Opinion
D070583
01-18-2018
ALPINE UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. GROSSMONT UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Williams Iagmin and Jon R. Williams for Plaintiff and Appellant Alpine Union School District. Craig A. Sherman and Craig A. Sherman for Plaintiff and Appellant Alpine Taxpayers for Bond Accountability. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, Warrington S. Parker III, Khai Lequang and Evan M. Rose for Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2014-00034850-CU-MC-CTL) APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Joel M. Pressman, Judge. Affirmed. Williams Iagmin and Jon R. Williams for Plaintiff and Appellant Alpine Union School District. Craig A. Sherman and Craig A. Sherman for Plaintiff and Appellant Alpine Taxpayers for Bond Accountability. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, Warrington S. Parker III, Khai Lequang and Evan M. Rose for Defendants and Respondents.
Plaintiffs Alpine Union School District (Alpine) and Alpine Taxpayers for Bond Accountability (ATBA) (together Plaintiffs) appeal a judgment in favor of defendants Grossmont Union High School District (Grossmont) and Ralf Swenson (together Defendants) in their action against Defendants for a permanent injunction, declaratory relief, taxpayer and school bond waste prevention (Code Civ. Proc., § 526a; Ed. Code, § 15284), and a writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085). The crux of Plaintiffs' action was that Defendants breached their obligation under Proposition U (Prop. U), a school bond initiative passed by the voters in Grossmont's district in 2008, to construct a new high school in Alpine. Most importantly in this appeal, Prop. U contained an enrollment trigger that is a condition to Grossmont's authorization and obligation to construct a new high school in Alpine. That enrollment trigger provided in relevant part: "After district-wide enrollment . . . equals or exceeds 23,245 . . . at the time of release of request for construction bids, begin and complete construction" of school buildings and grounds to accommodate up to 800 students at a new high school in the Alpine/Blossom Valley area. (Italics added.)
In a prior appeal in this case (Alpine Union School District v. Grossmont Union High School District (Nov. 3, 2015, D067500) [nonpub. opn.] (Alpine I)), we affirmed the trial court's order granting Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction requiring Defendants to set aside certain Prop. U bond proceeds pending resolution of Plaintiffs' action. After we issued our opinion in Alpine I, the trial court conducted a trial on Plaintiffs' action, issued a detailed statement of decision, and entered judgment in favor of Defendants. In its appeal, Alpine contends the trial court erred by interpreting Prop. U's enrollment trigger language as giving Grossmont unrestricted discretion on when to use bond funds to construct a new high school in Alpine. In particular, it argues the court erred by: (1) not following the law of the case set forth in Alpine I and misinterpreting the plain and unambiguous language of Prop. U's enrollment trigger; (2) assuming that language was ambiguous, excluding evidence of voter intent as shown in Prop. U's voter ballot and pamphlet information; and (3) finding the enrollment trigger had not, in fact, been satisfied.
In ATBA's appeal, it contends the trial court erred by: (1) not following the law of the case set forth in Alpine I and misinterpreting the plain and unambiguous language of Prop. U's enrollment trigger; (2) assuming that language was ambiguous, excluding evidence of voter intent as shown in Prop. U's voter ballot and pamphlet information and failing to recognize that voter intent controls its interpretation of Prop. U; (3) interpreting Prop. U as allowing Grossmont to vary the terms of its obligations thereunder; (4) assuming the court correctly interpreted Prop. U's enrollment trigger language, finding the enrollment trigger had not, in fact, been satisfied; (5) contrary to Prop. U's plain and unambiguous language, interpreting Prop. U as allowing Grossmont to have discretion regarding the timing of site development for a new high school in Alpine; (6) rejecting its cause of action for waste under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a or Education Code section 15284; and (7) finding the doctrine of laches applied to bar its waste and mandamus causes of action. Based on our reasoning below, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2004, voters in the Grossmont district passed Proposition H (Prop. H), authorizing Grossmont to issue up to $274 million in general obligation bonds to finance certain school improvement projects. In addition to a list of specific projects that Grossmont intended to complete with bond proceeds, Prop. H also incorporated a long-range facilities master plan, which listed construction of a new school as one of the projects that Grossmont may also accomplish with bond proceeds. However, bond proceeds were insufficient to complete all of the Prop. H projects.
In 2008, voters in the Grossmont district passed Prop. U, authorizing Grossmont to issue up to $417 million in general obligation bonds to finance those school facilities projects specified in its Bond Project List. Prop. U stated that "[l]isted projects will be completed as needed at a particular school site according to Board-established priorities, and the order in which such projects appear on the Bond Project List is not an indication of priority for funding or completion." It further provided that "inclusion of a project on the Bond Project List is not a guarantee that the project will be funded or completed. The Governing Board may make changes to the Bond Project List in the future consistent with the projects specified in the proposition." Part two of Prop. U's Bond Project List provided in relevant part:
"Unless otherwise noted, the following projects are authorized to be completed at the following school sites: [¶] . . . [¶]
" NEW HIGH SCHOOL—ALPINE/BLOSSOM VALLEY AREA
• Complete site development including utilities and road extensions
• After district-wide enrollment at the existing comprehensive high school sites, including the two current charter schools, equals or exceeds 23,245 (which is the official 2007-08 CBEDS enrollment) at the time of release of request for construction bids, begin and complete construction—classrooms and general use school buildings and grounds to accommodate up to 800 students, adequate academic/vocational/job-training equipment, library/multimedia facilities, computer and science labs, food service facilities, and spac[e] for student-supported services." (Italics added.)
"CBEDS" refers to the official California Basic Educational Data System enrollment figure.
In 2009, Grossmont began the process of acquiring six parcels of real property for construction of a new school at the "Lazy A" ranch location in Alpine. By March 2012, Grossmont had acquired all of the parcels. However, at that time its enrollment at comprehensive high schools and charter schools was 22,712 students, which was less than the 23,245 level under Prop. U's enrollment trigger for construction of the new Alpine high school. In May 2013, Grossmont obtained the Army Corps of Engineers permit, which was a prerequisite to beginning construction on the site. In December 2013, Grossmont obtained approval for its site grading plans from the Division of the State Architect (DSA) of the California Department of General Services.
Grossmont's enrollment equaled or exceeded 23,245 students during the 2008-2009, 2009-2010, and 2010-2011 school years. Its enrollment fell below that level during the 2011-2012, 2012-2013, 2013-2014, 2014-2015, and 2015-2016 school years.
Between 2009 and 2012, Grossmont experienced a decline in student enrollment and less per-pupil state funding and, in response, made substantial cuts to its budget by, inter alia, eliminating teaching positions, laying off administrative staff, and reducing programs and salaries. In November 2012, Grossmont's governing board (Board) postponed further work on the new high school in Alpine and placed that project in Phase 17U of Prop. U's projects, its final phase.
In October 2014, Plaintiffs filed the instant action against Defendants. Plaintiffs sought, inter alia, a preliminary injunction enjoining Defendants from spending further bond and state matching funding on new projects or project approvals. On January 22, 2015, the trial court granted, in part, Plaintiffs' preliminary injunction motion and issued a preliminary injunction ordering Grossmont to immediately set aside $14 million and an additional $28 million by January 15, 2016. Grossmont appealed that order. In April 2015, Plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint, alleging causes of action for a permanent injunction, declaratory relief, taxpayer and school bond waste prevention (Code Civ. Proc., § 526a; Ed. Code, § 15284), and a writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085).
On November 3, 2015, we issued our opinion in Alpine I, supra, D067500, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by issuing the preliminary injunction. (Id. at pp. 2, 18.) In Alpine I, we stated:
"Although the record does not show the trial court adjudicated the merits of Alpine's action by granting its motion for a preliminary injunction, the record supports an inference the court found that Grossmont had an obligation, as a matter of law, under Prop. H and Prop. U to construct a new high school in the Alpine area, which obligation was subject to an enrollment condition. For purposes of deciding Alpine's motion [for a preliminary injunction], the court found that under Prop. H and Prop. U, Grossmont promised to construct a new high school in the Alpine area if certain prerequisites were satisfied. Nevertheless, we believe the court's determination did not decide that issue on the merits. Therefore, that
issue will be subject to the presentation of additional evidence and argument at trial, after which the court may then make a definitive determination of all of the legal and factual issues in this action. [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 10.)Assuming arguendo, as Grossmont argued, that the trial court decided solely a question of law whether it promised to construct a new high school in the Alpine area, we concluded the court had correctly decided that issue. (Id. at p. 11.) Citing the enrollment trigger and other language of Prop. U, we independently construed that language and concluded it contained "a promise by Grossmont to construct a new high school in the Alpine area." (Id. at p. 11.) We further concluded that Prop. U "did not leave the decision as to which projects would be funded (e.g., a new high school in the Alpine area) solely to the discretion of Grossmont's board" and did not give the Board "unfettered discretion to ignore its promise to construct a new high school in the Alpine area." (Id. at pp. 11-12.)
After denying the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court conducted a trial on the merits of Plaintiffs' action against Defendants. The court issued a 25-page statement of decision in favor of Defendants. It found Prop. U's enrollment trigger for construction of a new high school in the Alpine area had not been met. The court concluded the plain language of the enrollment trigger means that its modifying phrase "at the time of release of request for construction bids" applies at the time of construction of school buildings. The court explained that Grossmont's enrollment must equal or exceed 23,245 students "at the time of release of request for construction bids for the construction of a new high school, that is, when the site development work was completed (i.e., the lot finished) and [Grossmont] was ready to proceed with construction of the buildings identified in Prop. U. Thus, contrary to [Plaintiffs'] position, the release of construction bids unrelated to the construction of school buildings, such as site development or site preparation work, is insufficient to trigger the obligation to build." The court further concluded that, to the extent that the modifying phrase in the enrollment trigger was ambiguous, indicia of the voters' intent supported its interpretation of Prop. U.
The trial court made findings regarding Grossmont's student enrollment level in each school year since 2007 and concluded that the enrollment trigger had not been met. In particular, the court found that Grossmont's selection of Erickson-Hall (Erickson) as its lease-leaseback contractor did not meet the enrollment trigger because that selection did not involve a request for construction bids and no construction bids were requested or received by Grossmont. It also found that Grossmont's site preparation work, including the demolition of homes and removal of contaminated soils, did not involve any building or other construction work on the new high school. It also found that DSA did not approve site development plans until 2013 and had never approved building plans for the new high school. The court found that Prop. U distinguishes between site development work and construction of the new high school buildings and only the latter has an enrollment precondition. The court stated it was undisputed that the enrollment threshold had not been met since a November 8, 2012, resolution in which the Board placed the entire high school project on hold until: (1) state ADA (i.e., per-pupil) funding returned to its 2008 level; and (2) the enrollment threshold was met.
The trial court also found that Prop. U gave Grossmont discretion as to the priority of projects to be funded or completed and that it had properly exercised its discretion in light of the economic circumstances. The court concluded: "Defendants have exercised, not unfettered, but appropriate and reasonable discretion, not to build a school in Alpine at this time."
The court also rejected ATBA's waste cause of action, finding Grossmont's obligation to construct a new high school had not yet been triggered and there was no evidence that it spent money on projects not authorized by Prop. U. It also found that ATBA's waste and mandamus causes of action were barred by the doctrine of laches, because it unreasonably delayed in asserting its claims and Grossmont was prejudiced by that delay.
On June 16, 2016, the trial court entered judgment for Defendants. Plaintiffs timely filed notices of appeal challenging the judgment.
DISCUSSION
I
Interpretation of Prop. U's Enrollment Trigger
Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred by not following the law of the case set forth in Alpine I and misinterpreting the plain and unambiguous language of Prop. U's enrollment trigger.
A
Law of the case.
Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred by not properly following the law of the case that was established in Alpine I. They argue that in Alpine I we held, as a matter of law, that Prop. U included a promise by Grossmont to construct a new high school in the Alpine area. Alpine argues that under the law of the case the court erred by admitting extrinsic evidence at trial to interpret that promise, including its enrollment trigger, and should have granted its motion for summary judgment. ATBA argues that under the law of the case the court erred by finding Grossmont had discretion whether to fund and/or when to complete construction of a new high school in the Alpine area.
The California Supreme Court stated: "The law of the case doctrine states that when, in deciding an appeal, an appellate court 'states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, that principle or rule becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the lower court and upon subsequent appeal . . . .' [Citations.]" (Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 892-893 (Kowis), fn. omitted.) The doctrine also applies "to questions not expressly decided but implicitly decided because they were essential to the decision on the prior appeal." (Estate of Horman (1971) 5 Cal.3d 62, 73.)
In Alpine I, we independently construed the relevant language of Prop. U and concluded it contained "a promise by Grossmont to construct a new high school in the Alpine area." (Alpine I, supra, D067500, at p. 11.) We concluded the trial court, in granting the preliminary injunction, properly interpreted Prop. U's language as constituting a conditional promise by Grossmont (i.e., that its promise to construct the new high school was subject to satisfaction of the enrollment trigger). (Id. at pp. 10-11.) However, we did not interpret the enrollment trigger language or determine whether that trigger had, in fact, been met, leaving those issues for subsequent findings by the trial court. (Ibid.) As Plaintiffs note, we further concluded that Prop. U "did not leave the decision as to which projects would be funded (e.g., a new high school in the Alpine area) solely to the discretion of Grossmont's board" and did not give the Board "unfettered discretion to ignore its promise to construct a new high school in the Alpine area." (Id. at pp. 11-12.)
Contrary to Plaintiffs' apparent argument, we did not conclude in Alpine I that Grossmont had an unconditional promise to construct a new high school under Prop. U or that it had an obligation to construct a new high school immediately. Rather, as Grossmont concedes, we concluded that the trial court had properly found it had an obligation under Prop. U to construct a new high school in the Alpine area if certain prerequisites were satisfied and sufficient bond proceeds were received. (Alpine I, supra, D067500 at pp. 10, 12.) Because that conclusion of law was necessary to our disposition of the appeal, it is law of the case and applies to all subsequent proceedings in this case. (Kowis, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 892-893.) However, our disposition of the appeal did not require us to decide either the proper interpretation of the enrollment trigger or whether that trigger had, in fact, been met. Therefore, our statements on those issues are not law of the case. (Ibid.)
Furthermore, contrary to Plaintiffs' apparent argument, our statement that Grossmont did not have "unfettered discretion to ignore its promise to construct a new high school" does not mean we concluded that Grossmont has no discretion regarding when to construct that new high school and/or in prioritizing construction of the new high school along with other Prop. U projects. Rather, in deciding Alpine I, we did not need to, nor did we, decide the nature and/or scope of Grossmont's discretion regarding those issues. Accordingly, because a determination of the nature and scope of Grossmont's discretion regarding when to construct a new high school in the Alpine area was not necessary to our disposition of the appeal in Alpine I, our statements regarding such discretion did not constitute law of the case and therefore cannot bind the trial court or this court in subsequent proceedings. (Kowis, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 892-893.)
B
Interpretation of enrollment trigger as a matter of law.
Because we did not interpret Prop. U's enrollment trigger language in Alpine I, the law of the case doctrine does not apply to, and the trial court did not err by addressing thereafter, that interpretation question. (Kowis, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 892-893.) Nevertheless, Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred by concluding, as a matter of law, that the plain language of Prop. U's enrollment trigger means that Grossmont's enrollment must equal or exceed 23,245 students "at the time of release of request for construction bids," which means when the site development work is completed and Grossmont is ready to proceed with construction of the new high school buildings identified in Prop. U. Plaintiffs apparently argue that Prop. U's enrollment trigger language should be interpreted as being satisfied if, at any point on or after passage of Prop. U, Grossmont's enrollment equaled or exceeded 23,245 students, whether or not that level was met at the time Grossmont released a request for construction bids for the new high school.
We review a trial court's determination of questions of law de novo or independently. (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42.) The proper interpretation of a statute or initiative is a question of law that we determine de novo or independently. (Taxpayers for Accountable School Bond Spending v. San Diego Unified School Dist. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1057; Apartment Assn. of Los Angeles County, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2001) 24 Cal.4th 830, 836; Monette-Shaw v. San Francisco Bd. of Supervisors (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1215 (Monette-Shaw).) "In interpreting a voter initiative, we apply the same principles that govern our construction of a statute. [Citation.] We turn first to the statutory language, giving the words their ordinary meaning. [Citation.] If the statutory language is not ambiguous, then the plain meaning of the language governs. [Citation.] If, however, the statutory language lacks clarity, we may resort to extrinsic sources, including the analyses and arguments contained in the official ballot pamphlet, and the ostensible objects to be achieved." (People v. Lopez (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1002, 1006.) We only consider extrinsic evidence or other extrinsic aids to interpret a statute or initiative when the language of the statute or initiative is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation. (People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1007-1008.) "If the language is clear and unambiguous[,] there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent . . . of the voters . . . ." (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735.) Furthermore, "[c]ourts should interpret statutes or written instruments so as to give force and effect to every provision and not in a way which would render words or clauses nugatory, inoperative or meaningless. [Citations.]" (Committee for Responsible School Expansion v. Hermosa Beach City School Dist. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1189 (Hermosa).)
Applying the rules, ante, for statutory construction to the relevant language in this case, we conclude the trial court correctly interpreted the plain and unambiguous language of Prop. U's enrollment trigger. Part two of Prop. U's Bond Project List set forth certain projects that were authorized to be completed at certain school sites, including a project titled: "NEW HIGH SCHOOL—ALPINE/BLOSSOM VALLEY AREA." Prop. U describes that project in two bullet points. The first bullet point states: "Complete site development including utilities and road extensions." The second bullet point, which includes the enrollment trigger that is the primary focus of this appeal, states in relevant part: "After district-wide enrollment at the existing comprehensive high school sites . . . equals or exceeds 23,245 . . . at the time of release of request for construction bids, begin and complete construction—classrooms and general use school buildings and grounds to accommodate up to 800 students . . . ." (Italics added.)
ATBA argues that the italicized language, ante, "at the time of release of request for construction bids," does not modify, or impose a temporal condition on, the clause requiring that Grossmont's enrollment must equal or exceed 23,245 students before it is authorized under Prop. U to "begin and complete construction" of the new high school. Instead, ATBA argues that the enrollment trigger language should be interpreted as requiring that the 23,245 student enrollment level be met only once after passage of Prop. U and without regard to Grossmont's enrollment level at the time of the release of the request for construction bids for the new high school. In particular, ATBA argues the only temporal restriction or condition in the enrollment trigger is the word "[a]fter" at the beginning of that clause. It argues that "[a]fter" an enrollment level of 23,245 students is met once after passage of Prop. U, then Grossmont is thereafter obligated to proceed with construction of the new high school regardless of whether that enrollment level is met at the time of the release of the request for construction bids.
However, by so arguing, ATBA disregards the plain and unambiguous language of the enrollment trigger clause. The modifying phrase "at the time of release of request for construction bids" is an integral part of the introductory adverbial clause that constitutes the enrollment trigger condition to Grossmont's authorization to "begin and complete construction" of the new high school. The language of that adverbial clause includes two temporal modifying words or phrases—"[a]fter" and "at the time of release of request for construction bids." We cannot, and should not, read that adverbial clause as omitting either of those modifying words or phrases. "Courts should interpret statutes or written instruments so as to give force and effect to every provision and not in a way which would render words or clauses nugatory, inoperative or meaningless. [Citations.]" (Hermosa, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1189.) If the adverbial clause were interpreted as ATBA suggests, it would render the modifying phrase "at the time of release of request for construction bids" inoperative or meaningless. (Ibid.) However, we should give all words in Prop. U, including the enrollment trigger language, force and effect. (Ibid.) Independently construing Prop. U's language, we conclude, as the trial court concluded, that the plain and unambiguous language of the enrollment trigger requires that the 23,245 enrollment level be met "at the time of release of request for construction bids."
Contrary to ATBA's assertion, the words "begin and complete" in Prop. U's second bullet point are not words that modify the phrase "at the time of release of request for construction bids." Rather, that latter phrase is part of the introductory adverbial clause that modifies the verbs "begin and complete" and constitutes the enrollment trigger condition to Grossmont's authority to begin and complete construction of the new high school. Alternatively stated, the phrase "at the time of release of request for construction bids" sets forth a temporal restriction that qualifies or modifies the introductory adverbial clause's enrollment level condition that is a prerequisite to Grossmont's authority to begin and complete construction of the new high school.
To the extent ATBA relies on the "last antecedent rule" to support its suggested interpretation of the phrase "at the time of release of request for construction bids," it misconstrues and/or misapplies that rule. "A longstanding rule of statutory construction—the 'last antecedent rule'—provides that 'qualifying words, phrases and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding and are not to be construed as extending to or including others more remote.' " (White v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 680 (White).) That rule is not absolute and can be overcome by other indicia of meaning. (State ex rel. Bartlett v. Miller (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1409.) Proper application of the last antecedent rule requires that the qualifying phrase "at the time of release of request for construction bids" be tied or applied to the clause immediately preceding that qualifying phrase, which in the enrollment trigger is "[a]fter district-wide enrollment . . . equals or exceeds 23,245." (Cf. White, supra, 31 Cal.3d at pp. 679-682 [applying phrase "for purposes of punishment" to word "transfer" that immediately preceded that phrase]; Mt. Hawley Insurance Co. v. Lopez (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1412-1414; People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 516, 529-531 (R.J. Reynolds); In re Phelps (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 451, 456-457 (Phelps); Lockhart v. U.S. (2016) ___ U.S. ___ [136 S.Ct. 958, 962-963]; Barnhart v. Thomas (2003) 540 U.S. 20, 26 [the last antecedent rule provides that "a limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows"].) Application of the last antecedent rule in this manner is further supported by the fact that there is only one clause that precedes the qualifying phrase "at the time of release of request for construction bids." (Cf. Phelps, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 457 ["there is only one antecedent and the qualifying phrase therefore must attach to all of it"]; R.J. Reynolds, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 531 [same].) Therefore, we reject ATBA's suggested interpretation that we relate or tie the qualifying phrase "at the time of release of request for construction bids" only to the verbs "begin and complete" that follow it, rather than to the adverbial clause "[a]fter district-wide enrollment . . . equals or exceeds 23,245" that immediately precedes it and is part of the same introductory clause as the instant qualifying phrase (i.e., the enrollment trigger). Under the last antecedent rule, the verbs "begin and complete" are not qualifying words or phrases that can be subject to that rule and apply to words or phrases preceding them (e.g., "at the time of release or request for construction bids").
We likewise reject Plaintiffs' argument that the trial court erred by interpreting the words "construction bids" within the phrase "at the time of release of request for construction bids" as meaning bids for construction of buildings for the new high school and not including bids for preliminary work, such as the demolition of homes on the school site. In construing the term "construction bids," we consider the usual and ordinary meaning of that term in the context of the provision as a whole. Like the trial court, we conclude the usual and ordinary meaning of the term "construction bids" means bids for the building of school structures at the site of the new high school. Other language in Prop. U supports our interpretation. In particular, the second bullet point expressly describes the types of construction for which bids will be requested—i.e., "begin and complete construction—classrooms and general use school buildings and grounds to accommodate up to 800 students, adequate academic/vocational/job-training equipment, library/multimedia facilities, computer and science labs, food services facilities, and spac[e] for student support services." (Italics added.) None of that described construction includes any preliminary work at the school site, such as the demolition of homes or removal of contaminated soils. Rather, as Grossmont argues, that type of preliminary work constitutes, at most, "site development" work that is set forth in the first bullet point (i.e., "[c]omplete site development including utilities and road extensions"). That first bullet point (i.e., "site development" work) is not subject to an enrollment trigger condition; rather, only the second bullet point (i.e., "begin and complete construction") is subject to an enrollment trigger condition, as discussed ante. Therefore, the only common sense and reasonable interpretation of the term "construction bids" in the second bullet point, when read in the context of Prop. U as a whole, is bids for building the school structures and ancillary facilities and grounds for the new high school, and therefore we adopt that meaning as the plain and unambiguous meaning of the term "construction bids."
Although Alpine cites various statutes and regulations that define or use the term "construction" in a broader manner that includes demolition, excavation, or other preliminary site work, those statutes and regulations relate to different circumstances with different legislative purposes and intents and therefore do not control our interpretation of the term "construction bids" in the context of Prop. U. (See Civ. Code, § 2783; Gov. Code, §§ 15802, subd. (b), 53800, subd. (d); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11100, subd. (d); Cal. Code Regs, tit. 8, § 11160.) In any event, those statutes and regulations do not persuade us to adopt a broader definition of the term "construction bids" in the context of this case.
C
Extrinsic evidence.
Because we concluded ante that the language of the enrollment trigger condition is plain and unambiguous, we need not, and do not, consider any extrinsic evidence (e.g., ballot pamphlet arguments) in interpreting the enrollment trigger. The trial court properly interpreted the plain and unambiguous language of Prop. U's enrollment trigger.
II
Finding That Enrollment Trigger Had Not Been Satisfied
Plaintiffs contend that even if the trial court properly interpreted the plain and unambiguous language of Prop. U's enrollment trigger, it erred by finding the enrollment trigger had not, in fact, been satisfied. In particular, they argue Grossmont released a request for construction bids within the meaning of the enrollment trigger when in 2010 it issued a request for proposal for qualifications for a lease-leaseback contractor and selected Erickson to serve as its lease-leaseback contractor.
A
Trial.
At trial, Defendants presented evidence regarding lease-leaseback arrangements, its selection of Erickson as its contractor for such an arrangement, and the absence of any request for, or receipt of, bids for construction of the new high school. Grossmont selected the lease-leaseback method for "delivery" (i.e., construction) of the new high school. Under that method, Grossmont would select a qualified lease-leaseback contractor and would subsequently enter into a construction services agreement with that contractor, which agreement would define how the work would be prosecuted, a lease of the site property to that contractor, and a sublease (i.e., leaseback) of the property to Grossmont. Under the leaseback, Grossmont would make lease payments that include the value of the improvements constructed on the property pursuant to the lease-leaseback agreement.
The lease-leaseback method for school construction allows a district control over selecting a quality contractor in lieu of a lowest bidder contractor under the usual public contracting method.
In 2010, Grossmont issued a request for qualifications (RFQ) seeking a qualified lease-leaseback contractor for construction of the new high school. The RFQ did not request, nor did Grossmont receive, any bids for construction of the new high school. Grossmont received 12 responses to its RFQ and selected Erickson as the qualified contractor for a lease-leaseback arrangement. However, Grossmont and Erickson have never entered into a construction services agreement, lease, or sublease/leaseback, all of which are required for a lease-leaseback arrangement or agreement. Rather, Erickson provided Grossmont with preconstruction services.
Grossmont could not release a request for construction bids for the new high school until the DSA approved its building plans. At the time of the trial, Grossmont did not have current building plans submitted for the DSA's approval, nor had the DSA approved any building plans or issued a building permit for the new high school. Grossmont would have had to have, inter alia, DSA-approved building plans and entered into a lease-leaseback agreement before a request for construction bids for the new high school could be released. If Grossmont had entered into a lease-leaseback agreement with Erickson, Erickson could have solicited construction bids only after Grossmont first gave it authority to do so. If Grossmont had given Erickson authority to do so, then Erickson would have managed the release of a request for construction bids and been solely responsible for going forward with the construction project. However, Grossmont has never entered into a lease-leaseback agreement with Erickson and never authorized Erickson to proceed with soliciting construction bids, nor has Erickson (or Grossmont) ever released a request for construction bids or received any construction bids.
Although Grossmont did not receive the DSA's approval of any building plans or designs for the new high school, in 2013 it received approval from the DSA and the Army Corps of Engineers for grading of the site for the new high school. Grossmont's initial building plans had been rejected by the DSA because they were incomplete and lacked details. Grossmont did not complete the design phase for the new high school and the DSA never approved any building plans.
In its statement of decision, the trial court found that the DSA approved Grossmont's site development plans in 2013 after its enrollment fell below 23,245 students, but the DSA never approved building plans for the new high school. The court found that although Grossmont had submitted initial building plans in 2012, its enrollment at that time was below 23,245 students and continued to drop thereafter. It stated: "Therefore, even if DSA had ultimately approved building plans, the enrollment number would not have been met at a time when [Grossmont] would have sought construction bids." The court further stated:
"The selection of [Erickson] as a [lease-leaseback] contractor is not relevant. Selection of the lease-leaseback contractor did not involve a request for construction bids. No bids were requested during this process, and no bids were received. [Erickson] was selected based on qualifications, not bids. Furthermore, the unrebutted evidence is that site development work and construction work would start and be managed by [Erickson] only after [Grossmont] entered into a construction contract with [Erickson]. In a lease-leaseback, that contract would consist of a lease agreement and a sublease agreement and a construction services agreement. [Citations.] . . . [Grossmont] has never entered into such agreements for the new high school. The unrebutted evidence also indicates that in a lease-leaseback, the lease-leaseback contractor, [Erickson], would request bids for site development work and construction of the school upon receiving direction from [Grossmont]. No such
requests for bids have been identified in connection with the new high school project . . . . [B]oth [Grossmont] and [Erickson] have confirmed that they have never released a request for bids for construction of the new school. [Citations.]"The court found that only ancillary site preparation work, involving the demolition of homes and removal of contaminated soils, had been done. That work did not involve any building. Finding Grossmont's enrollment equaled or exceeded 23,245 students only through the 2010-2011 school year and Grossmont had not, and could not, have released a request for construction bids during that period, the court concluded the enrollment trigger had not been satisfied.
B
Lease-leaseback agreements generally.
"Education Code section 17406 authorizes school districts to use lease-leaseback agreements in contracting for construction or improvement of school facilities. Under a lease-leaseback agreement, the school district leases its own real property to a contractor for a nominal amount, and the contractor agrees to construct school facilities or improve existing facilities on the property and lease the property and improvements back to the school district. At the end of the lease-leaseback agreement, title to the construction project vests in the school district. [Citations.]" (California Taxpayers Action Network v. Taber Construction, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 115, 122.) A lease-leaseback agreement is a method for financing and delivery of new school facilities and "is an alternative to the traditional 'design-bid-build' method, which involves hiring an architect to design the project, requesting competitive bids based on the design, and having the winning bidder build the project. [Citation.]" (Id. at pp. 122-123.) A lease-leaseback agreement is exempt from the competitive bidding requirements of Education Code section 17417. (California Taxpayers Action Network, at p. 136; see McGee v. Balfour Beatty Construction, LLC (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 235, 239, 243; Los Alamitos Unified School District v. Howard Contracting, Inc. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1224.)
C
Analysis.
Based on the evidence, ante, that Plaintiffs did not refute at trial, we conclude that Grossmont's RFQ, selection of Erickson as its lease-leaseback contractor, and/or preliminary site work did not constitute a "release of request for construction bids" within the meaning of Prop. U's enrollment trigger, which would have authorized and/or obligated Grossmont to "begin and complete construction" of the new high school in the Alpine area. The RFQ did not request any bids, nor did Grossmont receive any bids from Erickson or other potential contractors in response to the RFQ. In fact, at the time of the RFQ, Grossmont did not have any site or building plans for the new school and therefore RFQ respondents had no basis on which to provide any bids. Furthermore, Grossmont and Erickson did not enter into any of the three lease-leaseback agreements (i.e., construction services agreement, lease, and sublease/leaseback) because the project was still in the preconstruction phase. At most, Grossmont and Erickson entered into a construction management services agreement pursuant to which Erickson provided Grossmont with preconstruction services (e.g., design development, value engineering, and management of ancillary work). Erickson could have solicited construction bids only after the DSA approved building plans and Grossmont approved detailed bid packages, but those events never occurred. Although Grossmont performed certain ancillary or preconstruction work at the school site (e.g., demolition of homes and removal of contaminated soils), that work was a preliminary step prior to site development work under Prop. U's first bullet point and, even if it constituted site development work, would nevertheless not constitute any construction work within the meaning of Prop. U's second bullet point (i.e., "begin and complete construction—classrooms and general use school buildings and grounds to accommodate up to 800 students"). Accordingly, based on our review of the undisputed evidence on this issue, we conclude the trial court correctly found Prop. U's enrollment trigger had not been satisfied and therefore Grossmont was not authorized under Prop. U to begin and complete construction of the new high school in the Alpine area. (Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 799 [court concluded respondent correctly argued substantial evidence standard of review did not govern because relevant facts were undisputed, stating: "When the decisive facts are undisputed, we are confronted with a question of law and are not bound by the findings of the trial court."].)
Assuming arguendo the evidence on this issue was disputed, we nevertheless would conclude there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that the enrollment trigger had not been satisfied. (Bickel v. City of Piedmont (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1040, 1053 [substantial evidence standard of review generally applies to trial court's findings of fact]; SFPP v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 452, 462 [same].)
III
ATBA's Additional Prop. U Contentions
ATBA also contends that the trial court erred by interpreting Prop. U as allowing Grossmont to, in effect, vary the terms of its obligations thereunder and allowing it to have discretion regarding the timing or completion of site development work for a new high school in Alpine.
ATBA specifically argues that the trial court erred by finding that Grossmont had discretion not to build the new high school. In paragraph No. 29 of its statement of decision, the court stated: "[A]s discussed below, the terms of the agreement reflected in Prop[.] H [were] that funds may be spent to build a new high school in Alpine, not that they must be spent on a high school. Prop[.] U also included prerequisites that triggered the promise." In paragraph No. 56, the court stated: "Prop[.] U language identifies the high school as one of many projects 'authorized,' not required." The court also correctly recognized that Prop. U provided that the new high school was one of many listed projects that were "authorized" to be completed and that there was no guarantee that any listed project would be funded or completed. The court also noted Prop. U provided that listed projects would be completed " 'according to Board-established priorities, and the order in which such projects appear on the Bond Project List is not an indication of priority for funding or completion.' " Accordingly, we conclude the court correctly interpreted Prop. U as contemplating multiple projects and correctly found that Grossmont's "board retained discretion as to priority."
However, the trial court also recognized that in Alpine I, we held that Grossmont promised to build a new high school, but that promise was conditional (i.e., conditioned on satisfaction of the enrollment trigger) and that Grossmont's discretion under Prop. U was not unfettered. The court found that because Grossmont faced difficult post-Prop. U economic circumstances (e.g., decline in enrollment, economic recession, reduction in per-pupil state funding, budget deficit, and reduction in assessed property values), it validly exercised its discretion in placing construction of the new high school on hold. Based on those circumstances, the court concluded: "Defendants have exercised, not unfettered, but appropriate and reasonable discretion, not to build a school in Alpine at this time." Because there is nothing in the trial court's statement of decision that is inconsistent with, or contrary to, our opinion in Alpine I, we reject ATBA's assertion that the court did not follow the law of the case. We further reject ATBA's assertion that the court erred by finding post-Prop. U economic circumstances justified Grossmont's exercise of its discretion to lower the priority of the new high school project. There is nothing in Prop. U or Alpine I that precludes Grossmont from exercising reasonable discretion in prioritizing listed projects based on changing economic circumstances. O'Farrell v. County of Sonoma (1922) 189 Cal. 343 (O'Farrell), cited by ATBA, is factually inapposite to this case and does not otherwise persuade us to reach a contrary conclusion. In any event, because we concluded ante that the trial court correctly found the enrollment trigger had not been satisfied, at no point through the time of the trial did Grossmont have any authority or obligation to begin and complete construction of the new high school, regardless of the designated priority of that Prop. U listed project.
We also reject Plaintiffs' related assertion that the trial court found, in effect, that under the enrollment trigger Grossmont had unlimited discretion to decide when to release the request for construction bids or to otherwise impose inordinate delay. Although Grossmont has discretion in making certain decisions regarding Prop. U projects, including construction of the new high school in Alpine, that discretion is not unfettered and must be exercised reasonably. In its respondents' brief, Defendants rightly concede that Grossmont's discretion to determine the priority of Prop. U projects is not unbounded and that it must act reasonably under the circumstances. They further represent: "This means Grossmont is obliged, when enrollment warrants, to take reasonable steps toward construction of the new school while taking into account its other priorities, ongoing projects, and finances."
In O'Farrell, because the ballot proposition described the exact scope of the road to be constructed with bond funds, the court concluded that the county had no discretion to build only part of that road. (O'Farrell, supra, 189 Cal. at pp. 347-348.)
Although ATBA does not expressly assert that Grossmont unreasonably exercised its discretion in 2012 when it placed the new high school project in Phase 17U of Prop. U's listed projects, which phase may not be completed until after 2032, we nevertheless conclude there is substantial evidence (e.g., evidence of decline in enrollment, economic recession, reduction in per-pupil state funding, budget deficit, and reduction in assessed property values) to support the trial court's finding that Grossmont reasonably exercised its discretion by doing so.
ATBA also argues the trial court erred by interpreting Prop. U as allowing Grossmont to have discretion regarding the timing or completion of site development work for a new high school in Alpine. As the trial court correctly noted, site development work for the new high school under Prop. U's first bullet point is not subject to the enrollment trigger that applies to construction of the new high school under the second bullet point. Prop. U provides that Grossmont is "authorized" to complete certain projects listed in part two and, in particular, to "[c]omplete site development including utilities and road extensions" for the new high school in the Alpine area. ATBA argues the trial court erred by not finding Grossmont was obligated to complete site development work for the new high school and instead finding that ATBA had not alleged a cause of action based on Grossmont's failure to complete site development. The court stated: "Any failure to complete site development was not clearly alleged or presented in this case, which dealt with the alleged failure to construct a new high school." Based on our review of the second amended complaint and record on appeal, we agree with the trial court that Plaintiffs did not allege any cause of action requesting relief based on Grossmont's purported failure to complete site development work. In any event, contrary to ATBA's apparent assertion, we did not hold in Alpine I that Grossmont was required to complete forthwith all site development work for the new high school. Therefore, the trial court did not err by not following any law of the case on that issue and by, in effect, allowing Grossmont to exercise discretion regarding the timing of, or delay in, completing site development work for the new high school. (Cf. Monette-Shaw, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1221 [ballot proposition's language was "intentionally broad and nonspecific. It is self-evidently drafted to leave the City significant flexibility in designing the replacement facility. There is nothing improper in providing for such flexibility."].)
IV
Cause of Action for Waste
ATBA contends the trial court erred by rejecting its cause of action against Defendants for waste under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a or Education Code section 15284.
A
In the second amended complaint, ATBA alleged a cause of action against Defendants for waste under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a or Education Code section 15284, alleging, inter alia, that Defendants committed waste by violating or breaching their promise to construct the new high school in Alpine. In its statement of decision, the trial court described three theories that ATBA presented at trial in support of its waste cause of action, as follows: "(1) spending Prop[.] U money on any project but the school in Alpine constitutes waste, (2) spending $23 million of Prop. U tax dollars for site acquisition, permitting, and site preparation without completing construction and development of the [new high school] constitutes 'waste' and (3) Prop[.] U monies were spent on projects not authorized by Prop[.] U." In its statement of decision, the court stated:
Code of Civil Procedure section 526a provides: "An action to obtain a judgment, restraining and preventing any illegal expenditure of, waste of, or injury to, the estate, funds, or other property of a county, town, city or city and county of the state, may be maintained . . . ."
Education Code section 15284, subdivision (a), provides: "An action to obtain an order restraining and preventing any expenditure of funds received by a school district . . . through the sale of bonds . . . may be maintained . . . if it appears by the complaint or affidavits that any of the following conditions are present: [¶] (1) An expenditure of funds received by a school district . . . through the sale of bonds . . . is for purposes other than those specified in paragraph (3) of subdivision (b) of Section 1 of Article XIIIA of the California Constitution; [¶] (2) The expenditure is not in compliance with [that constitutional provision]; [¶] (3) That an expenditure in violation of [that constitutional provision] will be made or will continue to be made during the litigation that would produce waste or great or irreparable injury; . . . ."
"73. As to the first theory, for the reasons set forth above, this Court rejects Plaintiffs' waste claim because any obligation to build a school has not been triggered. Additionally, it is not waste to spend money on a project. [Citations.]
"74. As to the second theory, ATBA argues the law controlling strict accountability bond expenditures supports that spending $23 million of Prop[.] U tax dollars for site acquisition, permitting, and site preparation without completing construction is impermissibly incomplete spending and 'waste.'Accordingly, the court denied Plaintiffs' cause of action for waste.
"75. It is conceded by the parties in this case that Prop[.] U independently authorizes 'complete site development including utilities and road extensions.' There is no evidence that work in this regard to date was unnecessary or wasteful. Further, the fact that Defendants performed independent site development does not require completion of the high school, which, as stated above, has a separate enrollment trigger requirement.
"76. As to the third theory, the Court does not find evidence that Prop[.] U monies were spent on projects not authorized by Prop[.] U." (Fn. omitted.)
B
To the extent ATBA can assert a waste cause of action based on the theory that Defendants breached their promise under Prop. U to construct a new high school in Alpine, we conclude that theory necessarily fails because, as discussed ante, the enrollment trigger was not satisfied and therefore Defendants could not, and did not, breach their conditional promise to construct the new high school. Alternatively stated, because at no point in time through the trial was Grossmont authorized or obligated to begin and complete construction of the new high school, Defendants did not breach their obligation under Prop. U to construct that high school and therefore did not commit waste by not constructing the new high school.
Similarly, to the extent ATBA can assert a waste cause of action based on the theory that Defendants cannot spend Prop. U bond funds on other listed projects in a manner and to a degree that funds necessary to construct the new high school may be exhausted, we conclude that theory also necessarily fails because, as discussed ante, at no point in time through the trial was Grossmont authorized or obligated to begin and complete construction of the new high school and Grossmont had reasonable discretion, based on economic circumstances, to prioritize the funding and completion of Prop. U listed projects, such as placing construction of the new high school in Phase 17U. Contrary to ATBA's apparent argument, Prop. U's language cannot be reasonably interpreted as precluding or limiting the expenditure of bond funds on listed projects other than the new high school until, if ever, the enrollment trigger is satisfied. Therefore, the court correctly denied ATBA's request for injunctive relief precluding Defendants from spending Prop. U funds that may be needed to construct the new high school if, and when, the enrollment trigger is eventually satisfied.
To the extent ATBA can assert a waste cause of action based on the theory that Defendants cannot spend $23 million on preconstruction or site development work for the new high school without beginning and completing construction of the new high school, we conclude the trial court correctly rejected that theory because, as discussed ante, Prop. U's express language does not authorize or obligate Grossmont to begin and complete construction of the new high school until the enrollment trigger is satisfied. Grossmont's expenditure of Prop. U bond funds for preconstruction work or site development work (e.g., acquiring site property, demolishing homes, removing contaminated soils, and designing site grading plans and obtaining approval thereof) was authorized under the first bullet point and therefore was not subject to the enrollment trigger for construction work under the second bullet point. Prop. U's express language cannot be reasonably interpreted as affirmatively requiring Grossmont to proceed with construction of the new high school if it has performed any site development work, even though the enrollment trigger for construction work has not been satisfied. Contrary to ATBA's assertion, Grossmont did not commit waste of Prop. U bond funds by not beginning and completing construction of the new high school under the second bullet point after performing preconstruction work and/or site development work under the first bullet point. Therefore, the court correctly denied ATBA's request for affirmative injunctive relief ordering Defendants to proceed with construction of the new high school.
V
Doctrine of Laches
ATBA contends the trial court erred by finding the doctrine of laches applied to bar its waste and mandamus causes of action. In particular, it argues there is insufficient evidence to support the court's finding that Defendants were prejudiced by Plaintiffs' unreasonable delay in filing their action.
A
Plaintiffs' second amended complaint alleged a waste cause of action as described ante. Its mandamus cause of action challenged Grossmont's action approving the sale of $73.5 million of its currently available Prop. U bond capacity "for a purpose directly and indirectly in contravention of Defendants' mandatory, non-discretionary duty to build a high school in Alpine." It sought a writ of mandate compelling Defendants to reconsider and reapprove that bond issuance "so that substantial construction and completion of the Alpine High School is slated and disclosed as a priority project" rather than spending all of those bond revenues on projects other than the new high school. It also sought a writ of mandate related to its waste cause of action.
In its statement of decision, the trial court found that the doctrine of laches barred Plaintiffs' waste and mandamus causes of action. Noting that laches requires both an unreasonable delay in asserting a claim and prejudice to the other party, the court found Plaintiffs unreasonably delayed filing their action until October 2014, which was about two years after their waste and mandamus claims arose in 2011 or 2012. The court then found Defendants were prejudiced by that unreasonable delay, stating:
"Defendants have expended Prop[.] U bond money on a variety of projects since November 8, 2012. Had Defendants been sued at some earlier point, more Prop[.] U bond monies would be available and any remedy would have done less violence to their bond program. Also, [Grossmont] expended Prop[.] U monies to plan projects, to design them, and for plan oversight. This money would go to waste as projects would have to be re-worked, including those items in design, as Defendants would have insufficient Prop[.] U funds to continue with the projects as planned and in the order planned. [Citations.]"Accordingly, the court found the doctrine of laches barred Plaintiffs' waste and mandamus causes of action.
B
"[T]he affirmative defense of laches requires unreasonable delay in bringing suit 'plus either acquiescence in the act about which plaintiff complains or prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay.' [Citation.] Prejudice is never presumed; rather it must be affirmatively demonstrated by the defendant in order to sustain his burdens of proof and the production of evidence on the issue. [Citation.] Generally speaking, the existence of laches is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court in light of all of the applicable circumstances, and in the absence of manifest injustice or a lack of substantial support in the evidence its determination will be sustained. [Citations.]" (Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center (1980) 27 Cal.3d 614, 624 (Miller).)
C
Plaintiffs' waste and mandamus causes of action are based on the apparent premise that the enrollment trigger has been satisfied and Defendants therefore are obligated to begin and complete construction of the new high school in Alpine. However, we concluded ante, that the enrollment trigger has not, in fact, been satisfied and Defendants therefore are not authorized or obligated to begin and complete construction of the new high school. Because the premise of Plaintiffs' waste and mandamus causes of action is incorrect, we need not, and do not, address the question of whether the trial court erred by rejecting those causes of action on the alternative ground of laches.
In any event, because, as we concluded ante, the trial court correctly rejected Plaintiffs' waste cause of action on its merits, we need not address the question of whether it also rejected that cause of action on the alternative ground of laches. To the extent the court did not decide the merits of the mandamus cause of action and instead rejected that claim by finding the doctrine of laches applied, we conclude there is substantial evidence to support that finding. In particular, contrary to ATBA's assertion, there is substantial evidence to support a finding that Defendants were prejudiced by Plaintiffs' unreasonable delay in filing their action. As the trial court found, during the period of Plaintiffs' unreasonable delay, Grossmont proceeded with the planning of, and spending bond funds on, Prop. U listed projects other than the new high school. In particular, Grossmont expended substantial time and resources completing a comprehensive review of the Prop. U program and updating the scope and priorities of listed projects. If Plaintiffs had timely filed their action, Defendants presumably would not have expended such time and resources and proceeded with projects other than the new high school in the same manner as it did. Therefore, there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that the doctrine of laches barred Plaintiffs' mandamus (and waste) causes of action. (Miller, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 624.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to their costs on appeal.
BENKE, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR: HUFFMAN, J. NARES, J.