Opinion
C. A. 6:20-cv-03385-DCC-KFM
12-30-2020
Anthony Allen, Plaintiff, v. James R. Pregel, Jr.; Matthew Broad; Bradley Grice; Quincy Whitner; William Watkins; Jonathan Davenport; Christopher Pletcher; Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald, United States Magistrate Judge
The plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his Constitutional rights (doc. 1). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
The plaintiff's case was entered on the docket on September 24, 2020 (doc. 1). By orders dated October 22, 2020, and November 20, 2020, the undersigned informed the plaintiff that his case was not in proper form (docs. 6; 12). On December 3, 2020, the plaintiff submitted additional documents, and the case is now in proper form for judicial screening. Having reviewed the plaintiff's complaint, the undersigned recommends it be dismissed.
ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff seeks damages from the defendant as a result of constitutional violations he alleges occurred when he was arrested by the defendants on August 15, 2018 (doc. 1). Of note, although the plaintiff was a pretrial detainee with respect to the allegations alleged herein, the plaintiff is now a prisoner in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”). See South Carolina Department of Corrections Incarcerated Inmate Search, https://public.doc.state.sc.us/scdc-public/ (enter the plaintiff's first and last name) (last visited December 30, 2020). Additionally, the court takes judicial notice of the plaintiff's applicable criminal proceedings in the General Sessions Court of Greenville County. See Greenville County Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Greenville/ PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (enter the plaintiff's name and 2018A2330207550, 2019GS2309854A) (last visited December 30, 2020).
Phillips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record.”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘[t]he most frequent use of judicial notice . . . is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
The plaintiff contends that his Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights were violated by the defendants (doc. 1 at 4). He alleges that on August 15, 2018, the defendants approached the plaintiff on private property to locate and make drug purchases, which he contends is entrapment (id. at 8). The plaintiff further alleges that by choosing the area where the plaintiff was located, the defendants were discriminating against the plaintiff (id.). The plaintiff contends that Sgt. Broad and Sgt. Whitner were not acting pursuant to a warrant when they “coerced, by act of entrapment” the purchase of narcotics from the plaintiff (id. at 8-9). The plaintiff alleges that no hand-to-hand transaction of an illegal substance took place and that the defendants had to return at a later time with a K-9 to “maliciously search people” (id. at 9). The plaintiff contends that the defendants used the excuse of smelling marijuana to justify a search warrant for a room where they found narcotics, but they never saw the plaintiff in that room (id. at 9-10).
For injuries, the plaintiff asserts posttraumatic stress disorder because the defendants openly violated his rights and then covered it up (id. at 11). For relief, the plaintiff seeks money damages (id.).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, ” is “frivolous or malicious, ” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, the plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if the plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening the plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
This complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to § 1983, seeking damages from the defendants. For the reasons that follow, the instant matter is subject to summary dismissal.
The plaintiff's complaint is barred by Heck v. Humphrey
With respect to the plaintiff's accusations that his rights were violated when he was arrested and prosecuted by the defendants for the manufacture and distribution of cocaine base, 2nd offense, as well as for violating drug distribution laws, his claims are currently barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that in order to recover damages for imprisonment in violation of the Constitution, the imprisonment must first be successfully challenged. The Court stated:
We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, . . . a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted); see also Edwards v. Balisock, 520 U.S. 641 (1997) (the preclusive rule of Heck extended to § 1983 claims challenging procedural deficiencies which necessarily imply the invalidity of the judgment). This is known as the “favorable termination” requirement. See Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262, 263 (4th Cir. 2008). As noted, judicially-noticed, publicly-available online records for the Greenville County General Sessions Court indicate that the plaintiff pled guilty to the manufacture, distribution, etc., of cocaine base, 2nd offense (case number 2019A2309854A) in exchange for the dismissal of a charge for violation of drug distribution law (case number 2018A2330207550). See Greenville County Public Index, enter the plaintiff's name and 2018A2330207550, 2019A2309854A) (last visited December 30, 2020). The plaintiff's convictions do not indicate a favorable termination. Indeed, because the plaintiff's violation of drug distribution charge was dismissed as part of the plaintiff's guilty plea to other charges, it does not indicate a favorable termination. As such, the plaintiff's claims are barred by Heck at this time, because he has not received a favorable termination on his underlying state criminal charges.
Section 1983 Claims
As noted above, the plaintiff's claims are barred by Heck at this time. However, even if not barred by Heck, the plaintiff's claims are still subject to summary dismissal. As an initial matter, to the extent the plaintiff asserts constitutional violations based upon “entrapment” by the defendants, any such claims are subject to summary dismissal because entrapment is not a constitutional violation which extends to civil cases, and it does not implicate constitutional rights. See Juste v. Lawrence, C/A No. 3:19-cv-98, 2019 WL 4439113, at *3 (N.D. W.Va. July 11, 2019) (collecting cases and recognizing, among other things, that there is no constitutional violation for § 1983 purposes even when a plaintiff prevails on an entrapment defense at trial, as well as that an entrapment claim cannot serve as the basis of a federal habeas claim) (internal citations omitted), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 3456622 (N.D. W.Va. July 31, 2019), appeal dismissed 806 Fed.Appx. 219 (4th Cir. 2020).
Additionally, section 1983 actions premised on malicious prosecution, false arrest, and/or false imprisonment are analyzed as actions claiming unreasonable seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367-68 (4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that a plaintiff alleging a § 1983 false arrest claim needs to show that the officer decided to arrest him without probable cause to establish an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment); Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating claims of false arrest and false imprisonment “are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment”).
However, “an indictment, fair upon its face, returned by a properly constituted grand jury, conclusively determines the existence of probable cause.” Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 189 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 n.19 (1975)); see also Provet, 2007 WL 1847849, at *5 (section 1983 claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution were precluded because of indictment). This Court, as noted above, has taken judicial notice of the plaintiff's state criminal proceedings, including grand jury indictments for the manufacture, distribution, etc., of cocaine base, 2nd offense, as well as for violating drug distribution laws. See Greenville County Public Index, enter the plaintiff's name and 2018A2330207550, 2019A2309854A) (last visited December 30, 2020). The indictments act as a bar to the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims, and as such, they are subject to summary dismissal.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the undersigned also notes that the plaintiff's claims are subject to summary dismissal because the injuries alleged by the plaintiff are not constitutionally cognizable under § 1983. The plaintiff alleges that he has post traumatic stress disorder because the defendants violated his rights (doc. 1 at 11). There is no federal constitutional right to be free from emotional distress, mental anguish, or psychological stress. See Williams v. Pruitt, C/A No. 8:13-cv-01812-JMC, 2013 WL 4500436, at *2 n.2 (citing Grandstaff v. City of Borger, Tex., 767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 480 U.S. 916 (1987); Rodriguez v. Comas, 888 F.2d 899, 903 (1st Cir. 1989)). As such, in light of the foregoing, the plaintiff's claims against the defendant are subject to summary dismissal.
RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned is of the opinion that the plaintiff cannot cure the defects identified above by amending his complaint. See Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, 807 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2015); In re GNC Corp., 789 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 2015); Chao v. Rivendell Woods, Inc., 415 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 2005); Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392 of United Food and Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 10 F.3d 1064 (4th Cir. 1993)). As noted in more detail above, even if not barred by Heck, the plaintiff's claims are subject to dismissal. Thus, the undersigned recommends that the court decline to automatically give the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that the District Court dismiss this action without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).