Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:00-CV-1801-G.
August 27, 2001.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
This case is before the court on the plaintiff's objections to the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the United States Magistrate Judge dated May 29, 2001, as reflected in a written order dated June 19, 2001. The defendants responded to the objections on June 12, 2001, and the matter is now ripe for decision. For the reasons stated below, the plaintiff's objections are denied.
I. BACKGROUND
On February 13, 2001, the plaintiff filed its motion to disqualify Wolin, Ridley Miller, L.L.P. (now known as Kirkpatrick Lockhart, L.L.P.) as counsel for the defendants. After the motion was fully briefed, it was referred, on May 3, 2001 (as amended on June 15, 2001), to Magistrate Judge Paul D. Stickney for a hearing, if necessary, and for determination. Magistrate Judge Stickney held a hearing on the motion on May 25 and May 29, 2001 and, by written order entered June 19, 2001, denied the motion. These objections resulted.
II. ANALYSIS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), a district judge may designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine nondispositive pretrial matters pending before the court. See Castillo v. Frank, 70 F.3d 382, 385 (5th Cir. 1995); Smith v. Smith, 154 F.R.D. 661, 665 (N.D. Tex. 1994). The standard of review which the court must use in reviewing the magistrate judge's order is contained in Rule 4(a) of Miscellaneous Order No. 6 of the Local Rules of this court, reprinted in Texas Rules of Court: Federal at 275 (West Pamp. Supp. 2001), which states in pertinent part:
(a) Nondispositive Matters.
Review of an order by a magistrate judge in a pretrial matter not dispositive of a claim or defense of a party shall be governed by F.R. CIV. P. 72(a).
Rule 72(a), F.R. CIV. P., in turn, provides as follows:
(a) Nondispositive Matters. A magistrate judge to whom a pretrial matter not dispositive of a claim or defense of a party is referred to hear and determine shall promptly conduct such proceedings as are required and when appropriate enter into the record a written order setting forth the disposition of the matter. Within 10 days after being served with a copy of the magistrate judge's order, a party may serve and file objections to the order.
. . . The district judge to whom the case is assigned shall consider such objections and shall modify or set aside any portion of the magistrate judge's order found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
The plaintiff has not shown grounds upon which this court should overturn the magistrate judge's order. As the rule states, the magistrate judge's decision must be clearly erroneous or contrary to the law before this court can modify it or set it aside. This standard has been described as "extremely deferential." Reko v. Creative Promotions, Inc., 70 F. Supp.2d 1005, 1007 (Minn. 1999). Under the "clearly erroneous" standard, the district court cannot disturb a factual finding of the magistrate judge "unless, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Smith, 154 F.R.D. at 665 (quoting Resolution Trust Corporation v. Sands, 151 F.R.D. 616, 619 (N.D. Tex. 1993)). If the magistrate judge's "account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety," the district judge may not reverse it. Id. When a party objects to a magistrate judges' ruling on the ground that it is contrary to law, the party must demonstrate that the magistrate judge erred in some respect in his legal conclusions. Id. The plaintiff has not satisfied its burden of showing that the magistrate judge's decision was either clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the plaintiff's objections to the magistrate judge's order of June 19, 2001, which denied the motion to disqualify Wolin, Ridley Miller, L.L.P., are DENIED.