Opinion
Civil Action No. 4:04-CV-0169-A.
June 28, 2004
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND NOTICE AND ORDER
This cause of action was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), as implemented by an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge are as follows:
I. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS A. NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a petition for writ of habeas corpus by a state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
B. PARTIES
Petitioner Ricardo Alexander, TDCJ-ID#1180258, was in custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, at a state jail facility in Brownwood, Texas.
Respondent Douglas Dretke is the Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division (TDCJ).
C. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus, filed on February 27, 2004, Alexander contends he was denied pretrial jail time credits toward his ten-month sentence for a 2003 conviction for delivery of a controlled substance. (Federal Petition at 2, 7.) On May 11, 2004, Dretke filed an answer with supporting brief and documentary exhibits, to which Alexander did not timely reply. On May 19, 2004, Alexander's sentence was fully discharged and he was unconditionally released from the custody of TDCJ. (Respondent's Amended Answer at 3 and Exhibits B C.) Dretke has now filed an amended answer and motion to dismiss with supporting brief and documentary exhibits.D. MOOTNESS
The question in this case then becomes whether dismissal is warranted on the basis that the case has been rendered moot by Alexander's release because he can no longer satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III of the Constitution. A habeas petition typically challenges prison officials' authority to keep a prisoner in custody; thus, in general, the petitioner's release moots a habeas petition. See Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 632 (1982). A petition is not moot, however, if the released prisoner can show that the challenged conviction will cause him to suffer some future collateral consequences. Id.; Carafas v. Lavalle, 391 U.S. 234 (1968). Thus, where the petition challenges the validity of the petitioner's underlying conviction, he can often satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement by showing that the conviction affects his ability to vote, engage in certain businesses, serve as a juror, or hold public office. Carafas, 391 U.S. at 237. While the presumption of collateral consequences may comport with the reality in the context of criminal convictions, the Supreme Court has held that the same cannot be said for other situations where a conviction is not being attacked. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1998). See also Lane, 455 U.S. at 624 (holding that where prisoner only challenges his sentence, and not his conviction, Carafas does not apply). Accordingly, Spencer dictates a cautious approach to the presumption of collateral consequences, requiring the petitioner to affirmatively allege and demonstrate such consequences. See Beachem v. Schriro, 141 F.3d 1292, 1294 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 938 (1998).
In the instant petition, Alexander does not challenge the validity of his underlying conviction or sentence, only the alleged denial of pretrial time credits toward completion of his sentence. As indicated, the principles enunciated by Spencer militate against a presumption of collateral consequences, and Alexander has made no demonstration whatsoever that he will suffer any collateral consequences. Because there is nothing for the court to remedy, dismissal of this petition as moot is appropriate due to the expiration and discharge of Alexander's sentence and his unconditional release from state custody. See Blue v. Armstrong, 202 F. Supp.2d 534, 535-36 (S.D. Miss. 2002); Branton v. Cockrell, No. 4:01-CV-0637-A, 2001 WL 1669386, at *2-3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2001); Loth v. Guzik, No. 4:00-CV-0377-G, 2001 WL 649650, at * 2-3 (N.D. Tex. May 16, 2001), adopted, 2001 WL 649656 (N.D. Tex. June 8, 2001).
II. RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that Dretke's motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute be granted to the extent this petition for writ of habeas corpus be dismissed as moot.
III. NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT TO PROPOSED FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO OBJECT
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), each party to this action has the right to serve and file specific written objections in the United States District Court to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation within ten (10) days after the party has been served with a copy of this document. The court is extending the deadline within which to file specific written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation until July 19, 2004. The United States District Judge need only make a de novo determination of those portions of the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation to which specific objection is timely made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(B)(1). Failure to file by the date stated above a specific written objection to a proposed factual finding or legal conclusion will bar a party, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice, from attacking on appeal any such proposed factual finding or legal conclusion accepted by the United States District Judge. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc op. on reh'g); Carter v. Collins, 918 F.2d 1198, 1203 (5th Cir. 1990).
IV. ORDER
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, it is ORDERED that each party is granted until July 19, 2004, to serve and file written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation. It is further ORDERED that if objections are filed and the opposing party chooses to file a response, a response shall be filed within seven (7) days of the filing date of the objections.
It is further ORDERED that the above-styled and numbered action, previously referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for findings, conclusions, and recommendation, be and hereby is returned to the docket of the United States District Judge.