Opinion
No. CV 07-5015574S
August 5, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF LAW RE MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT (#119) AND MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT (#120)
FACTS
On November 22, 2005, the plaintiff, Justin Anamasi, was operating his vehicle on Foxon Road in North Branford, Connecticut. While he was stopped at a stop light, a vehicle operated by Christina Lowe and owned by Gary Lowe, the defendants, collided into the rear end of the plaintiff's vehicle. The plaintiff subsequently filed this action against the defendants. The case was tried to a jury on April 7, 2010. The plaintiff testified that (1) he did not see Christina Lowe's car before the collision; (2) he did not hear any warning of her approach; and (3) although it had been raining, the road was not slippery and he had passed over the same portion of road prior to the collision without skidding. The police officer who prepared an accident report after the collision testified that he did not remember the incident and his testimony was based upon the accident report. He further testified that the weather was a contributing factor in the collision. Christina Lowe did not testify. At the close of the plaintiff's case, the defendants moved for a directed verdict on the ground that there was insufficient evidence of negligence and/or proximate causation. This court denied that motion. Thereafter, the case was submitted to the jury, which was charged with the following: failure to keep a reasonable and proper lookout; failure to keep the vehicle under control; failure to apply brakes to avoid the collision; and failure to sound the horn or warn the plaintiff. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. Thereafter, on April 16, 2010, the defendants filed a motion to set aside judgment and a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The plaintiff filed his objection on April 23, 2010. The matter was heard at short calendar on May 17, 2010.
DISCUSSION
The defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment in their favor because the evidence presented at trial is not sufficient to establish that Christina Lowe was negligent. The plaintiff argues that the jury made a reasonable inference that the collision was caused by Christina Lowe's negligent operation of her vehicle. He asserts that, prior to the collision, he did not hear the sound of brakes or a horn and the jury could have reasonably based their verdict on these "specific allegations of negligence."
The "standard of review for motions to direct a verdict, motions to set aside a verdict and motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict are the same." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Medcalf v. Washington Heights Condominium Assn., Inc., 57 Conn.App. 12, 15 n. 2, 747 A.2d 532, cert. denied, 253 Conn. 923, 754 A.2d 797 (2000). "[A] motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is not a new motion, but the renewal of a motion for a directed verdict." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 255 Conn. 390, 400, 766 A.2d 416 (2001). Practice Book § 16-37 states in relevant part: "Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at any time after the close of the plaintiff's case in chief is denied or for any reason is not granted, the judicial authority is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion . . ." A "verdict will be set aside and judgment directed only if [the court finds] that the jury could not reasonably and legally have reached their conclusion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ham v. Greene, 248 Conn. 508, 519, 729 A.2d 740, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 929, 120 S.Ct. 326, 145 L.Ed. 254 (1999). "In making this determination, [t]he evidence must be given the most favorable construction in support of the verdict of which it is reasonably capable." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gaudio v. Griffin Health Services Corp., 249 Conn. 523, 534, 733 A.2d 197 (1999).
"The trial court possesses inherent power to set aside a jury verdict which, in the court's opinion, is against the law or the evidence . . . [The trial court] should not set aside a verdict where it is apparent that there was some evidence upon which the jury might reasonably reach their conclusion, and should not refuse to set it aside where the manifest injustice of the verdict is so plain and palpable as clearly to denote that some mistake was made by the jury in the application of legal principles . . . Ultimately, [t]he decision to set aside a verdict entails the exercise of a broad legal discretion . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 278 Conn. 692, 702, 900 A.2d 498 (2006). Courts "must determine, in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, whether the totality of the evidence, including reasonable inferences there from, support the jury's verdict . . . In making this determination, [t]he evidence must be given the most favorable construction in support of the verdict of which it is reasonably capable . . . In other words, [i]f the jury could reasonably have reached its conclusion, the verdict must stand, even if [the] court disagrees with it." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. "Limiting [the court's] discretion . . . is the litigants' constitutional right to have issues of fact determined by a jury where there is room for a reasonable difference of opinion among fair-minded jurors." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Purzycki v. Fairfield, 244 Conn. 101, 107, 708 A.2d 937 (1998). "When an element necessary to a cause of action cannot be established without conjecture, the evidence presented cannot withstand a motion for a directed verdict." Boehm v. Kish, 201 Conn. 385, 389, 517 A.2d 624 (1986).
"[T]o establish a prima facie case, the proponent must submit evidence which, if credited, is sufficient to establish the fact or facts which it is adduced to prove . . . Negligence involves the violation of a legal duty which one owes to another, in respect to care for the safety of the person or property of that other . . . The essential elements of a cause of action in negligence are well established: duty; breach of that duty; causation; and actual injury." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Schweiger v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., 110 Conn.App. 736, 739-40, 955 A.2d 1241, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 955 (2008). "To prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant's conduct legally caused the injuries . . . The first component of legal cause is causation in fact. Causation in fact is the purest legal application of . . . legal cause. The test for cause in fact is, simply, would the injury have occurred were it not for the actor's conduct . . . The second component of legal cause is proximate cause . . . [T]he test of proximate cause is whether the defendant's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's injuries . . . Further, it is the plaintiff who bears the burden to prove an unbroken sequence of events that tied his injuries to the [defendant's conduct] . . . The existence of the proximate cause of an injury is determined by looking from the injury to the negligent act complained of for the necessary causal connection . . . This causal connection must be based upon more than conjecture and surmise . . . An actual cause that is a substantial factor in the resulting harm is a proximate cause of that harm . . . The finding of actual cause is thus a requisite for any finding of proximate cause." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 740.
There is a long line of case law that establishes the plaintiff's burden of proof in an automobile accident case involving allegations of negligence. "[I]n a case involving an automobile accident, [a] plaintiff cannot merely prove that a collision occurred and then call upon the defendant operator to come forward with evidence that the collision was not a proximate consequence of negligence on his part. Nor is it sufficient for a plaintiff to prove that a defendant operator might have been negligent in a manner which would, or might have been, a proximate cause of the collision. A plaintiff must remove the issues of negligence and proximate cause from the field of conjecture and speculation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Winn v. Posades, 281 Conn. 50, 57, 913 A.2d 407 (2007) (affirming Appellate Court decision affirming trial court's judgment of dismissal because there was no evidence to support finding of proximate cause even though evidence demonstrated that defendant tortfeasor had been speeding and failed to look in direction of plaintiff's car prior to collision). A "plaintiff must establish that it is more likely than not that the cause on which the plaintiff relies was in fact a proximate cause of the accident." Hicks v. State, 287 Conn. 421, 438, 948 A.2d 982 (2008). "In Connecticut, res ipsa loquitur does not apply to [motor vehicle accidents in which there are no eyewitnesses] . . . since common experience shows that causes of motor vehicle accidents other than driver negligence are not infrequent." (Citation omitted.) Toomey v. Danaher, 161 Conn. 204, 207, 286 A.2d 293 (1971) (where there were no eyewitnesses to collision, jury could not have ruled out sudden illness or sudden emergency, therefore, conclusion that collision was result of negligence was product of conjecture or guess).
In their memoranda, the defendants assert that the present case "looks exactly like" O'Brien v. Cardova, 171 Conn. 303, 370 A.2d 933 (1976) and Schweiger v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., supra. Both cases stemmed from automobile collisions in which the plaintiffs were struck from the rear and alleged that the collision was the result of the other driver's negligence. Similar to the plaintiff in the present case, the plaintiffs in those cases did not observe the alleged tortfeasor's car before they were struck. In O'Brien, the court held, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to support a verdict in the plaintiffs' favor because the evidence indicated only that a collision had occurred. 171 Conn. 306. In Schweiger, the court held, inter alia, that the trial court had properly granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict because the evidence presented by the plaintiff established only that the plaintiff's vehicle was struck by the defendant's vehicle, and therefore, there was "not sufficient evidence regarding negligence and proximate cause to remove the issues from the field of speculation and conjecture." 110 Conn.App. 741.
In O'Brien, supra, the plaintiff's allegations included negligent operation of a vehicle at an unreasonable rate of speed; failure to keep a vehicle under proper control; failure to maintain a proper lookout; failure to give a signal of approach; failure to stop at a stop sign; and following the plaintiff's vehicle too closely. 171 Conn. 303.
Although the court recognizes the deference due to jury verdicts and the plaintiff's right to have issues of fact to be determined by a jury, it is bound to follow Appellate and Supreme Court precedent. In the present case, the court finds that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to make a reasonable inference regarding a breach on the part of Christina Lowe or causation that would be based upon more than speculation or conjecture. The lack of circumstantial evidence presented, particularly the absence of an eyewitness to the collision, distinguishes the present case from those in which courts have held that the plaintiff had removed the issues of negligence and causation from the realm of speculation and conjecture. See Burton v. Stamford, 115 Conn.App. 47, 971 A.2d 739, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 912, 978 A.2d 1108 (2009) (alleged tortfeasor testified as to his recollections of the collision); Hicks v. State, supra (plaintiff presented independent eyewitness testimony which was competent evidence to establish that defendant's conduct was proximate cause of collision); Terminal Taxi Co. v. Flynn, 156 Conn. 313, 317-18, 240 A.2d 881 (1968) (plaintiff testified as to what was seen immediately before collision leaving little doubt about circumstances of accident, thereby removing proximate cause from realm of speculation and conjecture).
Here, the plaintiff offered no testimony regarding the actual circumstances which caused Christina Lowe's vehicle to strike the plaintiffs. In fact, the plaintiff testified that he did not see Christina Lowe's vehicle approaching. The plaintiff's testimony regarding the potential cause of the accident was limited to his statements that although it was raining, the road was not slippery and he did not have trouble controlling his vehicle over the same portion of the road where Christina Lowe's vehicle slid, eventually colliding with the plaintiff's vehicle. It is well settled that in a case involving an automobile collision, "[t]he fact that there was a collision by itself is insufficient to establish legal cause." Schweiger v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 110 Conn.App. 741-42; see O'Brien v. Cardova, supra, 171 Conn. 306. Moreover, the police officer who responded to the scene of the collision stated that the weather was a contributing factor to the accident. Christina Lowe did not testify. The police report, which was admitted into evidence by the plaintiff, indicates at the time of the collision, it was raining and the road was wet and that Christina Lowe told the officer at the scene that she attempted to stop for a traffic signal "when she began to slide and subsequently collided into the rear of [the plaintiff's vehicle]." Because of the lack of evidence presented, there are many factual possibilities that could explain how the collision occurred. Consequently, the court finds that the plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably infer that Christina Lowe was negligent in operating the vehicle and that such negligent conduct was the cause of the collision.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons the verdict is set aside and judgment entered for the defendants.