Opinion
CV166033614S
05-01-2018
ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO. v. FARMINGTON AUTO PARK, LLC
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
PETER EMMETT WIESE, JUDGE
I
Procedural History
This claim arises from a motor vehicle towing that occurred in Plainville, Connecticut. The plaintiff alleges the following facts. On or about July 31, 2015, Sharon Dunn, who was insured by the plaintiff, was involved in a motor vehicle collision. The police determined that Ms. Dunn’s vehicle was not safe to drive and contacted the defendant, who had Ms. Dunn’s vehicle towed. Pursuant to Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) regulations, the towing was " nonconsensual" because it was the police, and not Ms. Dunn, who selected, contracted, and made arrangements with the defendant.
The plaintiff further alleges the following. By August 14, 2015, the plaintiff had concluded that Ms. Dunn’s vehicle was a total loss and they paid Ms. Dunn the actual cash value of the car, $2,577.23. Ms. Dunn then transferred title of the vehicle to Allstate, who has been the titled owner of the vehicle since that time. The plaintiff has paid all storage, towing, and other costs required to the defendant.
On September 9, 2015, the self-represented defendant filed suit against Ms. Dunn in the District Court of Maine, claiming damages for towing, recovery, storage, and labor in the amount of $6,000. A trial took place in South Paris, Maine on January 19, 2016, with a judgment of $1,012.19 and $61.74 in costs granted in favor of the defendant.
The defendant was self-represented in the District Court of Maine and stated at trial that his full damages were in the amount of approximately $7,991, but that he was limited by the maximum amount of damages allowed in small claims court in the District Court of Maine. See Transcript of Trial, Maine District Court of South Paris, small claims court, pp. 46-47 (Transcript).
On June 6, 2016, the plaintiff, Allstate Insurance Company, filed a one-count complaint against the defendant, Farmington Auto Park, for the release of the vehicle or the fair salvage value of the vehicle. On November 2, 2016, the defendant filed a two-count counterclaim for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, requesting damages of $7,991.68 for the services that the defendant provided, including towing, recovery, storing, and labor.
On September 1, 2017, the counterclaim defendant filed a motion for summary judgment of the plaintiff’s counterclaim on the ground that it is barred by res judicata and/or collateral estoppel. The counterclaim defendant argues in its motion for summary judgment that the claims are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and/or issue preclusion. Specifically, the counterclaim defendant asserts that the claims for damages, including for towing, recovery, labor, and storage of the vehicle, have already been decided in the District Court of South Paris, Maine. That judgment has been paid for by the counterclaim defendant.
Along with its memorandum of law in support of the motion, the counterclaim defendant attaches a copy of the complaint filed in the District Court of Maine, a certified copy of the full transcript of the trial in the District Court of Maine, a certified copy of the judgment issued by the District Court of Maine, a certified copy of the satisfaction of judgment with the District Court of Maine, an affidavit of M. Margaret Coombs, which contains the checks sent to the counterclaim plaintiff, and an affidavit as to the authenticity of the exhibits.
Henceforth, the action in the District Court of South Paris, Maine will be referred to as the Maine litigation.
The counterclaim plaintiff counters in its objection that the doctrine of res judicata is only a bar on a subsequent action between the same parties. Specifically, the counterclaim plaintiff asserts that the counterclaim defendant abandoned the vehicle and unjustly failed to pay the counterclaim plaintiff for benefits it received.
II
Discussion
A. Applicable Law- Motion for Summary Judgment
" Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bozelko v. Papastavros, 323 Conn. 275, 282, 147 A.3d 1023 (2016).
" [A]ny party may move for summary judgment upon any counterclaim or cross complaint as if it were an independent action ..." Practice Book § 17-44. " Because a counterclaim is a separate and distinct action ... a party seeking summary judgment on both a complaint and a counterclaim must file an appropriate motion addressed to each." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Bourgoin, 28 Conn.App. 491, 500, 613 A.2d 292, cert. denied, 223 Conn. 927, 614 A.2d 825 (1992).
" [S]ummary judgment is an appropriate vehicle for raising a claim of res judicata ..." (Citations omitted.) Joe’s Pizza, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 236 Conn. 863, 867 n.8, 675 A.2d 441 (1996). " Because res judicata or collateral estoppel, if raised, may be dispositive of a claim, summary judgment [is] the appropriate method for resolving a claim of res judicata." Jackson v. R.G. Whipple, Inc., 225 Conn. 705, 712, 627 A.2d 374 (1993).
B. Applicable Law- Res Judicata
" Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment, when rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent action, between the same parties or those in privity with them, upon the same claim ... In contrast, collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating issues and facts actually and necessarily determined in an earlier proceeding between the same parties or those in privity with them upon a different claim." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Weiss v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 227 Conn. 802, 818, 633 A.2d 282 (1993).
" [U]nder the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, a former judgment on a claim, if rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent action on the same claim [or any claim based on the same operative facts that] might have been made ." (Emphasis in original; Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut National Bank v. Rytman, 241 Conn. 24, 43-44, 694 A.2d 1246 (1997). " Generally, for res judicata to apply, four elements must be met: (1) the judgment must have been rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the parties to the prior and subsequent actions must be the same or in privity; (3) there must have been an adequate opportunity to litigate the matter fully; and (4) the same underlying claim must be at issue ... Res judicata bars the relitigation of claims actually made in the prior action as well as any claims that might have been made there ... Thus, res judicata prevents reassertion of the same claim regardless of what additional or different evidence or legal theories might be advanced in support of it." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wheeler v. Beachcroft, LLC, 320 Conn. 146, 156-58, 129 A.3d 677 (2016). See Powell v. Infinity Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 594, 600, 922 A.2d 1073 (2007).
When res judicata is asserted against a nonparty to a prior action, privity must be established to ensure that the nonparty’s rights were sufficiently protected in the action. " In determining whether privity exists, [Connecticut courts] employ an analysis that focuses on the functional relationships of the parties. Privity is not established by the mere fact that persons may be interested in the same question or in proving or disproving the same set of facts. Rather, it is, in essence, a shorthand statement for the principle that [res judicata] should be applied only when there exists such an identification in interest of one person with another as to represent the same legal rights so as to justify preclusion." Mazziotti v. Allstate Ins. Co., 240 Conn. 799, 814, 695 A.2d 1010 (1997).
" [T]he crowning consideration ... [is] that the interest of the party to be precluded must have been sufficiently represented in the prior action so that the application of [res judicata] is not inequitable." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 818. Thus, " [a] key consideration ... is the sharing of the same legal right ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wheeler v. Beachcroft, supra, 320 Conn. 167; Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Jones, 220 Conn. 285, 304, 596 A.2d 414 (1991). " There is no prevailing definition of privity to be followed automatically in every case. It is not a matter of form or rigid labels; rather it is a matter of substance." Mazziotti v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra, 240 Conn. 813-14. At the very least, however, privity " signifies a relationship between one who is a party of record and another who is a nonparty, but is sufficiently close to mandate the application of res judicata ..." Id., 813 n.12.
Collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating issues and facts actually and necessarily determined in an earlier proceeding between the same parties or those in privity with them upon a different claim. DeLaurentis v. New Haven, 220 Conn. 225, 239, 597 A.2d 807 (1991); Weiss v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, 227 Conn. 818. To invoke collateral estoppel the issues sought to be litigated in the new proceeding must be identical to those considered in the prior proceeding. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Jones, supra, 220 Conn. 297.
C. Analysis
In order to determine whether the claims in the counterclaim are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, the court must look to four factors: (1) the judgment must have been rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the parties to the prior and subsequent actions must be the same or in privity; (3) there must have been an adequate opportunity to litigate the matter fully; and (4) the same underlying claim must be at issue. Wheeler v. Beachcroft, LLC, supra, 320 Conn. 156-58.
First, as Ms. Dunn was a resident of Maine, the judgment from the Maine litigation was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. There is no question that the first prong of the test is satisfied.
Second, while the parties in the Maine litigation were not the same as in the present action, the court must determine whether Ms. Dunn and the counterclaim defendant are in privity. As the insurer of Ms. Dunn, the counterclaim defendant indemnified Ms. Dunn in order to pay the Maine litigation judgment under its insurance policy with Ms. Dunn. The counterclaim defendant has the same legal rights are those of Ms. Dunn; at the time of the Maine litigation, it was, and continues to be, the legal owner to the title of the vehicle and has indemnified Ms. Dunn in the payment of the Maine litigation damages. Accordingly, the court finds that there is an identification in interest between the counterclaim defendant and Ms. Dunn.
The counterclaim defendant paid the Maine litigation judgment of $1,012.19 with a check issued on September 1, 2015 directly to the counterclaim plaintiff. The counterclaim plaintiff received, but did not cash, that check. The Maine litigation was for the exact same amount as the issued check, $1,012.19. Additionally, the counterclaim defendant sent a check, dated January 25, 2016, for the amount of $61.74 in costs, to the counterclaim plaintiff. See Exhibit C, Maine litigation Notice of Judgment, and Exhibit D, Satisfaction of Judgment.
Third, the counterclaim plaintiff was afforded the opportunity to litigate the damages at issue in the Maine litigation. The counterclaim plaintiff was afforded the opportunity to present testimony, call witnesses, and provide evidence to the Maine District Court in a trial. " In other words, the plaintiff was not deprived of the opportunity to litigate [its] claim." Weiss v. Weiss, 297 Conn. 446, 466, 998 A.2d 766 (2010). Thus, the third prong of the test is also satisfied.
Finally, in the Maine litigation, the counterclaim plaintiff alleged that it had suffered damages of $7,991.68 for towing, storage fees, and disassembly. Transcript p. 46. These are the same claims for damages that are in the present counterclaim.
The court finds that the same underlying claim is at issue in both the Maine litigation and the present action, thus satisfying the fourth prong as well as barring the claim for damages under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
Even though the counterclaim plaintiff alleges that there are additional allegations of breach of contract and abandonment of vehicle in the present action, those claims are barred under res judicata because it was the counterclaim plaintiff’s decision to bring up any and all arguments that it decided to in the Maine litigation. In fact, the arguments of abandonment were brought up in the Maine litigation. See Transcript p. 45, 48, 68-70 (timeline of filing for abandonment of vehicle), 72-73 (no notice by certified letter or telephone call of abandonment of vehicle given to Ms. Dunn), 112-13 (no testimony of notice by certified letter or telephone call of abandonment of vehicle given to Allstate). While there is no written memorandum of decision for the judgment in the Maine litigation, the arguments that the counterclaim plaintiff makes of abandonment in the present action could have been, and indeed were, asserted in the prior litigation, and thus, are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See Powell v. Infinity Ins. Co., supra, 282 Conn. 598-99 (" action II was barred by the doctrine of res judicata because the plaintiffs could have asserted the causes of action in the present case in action I" ).
The counterclaim plaintiff argues that, if this action were barred by res judicata, the counterclaim defendant would also be barred from the underlying action. Because a complaint and counterclaim are separate and distinct actions, see Miller v. Bourgoin, supra, 28 Conn.App. 500 (requiring that motions for summary judgment on claims and counterclaims be brought separately), the court will only address the claims brought in the motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim.
Accordingly, the court determines that the counterclaim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
III
Conclusion
For the stated reasons, the counterclaim defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim plaintiff’s counterclaim for breach of contract and unjust enrichment is granted.
SO ORDERED.