No. 89-2487.
June 5, 1990.
Terry E. Allbritton, David Gelfand, Tulane Law School Appellate Advocacy Clinic, New Orleans, La., Richard R. Renner, Southeastern Ohio Legal Services, New Philadelphia, Ohio, for plaintiffs-appellants.
David Ayala, Atty., I.N.S., Litigation Service, Jack Shepherd, Harlingen, Tex., Henry K. Oncken, U.S. Atty., Jeanette Mercado, Asst., Brownsville, Tex., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Before REAVLEY, JONES and DUHE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Upon careful review of the record, briefs and oral arguments in this cause, we find that the judgment of the district court, Ricardo H. Hinojosa, J., is correct.
With the exception of additional footnotes provided by our court, we adopt the judgment and persuasive reasoning of the district court to the extent published below as Appendix A.
AFFIRMED.
APPENDIX A
29 U.S.C. §§ 201 219 29 U.S.C. §§ 216 217 28 U.S.C. § 1346 28 U.S.C. § 1361 ANALYSIS
Keating v. Shell Chemical Co., 610 F.2d 328 8 U.S.C. § 1555 95-86 91 Stat. 426 29 U.S.C. § 203 29 U.S.C. § 202 Alexander v. Sara, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 42 aff'd. 721 F.2d 149 Alexander v. Sara, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 42 aff'd. 721 F.2d 149 Sims v. Parke Davis Co., 334 F. Supp. 774 aff'd. 453 F.2d 1259 cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 92 S.Ct. 1196 31 L.Ed.2d 254 Worsley v. Lash, 421 F. Supp. 556 See also Lavigne v. Sara, Inc., 424 So.2d 273 721 F.2d at 150 Id. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1555 8 U.S.C.A. § 1555 See generally Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 96 S.Ct. 1883 48 L.Ed.2d 478 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 97 S.Ct. 1473 52 L.Ed.2d 50 Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 96 S.Ct. 1895 48 L.Ed.2d 495 Plaintiffs Jose Rudolfo Alvarado Guevara, Luis Miguel Dominquez Mendoza, Elidio Escobar, Jose Dennis Flores Medrano, Juan Francisco Garcia Perez, Carlos Eduardo Gonzalez Cruz, Virgilio Tapia Rodas, Henry Vasquez Cruz, Encarnacion Calderon Valdizon, Carlos Humberto Campos Ortiz, Hector Najarco Alas, Cristobal Osorio Machado, Edwin Perez Valle, Jose Daniel Sullivan Lopez, Jose Vergara Hernandez, and Luis Arturo Zelaya Martinez (hereinafter "Plaintiffs") have brought suit against Defendants Immigration and Naturalization Service (hereinafter "INS"), Port Isabel Service Processing Center (hereinafter "PISPC"), John Luvender, Individually and as Director of the PISPC, Omer Sewell, Individually and as District Director of the Defendant, INS, and Edwin Meese, Individually and as Attorney General of the United States (hereinafter "Defendants"). Plaintiffs allege that they are current and former alien detainees of the INS whom Defendants employed in grounds maintenance, cooking, laundry and other services at the rate of one dollar ($1.00) per day. Further alleging that this practice is a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (hereinafter "FLSA"), -, Plaintiffs seek relief in the form of unpaid minimum wages, statutory liquidated damages, attorneys' fees and costs, and injunctive relief pursuant to the FLSA. Plaintiffs allege that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to (b) and as an action under the FLSA, pursuant to (a)(2) as an action against an agency and officers of the United States, and pursuant to as an action to compel the Defendant officers of the United States to perform duties owed to Plaintiffs. Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' cause of action, alleging that Plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6). After considering the pleadings, the memoranda on file and the arguments of counsel, the Court is of the opinion that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' cause of action should be granted. It would be improper for the Court to grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' cause of action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) unless Plaintiffs do not make any factual allegations that would support a cause of action. (5th Cir. 1980). According to the affidavit of INS District Director Omer G. Sewell (hereinafter "Defendant Sewell") that was submitted as an attachment to the Motion to Dismiss, the PISPC is an alien detention facility located near Harlingen, Texas. Defendant Sewell further asserts that, as part of the detention program, it is customary to announce to the detainees, over a public address system, that volunteer duties are available to those detainees who wish to participate. Pursuant to (d), which provides for payment of allowances to aliens for work performed while held in custody under the immigration laws, volunteers are compensated one dollar ($1.00) per day for their participation. The amount of payment was set by congressional act. Department of Justice Appropriation Act, 1978, Pub.L. No. , (1978). Despite this apparent exchange of money for labor, Plaintiffs are not covered by the FLSA. Under the FLSA, an "employee" is defined as "any individual employed by an employer." (e)(1).... [I]t would not be within the legislative purpose of the FLSA to protect those in Plaintiffs' situation. The congressional motive for enacting the FLSA, found in the declaration of policy at (a), was to protect the "standard of living" and "general well-being" of the worker in American industry. (M.D.La. 1983), (5th Cir. 1983). Because they are detainees removed from American industry, Plaintiffs are not within the group that Congress sought to protect in enacting the FLSA. While both Plaintiffs and Defendants admit that there are no cases dealing directly with factually identical circumstances, several cases have held that prison inmates, who are similar to detainees in that they have been incarcerated and are under the direct supervision and control of a governmental entity should not be protected under the FLSA. (M.D.La. 1983), (5th Cir. 1983). (E.D.Mich. 1971), (6th Cir. 1971), , , (1972); (N.D.Ind. 1976). (La.App. 1st Cir. 1982). These prior decisions on the issue have recognized imprisoned individuals are not covered under the FLSA because they do not fit the statutory definition of employee and because the congressional intent of the FLSA was to protect the standard of living and general well-being of the worker in American industry. . Those courts have concluded that an extension of the FLSA to the prison inmate situation was not, therefore, legislatively contemplated. Because of the similarity in circumstances between the prison inmates and Plaintiff detainees here, the reasons noted by those courts for not extending the FLSA are applicable in this case. Finally, Plaintiffs allege in their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss that (d) makes a distinction based on alienage without a compelling governmental purpose to justify this classification and is, therefore, unconstitutional. (d) is part of a statutory scheme of Title 8 of the United States Code regulating aliens and nationality and is an example of the broad congressional power over immigration and naturalization. , , (1976) (noting that there are many federal statutes that distinguish between citizens and aliens). Because of this broad congressional power, immigration legislation is subject to a limited scope of judicial inquiry. , , (1977); , , (1976). The Court will uphold the constitutionality of the statute as a valid exercise of the congressional power to regulate the conduct of aliens.