Opinion
2:00-CV-670 PGC.
July 10, 2003
ORDER
Plaintiff, Charles Allen, filed an amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 2003). On March 20, 2002 the Court ordered service of process on defendants Marty O'Bray, Bradley Zeeman, Kenneth Wiley, Steven Caverley, Jason Allinson, Kim Johnson, Jason Gurney, and Carl Jacobson. The Court ordered that these defendants respond to Plaintiff's claims arising from two separate periods: The first period, occurring in August of 1998, involves alleged violations of Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights regarding his confinement in a strip cell and a failure to provide medical care; the second period, during July 2000, involves Plaintiff's claim that Defendants denied him access to a toilet for several hours, forcing him to urinate on the floor, and that Plaintiff was then punished by being put in a strip cell, naked for more than five days. Defendants responds to Plaintiff's claims through a motion for summary judgment, arguing qualified immunity.
ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In applying this standard, the Court must "examine the factual record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Lopez v. LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756, 759 (10th Cir. 1999). "Where the nonmovant will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, however, that party must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts so as to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence, as a triable issue, of an element essential to that party's case in order to survive summary judgment:" Id.
Defendants' motion raises the defense of qualified immunity. To promote the efficient administration of public services, the doctrine of qualified immunity "shields government officials performing discretionary functions from individual liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless their conduct violates `clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Baptiste v. J.C. Penney Co., 147 F.3d 1252, 1255 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982)). "[Q]ualified immunity is an affirmative defense to a section 1983 action, providing immunity from suit from the outset." Adkins v. Rodriquez, 59 F.3d 1034, 1036 (10th Cir. 1995).
I. Failure-to-Provide-Medical-Care Claims
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Caverley refused to provide medical care after Plaintiff swallowed a razor blade. Plaintiff has a clearly established constitutional right to receive needed medical care. See Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1310 (10th Cir. 1998). Thus, Defendant Caverly is not entitled to qualified immunity regarding this claim. However, for Plaintiff to survive summary judgment on his Eighth Amendment claims regarding medical care he must designate specific facts supporting two elements: "First, he must show that his medical needs were serious and, second, that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to [his] medical needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292 (1976).
"Deliberate indifference involves both an objective and a subjective component." Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000). The objective component is met if the deprivation is "sufficiently serious." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994). A medical need is sufficiently serious "if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Hunt v. Uphoff, 199 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).
The subjective component is met only if a prison official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Specifically, Plaintiff must show: "(1) that a defendant prison officer knew of the prisoner's serious medical condition and (2) deliberately or intentionally acted or refused to act in response to that condition, (3) and that such conduct caused the harm or unnecessary pain and suffering complained of." Gomm v. Deland, 729 F. Supp. 767, 778 (Utah 1990), aff'd, 931 F.2d 62 (10th Cir. 1991). Allegations of negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition are insufficient to state a claim against a physician under the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105.
The facts show that Plaintiff swallowed a razor blade in August of 1998. In response, prison officers moved Plaintiff into a strip cell for observation. Defendant Caverley asserts that he has no recollection of the event; however, he does allege that the standard procedure when inmates swallow foreign objects, such as razor blades, is to monitor the prisoner as the object passes through the digestive system. Defendant Caverly further asserts this procedure of monitoring is well documented and accepted in medical literature.
For Plaintiff to create a genuine issue for trial as to the seriousness of his condition, he must present specific facts which would call into question the determination of medical personnel that his condition warranted only monitoring. Plaintiff does not that assert that this course of treatment led to an undesired result. To the contrary, the undisputed facts show that the razor blade passed through Plaintiff's system without injuring him.
Plaintiff has also failed to establish that Defendants acted with "deliberate indifference" in refusing to do more than monitor his condition. Plaintiff's allegation of deliberate indifference rests upon the assertion that Defendant Caverley knew Plaintiff's condition mandated a course of action other than monitoring. However, because Plaintiff has failed to adequately contradict Defendant's determination that he did not require such treatment he cannot make out deliberate indifference.
Plaintiff's allegation of deliberate indifference boils down to a mere difference of opinion as to the proper course of treatment for his condition and such a claim is not actionable. See Coppinger v. Townsend, 398 F.2d 392, 394 (10th Cir. 1968). Thus, Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendant Caverley was deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's medical needs. Summary judgment is therefore granted to Defendant Caverley.
III. Condition-of-Confinement Claims
The Eighth Amendment requires jail officials "to provide humane conditions of confinement by ensuring inmates receive the basic necessities of adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care and by taking reasonable measures to guarantee the inmates' safety." Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1310 (10th Cir. 1998). To hold a prison official personally liable for violating an inmate's right to humane conditions of confinement, a plaintiff must satisfy two requirements, consisting of an objective and subjective component. See id. The objective component requires that the alleged deprivation be "sufficiently serious." Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 111 S.Ct. 2321 (1991). Jail conditions may be "`restrictive and even harsh'" without violating constitutional rights. Barney, 143 F.3d at 1311 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392 (1981)). "[O]nly those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities . . . are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation." Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298; see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994).
The inquiry examines not only the severity of the alleged deprivations, but also their duration. See Barney, 143 F.3d at 1311. Further, when a claim involves a number of inhumane confinement conditions, the court should look at the conditions as a whole when determining a violation:
Some conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation "in combination" when each would not do so alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need . . . for example, a low cell temperature at night combined with a failure to issue blankets . . . Nothing so amorphous as "overall conditions" can rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation of a single human need exists.Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304-05; see also Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1442 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing cases in which deprivation of human needs found to be Eighth Amendment violation).
A. Sgt. Wiley
First, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Sgt. Wiley regarding Plaintiff's time in a strip cell from August 7 through 10, 1998 allege that Plaintiff had no mattress, bedding, or toilet paper; the light was on day and night; the air conditioner was running very cold; and he was fed cold cuts for breakfast and lunch that were thrown on the floor for five minutes at a time. The question is whether these conditions violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights — i.e., were the conditions complained of "sufficiently serious" and did Defendant Wiley act with "deliberate indifference" to Plaintiff's health or safety? See Farmer, 511 U.S. 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970.
First, the Eighth Amendment requires jail officials "to provide humane conditions of confinement by ensuring inmates receive the basic necessities of adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care and by taking reasonable measures to guarantee the inmates' safety." Barney, 143 F.3d at 1310; see also Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 568 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding prison officials must provide "reasonably adequate ventilation, sanitation, bedding, hygiene materials, and utilities (i.e. hot and cold water, light, heat, and plumbing")). Defendants agree that while in the strip cell Plaintiff was denied access to bedding, mattress, clothes, and toilet paper. Thus, the conditions described by Plaintiff meet the "sufficiently serious" element of the Farmer test.
Second, Plaintiff must show that Defendant Wiley was "deliberately indifferent" to this risk. Plaintiff's situation is somewhat unusual. The reason Plaintiff was subject to these inhumane conditions was because he swallowed a razor blade, and the undisputed facts show that prison officials took steps to ensure that Plaintiff would not further harm himself. Although prison officials ordinarily must provide inmates with adequate clothing and bedding, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not called into question Defendants' protective motive for denying Plaintiff's clothing and bedding in this case. The Supreme Court has recognized that prison officials may limit inmates' constitutional rights when doing so is necessary to maintain security and discipline. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1881 (1979). Because by placing Plaintiff in the "strip cell" Defendants were trying to prevent further harm to Plaintiff, the Court concludes that Defendant Wiley was not "deliberately indifferent" to the challenged conditions. Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment for Defendant Wiley on this claim.
B. Defendants Johnson, Allinson, Gurney
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Johnson, Allinson and Gurney denied Plaintiff access to a toilet for four hours, leaving Plaintiff no choice but to urinate on the floor, and as result he was placed in a strip cell. Plaintiff's claims regard two separate events: First, Defendants' denial of Plaintiff's access to a toilet; second, Defendants' alleged retaliation.
Under Farmer, Defendant's denial of Plaintiff access to a toilet for four hours must be "sufficiently serious" to implicate constitutional rights. Farmer, 511 U.S. 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970. A prisoner must show that conditions were more than uncomfortable, and instead rose to the level of "conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm" to inmate's health or safety. Id. It is true that "[e]xposure to human waste, like few other conditions of confinement, evokes both the health concerns emphasized inFarmer and the more general standards of dignity embodied in the Eight Amendment." DeSpain v. Uphoof, 264 F.3d 965, 974 (10th Cir. 2001). A probe "into conditions of confinement by necessity relies on the particular facts of each situation; the `circumstances, nature, and duration' of the challenged conditions must be carefully considered."Id. (quoting Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1065, 121 S.Ct. 2215 (2001)). Further, "[w]hile no single factor controls the outcome of these cases, the length of exposure to the conditions is often of prime importance." Id. Plaintiff asserts that he urinated in the holding cell after four hours. He further asserts that he was only in holding cell for four hours and ten minutes (1:30 PM to 5:40 PM). The Court concludes as a matter of law that neither being denied access to a toilet for such a limited amount of time, nor being exposed to urine for ten to fifteen minutes, infringes on Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment protections. See, e.g., DeSpain, 264 F.3d at 972-75 (holding constitution violated when flooding with standing water containing human waste lasted thirty-six hours); McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287, 1292 (10th Cir. 2001) (concluding constitutional violation when inmate exposed to feces-covered cell for three days); contra Grizzle v. Cambra, No. C96-885SI(PR), 1999 WL 66139, at #9 (N.D. Cal. February 10, 1999) (holding no constitutional violation when inmates repeatedly threw feces and urine into plaintiff's cell, which was cleaned the next day, stating "foul conditions may not have been remedied fast enough to please [plaintiff], but he has not presented evidence that any condition which was objectively serious enough to violate the Eight Amendment was brought to the attention of [defendants] and then left uncorrected for a significant amount of time").
Further, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's claim that Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff for urinating is without merit. While prison officials may be liable for retaliating against an inmate because of the inmate's exercise of constitutional rights, Plaintiff has failed to allege that he was participating in a constitutionally protected activity. See Peterson v. Shanks, 149 F.3d 1140, 1144 (10th Cir. 1998) Therefore, Defendants Johnson, Allinson, and Gurney are granted summary judgment.
C. Defendant Jacobson
Plaintiff asserts Defendant Jacobson punished him for urinating on the floor on July 5, 2000 by placing him "in a strip cell, naked with no underwear or mattress for over 5 days." Defendants, in their motion for Summary Judgment, suggest that Plaintiff was not placed in the strip cell merely for urinating on the floor; his placement was also based on "plaintiff's unpredictable behavior. . . . and after consultation with the mental health worker." Supporting this allegation, Plaintiff states in his memorandum in opposition to summary judgment, that on July 4, 2000 Plaintiff "had sent a Health care request . . . saying [Plaintiff was] very depressed and having crazy thoughts."
Defendants have provided a copy of the "Strip Cell Status Chronological Log and Summary Sheet," showing Plaintiff was placed in the strip cell on July 5 at 10:00 PM; was provided a blanket, mattress, underwear and toilet paper on July 6 at 10:34 PM; and was released from the strip cell on July 10 at 12:00 PM after he "committed to the safety of himself and others." Plaintiff does contradict this order of events. Thus the Court concludes that any alleged unconstitutional conditions occurred between July 5 and July 6 and applies the Farmer test of "sufficient seriousness" and "deliberate indifference" to the alleged conditions occurring during that period. The inquiry here then is whether Defendant Jacobson violated Plaintiff's rights by not providing him with clothes and bedding for those twenty-four hours.
As stated above, the Eighth Amendment requires jail officials "to provide humane conditions of confinement by ensuring inmates receive the basic necessities of adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care and by taking reasonable measures to guarantee the inmates' safety."Barney, 143 F.3d at 1310; see also Ramos, 639 F.2d at 568.
However, like the strip cell incident in August 1998, while officials must ordinarily must provide inmates with adequate clothing and bedding,see Barney, 143 F.3d at 1310, the Court concludes on the undisputed facts that Defendant Jacobson's denial of Plaintiff's clothing and bedding was justified here because prison officials may limit inmates' constitutional rights when doing so is necessary to maintain security and discipline.See Bell, 441 U.S. at 546, 99 S.Ct. at 1881. Here, Plaintiff was being disruptive and admits he complained of being severely depressed. As a matter of law and regardless of the effect of the urination incident, Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant Jacobson was deliberately indifferent by placing him in a strip cell until he committed to the safety of himself and others. Therefore, summary judgment is granted for Defendant Jacobson.
D. Defendant O'Bray
The Court ordered that Defendant O'Bray respond to Plaintiff's allegations that Plaintiff told O'Bray that his cell had no running water, yet O'Bray left him there from August 19th through the 26th. Defendant's reply asserts that Defendant O'Bray only worked August 19 and 20 and, further, that there may have been running water during this period. O'Bray does not deny that Plaintiff may have told him that the faucet in his cell did not work.
Plaintiff has a clear constitutional right to running water in his cell. See Ramos, 639 F.2d at 568. Denial of water for an entire week likely satisfies the "sufficiently serious" element of the Farmer test. The second element, "deliberate indifference," is met as well. Defendant O'Bray merely asserts that he did not work for the entire week Plaintiff alleges he was without running water. However, even two days without running water may be sufficient grounds for an Eighth Amendment claim. It is not clear to the Court, either, that merely not working some days protects a defendant from liability. When conflicting evidence is presented regarding events and motivations, "it is the jury's prerogative to weigh the credibility of the witnesses and determine who should be believed." Klein v. Grynberg, 44 F.3d 1497, 1504 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 58 (1995). It is the fact finder's decision about what evidence it wishes to believe. Further, it is then the fact finder's prerogative to decide whether the alleged deprivations constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Therefore, Defendant's motion for summary judgment regarding Defendant O'Bray is denied.
E. Defendant Zeeman
Plaintiff contends that Defendant Zeeman turned off water to Plaintiff's toilet after Plaintiff asked for running water in his cell. Defendant Zeeman merely asserts that there are no separate controls for the sink and toilet so he could not have done as Plaintiff complains. However, Zeeman admits it is likely he turned the water on and off at various times during the water cycle. Plaintiff disputes this, alleging that the toilet does have an independently controlled source.
Like the situation with Defendant O'Bray, the Court concludes that there are sufficient material facts in dispute that render summary judgment regarding Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Zeeman inappropriate at this time.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has failed to allege specific facts which materially contradict some of Defendants' allegations and accompanying affidavits. Moreover, the facts alleged by Plaintiff are insufficient to sustain certain of his Eighth Amendment claims. Therefore, the Court concludes that Defendants Caverley, Wiley, Allinson, Gurney, Johnson and Jacobsen are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Further, Plaintiff has escaped summary judgment by establishing material issues of disputed fact as to his allegation that Defendants O'Bray and Zeeman violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights when they denied him running water from August 19 to 26, 1998.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted regarding Defendants Caverley, Wiley, Allinson, Gurney, Johnson and Jacobsen. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' motion for summary judgment regarding Defendants O'Bray and Zeeman is denied.