Summary
Quoting Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 19680)
Summary of this case from Gerhart v. Rankin Cnty.Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO: 02-3805, SECTION: "R"
May 20, 2004
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the motion of defendant United States of America to dismiss the claims of plaintiff Tammie Holley. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES defendant's motion.
I. Background
Plaintiffs allege that on September 11, 2000, they were driving in Tammie Holley's car when they were rear-ended by Justin Vickers, a United States Marshal. Plaintiffs aver that Holley was driving at the time. Plaintiffs assert that they filed claims with the United States Marshals Service, and it denied Holley's claim on June 25, 2002 and denied Altamirano's claim on June 26, 2002. As a result, Holley was required by law to present her claims in federal court within six months after the final notice of denial was mailed, i.e., by December 24, 2002. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
In connection with the same car accident, Holley's insurance company, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, sued the United States to recover the medical expenses that Holley incurred as a result of the accident. State Farm's suit was originally styled as "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company as Subrogee of/and Tammie Holley," but the complaint asserted no claims on behalf of Tammie Holley. State Farm later amended its complaint and restyled it to list itself as the sole plaintiff. In addition, State Farm's counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for Holley, in which he indicated that Holley was mistakenly named as a plaintiff in the action. Holley moved to enroll counsel, but the Court denied Holley's motion on the grounds that she was not a party to the action. Holley then moved to intervene as a plaintiff in that case, and the Magistrate Judge granted Holley's motion. The United States moved this Court to review the Magistrate's order. Holley opposed the United States' motion, arguing that she was already a party plaintiff before she intervened and her claims were already in the lawsuit. The Court rejected Holley's argument, relying upon its previous determination that Holley was not a party to the action. The Court reversed the Magistrate's order and denied Holley's motion to intervene because it concluded that the claims that Holley asserted in her motion to intervene were time-barred.
See State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Vickers, Eastern District of Louisiana Civil Action 02-1799.
After State Farm filed its suit against the United States, Altamirano filed this suit against Vickers and the United States on December 24, 2002. On April 15, 2003, Altamirano and Holley amended the complaint to add Holley as a plaintiff. Defendants moved to dismiss Holley's claims as time-barred, and the Court denied defendants' motion in an Order and Reasons dated December 12, 2003. The Court found that the amended complaint related back to the original filing date under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), and therefore Holley's claims are timely. The United States now moves again to dismiss Holley's claims as time-barred. This time defendant more fully articulates that its argument is based on the theory that the Court's determination in the State Farm action that Holley's claims were time barred precludes Holley's claims in this case under the doctrine of res judicata. Defendant also argues that the amended complaint does not relate back under Rule 15(c).
Rec. Doc. 21.
II. Discussion
A. Legal Standard
Defendant's current motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims as time barred is, in essence, a motion to reconsider this court's previous order denying defendant's motion to dismiss. Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not formally recognize a motion to reconsider in haec verba, the Fifth Circuit has held that a motion to reconsider a dispositive pretrial motion may be classified under either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 or 60, depending upon the time of filing. See Pryor v. United States Postal Service, 769 F.2d 281, 285 (5th Cir. 1985); Lavespere v. Niagra Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 n. 14 (5th Cir. 1994) ( en banc); see also Blanchard Co., Inc. v. Barrick Gold Corp., 2003 WL 22533641, *1 (E.D.La.) (considering defendants' motions to reconsider order denying motion to dismiss); Ambrose v. Ocean Shipholdings, Inc., 2003 WL 21991656, *1 (E.D.La.) (same). Because defendant filed its motion for reconsideration more than ten days after the court's denial of its motion to dismiss, the motion falls under Rule 60(b). See Lavespere, 910 F.3d at 173. Under Rule 60(b), a court will grant relief only in limited circumstances, such as upon a showing of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; or any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the order. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
B. Res Judicata
The United States argues that Holley's claims are barred under the doctrine of res judicata. "The test for res judicata has four elements: (1) the parties are identical or in privity; (2) the judgment in the prior action was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the prior action was concluded by a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the same claim or cause of action was involved in both actions." Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. v. United States, ___ F.3d ___, 2004 WL 628657 (5th Cir. 2004). In the previous action, the Court denied Holley's motion to intervene, and thus Holley was not a plaintiff to that action. As a result, the parties to the State Farm action and this lawsuit are not identical. The res judicata doctrine still applies, however, "to fully litigated issues raised by a motion to intervene." Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. Seaboard Coastline R.R. Co., 413 F.2d 19, 24 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969); see also Castro Convertible Corp. v. Castro, 596 F.2d 123, 125 (5th Cir. 1979). In the State Farm action, the Court determined that Holley could not intervene in light of the parties and procedural posture that were present in that suit. In this case, the issue before the Court was whether Altamirano could amend his complaint to add Holley, a similarly situated plaintiff. Because of the different procedural postures and parties involved in the two cases, Holley's motion to intervene in State Farm's suit did not raise the issue that is present in this suit. The Court therefore cannot conclude that the issue was fully litigated in the previous action, the Court rejects defendant's argument that res judicata precludes Holley's claims in this suit.
C. Relation Back
In this case, the Court granted Altamirano's motion to amend his complaint to add Holley as a plaintiff because it found that the amended complaint relates back to the original complaint, and as a result, Holley's claims are timely. In its motion, defendant argues that the Court improperly concluded under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) that the amended complaint related back to the original complaint. As defendant argues, generally "relation back will not apply to an amendment that substitutes or adds a new party for those named initially in the earlier timely pleadings." Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1968). Courts have found, however, that amendments that add or substitute a plaintiff relate back in certain limited circumstances. In Williams, for example, the minor plaintiff's mother had sued on behalf of her son as his next friend, and the mother sought to amend the complaint to add herself as a party plaintiff in her own right and assert claims for recovery for loss of services. Id. at 235. The Fifth Circuit found that the amended complaint related back and therefore the mother's claims were timely. Id. at 239. The Court held that "notice is the critical element involved in Rule 15(c) decisions," id. at 236, and permitted the amendment because the defendant was on notice of and not materially prejudiced by the additional claims.
Other courts have also applied this same rationale to permit amendments that have add plaintiffs whose claims would otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations. See, e.g., Raynor Brothers v. American Cyanimid Co., 695 F.2d 382, 384-85 (9th Cir. 1982); Tessier v. Moffatt, 93 F. Supp.2d 729, 736 (E.D.La. 1988); Cunningham v. Quaker Oats Co., 107 F.R.D. 66, 71-72 (W.D.N.Y. 1985). Most of the cases in which an amendment that adds or substitutes a plaintiff relates back are cases in which the plaintiff was already in the lawsuit in some capacity or there is a direct relationship, such as ownership, between the current plaintiffs and the new or substituted plaintiffs. See, e.g., Williams, 405 F.2d at 235 (party in lawsuit in representative capacity allowed to assert her own claims); Raynor Brothers, 695 F.2d at 384-85 (permitted substitution of affiliated partnership for corporate plaintiff); Tessier, 93 F. Supp.2d at 736 (amendment adding limited partnership as plaintiff related back to original complaint filed by the partnership's limited partners); Cunningham, 107 F.R.D. at 71-72 (in suit based on child's choking accident, mother's claims related back to suit filed by father on behalf of himself and minor child). District courts have, however, permitted the addition of plaintiffs that are similarly situated even though they are not directly related to the existing plaintiffs. See, e.g., In re: Simon II Litigation; 211 F.R.D. 86, 144-46 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); In re: Integrated Resources Real Estate Limited Partnerships Securities Litigation; 815 F. Supp. 620, 642-644 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Nielsen v. Professional Financial Mgmt., Ltd., 682 F. Supp. 429, 435-436 (D.Minn. 1987); Andujar v. Rogowski, 113 F.R.D. 151, 154-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Stoppelman v. Owens, 580 F. Supp. 944, 946-47 (D.D.C. 1983).
In a determination of whether a new plaintiff's claims relate back to the original complaint, courts consider whether "(1) the new plaintiff's claim arose out of the same conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth in the original complaint; (2) the new plaintiff shares an identity of interest with the original plaintiff; (3) the defendants have fair notice of the new plaintiff's claim; and (4) the addition of the new plaintiff causes the defendants prejudice." Olech v. The Village of Willowbrook, 138 F. Supp. 1036, 1044 (N.D.Ill. 2000) (internal citations omitted). Notice is the "linchpin" of the analysis. Young v. Lepone, 305 F.3d 1, 16-17 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 31 (1986)). Discussing generally the notice required under Rule 15(c), the Advisory Committee Notes indicates that the notice may be informal. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c), Advisory Committee Note to the 1966 Amendment. A finding that informal notice is sufficient is frequently dependent upon "determining whether the party to be added would be prejudiced by allowing relation back under the circumstances of the particular case." WRIGHT MILLER, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1498; see also Young, 305 F.2d at 17 ("In our view, lack of notice and unfair prejudice go hand in hand.").
Here, the Court affirms its earlier conclusion. Holley's claims arise out of the same car accident that Altamirano identified in his original complaint. Indeed, both Holley and Altamirano assert liability premised on Vickers' negligence, and only their alleged damages differ. In this respect, this case is akin to the Williams case, in which the mother sought to allege her own, distinct damages based on the same premise of liability that was previously asserted. See Williams, 405 F.2d at 235. Furthermore, the United States knew of Holley's alleged claims within the limitations period. To begin with, the complaint alleges that Vickers rear-ended Holley's car, in which Altamirano was a guest passenger. The United States knew that Holley alleged that she had sustained injuries in the accident both because Holley had filed a claim with the United States Marshal's Service and because Holley's insurance company had filed suit in June of 2002. In its suit, State Farm specifically alleged that Vickers negligently operated the vehicle owned by the United States and caused the car accident in which Holley sustained personal injuries. Here, the argument that defendant had notice of Holley's claims is even stronger than it was in Williams. In Williams, the plaintiff did not assert her claims until more than four years after the complaint had been filed and after a determination of liability in the case. See Williams, 405 F.2d at 235. The Fifth Circuit concluded that even though the defendant had to defend against a claim that it might have thought was barred based on the passage of time, the defendant suffered no prejudice. Id. at 239. In comparison, Holley attempted to assert her claims by intervening in the State Farm action approximately one month after the limitations period ended and moved to amend the complaint in this suit less than four months after Altamirano filed his original complaint. Moreover, in light of this short time lapse between the original suit and plaintiffs' motion to amend, there is no concern that the United States will be prejudiced by potentially stale evidence. Based on the above, the Court finds that the United States had notice of Holley's claims and is not prejudiced by allowing plaintiffs' amended complaint to relate back.
See Complaint, Rec. Doc. 1, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Vickers, Eastern District of Louisiana Civil Action 02-1799.
As noted above, courts grant relief under Rule 60(b) only in limited circumstances. In light of the Court's findings, these circumstances are not present here, and the Court denies defendant's motion.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES defendant's motion to dismiss Holley's claims.