Opinion
04-20-2016
Maksuda AMIN, plaintiff-respondent, v. COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, et al., appellants, Brendan T. Simmons, defendant-respondent, et al., defendant.
Devitt Spellman Barrett, LLP, Smithtown, N.Y. (John M. Denby and Brian Isaac of counsel), for appellants. Subin Associates, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Robert J. Eisen of counsel), for plaintiff-respondent.
Devitt Spellman Barrett, LLP, Smithtown, N.Y. (John M. Denby and Brian Isaac of counsel), for appellants.
Subin Associates, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Robert J. Eisen of counsel), for plaintiff-respondent.
Opinion
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants County of Suffolk and Suffolk County Transit appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Farneti, J.), dated October 23, 2014, which denied their motion, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
On August 16, 2011, the plaintiff allegedly was disembarking from a bus owned and operated by the defendants County of Suffolk and Suffolk County Transit (hereinafter together the County defendants) when she was stuck by a motorcycle owned and operated by the defendant Brendan T. Simmons. The Supreme Court denied the County defendants' motion, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.
“[A] common carrier is subject to the same duty of care as any other potential tortfeasor—reasonable care under all of the circumstances of the particular case” (Bethel v. New York City Tr. Auth., 92 N.Y.2d 348, 356, 681 N.Y.S.2d 201, 703 N.E.2d 1214; see Batista v. MTA Bus Co., 129 A.D.3d 1003, 1003–1004, 13 N.Y.S.3d 144; Thomas v. New York City Tr. Auth., 101 A.D.3d 852, 852–853, 957 N.Y.S.2d 147; Kadymir v. New York City Tr. Auth., 55 A.D.3d 549, 550–551, 865 N.Y.S.2d 269). A common carrier owes a duty to an alighting passenger to stop at a place where the passenger may safely disembark and leave the area (see Smith v. Sherwood, 16 N.Y.3d 130, 133, 919 N.Y.S.2d 102, 944 N.E.2d 637; Miller v. Fernan, 73 N.Y.2d 844, 846, 537 N.Y.S.2d 123, 534 N.E.2d 40; Fagan v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 220 N.Y. 301, 306–307, 115 N.E. 704; Barravecchio v. New York City Tr. Auth., 83 A.D.3d 630, 632, 922 N.Y.S.2d 96). Here, in support of their motion for summary judgment, the County defendants failed to submit evidence sufficient to establish, prima facie, that they satisfied this duty (see Ajayi v. New York City Tr. Auth., 28 A.D.3d 502, 812 N.Y.S.2d 647; see also Pryce v. County of Suffolk, 55 A.D.3d 894, 866 N.Y.S.2d 354). Since they failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, we need not review the sufficiency of the plaintiff's opposition papers (see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316, 476 N.E.2d 642).
The remaining contention of the County defendants is without merit.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the County defendants' motion in its entirety.
RIVERA, J.P., LEVENTHAL, DICKERSON and MILLER, JJ., concur.