Opinion
Civil Action No. 1:02-CV-022 C
February 22, 2002
ORDER
On January 30, 2002, Plaintiff Berl O'Dell Allbright ("Allbright"), acting pro se, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By Order dated February 6, 2002, he was granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. Defendant has not filed an answer.
When a prisoner seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, "[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines" that the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (West 1994 and Supp. 2000). See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A (West 1994 and Supp. 2000) (stating that when a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or one of its employees, the court shall review the complaint as soon as practicable and dismiss it if the court finds the complaint frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(c) (West 1994 and Supp. 2000) (providing that a district court shall on its own motion or the motion of any party dismiss a complaint by a prisoner regarding prison conditions if the court is satisfied the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant).
Plaintiff complains that the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division failed to release him to mandatory supervision on August 3, 2001, and he demands an immediate release and compensation for the six months that he was illegally incarcerated.
"Generally, § 1983 suits are the proper vehicle to attack the unconstitutional conditions of confinement and prison procedures." Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1997). See Cook v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice Planning Dept., 37 F.3d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that a § 1983 action is appropriate for recovering damages resulting from illegal administrative procedures, but habeas is the appropriate federal remedy for a state prisoner challenging the fact of his confinement). "A habeas petition [filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254], on the other hand, is the proper vehicle to seek release from custody." Id. "[I]n instances in which a petition [or complaint] combines claims that should be asserted in habeas with claims that properly may be pursued as an initial matter under § 1983, and the claims can be separated, federal courts should do so, entertaining the § 1983 claims." Serio v. Members of La. State Bd. of Pardons, 821 F.2d 1112, 1119 (5th Cir. 1987).
The Court has reviewed Allbright's complaint and the records attached to his complaint and finds that he is challenging the outcome of a single parole board action and seeking immediate release from prison. Accordingly, the Court finds that Allbright's request for his immediate release and complaints regarding the denial of his release to mandatory supervision are more properly raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Cook v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice Planning Dept., 37 F.3d at 168 (holding that a challenge to a single defective parole hearing must be pursued in habeas if resolution of the challenge would automatically result in the inmate's accelerated release).
To the extent that Allbright is seeking damages for a period of illegal incarceration resulting from the denial of release to mandatory supervision, the Court finds that he has failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted under § 1983. The Supreme Court of the United States has determined that
in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, [footnote omitted] a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Thus, any plaintiff "seeking damages pursuant to § 1983 for unconstitutional imprisonment [who] has not satisfied the favorable termination requirement of Heck" is "barred from any recovery and fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the denial of his release to mandatory supervision has been set aside or overturned. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff's complaint and request for monetary damages for his "wrongful" incarceration should be dismissed with prejudice, until he has satisfied the Heck requirements, for failure to state a claim. See Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that a § 1983 claim based on the duration of a prisoner's incarceration must be dismissed unless the plaintiff has established the invalidity of the fact of, or the length of, his confinement); Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 94 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that a § 1983 claim does not accrue until the Heck conditions have been satisfied).
It is, therefore, ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff's complaint regarding the denial of release to mandatory supervision and his request for immediate release is dismissed without prejudice to his right to pursue such claims in a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
2. Plaintiff's request for monetary damages is dismissed with prejudice to its being asserted again until the Heck conditions are satisfied. Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996).
Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
All pending motions are hereby denied.
The dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint does not release Plaintiff or the institution where he is incarcerated from the obligation to pay any filing fee previously imposed.
Plaintiff is advised that if he appeals this Order, he will be required to pay the appeal fee of $105.00 pursuant to the PLRA, and he must submit an application to proceed in forma pauperis and a 6-month Certificate of Inmate Trust Account at the same time he files his notice of appeal.
A copy of this Order shall be mailed to the Office of General Counsel, TDCJ-ID Litigation Support, P.O. Box 13084, Austin, Texas, 78711, and to TDCJ Local Funds Division, P.O. Box 629, Huntsville, Texas 77342-0629.