Opinion
C. A. 8:22-cv-01045-TMC-JDA
04-04-2022
Aaron Allen, Plaintiff, v. David Stumbo, Solicitor, Penny B. Carson, Assistant Solicitor, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JACQUELYN D. AUSTIN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Aaron Allen (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Although Plaintiff's claims are related to criminal charges made against him in the state court, he does not appear to be incarcerated at this time. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint filed in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned finds that this action is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons below.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his Complaint. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [Id. at 3.] Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of Defendants' conduct, he lost his home and property and was subjected to “malicious intentional discriminatory prosecution” in violation of the Constitution. [Id. at 5.] For his relief, Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $8,100 for the loss of his home, property, jewelry, furnishings, moped, riding mower, shed, and other personal items and for damages in the amount of $500,000 for the charges filed against him. [Id.]
Plaintiff has attached to his Complaint numerous documents from his state court criminal action. [Doc. 1-1.] In his documents, Plaintiff includes a statement of his claims in which he makes the following additional allegations. [ Id. at 1-3.]
Plaintiff contends that he and his ex-wife were separated when she came home one morning with a cut on her head. [Id. at 1.] Plaintiff took her to the hospital. [Id.] On October 15, 2016, Plaintiff's ex-wife provided a voluntary statement to police officers describing an alleged assault that caused her injuries. [Id. at 2.] On October 15, 2016, Plaintiff went to the hospital where he was arrested and taken to the Greenwood County Detention Center. [Id.] He was given a copy of his arrest warrant on October 16, 2016, and learned that he had been charged with domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature. [Id.] Plaintiff maintained his innocence. [Id.]
After his arrest and while he was confined in jail, his home was robbed and vandalized. [Id.] In February 2017, Plaintiff was given a restrictive bond and ankle monitor for about a year. [Id.] Plaintiff contends he was not indicted within the time permitted under state law and he asked his attorney to request that the charge against him be dismissed or dropped. [Id.] Plaintiff appears to allege that there was some kind of relationship between his original attorney and Defendant Carson, but he does not provide any allegations about that relationship. [Id.] Plaintiff contends that his attorney was dismissed from his case and that Defendant Carson then “secretly initiated indictment proceeding[s]” against him. [Id. at 3.]
Plaintiff contends he was forced to represent himself at trial. [Id. at 1.] According to Plaintiff, the trial started on September 20, 2021, even though he was arrested on October 15, 2016. [Id.] The trial concluded on September 23, 2021, and the jurors unanimously voted not guilty. [Id.] During deliberations, the jury asked the judge why it took five years to prosecute the case against Plaintiff. [Id.]
Plaintiff's dates are confusing and it appears that he inadvertently lists the wrong years for some of the events listed in his statement of claims. For example, in the first paragraph, Plaintiff alleges he was arrested on October 15, 2021, while in the sixth paragraph, he alleges that he was arrested on October 15, 2016. [Doc. 1-1 at 1-2.]
The Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff was charged with domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature in the Greenwood County Court of General Sessions at case number 2016A2410201144. See Greenwood County Eighth Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Greenwood/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case number 2016A2410201144) (last visited Apr. 4, 2022). That action was disposed on September 27, 2021, after a jury returned a verdict of not guilty. Id.; see also Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute.
This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411,417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se pleadings and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in the Complaint, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Here, the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal as Defendants are entitled to immunity from suit.
The crux of this action appears to be a challenge to Defendants' conduct related to their prosecution of criminal charges against Plaintiff in the state court. For his relief, Plaintiff seeks money damages. Plaintiff sues Solicitor David Stumbo and Assistant Solicitor Penny B. Carson, both with the Eighth Judicial Circuit Solicitor's Office. Attorneys with the Solicitor's Office are entitled to prosecutorial immunity. In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held that prosecutors, when acting within the scope of their duties, have absolute immunity from liability under § 1983 for alleged civil rights violations committed in the course of proceedings that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Id. at 430. For example, when a prosecutor “prepares to initiate a judicial proceeding,” “appears in court to present evidence in support of a search warrant application,” or conducts a criminal trial, bond hearings, grand jury proceedings, and pretrial “motions” hearings, absolute immunity applies. Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341-45 (2009). Here, the alleged wrongful conduct of Defendants is intricately related to the judicial process and to the prosecution of the State's case against Plaintiff. Therefore, these Defendants have absolute immunity from suit. See Dowdle v. Skinner, No. 6:12-cv-3253-DCN, 2013 WL 5771199, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 24, 2013); Rhodes v. Seventh Cir. Solics. Off., No. 9:09-cv-1863-JFA-BM, 2009 WL 2588487, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 19, 2009) (“Even if the . . . Solicitor's Office could be construed as [a] ‘person[ ]' under § 1983, . . . [the] Solicitor's Office would be entitled to prosecutorial immunity, as would any individual Solicitor or Assistant Solicitor within that office.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims are subject to dismissal because Defendants are entitled to immunity.
In South Carolina, regional prosecutors are called Solicitors and Assistant Solicitors. See S.C. CONST Art. V, § 24; S.C. Code § 1-7-310. As noted, such prosecutors are protected by immunity for activities in or connected with judicial proceedings.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court DISMISS this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 without leave to amend and without issuance and service of process.
The undersigned finds that Plaintiff cannot cure the defects in his Complaint by mere amendment and therefore recommends that the instant action be dismissed without affording Plaintiff an opportunity to amend because amendment would be futile. See Thomas v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., No. 6:18-cv-169-AMQ, 2018 WL 5258811, at *2 (D.S.C. July 25, 2018) (declining to automatically give plaintiff leave to amend because plaintiff could not cure the defects in his claims against defendant by mere amendment), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 5255183 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2018); Workman v. Kernell, No. 6:18-cv-00355-RBH-KFM, 2018 WL 4826535, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 2, 2018) (declining to give plaintiff leave to amend because it would be futile for plaintiff to amend his complaint against the defendants being dismissed), aff'd, 766 Fed.Appx. 1 (4th Cir. 2019).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.