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granting the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b) because the plaintiff's injuries were covered by FECA
Summary of this case from Milton v. Rapiscan Security ProductsOpinion
Civil Action No. SA-01-CA-1103 NN
September 19, 2002
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION
I. Introduction
Plaintiff, Jeannette Almaguer, proceeding pro se, alleges in this suit that defendant, the United States Department of the Army ("Army"), discriminated against her on the bases of her national origin (Hispanic), gender (female), disability (multiple chemical hypersensitivity among other illnesses) when on June 20, 2000 it purportedly conspired with the United States Department of Labor's Office of Workers' Compensation Program ("OWCP") to suspend her workers' compensation benefits. As a federal employee with an occupational injury or disease, plaintiff began receiving workers' compensation under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act ("FECA"), 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq., in December of 1997. FECA benefits are regulated and administered by the Secretary of Labor through its OWCP.
According to her complaint, plaintiffs other illnesses included, among others: lung obstruction, neuropathy, allergies, chemical exposure to toxic effects, mycosis, muscular atrophy, seizures, chronic liver disorder, demyelinating disease, chronic cough, asthma, and immune mechanism disorder. Docket Entry 4.
In June of 2000, OWCP discontinued plaintiff's FECA benefits in order to perform a cost benefit analysis of plaintiffs medical treatments. Plaintiff's FECA benefits, however, were fully reinstated four months later, in October of 2000.
Plaintiff brings this lawsuit to recover compensatory damages for the mental anguish and emotional distress she suffered as a result of the four-month suspension. Plaintiff further alleges that the Army's conspiratorial actions with OWCP, resulting in the discontinuation of her FECA benefits, were taken in retaliation against her for having engaged in protected activity in the past. Plaintiffs employment with the Army ended with her disability-based retirement in November of 1998. Plaintiff alleges the Army discriminated against her on the bases of her national origin, gender, physical disability and also retaliated against her, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
Plaintiff alleges she voluntarily resigned from her employment due to illness in June of 1996. Nevertheless, the record is clear that the Army granted her disability retirement status in 1998. Docket Entry 4.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 et seq. (applicable to federal sector employees).
29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq.
Pending before me is the Army's request for dismissal pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Specifically, the Army argues that this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because plaintiff's discrimination claims brought under Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act are precluded by FECA. Under FECA, the Army argues, decisions pertaining to the workers' compensation benefits received by former or current federal employees, as the plaintiff in this case, are within the sole discretion of the Secretary of Labor and are not subject to judicial review. Further, the Army contends that none of plaintiff's allegations as pleaded in her complaint entitle her to any relief because she has not complained, nor can she allege, that the Army took an adverse employment action against her in June of 2000, almost two years after her employment relationship with the Army ended. Plaintiff has filed a response opposing the Army's request for dismissal, to which the Army responded by filing a reply brief. On February 20, 2002, upon the parties' consent and consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(i), the case was assigned to me for all purposes, including trial and entry of judgment.
Docket Entry 10.
Id .at 6-8.
Id. at 8-9.
Docket Entry 13 and 19.
Docket Entry 11.
Having reviewed the complaint, the arguments made by the parties, and the applicable law, it is my opinion that defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) should be GRANTED and this matter should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. While FECA does not completely preempt other relief available to federal employees under anti-discrimination federal statutes such as Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act, FECA nevertheless provides the exclusive remedy for injuries which derive solely from compensation decisions made by the Secretary of Labor. Challenges to compensation decisions made by the Secretary of Labor are not subject to judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 8128(b). Because plaintiff bases this suit on the discontinuation of her FECA benefits, a decision made by the Secretary of Labor, and one within his expressed statutory authority, this court is without subject-matter jurisdiction. 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a)
II. Jurisdiction
Plaintiff presumes original jurisdiction of this court based upon federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1343, as well as pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. It appears that plaintiff properly exhausted her administrative remedies in regards to her legal challenges concerning the temporary suspension or discontinuation of her workers' compensation benefits. Plaintiff filed the instant suit subsequent to her receipt of the agency's final decision regarding her September 15, 2000 EEO charge of discrimination and reprisal, issued on August 7, 2001. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). Nevertheless, for the reasons discussed below, this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the suit.
III. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit, her third suit filed in federal court, on December 6, 2001, when she submitted a form complaint of discrimination against her former employer, the Army. According to the statements made by plaintiff in the complaint, her supplemental responses to some of the items listed in the complaint and her supporting documentation, it appears that plaintiff is claiming that defendant discriminated against her when it allegedly conspired with the OWCP to temporarily suspend or discontinue her workers' compensation benefits. It is undisputed that the suspension of plaintiffs FECA benefits resulted in the interruption of her intravenous ("IV") immunoglobulin treatments. Plaintiff argues that defendant's participation in the OWCP's temporary suspension of her benefits was unlawfully motivated by her national origin, gender, and physical disability, and was committed to further retaliate against her for having previously engaged in protected activity.
Docket Entry 4.
Docket Entries 6-7.
Docket Entry 4, at 3.
The Army employed plaintiff as an Educational Specialist at Fort Sam Houston ("FSH"), in San Antonio, Texas, from June of 1989 until she was granted disability retirement in November of 1998. After having been denied initially, plaintiff began receiving workers' compensation benefits under FECA in December of 1997, due to the occupational physical illnesses she developed as a result of her exposure to toxic chemicals or substances while performing her duties at FSH.
Docket Entry 10, at 2.
Id. See also Docket Entry 4, The EEOC Decision on the Record, rendered by Administrative Judge Laura Alderman, on July 26, 2001. at 2.
In June of 1999, plaintiff began IV immunoglobulin treatments ("IV treatments") every two weeks as recommended by an immune toxicologist. The treatments, administered by a private third party, at a cost of $8,100 per treatment, were paid for by OWCP as part of the workers' compensation medical benefits received by plaintiff. Plaintiffs benefits, however, were discontinued in June of 2000 as part of the OWCP's assessment of plaintiff's high medical treatment costs. During this period, OWCP was conducting a cost benefit analysis of its most expensive workers' compensation claims, and in the case of plaintiffs, investigating whether there were less expensive (but as effective) medical treatments available for her to receive in lieu of her TV treatments. Nevertheless, plaintiffs benefits and full medical coverage for her IV treatments were fully reinstated four months later, in October 2000.
Id.
Docket Entry 4, EEOC Decision, at 3; and Docket Entry 10, at 5 fn.5.
Id.
Id.
Id. Plaintiff attributes the reinstatement of her benefits to the actions taken by her congressional representatives in response to her complaints.
As the Army notes in its motion to dismiss, plaintiff is not unfamiliar with federal court proceedings. In fact, her employment with the Army has been the subject of numerous administrative complaints of discrimination and federal court lawsuits. For instance, prior to the instant case, plaintiff, in cause number SA-00-CA-0085-OG, brought a Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") suit, seeking damages for emotional injuries based on her exposure to toxic substances at FSH; the same situation which lead to her receiving FECA compensation for physical injuries in December of 1997. The court held that FECA must be her first avenue of relief because the alleged emotional distress occurred during the course of her employment and there was a substantial question as to whether the claim fell within the scope of FECA. Since plaintiffs claim for damages based upon emotional injury had not been raised before the Secretary of Labor, her claim was dismissed due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Docket Entry 10, at Exhibit 1.
Previous to the 2000 suit, plaintiff filed an action on March 10, 1998, alleging discriminatory harassment due to her physical handicap, her national origin, and her sex, and in reprisal for having engaged in protected activity. The court dismissed the case, cause number 98-CV-189-HG, on January 27, 1999 on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims because plaintiff had failed to timely exhaust the statutory administrative remedies provided to her as a federal employee. In addition to filing her 1998 suit, plaintiff also filed an administrative complaint on March 11, 1998, in which she alleged discrimination on the bases of her disability (physical), national origin (Mexican-American) and race (Hispanic), and a reprisal claim. This complaint was nevertheless administratively dismissed because it was untimely and was the basis of the pending civil action she had filed the day before in federal court.
Docket Entry 10, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Plaintiff filed a third administrative complaint of discrimination on February 8, 1999, and then filed her formal complaint on February 23, 1999. Plaintiff alleged she was discriminated against when, on or about December 3, 1998, she received a packet in the mail from the FSH's Civilian Personnel Advisory Center ("CPAC"), declaring that she had been retired from service, effective November 20, 1998, without providing her any pre-or post-retirement counseling. This complaint was resolved in mediation on March 31, 1999.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
On September 15, 2000, plaintiff filed her fourth administrative complaint which led to this case, plaintiff's third federal court lawsuit. Plaintiff alleged in her administrative complaint that defendant conspired with the OWCP to temporarily discontinue her workers' compensation benefits and that, in the process of conspiring, defendant discriminated against her based upon her national origin, her gender, her physical disability, and also engaged in reprisal for her prior protected activity. A month after her administrative complaint was filed, the OWCP reinstated plaintiff's FECA benefits. Nevertheless, plaintiff continued to pursue her claim of discrimination against the Army. An Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") rendered a finding of no discrimination on July 26, 2001. The Army, on August 7, 2001, adopted the ALJ's finding as its final decision on plaintiff's administrative complaint. Plaintiff promptly commenced this action in federal court on December 6, 2001.
Docket Entry 4, ALJ's Decision on the Record, rendered July 26, 2001, at 3.
Docket Entry 1.
It should be noted that while plaintiff may have had many grievances related to her employment with the Army throughout the years, the scope of this suit is limited to the four-month suspension of her FECA benefits, from June to October of 2000.
To the extent that plaintiff now attempts to bring a reprisal claim against the Army for failure to reasonably accommodate her physical disability, that claim is barred because it was not raised during the administrative phase of her September 15, 2000 charge. Docket Entry 10, at 8-9 (citing Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820 (1976)("Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite before filing a suit under Title VII.").
V. Analysis
The dispositive issue in this case is whether plaintiff's claim, that she was discriminated against during the temporary suspension of her workers' compensation benefits, is precluded by FECA. Defendant argues that since compensation decisions made under FECA, such as the discontinuation of benefits pending a cost assessment analysis as made in this case, are not subject to judicial review, this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the suit. I agree. Clearly, the injuries for which plaintiff seeks relief under Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act are derived solely from a compensation decision made by the Secretary of Labor under FECA. Because compensation decisions such as the one made in this case are expressly reserved to the Secretary of Labor, and are not subject to judicial review, this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's suit. 5 U.S.C. § 8128.Defendant has moved for dismissal pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Rule 12(b)(1) authorizes the dismissal of a case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction when the district court lacks the statutory and constitutional power to adjudicate the case. A district court may dismiss a case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on any one of three different bases: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts. Once the defendant challenges jurisdiction by filing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff has the burden of establishing the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction. A motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction should be granted only if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of her claim that would entitle her to relief. With these legal principles in mind, I will proceed to analyze the dispositive issue in this case, that is, whether FECA provides the exclusive remedy for plaintiff's claim.
See Home Builders Association of Mississippi, Inc., v. City of Madison, Miss., 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998).
See Carney v. Resolution Trust Corp., 19 F.3d 950, 954 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Subject-matter jurisdiction is determined at the time the complaint is filed.").
See Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981)).
See Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1981); and Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980).
See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) ("The court must take the allegations in the complaint to be true unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim that would entitle [her] to relief."); and Home Builders Association of Mississippi, Inc., 143 F.3d 1006, at 1010.
FECA is a comprehensive statutory scheme that operates essentially as a federal workers' compensation law, the purpose of which is "to provide quick and uniform coverage for work-related injuries." The statute in that regard provides: "The United States shall pay compensation . . . for the disability or death of an employee resulting from personal injury sustained while in the performance of his duty." FECA furnishes the exclusive remedy against the United States for federal employees who sustain damages because of a work-related injury that is within the scope of FECA's coverage. Importantly, FECA authorizes the Secretary of Labor to grant or deny compensation awards, to modify previous compensation awards, and to grant compensation awards that were previously denied or discontinued. In that regard, § 8128 of the Act expressly provides:
5 U.S.C. § 8103-8193.
Woodruff v. United States Dept. of Labor, Office of Workers' Compensation Program, 954 F.2d 634, 639 (11th Cir. 1992).
§ 8116(c).
§§ 8128(a) and 8124.
(a) The Secretary of Labor may review an award for or against payment of compensation at any time on his own motion or on application. The Secretary, in accordance with the facts found on review, may —
(1) end, decrease, or increase the compensation previously awarded; or
(2) award compensation previously refused or discontinued.
(b) The action of the Secretary or his designee in allowing or denying a payment under this sub-chapter is—
(1) final and conclusive for all purposes and with respect to all questions of law and fact; and
(2) not subject to review by another official of the United States or by a court by mandamus or otherwise. Credit shall be allowed in the accounts of a certifying or disbursing official for payments in accordance with that action.
§ 8128(a-b).
Some Circuit Courts, including the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, have described Section 8128 as a "door-closing provision," because "[t]he Secretary's decision to award or deny compensation to a particular claimant is not subject to judicial review." FECA limits the ability of employees to seek legal relief against the government because employees are guaranteed the "right to receive immediate, fixed benefits, regardless of fault and without need for litigation, but in turn, they lose the right to sue the Government." The United States Supreme Court has also commented that Congress uses "such unambiguous and comprehensive" language as found in § 8128(b) "when [it] intends to bar judicial review altogether." The only exception to the "door-closing" provision arises when a FECA plaintiff raises constitutional questions which are unsuitable for determination in an administrative hearing.
See White v. United States, 143 F.3d 232, 237 (5th Cir. 1998); and Woodruff, 954 F.2d at 636-37.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 470 U.S. 190, 194 (1983).
Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, 470 U.S. 768, 780 n. 3 (1985). See also Benton v. United States, 960 F.2d 19, 22 (5th Cir. 1992) (FECA's structure and "`the language of section 8128(b) convince us that Congress intent was that the courts not be burdened by a flood of small claims challenging the merits of compensation decisions, [. . .] and that the Secretary should be left free to make the policy choices associated with disability decisions.'") (quoting Rodrigues v. Donovan, 769 F.2d 1344, 1347 (9th Cir. 1985)).
Woodruff, 954 F.2d at 639.
It is undisputed that plaintiff has not pleaded a constitutional violation of any sort in this case. Instead, plaintiff has claimed that the reasons behind the temporary suspension of her FECA benefits were motivated by her race, gender, physical disability and prior protected activity, in violation of Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiff argues that because FECA was not meant to provide relief for intentional discrimination ( i.e., damages for mental distress and/or anguish, as well as other compensatory damages), that this suit is outside the scope of the Secretary of Labor's exclusive authority under FECA. Plaintiff's argument is not persuasive.
Docket Entry 13, at 3.
While not all Title VII and Rehabilitation Act claims filed by federal employees are precluded by FECA, direct challenges to compensation decisions made under FECA, as plaintiff brings in this case, are viewed as impermissible collateral attacks of a prior unreviewable decision by the Department of Labor; and as such are statutorily barred from judicial review. Further, plaintiff's discrimination claim is diminished by the fact that she retired from federal employment in November of 1998. The temporary suspension of FECA benefits occurred from June to October of 2000. Based on this time-line, plaintiff's allegation that the temporary suspension of her FECA benefits can be viewed as a form of discrimination at the workplace, in violation of Title VII and/or the Rehabilitation Act, is incredulous. Based on the express language of § 8128(a), the temporary suspension of plaintiff's FECA benefits was within the scope of the Secretary of Labor's statutory authority under the Act. This court is simply without jurisdiction to review the decision of the Secretary of Labor to award, discontinue, or deny benefits under FECA.
See Morris v. Roche, 182 F. Supp.2d 1260, 1274 (M.D. Ga. 2002) (and case authorities cited therein for the proposition that recovery of FECA benefits does not bar a subsequent claim for discrimination). The instant case, however, is nevertheless barred because plaintiffs claim of discrimination is predicated upon the same illness or injury that gave rise to the Secretary of Labor's initial decision to award FECA benefits.
See Meester v. Runyon, 149 F.3d 855, 857 (8th Cir. 1998) (where the court held that a frustrated FECA claimant cannot secure judicial review of a FECA compensation decision by claiming that the Rehabilitation Act entitles her to accommodation in performing an alternative position approved by the Department of Labor when the claim is predicated upon the same illness or injury that gave rise to the Department of Labor's initial decision), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1144 (1999). See also Stubler v. Runyon, 892 F. Supp. 228, 229-30 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (prohibiting discrimination claims based on the same work-related injury for which FECA benefits were sought), aff'd, 56 F.3d 69 (8th Cir. 1995); Alexander v. Frank, 777 F. Supp. 516, 523-24 (N.D. Tex. 1991) (granting summary judgment for the defendant on the plaintiffs disability discrimination claim because FECA benefits constitute the government's exclusive liability); and Black v. Frank, 730 F. Supp. 1087, 1090-91 (S.D. Ala. 1990) (holding that FECA benefits constitute the government's exclusive liability because awarding a remedy under the Rehabilitation Act would "irreconcilably conflict" with FECA).
It is not evident from the documentation submitted by plaintiff whether she ever challenged the temporary suspension of her FECA benefits with the Department of Labor.
Accordingly, because no subject-matter jurisdiction exists to entertain plaintiff's federal court complaint, I need not discuss the remaining substantive arguments made by the defendant in this case in support of dismissal.
VI. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, I hereby GRANT defendant's motion to dismiss (Docket Entry 10), pursuant to FED.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The temporary suspension of plaintiff's FECA benefits from June to October of 2000 is not subject to judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 8128(b). Because it appears certain, and indeed beyond doubt, that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of her claim which would entitle her to relief under Title VII and/or the Rehabilitation Act, this action must be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.