Opinion
Nos. 09AP-306, 09AP-307, 09AP-308, 09AP-309, 09AP-318, 09AP-319, 09AP-320, and 09AP-321.
Rendered on November 17, 2009.
APPEALS from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, C.P.C. Nos. 07CVH07-8934, 07CVH05-6515, 07CVH08-11422, 08CVH02-3167, 07CVH05-6515, 07CVH08-11422, 08CVH02-3167, 07CVH07-8934.
Crabbe, Brown James LLP, and Daniel J. Hurley, for appellee Allstate Insurance Company.
Caborn Butauski Co., LPA, and David A. Caborn, for appellee Erie Insurance Exchange.
Harris Mazza, and Robert H. Willard, for appellee American Southern Insurance Company.
Gary L. Grubler, for appellee Grange Mutual Casualty Company.
Paul O. Scott, for appellants Dustin S. Zachariah and Katherine E. Piper.
Karr Sherman Co., LPA, Keith M. Karr, and David W. Culley, for appellant Robert J. Roby, Jr.
DECISION
{¶ 1} Defendants-appellants, Dustin S. Zachariah, his mother, Katherine E. Piper, and Robert J. Roby, Jr., appeal from the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs-appellees, Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate"), Erie Insurance Exchange ("Erie"), American Southern Insurance Company ("American Southern"), and Grange Mutual Casualty Company ("Grange"), on appellees' declaratory judgment actions. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings.
{¶ 2} Joey Ramge, Carson Barnes, Jesse Howard, Corey Manns, Dailyn Campbell, Taylor Rogers, and Joshua Lowe were friends as well as teammates on the Kenton High School football team. On the evening of November 18, 2005, Lowe, accompanied by Manns, Rogers, Howard, and Campbell, drove to a residence in a nearby town and stole a target deer with the intention of later placing it in the travel lane of a rural highway. The group transported the stolen target deer to Lowe's garage, Campbell spray painted profanities and the words "hit me" on the deer while others altered the legs so it could stand upright on pavement.
{¶ 3} Rogers became ill and left. Shortly thereafter, Barnes and Ramge joined the group. Around 9:00 p.m., the six remaining boys loaded the deer into Lowe's vehicle and drove around, searching for a spot to set it up. Campbell suggested that they place it on County Road 144 ("CR 144"), a two-lane rural highway with a speed limit of 55 m.p.h. Following some discussion about placement options, the six eventually settled on a location just beyond the crest of a hill in the eastbound lane of CR 144. Campbell and Manns retrieved the target deer from the vehicle and placed it in the center of the travel lane; Howard, Lowe, Ramge, and Barnes remained inside the vehicle.
{¶ 4} After Manns and Campbell returned to the vehicle, Lowe drove up and down CR 144 in order to observe the reactions of motorists suddenly confronted with the deer positioned directly in their travel lane. The group observed at least two motorists approach the deer, navigate around it, and continue on their way. Shortly thereafter, a vehicle operated by Roby and occupied by Zachariah crested the hill, swerved to avoid the deer, and careened into an adjacent field. Both Roby and Zachariah sustained serious physical injuries as a result of the accident.
{¶ 5} Manns, Howard, and Campbell subsequently entered no contest pleas in juvenile court to two counts of second-degree felony vehicular vandalism in violation of R.C. 2909.09(B)(1)(c), one count of fifth-degree felony possessing criminal tools in violation of R.C. 2929.24(A), and one count of first-degree misdemeanor petty theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1). The juvenile court accepted the pleas, adjudicated the three delinquent, and found them guilty.
{¶ 6} Appellant Roby thereafter filed a negligence action against the seven boys involved in the incident. Appellants Zachariah and Piper also filed a negligence action against the seven boys.
Roby also asserted negligent supervision claims against the boys' parents and several claims against DaimlerChrysler Corporation, the manufacturer of his automobile.
Zachariah and Piper also asserted a negligence claim against Roby and a claim for underinsured motorists benefits against their insurance carrier, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company.
{¶ 7} During the pendency of appellants' lawsuits, appellees filed declaratory judgment actions against their respective insureds seeking declarations that they had no legal obligation to defend them in the underlying tort actions or indemnify them against any liability imposed by such actions. Appellees' complaints also named appellants as defendants. Upon motion of the parties, the trial court consolidated the actions.
American Southern insured Campbell and his father, Dale Campbell, pursuant to a homeowner's policy; Erie insured Manns and his mother, Brenda Ober, and Barnes and his parents, Dan and Sheri Barnes, pursuant to homeowners' policies; Grange insured Manns and his father, Rodney Manns, pursuant to a homeowner's policy; and Allstate insured Campbell and his mother, Donna Deisler, and Howard and his father, Clarence Howard, pursuant to a homeowners' policy. Allstate ultimately obtained a default judgment against Howard. On April 28, 2009, Allstate, Zachariah, Piper, and Roby filed a written stipulation that Allstate would not use the default judgment it obtained against Howard as a defense or basis not to pay Allstate's applicable liability insurance coverage to Zachariah and Piper or Roby if such coverage was ultimately found to be available and those parties were successful in their negligence actions against Howard.
{¶ 8} "It is axiomatic that an insurance company is under no obligation to its insured, or to others harmed by the actions of an insured, unless the conduct alleged of the insured falls within the coverage of the policy." Gearing v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 76 Ohio St.3d 34, 36, 1996-Ohio-113. "Coverage is provided if the conduct falls within the scope of coverage defined in the policy, and not within an exception thereto." Id. "`([A]) defense based on an exception or exclusion in an insurance policy is an affirmative one, and the burden is cast on the insurer to establish it.'" Continental Ins. Co. v. Louis Marx Co., Inc. (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 399, 401, quoting Arcos Corp. v. Am. Mut. Liability Ins. Co. (D.C.E.D.Pa. 1972), 350 F.Supp. 380, 384.
{¶ 9} At issue in this case is whether appellants' claims against Manns, Barnes, Howard, and Campbell fall within the coverage provided by the pertinent insurance policies and do not fall within an exception in those policies. Accordingly, resolution of this issue requires an examination of the applicable provisions of the various policies, which are set forth below.
{¶ 10} The Allstate policies issued to Campbell and Howard contain identical terms and conditions and provide, in pertinent part, as follows:
Coverage X
Family Liability Protection
Losses We Cover Under Coverage X:
Subject to the terms, conditions and limitations of this policy, Allstate will pay damages which an insured person becomes legally obligated to pay because of bodily injury or property damage arising from an occurrence to which this policy applies, and is covered by this part of the policy.
We may investigate or settle any claim or suit for covered damages against an insured person. If an insured person is sued for these damages, we will provide a defense with counsel of our choice, even if the allegations are groundless, false or fraudulent. * * *
{¶ 11} The Allstate policies define "occurrence" as "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions during the policy period, resulting in bodily injury or property damage."
{¶ 12} In addition, the Allstate policies contain the following exclusionary language:
1. We do not cover any bodily injury or property damage intended by, or which may reasonably be expected to result from the intentional or criminal acts or omissions of, any insured person. This exclusion applies even if:
a) such insured person lacks the mental capacity to govern his or her conduct;
b) such bodily injury or property damage is of a different kind or degree than intended or reasonably expected; or
c) such bodily injury or property damage is sustained by a different person than intended or reasonably expected.
This exclusion applies regardless of whether or not such insured person is actually charged with, or convicted of a crime.
{¶ 13} The policies issued by Erie to Manns and Barnes contain identical terms and conditions and provide, as relevant here, as follows:
BODILY INJURY LIABILITY COVERAGE
PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY COVERAGE
* * *
We will pay all sums up to the amount shown on the Declarations which anyone we protect becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage caused by an occurrence during the policy period. We will pay for only bodily injury or property damage covered by this policy.
We may investigate or settle any claim or suit for damages against anyone we protect, at our expense. If anyone we protect is sued for damages because of bodily injury or property damage covered by this policy, we will provide a defense with a lawyer we choose, even if the allegations are not true. * * *
{¶ 14} The policies define "occurrence" as "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to the same general harmful conditions."
{¶ 15} The Erie policies also include the following coverage exclusions:
We do not cover under Bodily Injury Liability Coverage, Property Damage Liability Coverage, Personal Injury Liability Coverage and Medical Payments to Others Coverage:
1. Bodily injury, property damage, or personal injury expected or intended by anyone we protect even if:
a. the degree, kind or quality of the injury or damage is different that what was expected or intended; or
b. a different person, entity, real or personal property sustained the injury or damage than was expected or intended.
{¶ 16} The Grange policy issued to Manns provides the following terms and conditions:
COVERAGE E — PERSONAL LIABILITY COVERAGE
We will pay all sums, up to our limits of liability, arising out of any one loss for which an insured person becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage, caused by an occurrence covered by this policy. * * *
If a claim is made or suit is brought against the insured person for liability under this coverage, we will defend the insured person at our expense, using lawyers of our choice. * * *
{¶ 17} The policy defines "occurrence" as "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage during the policy period."
{¶ 18} The Grange policy also includes the following exclusions:
Under Personal Liability Coverage and Medical Payments to Others Coverage, we do not cover:
* * *
4. Bodily Injury or Property Damage caused by the willful, malicious, or intentional act of a minor for which an insured person is statutorily liable.
* * *
6. Bodily Injury or Property Damage expected or intended by any insured person.
{¶ 19} The American Southern policy issued to Campbell provides the following terms and conditions:
Coverage L — Liability — "We" pay, up to "our" "limit", all sums for which any "insured" is liable by law because of "bodily injury" or "property damage" caused by an "occurrence". This insurance only applies if the "bodily injury" or "property damage" occurs during the policy period. "We" will defend a suit seeking damages if the suit resulted from "bodily injury" or "property damage" not excluded under this coverage. * * *
{¶ 20} The policy defines "occurrence" as "an accident, including repeated exposures to similar conditions, that results in `bodily injury', or results in `property damage', if such `property damage' loss occurs within a 72 hour period."
{¶ 21} The American Southern policy also contains the following exclusions:
"We" do not pay for a loss if one or more of the following excluded events apply to the loss, regardless of other causes or events that contribute to or aggravate the loss, whether such causes or events act to produce the loss before, at the same time as, or after the excluded event.
* * * Liability and Medical Payment Coverage does not apply to "bodily injury" or "property damage" which results directly or indirectly from:
* * *
j. an intentional act of any "insured" or an act done at the direction of any "insured";
* * *
o. a criminal act or omission.
{¶ 22} Appellees filed separate motions for summary judgment. American Southern argued it was entitled to summary judgment for the following reasons: (1) Campbell did not qualify as an insured under the policy because he did not reside with his father at the time of the accident; (2) the incident giving rise to the Roby and Zachariah lawsuits was not an occurrence as defined by the policy; (3) Campbell's conduct was intentional and expected and, therefore, excluded from coverage under the policy; (4) Campbell's conduct constituted a criminal act for which coverage was excluded; and (5) the policy's intentional acts exclusion also excluded coverage for Dale Campbell's negligent supervision and control of his son. Erie similarly argued it was entitled to summary judgment for the following reasons: (1) Manns' and Barnes' conduct did not constitute an occurrence giving rise to coverage under the policies; (2) Manns' and Barnes' conduct was intentional, with injury or damage expected and substantially certain to occur, thus excluding coverage; and (3) Manns' juvenile court delinquency adjudication precluded Erie's obligation to defend or provide coverage under the policy. Allstate similarly argued it was entitled to summary judgment on the following grounds: (1) the incident giving rise to the Roby and Zachariah lawsuits did not constitute an occurrence as defined in the policies; (2) coverage was excluded because Campbell's and Howard's conduct was intentional, and the resulting bodily injury was reasonably expected; (3) Campbell's and Howard's juvenile court delinquency adjudications conclusively established intent for purposes of the intentional act exclusion; and (4) the policies' intentional acts exclusions also excluded coverage for Donna Deisler's and Clarence Howard's negligent supervision of their sons. Grange asserted it was entitled to summary judgment because (1) Manns' actions did not constitute an occurrence as defined in the policy, (2) Manns' conduct was intentional and, thus, barred by the intentional conduct policy language, and (3) Manns' delinquency adjudications precluded Grange's obligation to defend or provide coverage under the policy.
{¶ 23} American Southern, Grange, and Erie thus argued that, because their respective insureds were not entitled to coverage under the terms of their policies, they did not have a duty to defend or indemnify them against the claims asserted in appellants' tort actions. Allstate argued only that it had no duty to indemnify its insureds in the claims asserted in the Roby and Zachariah lawsuits.
{¶ 24} Roby filed a single memorandum contra opposing all four appellees' motions for summary judgment. Roby asserted that the intentional conduct exclusionary language in the policies did not apply. More specifically, Roby argued that the "inferred intent" rule did not apply to the boys' conduct because they neither intended nor expected harm to befall either Roby or Zachariah as a result of their placing the deer in the roadway. Roby further argued that the juvenile court adjudications could not be used to infer intent because those adjudications were inadmissible and bore no relation to the ultimate issue of coverage. He also argued that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the boys' intentions and expectations. In addition, Roby maintained that Campbell was an insured under the American Southern policy because, at the time of the accident, he resided at least part-time with his father pursuant to a court-ordered visitation schedule. Zachariah and Piper filed separate memorandum contra opposing each of the motions for summary judgment filed by the four appellees, asserting essentially the same arguments presented by Roby.
{¶ 25} By decision filed February 6, 2009, the trial court determined that the personal injuries sustained by Roby and Zachariah did not result from an accident and were otherwise excluded from coverage under the policies' intentional conduct exclusions. More particularly, although the trial court noted that the testimony in the record "consistently demonstrates that the [boys] neither intended nor expected any personal injury or property damage," the trial court nonetheless determined that the boys' intentional actions in placing the target deer over the crest of a hill at night on a roadway with a speed limit of 55 m.p.h. created a situation where harm was "substantially certain" to occur. Having so found, the court inferred intent as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court concluded that the intentional injury exclusion in the policies applied, and appellees had no duty to defend or indemnify the insureds in the pending personal injury actions. Having so concluded, the court did not consider issues regarding (1) the residency restrictions in the American Southern policy, and (2) the effect of the boys' delinquency adjudications. The trial court journalized its decision by entry filed March 4, 2009.
{¶ 26} Appellants have separately appealed; each advances one assignment of error. Appellants Zachariah and Piper assert:
The trial court committed reversible error when it granted summary judgment and ruled that intent to injure must be inferred as a matter of law to deny insurance coverage, when boys, engaged in a prank, placed an artificial deer on the roadway.
{¶ 27} Appellant Roby contends:
The trial court prejudicially erred in granting summary judgment to the Plaintiffs-Appellees by inferring, as a matter of law, that a group of high-school boys intended to cause injury when they placed a fake-deer decoy on a road as a prank in the context of determining insurance coverage in a declaratory-judgment action.
{¶ 28} Appellants' assignments of error are interrelated, and we will address them jointly. Appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for appellees. More specifically, appellants contend that their injuries resulted from an "accident," and, as such, the loss constituted an "occurrence" for purposes of all four policies. Appellants further contend that the intentional injury exclusion in the policies does not apply because the record evidence demonstrates that the boys neither intended nor expected any bodily injury to Roby or Zachariah. Although appellants separately argue the issues of coverage for "accidents" and the applicability of the express exclusions for intended or expected injuries, the issue is the same — whether the boys' conduct was an accident or whether it was intended or expected to cause injury. Appellants contend that the question of whether the insureds had the requisite intent to cause injury is a question of fact and that the trial court erred in inferring intent as a matter of law. Appellants assert that, because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the insureds intended to cause bodily injury, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for appellees.
{¶ 29} An appellate court reviews a summary judgment disposition independently and without deference to the trial court's determination. Brown v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 704, 711. In conducting this review, an appellate court applies the same standard employed by the trial court. Maust v. Bank One Columbus, N.A. (1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 103, 107. Accordingly, an appellate court "review[s] the same evidentiary materials that were properly before the trial court at the time it ruled on the summary judgment motion." Am. Energy Servs., Inc. v. Lekan (1992), 75 Ohio App.3d 205, 208. Proper evidentiary materials include only "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact." Civ. R. 56(C).
{¶ 30} Pursuant to Civ. R. 56(C), summary judgment is appropriate only where the evidence demonstrates the following: (1) no genuine issue of material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) reviewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the non-moving party, reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the non-moving party. State ex rel. Grady v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 78 Ohio St.3d 181, 183, 1997-Ohio-221. We must resolve any doubts in favor of the non-moving party. Viock v. Stowe-Woodward Co. (1983), 13 Ohio App.3d 7, 12.
{¶ 31} The party seeking summary judgment initially bears the burden of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the record demonstrating an absence of genuine issues of material fact as to the essential elements of the non-moving party's claims. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293, 1996-Ohio-107. The moving party may not fulfill its initial burden simply by making a conclusory assertion that the non-moving party has no evidence to prove its case. Id. Rather, the moving party must support its motion by pointing to some evidence of the type set forth in Civ. R. 56(C), which affirmatively demonstrates that the non-moving party has no evidence to support the non-moving party's claims. Id. If the moving party fails to satisfy its initial burden, the motion for summary judgment must be denied. Id. However, once the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the non-moving party bears the burden of offering specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. The non-moving party may not rest upon the mere allegations and denials in the pleadings, but, instead, must point to or submit some evidentiary material that demonstrates a genuine dispute over a material fact. Civ. R. 56(E); Henkle v. Henkle (1991), 75 Ohio App.3d 732, 735.
{¶ 32} It is well established that an insurance policy is a contract, to which we must give a reasonable construction that conforms with the intentions of the parties as gathered from the ordinary and commonly understood meaning of the language they used. Dealers Dairy Prods. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. (1960), 170 Ohio St. 336, paragraph one of the syllabus. As we noted, each of the policies at issue here grants coverage for an "occurrence" or "accident," but also excludes coverage for intentional acts.
{¶ 33} In Physicians Ins. Co. of Ohio v. Swanson (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 189, syllabus, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that, "[i]n order to avoid coverage on the basis of an exclusion for expected or intentional injuries, the insurer must demonstrate that the injury itself was expected or intended." In that case, Bill Swanson fired a BB gun toward a group of teenagers who were sitting about 70 to 100 feet away from him. He testified that he was aiming at a sign on a tree 10 to 15 feet from the group, not at them. Nevertheless, one of the BBs hit one of the teenagers, who lost an eye. The trial court found that the injury was accidental and that the insured was obligated to defend and indemnify Swanson, the insured. The Supreme Court affirmed that holding.
{¶ 34} In Gearing, the Supreme Court inferred intent for these purposes. In that case, Peter and Catherine Ozog and their three minor daughters sued Henry Gearing for recovery of damages arising from Gearing's sexual molestation of the three girls. Gearing sought a declaratory judgment that Nationwide, his homeowner's insurance carrier, was obligated to defend and indemnify him in the Ozogs' suit. Gearing admitted that he intentionally touched the girls inappropriately, but claimed that he did not know that his acts could cause emotional and mental harm to them.
{¶ 35} In affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Nationwide, the Supreme Court adopted the inferred intent rule, which provides that "intent to injure is inferred as a matter of law from the act of sexual abuse of a child itself, as harm is deemed inherent in the sexual molestation." Id. at 36-37. Rather than using the rule to consider whether exclusions to coverage applied, the court used the rule to determine whether coverage was available in the first instance, that is, whether intentional acts of child molestation could be considered "occurrences" for which insurance coverage could be obtained or, instead, could be seen as an intentional tort for which coverage would be contrary to public policy. Within these contexts, the court concluded that (1) Gearing's acts were not "accidental," and, therefore, not occurrences under the policies at issue, and (2) public policy precluded coverage.
{¶ 36} The court also explained that an insured's denial of an intention to harm anyone is "only relevant where the intentional act at issue is not substantially certain to result in injury." Id. at 39. In Swanson, for example, the insured's claim that he did not intend or expect anyone to be harmed "was not necessarily logically inconsistent with the facts surrounding the shooting." Gearing at 39. The court explained, however, that if the facts surrounding the shooting at issue in Swanson had been different — that is, if the shooting had been at close range — then Swanson would have been more analogous to Preferred Risk Ins. Co. v. Gill (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 108, in which the court concluded that a murderer's intentional acts fell within an intentional injury exclusion.
{¶ 37} In Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. New England Ins. Co., 87 Ohio St.3d 280, 1999-Ohio-67, the Supreme Court appeared to retreat from the application of inferred intent based on substantial certainty of injury. Citing Swanson, the court stated that "an intent to injure, not merely an intentional act, is a necessary element to uninsurability. Whether the insured had the necessary intent to cause injury is a question of fact." Id. at 283. Citing Gill and Gearing, the court referred to those circumstances in which it had inferred intent to injure as "very limited instances." Id. In both Gill and Gearing, the "insureds were found to have committed wrongful acts, acts that are intentionally injurious by definition." Id. at 284. In contrast, in Buckeye Union, the intentional act at issue was the failure to settle an insurance claim, an act far different from the murder and molestation at issue in Gill and Gearing. In her concurring opinion, Justice Cook recognized the court's holding in Buckeye Union as a departure from Gearing and the application of inferred intent based on a substantial certainty of injury. See id. at 288 (Cook, J., concurring).
{¶ 38} Arguably, the Supreme Court slowed its retreat from inferred intent in Penn Traffic Co. v. AIU Ins. Co., 99 Ohio St.3d 227, 2003-Ohio-3373, in which the court considered whether a particular type of commercial general liability policy covered an employer's liability for substantially certain intentional torts. In our view, Penn Traffic is of little value in the context of the case before us, however. The commercial policy at issue in Penn Traffic expressly excluded coverage for acts that are substantially certain to cause bodily injury and expressly defined "substantially certain" for these purposes. Therefore, we conclude that it offers us little guidance. Accord GNFH, Inc. v. West Am. Ins. Co., 172 Ohio App.3d 127, 2007-Ohio-2722, ¶ 54 (concluding that the court's statements on inferred intent were dicta "and had nothing to do with the issue being decided").
{¶ 39} In the end, our review of Supreme Court precedent in this arena leads to uncertainty about the Supreme Court's view of the strength of the inferred intent doctrine and whether it could apply to preclude coverage for intentional acts that are not as certain to cause injury as the acts underlying murder and sexual molestation. There is no uncertainty, however, about the strength of the inferred intent doctrine among Ohio's appellate courts, which have expanded inferred intent well beyond murder and molestation.
{¶ 40} In Horvath v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (1996), 108 Ohio App.3d 732, for example, this court reversed a trial court's denial of summary judgment where an insured pleaded guilty to negligent homicide. We held that an insured's intentional act of swinging a metal club with enough force to fracture the victim's skull and cause his brains to seep out showed, as a matter of law, that an injury was substantially certain to occur. We rejected the notion that coverage was required because the insured did not intend or expect to kill anyone. Rather, the insured's "intent to do physical harm" was enough to preclude coverage. Id. at 736.
{¶ 41} Many Ohio courts have similarly inferred intent where an insured has committed an act of violence. See, e.g., Baker v. White, 12th Dist. No. CA2002-08-065, 2003-Ohio-1614 (ramming a truck into another car); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Hayhurst (May 31, 2000), 4th Dist. No. 99 CA 25 (crashing a car into a building); W. Reserve Mut. Cas. Co. v. Macaluso (1993), 91 Ohio App.3d 93 (shooting an intruder at close range); Aguiar v. Tallman (Mar. 15 1999), 7th Dist. No. 97 C.A. 116 (punching someone in the face); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ray (Dec. 18, 1998), 7th Dist. No. 96 CA 20 (shooting a barrage of bullets into a car at close range); Erie Ins. Co. v. Stalder (1996), 114 Ohio App.3d 1 (engaging in a fistfight).
{¶ 42} We can easily distinguish the facts of this case from the facts at issue in Gill and Gearing, where the egregious acts of murder and molestation were intentionally injurious by definition. We can also distinguish this case from those cases involving violent acts committed directly against a person or property, acts that common sense tells us are generally intended, and substantially certain, to cause injury. It is more difficult, however, to distinguish the facts of this case from those at issue in cases where injury was less certain, but nevertheless certain enough to lead the court to infer intent as a matter of law. The trial court relied on two such cases.
{¶ 43} In Westfield Ins. Co. v. Blamer (Sept. 2, 1999), 10th Dist. No. 98AP-1576, a heavily-intoxicated Arthur Creighton poured lighter fluid on a sofa located on the front porch of the home of Freda and David Blamer and then ignited the sofa with a lighter. The ensuing fire spread to the home, causing significant property damage and injuring the Blamers. When the Blamers sued Creighton, he sought coverage under his parents' homeowner's policy. Finding no intent to injure the Blamers, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Creighton, the insured. On appeal, this court reversed. We found it "immaterial" that the insured did not intend for the fire to spread to the residence or to harm the inhabitants. Instead, we concluded that the insured "necessarily intended to cause some harm (and harm was substantially certain to result) when he doused the couch with lighter fluid and set it on fire." Thus, the Blamers' damages did not result from an "occurrence" under Creighton's policy.
{¶ 44} In Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Finkley (1996), 112 Ohio App.3d 712, Anwar Stembridge, a 16-year-old without a driver's license, drove a van owned by his grandmother, Gertrude Finkley, without her permission. Discovering the van missing, Finkley reported it stolen. When police attempted to pull the van over, Stembridge fled, drove through a stop sign, and crashed into the vehicle of Dorethea and Sheko Poteete, who sustained injuries. When the Poteetes sued Stembridge and Finkley, Finkley sought coverage under her automobile insurance policy. The policy excluded coverage for "`willful acts the result of which the insured knows or ought to know will follow from the insured's conduct.'" The trial court found that Stembridge's intentional acts precluded coverage and granted summary judgment to the insurer. On appeal, the Ninth District affirmed. The court held "that where an insured willfully and purposefully attempts to elude the police in an automobile chase through an urban area in reckless disregard of traffic control devices, his actions are substantially certain to result in injury." Id. at 715.
{¶ 45} While we agree that Blamer and Finkley are closer to the facts of this case than those cases that involve violent acts committed directly against a person or property, we have found no Ohio case that involves facts closely akin to the facts before us, i.e., where a group of teenage boys intend to commit a prank. We look, then, to cases outside Ohio.
{¶ 46} In Buckel v. Allstate Indemn. Co., 314 Wis.2d 507, 2008 WI App 160, four teenage boys created a wall of plastic across a public road. They did so by wrapping clear plastic wrap around sign posts on both sides of the road, crossing back and forth until the barrier was about six feet high. It was late at night, after midnight. One of the boys testified that the plastic wrap blocked the road completely and that it would have been impossible for a vehicle to travel down the road without hitting the plastic. The first vehicle to approach the barrier was a motorcycle driven by Daniel Buckel. Buckel drove directly into the barrier, and he and his passenger were seriously injured. They sued the boys and their parents, who sought coverage under their homeowners' policies. A trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurers, and the parents appealed.
{¶ 47} In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, District Two, affirmed. Recognizing that the issue of intent is generally a question of fact under Wisconsin law, the court acknowledged that "in some circumstances the state of mind of a person must be inferred from the acts of that person in view of the surrounding circumstances." 2008 WI App at ¶ 15. That question of intent, the court said, had to be addressed on a case-by-case basis and "the `more likely harm is to result from certain intentional conduct, the more likely intent to harm may be inferred as a matter of law.'" Id., quoting Loveridge v. Chartier (1991), 161 Wis.2d 150, 169-80. Considering the facts of the case before it, the court concluded that the boys' "intentional creation of a transparent six-foot-high barrier across the road, located such that avoidance was impossible, and put in place at night, produced such a high likelihood of injury that intent to injure may indeed be inferred as a matter of law." Id. at ¶ 17.
{¶ 48} In Tower Ins. Co. v. Judge (U.S.Dist.Minn. 1993), 840 F.Supp. 679, a federal court similarly considered whether the facts surrounding an intended prank could lead, as a matter of law, to inferred intent. Five young men, each 19 years old, spent a weekend together and drank heavily. About midnight on Saturday night, having passed out on the front lawn, Christopher Meyer made his way into a bedroom of the trailer home where the group was staying. Finding Meyer in the bedroom asleep, the other men attempted, but could not awaken, Meyer. Also finding an exposed light switch in the bedroom, they devised a plan to "shock" Meyer awake. They attached speaker wires to his ankle and wrist and the opposite ends of the wires to the light switch terminal. They then turned the light switch on and off repeatedly. After getting little reaction from Meyer, they turned the light switch off and left the room. Over a period of about 20 minutes, three of the men returned periodically to turn the switch on and off. After 20 minutes, one of the men checked on Meyer, who had stopped breathing. Although the group administered CPR and rushed him to a hospital, Meyer died. It was later discovered that electricity had been constantly flowing into Meyer when the light switch was in the off position, and he had died from electrocution.
{¶ 49} The court applied Minnesota law, which allows intent to be established by (1) proving an insured's actual intent to cause injury or (2) inferring intent "as a matter of law if the insured's acts are of a calculated and remorseless character." Id. at 684. For these purposes, acts "are `calculated and remorseless' only if they are such that harm is substantially certain to occur." Id. at 691. Considering the facts of the case, the court found no actual intent to cause injury to Meyer. The court also stated that, "[e]ven with the benefit of hindsight," it could not "say that there was a high degree of certainty that defendants' actions would cause permanent injury to Meyer." Id. The men had discussed the potential dangers of shocking Meyer, and they had even tested the wires on themselves. Although the defendants' assessment of the potential danger proved wrong, their misjudgment was not enough to bring them within the intentional act exclusions.
{¶ 50} In the case before us, there is no dispute that the boys' conduct was intentional; that is, they did not accidentally place the target deer in the eastbound lane of CR 144. The disputed issue here is whether they also intended harm or injury to follow from their intentional act. Appellants argue that the boys' intention is a question of fact for the jury. Accordingly, we must determine whether the boys' conduct supports an objective inference of the intent to injure.
{¶ 51} According to the testimony of the seven boys involved in the incident, the idea for placing the target deer in the roadway grew out of a classroom discussion about persons' reactions to various situations. As a result of this discussion, the boys stole a Styrofoam target deer, which weighed 10 to 15 pounds, altered it slightly so it could stand upright, placed it in the middle of the eastbound lane of a two-lane roadway, and observed the reactions of motorists suddenly confronted with an obstruction directly in front of them. The boys generally testified that they expected the motorists to observe the target deer in the roadway and maneuver around it. Manns, however, testified that the boys' purpose in placing the deer in the roadway was to "make cars slow down or maybe hit it." (Depo. 34.) Consistent with the boys' general expectations, the group observed at least two vehicles approach the deer, navigate around it, and drive on.
{¶ 52} The boys apparently never discussed or even contemplated the possibility that positioning a target deer 15 to 30 yards beyond the crest of a hill in the middle of an unlit two-lane roadway with a speed limit of 55 m.p.h. at night might cause an accident. Although Manns testified that the purpose of placing the deer in the road was to make cars either slow down or hit it, Campbell testified that the group never thought about "an accident," and "didn't think that much deep into it * * * that someone would actually hit [the target deer]." (Depo. 71, 110.) Lowe testified that no one in the group expressed any concern that the placement of the deer could pose a hazard to motorists. (Depo. 36.) Similarly, Manns, Ramge, and Barnes testified that they did not worry about the target deer posing a potential hazard. The boys' testimony in this regard reasonably suggests that not until they observed Roby's car traveling toward the deer at a high rate of speed were they even aware of the possibility that their actions might result in an accident.
{¶ 53} Viewing the facts of this case in a light most favorable to appellants, we conclude that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the boys necessarily intended to cause harm when they placed the target deer in the roadway, whether harm was substantially certain to result from their actions, and whether their actions fall within the scope of the individual insurance policies. As noted, the majority of the boys testified that they desired only to observe motorists' reactions to the target deer; more specifically, they expected motorists confronted with the deer in the roadway to stop, maneuver around it, and travel on. Although Roby's accident occurred less than ten minutes after the boys placed the deer in the roadway, the boys' expectations that motorists would successfully avoid the obstruction proved to be reasonable, as at least two motorists reacted in just that way.
{¶ 54} In Buckel, the insureds created a transparent barrier across the entire roadway, making early detection and avoidance impossible. Here, however, the boys' placement of the target deer did not obstruct the entire roadway, leaving room for motorists to avoid the deer by maneuvering around it. In addition, its placement at 15 to 30 yards beyond the crest of the hill apparently provided some stopping distance; no party provided Civ. R. 56-compliant evidence showing that placement at this distance made contact substantially certain.
{¶ 55} Further, even if the boys expected a motorist to hit the deer, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that harm was substantially certain to result, as it was made of Styrofoam and weighed only 10 to 15 pounds. The target deer is different from other instruments, like a gun, a car or a metal club, that are known to cause harm under certain circumstances. Several of the boys testified that they did not worry about or even contemplate an injury resulting from their actions. As in Tower, although their assessment of the potential danger ultimately proved to be incorrect, their misjudgment was not enough to bring them within the intentional acts exclusions in the policies as a matter of law.
{¶ 56} In addition, genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether the accident resulted not only from the boys' conduct in placing the deer in the roadway, but also from Roby's conduct. The boys testified that, as they traveled westbound on CR 144, they passed Roby heading eastbound toward the deer at an excessive rate of speed. Indeed, Barnes described Roby's car as traveling "really fast toward the deer." (Depo. Exhibit 126, at 25.) Ramge testified that Roby was traveling at a "high rate of speed" and came "flying by" their vehicle. (Depo. Exhibit 125, at 20-21.) Lowe stated that Roby was driving at a "high rate of speed," which he estimated to be 80 m.p.h. (Depo. 37, 115.) Campbell described Roby's speed as "real fast" and estimated it to be 80 m.p.h. (Depo. 72-73, 121-23, 208-09.) Manns testified that Roby's car was going so fast it "shook" Lowe's vehicle when it passed and suggested that Roby was driving 80 m.p.h. (Depo. 33, 105.) Howard testified that Roby was driving "really fast." (Depo. 38.) The boys turned around to follow Roby's vehicle because they were concerned that Roby's excessive speed would impede his ability to see and/or avoid the deer. (Barnes Depo. Exhibit 126, at 25; Ramge Depo. 34 and Exhibit 125, at 21-22; Lowe Depo. 37, 131-32 and Exhibit 121, at 33-36; Manns Depo. 33-34; Howard Depo. 133.) Reasonable persons could conclude from this body of evidence that Roby's speed may have been a factor contributing to the accident and, accordingly, the injuries he and Zachariah suffered were not substantially certain to occur from the boys' actions alone.
{¶ 57} Because questions of fact remain as to the certainty of harm from the boys' actions, we reverse the trial court's conclusion that intent may be inferred as a matter of law under these circumstances. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting appellees' motions for summary judgment. We decline to address issues that the trial court did not address in the first instance, including, but not limited to, the residency restrictions in the American Southern policy, the effect of the boys' delinquency adjudications, if any, regarding the criminal acts exclusions in some of the policies, and Roby's negligent supervision claims.
{¶ 58} For the foregoing reasons, we sustain appellants' assignments of error, reverse the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, and remand this matter to that court for further proceedings in accordance with law and consistent with this decision.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
BROWN, J., concurs.
SADLER, J., dissents.
{¶ 59} For the following reasons, I respectfully dissent.
{¶ 60} Because "`a completely subjective test would virtually make it impossible to preclude coverage for intentional [injuries] absent admissions by insureds of specific intent to harm or injure,'" in determining whether an intentional act is substantially certain to cause injury, "determination of an insured's subjective intent, or lack of subjective intent, is not conclusive of the issue of coverage." Gearing v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 76 Ohio St.3d 34, 39, 1996-Ohio-113. For this reason, I would not consider the boys' testimony about their expectations, plans and intentions, as recounted in paragraphs 51 through 53 of the majority opinion.
Gearing v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 76 Ohio St.3d 34, 37, 1996-Ohio-113, quoting Wiley v. State Farm Fire Cas. Co. (C.A.3, 1993), 995 F.2d 457, 464.
{¶ 61} This is also why I disagree with the majority's comparison of this case to the case of Tower Ins. v. Judge (U.S.Dist.Minn. 1993), 840 F.Supp. 679. Ante, ¶ 55. In Tower, the court refused to infer intent because the insureds had made a factual error about whether the switch's "off" position would stop the flow of electricity into the victim; theirs was not a miscalculation about the level of danger they were inflicting upon their victim through actions about which they were in possession of all of the correct facts, as in this case. Because miscalculations about what might happen involve the subjective expectations and intentions of the insureds, they have no place in our analysis.
{¶ 62} For a similar reason, I also consider irrelevant evidence regarding Roby's speed and the boys' testimony that two vehicles other than Roby's successfully avoided an accident while passing the decoy deer. The inferred intent inquiry does not address the actions of any specific victim or potential victim; it only addresses what, objectively, can be inferred from the intentional actions of the insured.
{¶ 63} In this case, the appropriate inquiry is "whether the boys' conduct supports an objective inference of the intent to injure." (Emphasis added.) Ante, ¶ 50. Under this objective standard, the question is whether the act of placing a decoy deer with wooden blocks attached to it, in the middle of a lane of travel, on a curvy, two-lane road, where the speed limit is 55 miles per hour, at night, just beyond the crest of a hill, positioned so that motorists would not see it until they were 15 to 30 yards from the decoy, is substantially certain to cause injury.
{¶ 64} In my view, it is difficult to imagine how the boys could have done more to inject chaos into the flow of traffic on that road. Whether motorists selected one or the other of the available options — try to avoid the decoy or hit the decoy — the risk of injury was substantially certain, given the deliberate choice to place the deer on that particular road under all the attendant circumstances. After all, "even when skillfully and carefully operated, [] use [of a motor vehicle] is attended by serious dangers to persons and property." Hess v. Pawloski (1927), 274 U.S. 352, 356.
{¶ 65} I am mindful that Ohio's appellate courts have applied the doctrine of inferred intent in narrow circumstances, usually in situations where the likelihood of harm was so great that it could be said that injury was certain — not just substantially certain-to result. However, the doctrine has also been applied in a case in which the insured injected a level of chaos and danger into the flow of traffic, which is already naturally attended by dangers to persons and property, similar to that in the present case. In Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Finkley (1996), 112 Ohio App.3d 712, the Ninth Appellate District held "that where an insured willfully and purposefully attempts to elude the police in an automobile chase through an urban area in reckless disregard of traffic control devices, his actions are substantially certain to result in injury." Id. at 715. In Finkley, the fact that the driver might have avoided causing injury, whether through his own driving skill or that of others, did not alter the court's conclusion that injury was substantially certain to occur.
See, e.g., Gearing, supra (sexual molestation); Preferred Risk Ins. Co. v. Gill (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 108 (murder/wrongful death); Horvath v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (1996), 108 Ohio App.3d 732 (swinging a metal club hard enough to fracture the victim's skull and cause brain matter to seep out); Baker v. White, 12th Dist. No. CA2002-08-065, 2003-Ohio-1614 (ramming truck into another vehicle); Aguiar v. Tallman (Mar. 15, 1999), 7th Dist. No. 97 C.A. 116 (punching someone in the face); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ray (Dec. 18, 1998), 7th Dist. No. 96 CA 20 (shooting a barrage of bullets into a car at close range); Westfield Ins. Co. v. Blamer (Sept. 2. 1999), 10th Dist. No. 98AP-1576 (setting a sofa on fire that was located on the porch of a home); Ash v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 5th Dist. No. 2005CA0014, 2006-Ohio-5221 (setting a sofa on fire that was located inside a home).
{¶ 66} I conclude likewise in this case and would affirm the trial court's judgment. Though Ohio courts have applied the doctrine of inferred intent largely in cases in which it was arguably unnecessary to do so because injury was certain to result from the insured's intentional acts (e.g., murder, felonious assault or sexual molestation), I believe it is appropriate to infer injurious intent in this case because under the narrow circumstances presented herein, the insureds' actions were substantially certain to cause injury. Because the majority concludes otherwise, I respectfully dissent.