Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 01-1563.
April 2, 2002
MINUTE ENTRY
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec Doc. 7) filed by defendants Seafarers Pension Plan and Lou Delma (collectively "Defendants"). Plaintiff, Ralph Amat, opposes the motion. The motion, set for hearing on March 27, 2002, is before the Court on briefs without oral argument. For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED.
The motion was originally noticed for hearing on January 30, 2002. Plaintiff subsequently moved to continue the hearing to February 20, 2002. The parties then jointly moved to continue the hearing until March 27, 2002.
Background
Plaintiff brought this suit under 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq., the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") He seeks statutory damages due to Defendants' failure to provide him with a Summary Plan Description ("SPD") pursuant to ERISA's disclosure and reporting requirements. The facts giving rise to this lawsuit are not in dispute, rather only the legal consequences attendant to chose facts are contested by the parties.
From late 1959 to mid-1975, plaintiff Ralph Amat ("Amat" or "plaintiff") was a member of seafarers International Union, a maritime union covering various vessels on which plaintiff was employed. The union was affiliated with defendant, Seafarers Pension Plan ("the Plan") in which Amat was a participant. The Plan is a multi-employer defined benefit plan as defined by ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (2)(a), (35), and (37). The Plan was established to provide tensions and related benefits to eligible employees working under contract with the union. Amat's last day of continuous employment under the seafarers' plan was May 17, 1975.
Although the union was originally named as a defendant in this suit, Amat eventually dismissed with prejudice his claims against that entity. (Rec. Doc. 2).
Amat also had a single day of employment on January 16, 1999, twenty-four years after his last day of continuous employment.
According to Amat's complaint, in January of 1983, he wrote to the seafarers union requesting how many, if any, pension benefit credits he had vested with the union. By letter dated January 28, 1983, the union responded that it would forward his request for information to the Plan, the appropriate entity for answering such an inquiry. Exhibit A, Rec. Doc. 1. Plaintiff never received a follow-up response.
It is unclear whether the Plan ever received that request for information. However, Defendants' supplemental memorandum refers to a document in the Plan's records that would seem to indicate that the request was eventually received by the Plan. Rec. Doc. 17 at 3.
Again in 1986, Amat wrote the union, this time asking whether work time accrued during his service time with the seafarers union could be transferred to his current union for purposes of calculating pension benefits. The then-current pension plan administrator responded immediately to Amat's request, in writing, informing him that no such transfer was permitted under union rules. Exhibit B, Rec. Doc. 1.
It is unclear how the request made with the union was forwarded to the Plan but apparently it was. See Rec. Doc. 1 at ¶ 12.
In 1993, Amat again contacted the union, this time by telephone, seeking information as to how to collect pension benefits under the Plan. In March and November of 1994, the Plan responded to his request, informing him that he would be advised as to the status of his request as soon as possible. Exhibits D E, Rec. Doc. 1. Plaintiff never received a subsequent response.
In January of 1996, Amat wrote the Plan administrator, defendant Lou Delma, asking whether he was vested in the Plan, and if not, requesting a detailed explanation. Exhibit F, Rec. Doc. 1. In February 1996, the Plan responded in writing that Amat was ineligible for benefits under the terms of the Plan because he had no service after January 1, 1976. Exhibit G, Rec. Doc. 1. According to the complaint, Amat was informed that under the terms of the Plan, as of 1986 he had lost credit for all prior service. Rec. Doc. 1 at ¶ 24.
Finally, in September 1997, Amat wrote to the Plan and requested, inter ails, an SPD. Exhibit H, ¶ 2, Rec. Doc. 1. in less than thirty days, Amat received the requested information including the SPD See Exhibit I, Rec. Doc. 1. It is undisputed that the Plan did not provide Amat an SPD until his 1997 express and written request.
Amat filed the instant lawsuit in May 2001. Amat does not claim that he is entitled to pension benefits under the terms of the Plan. Rather, the crux of his complaint is that under the disclosure requirements of ERISA, the Plan was required to automatically, i.e., even in light of no specific request, provide him with an SPD in response to his various inquiries over the years, id. at ¶ 36, and that the Plan's failure to do so prevented him from taking the steps necessary to preserve his rights to pension benefits under the Plan, id. at ¶ 39. Amat seeks statutory penalties of $100 per day "since the request for information was made," as well as attorney's fees, id. at ¶ 10, to redress the deprivation of his rights to have access to information guaranteed to him by ERISA. Id. at ¶ 35.
The complaint is not specific as which "request for information" Plaintiff refers to but the Court assumes that Amat seeks to impose penalties retroactive to the 1983 inquiry with the union.
Discussion
1. The Parties' Contentions
Defendants move for summary judgment arguing, as a matter of law, that the statutory civil penalties of ERISA section 1132(c) are limited to situations where the Plan administrator fails to respond to an affirmative request in writing. And given that Amat did not request an SPD in writing until 1997, he is not entitled to statutory penalties for the Plan's failure to provide him one in response to his various other inquiries over the years. Defendants also argue that any claim for statutory penalties is clearly time-barred.
Defendants were permitted to file their supplemental memorandum in support of summary judgment specifically to raise the time-bar issue. The Court granted Defendants leave to do so with the Plaintiff's concurrence after the parties moved to jointly continue the trial. See Rec. Doc. 15.
In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that the authorities cited by Defendants actually demonstrate that no formal, written request is necessary for imposition of penalties. As for the timeliness issue, Plaintiff argues that Louisiana's ten year prescriptive period for contractual claims should apply and that the ten year period did not begin to run until 1994 when the Plan informed Plaintiff that he did not qualify for benefits.
2. Summary Judgment Standards
In determining whether a party is entitled to summary judgment, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Littlefield v. Forney Indep. School Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 282 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Smith v. Brenoettsy, 158 F.3d 908, 911 (5th Cir. 1998); Tolson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 141 F.3d 604, 608 (5th Cir. 1998)). Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (citingCelotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). The moving party bears the burden, as an initial matter, of showing the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2548). If the moving party fails to meet this initial burden, the motion must be denied regardless of the nonmoving party's response. Id.
3. Plaintiff's Entitlement to Statutory Penalties Under ERISA
Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1024 (b)(4), an ERISA plan administrator "shall, upon written request of any participant or beneficiary, furnish a copy of the latest updated summary plan description . . . or other instruments under which the plan is established or operated." (Emphasis added). Any administrator who fails or refuses to comply with such a request may, within the court's discretion, be held personally liable to the requesting party of up to $100 for each day after the date of refusal. Fisher v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 895 F.2d 1073, 1077 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (c)). Although an award of statutory penalties under ERISA is left to the discretion of the district court, the Fifth Circuit has recognized that section 1132(c) must be strictly construed given its status as a civil penalty provision. Id.;see also Tracey v. Heublein, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 726, 729 (D. Conn. 1991) (citing Ivan Allen Co. v. United States, 422 U.S. 617, 626-27, 95 S.Ct. 2501, 45 L.Ed.2d 435 (1975)).
There exists no federal statute of limitations regarding statutory penalty actions brought pursuant to ERISA section 1132(c). Middleton v. Russell Group, Ltd., 924 F. Supp. 48, 49 (M.D.N.C. 1996). It is well-settled that the court must therefore look to state law for the most analogous statute of limitations. Id. (citing Johnson v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 942 F.2d 1260, 1261 (8th Cir. 1991)); see Hogan v. Kraft Foods, 969 F.2d 142, 145 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Kennedy v. Electricians Pension Plan, IBEW # 995, 954 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1992)). The the Court need only look to those events occurring after May 1991. And given that the Plan immediately responded to Amat's 1997 written request for an SPD, none of the events from 1997 forward are likewise relevant to his claim for penalties due to the Plan's failure to provide an SPD. Accordingly, the Court need only focus its attention on those events that occurred between May 1991 and 1997.
Looking to the allegations in Amat's complaint, only two events occurred in the timeframe at issue. In March 1993 Amat telephoned the union, not the Plan administrator, and inquired as to the procedure he would have to follow in order to collect a pension. Rec. Doc. 1, at ¶ 14. Then in January 1996, he submitted a written request, this time to the Plan administrator (defendant Lou Delma) requesting information as to whether he had any vested pension benefits with the Plan. Id. at ¶ 17. Within 30 days, the Delma responded to Amat's inquiry in writing, answering the specific questions that Amat had submitted. Amat did not, however, request an SPD. Nor did Delma send Amat the SPD.
As an initial matter, only a written request for an SPD compels the administrator to provide an SPD pursuant to ERISA section 1024(b)(4). Section 1024(b)(4) expressly requires a written request for information, and because civil penalties are punitive in nature, courts steadfastly enforce that requirement in conjunction with any award of penalties. See, e.g., Porcellini v. Strassheim Printing Co., 578 F. Supp. 605, 610-11 (E.D. Penn. 1983). But see Stone, 58 F.3d at 439 (Ninth circuit concluding that section 1132(c) penalties are not penal in nature). Consequently, Amat cannot base a claim for statutory penalties on the March 1993 telephone inquiry that he made to the union.
Recognizing that a written request is required, Amat argues that the 1983 letter that he sent to the union suffices. As noted above, however, any claim arising out of the events in 1983 is time-barred even under the most generous of limitation periods.
Another obstacle to Amat basing any claim on a phone call to the union is that section 1132(c) imposes personal liability on the Plan administrator giving Amat no cause of action against the union. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (c)(1). Further, the union is no longer a party to this suit because Amat previously dismissed with prejudice his claims against that party. Rec. Doc. 2.
Likewise, Amat cannot recover statutory penalties for the Plan administrator's failure to provide him an SPD based upon his January 1996 inquiry as to his vested status. Although the inquiry was in writing, Amat did not request an SPD but rather information as to his vested status. None of the authorities cited support Amat's argument that he is entitled to statutory penalties as a result of the Plan administrator's failure to provide him an SPD given that Amat did not request one. See e.g., Fisher, 895 F.2d at 1077 (holding that request for copies of policies did not amount to a request for an SPD for penalty purposes);Kleinhans v. Lisle Sav. Profit Sharing Trust, 810 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that penalties are only appropriate where participant affirmatively requests the in formation and administrator refuses to comply). To adopt Amat's position, the Court would have to ignore the clear mandates of the Fifth Circuit that require a strict construction of section 1132 given its penal nature. The Court declines to do so given that defendant Delma would face personal liability for the relief Amat seeks, and also that Delma immediately provided an SPD when Amat actually asked for one.
Another likely fatal aspect of Amat's claim is that statutory penalties are only recoverable by a Plan participant or beneficiary. See 29 U.S.C. § 1024 (b)(4). In Nugent v. Jesuit High School, 625 F.2d 1285, 1286 (5th Cir. 1980), the Fifth Circuit held that non-vested former employees are not plan participants and therefore cannot recover statutory penalties under ERISA. Amat alleges, without explanation, that he is a Plan participant but given that he does not appear to be, nor claim to be, vested in the Plan, under Nugent he lacks standing to claim statutory penalties. See also Paris v. Profit Sharing Plan for Emoloyees of Howard B. Wolf, Inc., 637 F.2d 357, 362 (5th Cir. 1981).
In sum, there are genuine issues of material fact so as to require a trial in this matter, and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Accordingly;
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 7) filed by defendants Seafarers Pension Plan and Lou Delma should be and is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiff's suit is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.