Summary
recognizing that equitable estoppel may prevent defendant from asserting limitations defense where defendant impeded timely filing
Summary of this case from Myers v. New YorkOpinion
Nos. 09-0356-cv (L), 09-0359-cv (Con).
March 29, 2010.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Laura Taylor Swain, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court entered on August 15, 2008, is AFFIRMED.
Donald C. Greaves, pro se (Saint Clair Jackson, pro se, on the brief), Brooklyn, NY, for Appellants.
Jessica H. Costanzo, Cullen and Dykman LLP, New York, NY, for Appellee.
SUMMARY ORDER
Plaintiffs Donald Greaves and Saint Clair Jackson appeal pro se from the district court's award of summary judgment in favor of defendant J.P. Morgan Chase Bank ("Chase"). We review a district court's summary judgment award de novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Havey v. Homebound Mortgage, Inc., 547 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2008). In doing so, we assume the parties' familiarity with the facts and the record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
As an initial matter, we decline to address the application of third-party standing requirements to this appeal and instead exercise hypothetical jurisdiction to reach the merits of plaintiffs' claims. See Moore v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 409 F.3d 506, 511 n. 5 (2d Cir. 2005). Upon a thorough review of the record, we identify no error in the district court's conclusion that plaintiffs' Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA") and tortious interference claims, which are subject to two- and three-year statutes of limitations, respectively, see 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(4), are time-barred. Plaintiffs became aware of Chase's refusal to extend credit to the AMS Group no later than May 7, 2004. Their August 3, 2007 complaint is therefore untimely under either limitations period.
While the limitations period governing an ECOA or tortious interference claim may be equitably tolled under some circumstances, see, e.g., Ramsdell v. Bowles, 64 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 1995); Shared Commc'ns Servs. of ESR, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs Co., 38 A.D.3d 325, 326, 832 N.Y.S.2d 32, 34 (1st Dep't 2007), the district court properly concluded that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate any entitlement to such relief. Plaintiffs' filing of a complaint with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York does not merit equitable tolling, as the filing was not a prerequisite to plaintiffs' right to seek relief in federal court. Cf. Higgins v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 942 F.2d 829, 833-34 (2d Cir. 1991). Nor does plaintiffs' pro se status provide a basis for such relief. See Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 18 (2d Cir. 2000). Finally, plaintiffs' contention that defendant should be equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense because it impeded the timely filing of their federal complaint is also without merit. See Dillman v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 784 F.2d 57, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that equitable estoppel may prevent defendant from asserting limitations defense "where the plaintiff knew of the existence of his cause of action but the defendant's conduct caused him to delay bringing his lawsuit" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiffs have adduced no evidence demonstrating that they were unable to file a federal complaint in May 2004, when they filed their complaint with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, much less that such inability resulted from Chase's conduct.
We have considered plaintiffs' remaining arguments on appeal and conclude that they lack merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Plaintiffs' motion to substitute the three-year statute of limitations under the Consumer Credit Protection Act for the two-year statute of limitations that governs ECOA claims is DENIED, as is their motion to reinstate their demand for a jury trial.