforceable contract. The court declined to reach the merits of Appellees' Quantum Meruit/Unjust Enrichment claim.
On December 9, 2016, Appellant filed a Post-Trial Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict ("JNOV"). On May 12, 2017, the court entered an Order granting the Motion in part, and denying the Motion in part. In particular, the court again found in favor of Appellees and ordered specific performance of the oral agreement, which it concluded was a valid and enforceable agreement that had commenced on April 15, 2013. The court expressly concluded that the written agreement was not a valid and enforceable contract. The court further explicated the terms of the oral agreement as follows:
a. The purchase price for the property is $105,000.00 with a $5,000.00 down payment on a rent[-]to[-]own agreement;Trial Ct. Opinion, 5/12/17, at 1-2. The court again declined to reach the merits of Appellees' Quantum Meruit/Unjust Enrichment claim. Id.
b. [Appellees] shall pay a monthly rental payment of $1,000.00 beginning June, 2017;
c. All payments made by [Appellees] to [Appellant] for this property shall be applied to the purchase price;
d. [Appellees] shall pay all real estate taxes, utilities and insurance on the property;
e. Payments shall continue until May 1, 2023 at which time [Appellees] must pay the remaining purchase price and close on the property.
This timely appeal followed. Appellant complied with the court's Pa.R.A.P. 1925 Order.
Appellant appealed from the May 12, 2017 Order granting in part, and denying in part her Post-Trial Motion. An order denying post-trial motions is interlocutory and generally not appealable. See Levitt v. Patrick , 976 A.2d 581, 584 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2009) (stating that appeal properly lies from the entry of judgment, not from order denying post-trial motions). However, since the trial court prothonotary entered Judgment on June 26, 2017, we consider the appeal as taken from the entry of Judgment. See Johnston the Florist , Inc. v. TEDCO Const. Corp., 657 A.2d 511, 514-15 (Pa. Super. 1995) (stating that appellate courts may "regard as done that which ought to have been done") (citations omitted)
The trial court did not file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion.
Appellant presents the following three issues on appeal:
1. Whether, under the facts of this case, an alleged oral agreement satisfies the Kurland v. Stolker , 533 A.2d 1370 (Pa. 1987), standard for an exception to the statute of frauds, when the material terms of the alleged oral agreement were not presented or outlined at trial[?]Appellant's Brief at 5 (reordered for ease of disposition).
2. Whether, under the facts of this case, an alleged oral agreement to rent real property until the year 2023 supersedes the parties' written agreement, which contains an integration clause and authorizes rental only until the year 2015[?]
3. Whether, under the facts of this case, an individual who has no relation to the matter at hand is a party to the relevant contract[?]
In her first two issues on appeal, Appellant challenges the court's denial of her Motion for JNOV based on its conclusion that the oral agreement between the parties represents a valid and enforceable rent-to-own contract, which the purported subsequent written agreement did not supersede. Appellant's Brief at 21-36.
This Court will reverse a trial court's denial of JNOV only if the trial court committed an error of law that controlled the case or abused its discretion.
Appellate review of a denial of JNOV is quite narrow. We may reverse only in the event the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law that controlled the outcome of the case. Abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court renders a judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious; that fails to apply the law; or that is motivated by partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will. When reviewing an appeal from the denial of a request for JNOV, the appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict-winner and give him or her the benefit of every reasonable inference arising therefrom while rejecting all unfavorable
testimony and inferences. . . . Thus, the grant of JNOV should only be entered in a clear case and any doubts must be resolved in favor of the verdict-winner[.]Sears , Roebuck & Co. v. 69th Street Retail Mall , L.P., 126 A.3d 959, 967 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
In the case sub judice, the trial court ordered specific performance on the parties' oral agreement after determining that the oral agreement constituted a valid and enforceable contract.
"[A] request for specific performance is an appeal to the court's equitable powers." Oliver v. Ball , 136 A.3d 162, 166 (Pa. Super. 2016). A court will order specific performance when a plaintiff demonstrates that she is clearly "entitled to such relief, there is no adequate remedy at law, and the trial court believes that justice requires such a decree." Id. "[S]pecific performance is an appropriate remedy to compel the conveyance of real estate where a seller violates a realty contract and specific enforcement of the contract would not be contrary to justice." Id. at 167.
Generally, agreements for the sale of real estate are only enforceable if they are in writing and signed by the seller. Hostetter v. Hoover , 547 A.2d 1247, 1250 (Pa. Super. 1988). See also 33 P.S. § 1 (Statute of Frauds). However, an oral contract for the sale of real estate may be enforceable if the party seeking to enforce the contract has satisfied the "part performance" exception.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained this exception in Kurland , supra , noting that in order to satisfy this exception, the party seeking to enforce the oral agreement must establish the following by "full, complete, and satisfactory proof:" (1) the terms of the contract; (2) the boundaries and quantity of the property; (3) the purchase price or amount of consideration; (4) that possession was taken pursuant to the oral contract; (5) that at or immediately after possession was taken, it was notorious, exclusive, continuous, and maintained; and (6) performance or part performance by the purchaser "which could not be compensated in damages, and such as would make rescission inequitable and unjust." Id. at 1373.
Here, the trial court found that Appellees had presented "full, complete, and satisfactory proof" to satisfy the part-performance exception to the Statute of Frauds. See Trial Ct. Op., 11/29/16, at 8-10. Accordingly, the court concluded that specific performance on the agreement was the appropriate equitable remedy. Id. at 11; see also Trial Ct. Order, 5/12/17.
Guided by our standard of review, we conclude Appellant is due no relief on her first two issues. The trial court has provided a comprehensive and well-reasoned Opinion, with citation to relevant case law and the record. We, thus, affirm on the basis of that Opinion. See Trial Ct. Op., 11/29/16, at 8-10 (explaining that: (1) the parties negotiated the purchase price, down payment amount, and terms of the rent-to-own agreement through Facebook, email, and text messages; (2) the parties do not dispute the boundaries of the property in question; (3) Appellees took possession of the property around April 5, 2013, and have maintained notorious, exclusive, and continuous possession since that date; (4) Appellees made improvements to the property for which no remedy at law would adequately compensate them; (5) the written agreement is not a valid and enforceable contract because Appellant never sent the portion of the agreement with its terms to Appellee Angela Anderson, so Appellee never saw, and, thus, never agreed to the terms of the written contract. The invalidity of the written agreement is further confirmed by the fact that Appellant did not send Appellee the agreement until three months after the expiration date the agreement provided for, and the term in the written agreement differed significantly from the term to which the parties originally agreed).
In her last issue, Appellant avers that the trial court erred in concluding that Appellee Linda Harter is "part of this transaction." Appellant's Brief at 36. Appellant claims that Ms. Harter's only relationship to this case is that she lived in the residence on the property. Id. Appellant, thus, concludes that Ms. Harter has failed to "prevail[] on [her] burden of proof." Id. at 37.
Preliminarily, we observe that appellate briefs must conform in all material respects to the briefing requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Pa.R.A.P. 2101. See also Pa.R.A.P. 2114-2119 (addressing specific requirements of each subsection of brief on appeal). "[I]t is an appellant's duty to present arguments that are sufficiently developed for our review. The brief must support the claims with pertinent discussion, with references to the record and with citations to legal authorities." Commonwealth v. Hardy , 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted). "This Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant." Id. If a deficient brief hinders this Court's ability to address any issue on review, we shall consider the issue waived. Commonwealth v. Gould , 912 A.2d 869, 873 (Pa. Super. 2006) (holding that appellant waived issue on appeal where he failed to support claim with relevant citations to case law and record). See also In re R.D., 44 A.3d 657 (Pa. Super. 2012) (finding that, where the argument portion of an appellant's brief lacked meaningful discussion of, or citation to, relevant legal authority regarding issue generally or specifically, the appellant's issue was waived because appellant's lack of analysis precluded meaningful appellate review).
Instantly, with respect to Appellant's final issue on appeal, the argument section of her Brief is significantly underdeveloped. It is unclear to this Court whether Appellant challenges Ms. Harter's standing to participate as a plaintiff in the underlying matter, whether she has met her burden of proof on the claims raised in the Complaint, or some other issue, because Appellant's Brief lacks meaningful discussion of her position. Furthermore, the citation to legal authority Appellant included in her Brief, which stood only for the general proposition that the duty of the trial court when interpreting a contract is to ascertain the intent of the parties, fails to elucidate her argument. Thus, Appellant has waived this issue for appellate review.
Appellant cited Murphy v. Duquesne Univ. of the Holy Ghost , 777 A.2d 418, 429 (Pa. 2001). Appellant's Brief at 36-37. --------
Judgment affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. The parties are directed to annex the trial court's November 29, 2016 Verdict, Opinion, and Order to any further filings. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 02/08/2018
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