Opinion
00 CIV. 6150 (DLC)
March 29, 2002
Jeffrey L. Liddle, Christine A. Palmieri, Liddle Robinson, LLP, New York, NY, For Plaintiff.
Barbara M. Roth, Thomas I. Sheridan, III, Jonathan L. Bing, TORYS LLP, New York, NY, For Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant Credit Lyonnais Securities (USA) Inc. ("CLS") moves for summary judgment to dismiss the remaining age discrimination claims brought by former Managing Director James Alban-Davies ("Alban-Davies"). Through an Opinion of August 8, 2001, summary judgment was awarded to CLS on two claims: a discrimination claim based on the initial allocation of a bonus pool in 1999, and a retaliation claim based on not being permitted to go on a business trip to Mexico. Alban-Davies v. Credit Lyonnais Sec. (USA), Inc., No. 00 Civ. 6150 (DLC), 2001 WL 884113 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2001) ("August 8 Opinion"). The August 8 Opinion denied summary judgment on a third claim, a retaliation claim premised on a group of actions in 2000 that were collectively characterized as the "Demotion claim." Since that time, the plaintiff has amended his complaint to add a retaliation claim based on the termination of his employment in July 2001. Following the completion of discovery on this new claim, CLS brings a renewed motion for summary judgment on the two remaining claims: the Demotion and termination claims. For the reasons described below, the motion addressed to the termination claim is granted.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are undisputed or as shown by the plaintiff unless otherwise noted. In August 1995, Alban-Davies was hired by CLS, a New York securities broker-dealer owned by a French banking corporation, to create and develop a Latin American Fixed Income Trading and Sales Group, known as the Emerging Markets Group. He promptly recruited and hired nine income-generating employees; a tenth such employee joined from another CLS department. The trading risk limits for the Emerging Markets Group, set by CLS's French parent, Credit Lyonnais, S.A. ("CL Paris"), were $13.6 million in 1996. The risk limits represented the theoretical maximum amount that the institution could lose in one day, based on the historical performance of a model portfolio of emerging market bonds. Risk limits were a fraction, therefore, of the total value of open positions being traded.
Although the Emerging Markets Group regularly had annual net revenues, when its trading losses and gains were compared over the course of a year, it lost money after the allocation of costs, and in some years significant amounts of money, every year of its existence. These losses existed even before taking into account the payment of bonuses. By the end of 1999, five of its income generating members had resigned. By 2001, three more had chosen to leave and only two traders remained: the plaintiff and Francis Rodilosso ("Rodilosso"). Rodilosso left on June 21, 2001.
Before payment of bonuses, the group experienced a net loss of $334,000 in 1996, $611,000 in 1997, $4.7 million in 1998, $1.5 million in 1999, and $633,000 in 2000.
CL Paris lost confidence in the group and began various efforts, from at least 1998, to terminate the group's operations. In 1998, Jerome Brunel ("Brunel"), Chief Executive Officer of Credit Lyonnais Americas ("CLA"), acted to save the group. For 1998, CL Paris reduced the group's trading limits to $10.9 million. That year is also notable for the merging of two groups, the Emerging Markets Group and the High Yield group. In that year, Alban-Davies was named Co-Head with Paul Phaneuf ("Phaneuf") of a combined group, High Yield and Emerging Markets Debt Trading and Sales. Phaneuf had been the head of the High Yield group before the merger. The net losses from trading continued, however, and in 1999, Francois Pages, Chief Executive Officer of CLS, had to rescue the Emerging Markets Group once more and convince CL Paris not to terminate it. This time the trading limits for Emerging Markets, which had been steadily reduced, were severely cut, plummeting to $1 million.
1999 Bonus Dispute
The defendant did not pay Alban-Davies a bonus for 1999. The employment contract executed when he was hired guaranteed Alban-Davies an annual salary of $225,000. He was paid a bonus of $700,000 for 1996, an amount in excess of the $600,000 guaranteed for that year by his contract. In 1997, he was paid a bonus of $727,000; in 1998, it was $350,000. Alban-Davies indicated to his employer as early as February 2000, that he intended to contest the 1999 bonus decision, and reported in March that he had retained an attorney to represent him in an arbitration proceeding over the bonus. He commenced the arbitration on August 9, 2000. In January 2002, a New York Stock Exchange arbitration panel awarded him $650,000 plus interest for the failure to pay him a bonus in 1999.
On March 14, 2000, Alban-Davies also filed a complaint over the bonus with the EEOC, alleging that CLS's decision not to pay him a bonus was based on his age. The only defendants named were CLS and Robin Moser ("Moser"), the treasurer of CLS. The EEOC dismissed the charge on July 28, 2000.
April 2000: Dismantling of High Yield
The first incident forming a part of the plaintiff's Demotion claim is plaintiff's loss of his title as Co-Head of High Yield and Emerging Markets Debt Trading and Sales. In April 2000, the group in which plaintiff had functioned as co-head for two years was dismantled. As already noted, Alban-Davies and Phanuef had been appointed co-heads of the Emerging Markets and High Yield Group in April 1998, so that Alban-Davies could oversee the two traders in the High Yield section. In April 2000, Phaneuf and the two traders were fired, and by July 2000, all High Yield trading activity had ceased. One High Yield employee, a salesman, remained: George Marroig-Tagle. Alban-Davies had never supervised him, and in any event, Marroig-Tagle left as soon as the bonus guarantee period provided in his employment contract expired. David Travis ("Travis") and Sarah Smith, who worked in the Debt Capital Markets Department, had provided some origination services for High Yield. Alban-Davies had never supervised Travis nor Smith, nor been responsible for the kind of work that they did for High Yield.
Reorganization of Four Units
In July or August 2000, Omar Abukhadra ("Abukhadra"), the head of the Interest Rate and Credit Derivatives Department, a highly profitable department, was also given responsibility for what remained of Emerging Markets and High Yield, as well as another group, Debt Capital Markets. Each of these three groups had just a handful of employees remaining in them.
July 2000 Statements
The specific statements on which the plaintiff relies to show animus against him are the following. He asserts that in July 2000, Abukhadra told him that "you cannot have sex while going through a divorce," that if Alban-Davies did not drop his claim against the bank he would "freeze" him "out of the business," and that if Alban-Davies did not get rid of his attorney he would have no real career with the bank. Abukhadra allegedly reported that Brunel was annoyed with Alban-Davies for filing a claim against the firm. Finally, he asked how much money Alban-Davies wanted to settle his claims and told him not to discuss the matter with anyone else at the bank.
Abukhadra denies knowing at any time before November 2000, that Alban-Davies had made any claim against the bank based on discrimination. In November 2000, Alban-Davies filed an EEOC complaint in which he named Abukhadra for the first time. The March 2000 EEOC complaint had been directed solely to the 1999 bonus claim and had not involved Abukhadra. Abukhadra and Alban-Davies both acknowledge that Abukhadra did know as of July 2000, however, that Alban-Davies had not received a bonus in 1999, and that Alban-Davies was taking legal action against the bank because of the bonus. Abukhadra also denies making some of the other statements attributed to him by the plaintiff, although he does admit making a comment about sex and divorce. The plaintiff has identified no evidence that Abukhadra had knowledge at any time before November 2000 of his discrimination claim.
October Reorganization By Function
The second critical incident in the Demotion claim stems from a reorganization in October 2000. In October 2000, Abukahdra reorganized all the employees in the four groups he was supervising into one unit organized not by business line but by function, i.e., origination, sales, and trading. He placed Mark Thompson ("Thompson"), who had been in charge of all trading activities with the exception of trading in Emerging Markets, in charge of the trading function and had both Alban-Davies and Rodilosso, the only two remaining traders in Emerging Markets, report to Thompson. Travis, who had been placed in charge of High Yield at some point after Phaneuf's dismissal in April, was placed in charge of another function, origination.
As a result of this reorganization, Alban-Davies lost his last two direct reports: Rodilosso and the one remaining sales person. He was also placed on the same level as Rodilosso, someone he had previously supervised, and instead of directly reporting to Abukhadra, now reported to Thompson, who in turn reported to Abukhadra.
Loss of a Private Office
Although not asserted as an adverse employment action, Alban-Davies also complains that he lost a private office late in 2000. Between July 2000 and the end of the year, the floor on which Abukhadra's unit worked was renovated in order to make room for another group of two dozen employees. Through the reconstruction, the number of private offices available to Abukhadra's unit was reduced from nine to six. Alban-Davies, who had always had both a private office and a trading desk on the floor, lost his private office. The only other person who had had a private office and lost it was Moser's secretary. On the other hand, it is undisputed that no one with a trading desk was given a private office after the reconstuction. Neither Travis, the head of origination, nor Thompson, the head of trading following the October reorganization of the four groups along functional lines, had a private office either.
Rejected Offer of Risk Manager Job
Finally, in October 2000, Moser asked Alban-Davies if he wished to become a Risk Manager and assess the risk in new foreign exchange products. This position had substantially less potential for the payment of any bonus. Moser is alleged by Alban-Davies to have said that "there comes a time in everyone's career to move into an administrative function." The position was never offered to anyone else after the plaintiff rejected it. The plaintiff contends that if he had taken the position it would in any event have been eliminated soon thereafter when the risk oversight department was reorganized.
Termination of Employment
In April 2001, Guy Laffineur ("Laffineur"), became Global Head of Derivatives and Fixed Income for CL Paris. In Paris, in June 2001, and without any knowledge of any complaints of discrimination filed or actions brought by Alban-Davies, Laffineur decided to close the Emerging Markets fixed-income trading business in New York. CL Paris had assessed this business line annually since the first full year the Emerging Markets Group was in operation, that is, 1996. As already noted, the group had a net loss every year. In each year since 1998, CL Paris had come close to closing down the group. In 1998, it shut down the Emerging Markets department in London because of the trading losses there. As of May 2001, Alban-Davies's individual trading book showed a trading loss of $334,590. After accounting for expenses, as of May 31, 2001, Emerging Markets had a net loss of more than $1 million for the preceding five months. Deciding that the time had come to shut down the New York trading operation, Laffineur refused to renew the trading risk limits for New York's Emerging Markets fixed-income trading activity when those limits expired on June 30. He communicated this decision in an e-mail to Moser on June 27.
Pages terminated the plaintiff's employment on July 6, 2001, after learning of Laffineur's decision. That termination is the basis for the second claim of retaliation brought by the plaintiff. Since Pages's arrival in New York in March 1999, CLS had discontinued its American Depository Receipts trading activity, its high yield corporate bond trading, research and sales activity, and its e-finance advisory activity, all because of a lack of profitability.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment may not be granted unless the submissions of the parties, taken together, "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The substantive law governing the case will identify those issues that are material, and "only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1987). "A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine `if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Belize NY, Inc., 277 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a material factual question, and in making this determination, the Court must view all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. When the moving party has asserted facts showing that the nonmovant's claims cannot be sustained, the opposing party must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," and cannot rest on the "mere allegations or denials" of his pleadings. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see also Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995). In deciding whether to grant summary judgment, this Court must, therefore, determine (1) whether a genuine factual dispute exists based on the evidence in the record, and (2) whether the facts in dispute are material based on the substantive law at issue.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. ("ADEA"), shields employees from the "unlawful [conduct of] an employer [who] discriminate[s] against any of his employees . . . because such individual . . . has opposed any practice made unlawful by this section." 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). Under the ADEA, it is "unlawful for an employer . . . to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). Courts analyzing retaliation claims under the ADEA apply the three step burden-shifting framework established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1972). See Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance America Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir. 2001).
Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. To state a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADEA, Alban-Davies must show that: (1) he was engaged in a protected activity; (2) the employer was aware of his participation in the protected activity; (3) he was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) there is a causal nexus between the protected activity and the adverse action taken. See Slattery, 248 F.3d at 94; Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope Co., 108 F.3d 462, 465 (2d Cir. 1997). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. If the employer has met its burden, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving retaliation. Slattery, 248 F.3d at 94.
To establish that he suffered an "adverse employment action" as a result of his protected activity, Alban-Davies must point to a "materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment." Galabya v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). A materially adverse change is "more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities." Weeks v. New York State, 273 F.3d 76, 85 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). "Adverse employment actions include discharge, refusal to hire, refusal to promote, demotion, reduction in pay, and reprimand." Phillips v. Bowen, 278 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted) (Section 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim). To prove retaliation other than through these "classic" examples, the plaintiff must demonstrate, "using an objective standard," that "the total circumstances of [his] working environment changed to become unreasonably inferior and adverse when compared to a typical or normal, not ideal or model, workplace." Id.
Alban-Davies need not show that retaliatory animus was the sole basis for the adverse employment action. Rather, the plaintiff must show that retaliation was a "motivating factor." Owen v. Thermatool Corp., 155 F.3d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 1998). A plaintiff may prove that retaliation was a motivating factor "either (1) indirectly, by showing that the protected activity was followed closely by discriminatory treatment, or through other circumstantial evidence such as disparate treatment of fellow employees who engaged in similar conduct; or (2) directly, through evidence of retaliatory animus directed against the plaintiff by defendant." Raniola v. Bratton, 243 F.3d 610, 625 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted) (Title VII). Where the decision-maker responsible for the adverse action denies direct knowledge of the protected activity, knowledge can be shown through circumstantial evidence or through evidence that the decision-maker was "acting explicitly or implicit[ly] upon the orders of a superior who has the requisite knowledge." Gordon v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2000).
A. Retaliatory Demotion Claim
There are four events that comprise the Demotion claim, although the only adverse action emphasized in the plaintiff's opposition to this motion is his loss of supervisory authority and the change in the reporting structure stemming from the October 2000 reorganization along functional lines of the four groups run by Abukhadra. Originally, the plaintiff had also contended that his removal as Co-Head of the High Yield and Emerging Markets Group in April 2000 was an adverse action. He also relies on the loss of a private office and the offer of a position as a Risk Manager as evidence of the intent and effect of the other two incidents.
1. Removal as Co-Head
Alban-Davies contends that he was removed in April 2000, as Co-Head of the High Yield and Emerging Markets Trading and Sales Group in retaliation for his March 2000 complaint of age discrimination. It is undisputed that the High Yield group was dismantled and its head and members fired for economic reasons. None of the High Yield employees the plaintiff had had responsibility for supervising while Co-Head survived the firings. Accordingly, there was no longer any group for Alban-Davies to co-head.
In the first instance, Alban-Davies has not presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that there was any adverse employment action taken against him. While a loss of a title might ordinarily suggest a demotion, here it is more appropriately seen as an alteration in job responsibilities. After all, Alban-Davies remained the Head of Emerging Markets. And unlike the unfortunate members of the High Yield group, he was not fired and suffered neither a change in salary nor benefits. Based on these facts, it cannot be said, when judged against any objective standard, that his working environment had become unreasonably inferior and adverse when compared to a typical or normal workplace. See Phillips, 278 F.3d at 109. There is another defect in this claim. Alban-Davies has not submitted sufficient evidence of retaliatory intent. While his loss of the title in April, followed directly on the heels of his filing of the EEOC complaint in March, and would ordinarily permit an inference of retaliatory intent, this is not an ordinary case. There are circumstances where timing alone is insufficient to raise a question of fact regarding discriminatory intent. See Slattery, 248 F.3d at 95. This is such a case. Alban-Davies has not presented any evidence from which a reasonable juror could infer that the High Yield employees and their direct supervisor were fired (when Alban-Davies was not) because of an intent to deprive Alban-Davies of a title in retaliation for his EEOC filing. Simply put, the impact of these events on others was so great in comparison with their impact on Alban-Davies that there is no reasonable basis to infer that these events were motivated by retaliation against Alban-Davies.
2. October 2000 Reorganization
Alban-Davies contends that the October 2000 reorganization was an adverse action since he was stripped of all of his remaining "direct reports": Rodilosso, who was the only remaining trader in addition to Alban-Davies, and one sales person. Under the reorganization, Rodilosso and Alban-Davies were now reporting to the same supervisor. Alban-Davies also dropped two levels in the reporting structure. While he had reported directly to Moser before Abukhadra took over Emerging Markets in July or August, and had been reporting to Abukhadra since that time, he now reported to Thompson, who reported to Abukhadra, who reported to Moser. No other employee was as negatively affected by the October reorganization in terms of either loss of supervisory responsibility or change in reporting structure.
The October reorganization constitutes an adverse employment action. See Phillips, 278 F.3d at 109 (demotion constitutes adverse employment action). The defendant nonetheless contends that summary judgment can be granted because the decision to reorganize in this fashion was made by Abukhadra alone, and he had no knowledge of any protected activity in which Alban-Davies had engaged.
It is undisputed that Abukhadra knew of the plaintiff's promise to bring an arbitration claim to contest the denial of the 1999 bonus. Abukhadra has denied knowing that Alban-Davies had brought any discrimination claim. Alban-Davies asserts that Abukhadra's discriminatory intent can be inferred from the fact that the reorganization occurred just two months after he filed the August 2000 age discrimination complaint in this court. Alban-Davies also asserts that Abukhadra's ignorance of the discrimination claim is "unlikely" since the threat that Abukhadra made in July 2000, occurred after Alban-Davies had filed his charge of age discrimination with the EEOC but before he had begun the arbitration proceeding.
To be actionable, an adverse employment action must be taken in retaliation for protected activity. The filing of an age discrimination complaint with the EEOC or with a court is protected activity; the pursuit of a contract claim for a bonus through arbitration is not. The term "protected activity" refers to "action taken to protest or oppose statutorily prohibited discrimination." Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir. 2000).
Alban-Davies had filed an age discrimination complaint with the EEOC over the 1999 bonus dispute in March 2000. There is nothing in the July conversation that Alban-Davies recites having had with Abukhadra that refers to either a complaint of discrimination generally or any issue of age discrimination. Since it is uncontested that Abukhadra knew of the bonus dispute and the threat by Alban-Davies to arbitrate it, the July conversation does not provide any evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that Abukhadra had also learned of the age discrimination charge by July. After all, the age discrimination complaint did not involve Abukhadra in any way, and the plaintiff has not identified any reason that those within CLS who knew of the EEOC filing would have discussed it with Abukhadra. While ordinarily the July conversation would provide substantial evidence of knowledge of protected activity and retaliatory motive, because of the existence and knowledge of the contract dispute over the 1999 bonus, the strength of this evidence for the plaintiff is entirely dissipated.
Standing alone, the proximity of the October reorganization to the filing of the August lawsuit is also insufficient to support an inference of retaliation. The October reorganization was not an event affecting only Alban-Davies. For entirely independent reasons, and in response to years of disappointing and even disastrous financial results, the Emerging Markets Group was a shell of its former self. Without either direct or circumstantial evidence that Abukhadra knew of any protected activity in which Alban-Davies had engaged, the timing of the lawsuit does not support an inference that the October reorganization and Alban-Davies's demotion were retaliatory. See Slattery, 248 F.3d at 95 ("Where timing is the only basis for a claim of retaliation, and gradual adverse job actions began well before the plaintiff had ever engaged in any protected activity, an inference of retaliation does not arise.").
This does not end the inquiry though. Alban-Davies asserts that the retaliatory intent can be found from the involvement of both Moser and Pages in the reorganization decision. It is undisputed that both of these men knew of the age discrimination charge by October 2000. There is no direct evidence that either of these men either suggested or were responsible for the idea to reorganize the four groups under Abukhadra along function lines and in the process to demote Alban-Davies to a mere trader. The evidence to which Alban-Davies points for their involvement in a "reorganization" shows only that they were responsible for the decision in July and August 2000 to place Abukhadra in charge of the four groups. The deposition testimony from Abukhadra and Moser indicates that, with respect to the October reorganization, Abukhadra merely advised Pages and Moser that he intended to reorganize the groups he was supervising, that they gave him no guidance or suggestion on how to do that, and specifically gave him no direction regarding how to treat Alban-Davies, and that the reorganization plan, which they approved after it was submitted to them, was of Abukhadra's design entirely.
There is circumstantial evidence, however, from which a jury could infer that Pages and/or Moser were more involved in the October reorganization, at least in its impact on Alban-Davies, than the testimony reveals. Most telling in this regard is Abukhadra's October 13 one page memorandum to Pages and Moser in which he describes his proposal for the reorganization. Despite a detailed description of the impact on each of the affected groups, including Emerging Markets, and of the impact on Thompson, who would head "Trading," and Rodilosso, who would leave Emerging Markets to join Trading, there is no reference at all to Alban-Davies. A jury would be entitled to find the absence of any reference to the plaintiff highly unusual, particularly given the prominence of Alban-Davies's role in Emerging Markets and the undeniably negative impact this reorganization would have on him. They would be entitled to infer that there was no discussion of Alban-Davies in the memorandum because there had already been either an implicit or explicit understanding reached among the men about how he was to be treated. While there could have been entirely legitimate reasons for demoting Alban-Davies, if retaliation was a motivating factor in the decision, it is actionable.
Given this conclusion, it is unnecessary to analyze either the loss of the private office or the offer of the position of Risk Manager. The defendant's motion for summary judgment on the Demotion claim, to the extent the claim is based on the October reorganization, is denied. To the extent the claim is based on the loss of the title of Co-Head of the High Yield and Emerging Markets Trading and Sales Group, the motion is granted.
B. Retaliatory Termination Claim
Alban-Davies concedes that Laffineur had no knowledge of his discrimination claims and that he alone made the decision to cancel the trading limits for the Emerging Markets business. He asserts, however, that it was Pages who actually made the decision to fire him.
It is undisputed that Pages was aware of the plaintiff's discrimination claims. Alban-Davies reasons that it is possible to infer that the cancellation of the trading limits provided only an opportunity to fire him rather than being the reason for doing so, since CLS could have worked to find another job for him to do either within CLS or in London or Brazil. He points to the chain of events that followed the filing of the first EEOC complaint and the fact that he was asked to sign a release that covered this action in exchange for his severance pay, as evidence that his discrimination claims must have been the motivation for the termination of his employment.
The fact that the individual who implemented the decision to close the Emerging Markets business in New York had knowledge of the protected activity is insufficient to create an issue of fact for a jury to resolve. It is undisputed that the decision to terminate the Emerging Markets business was made in Paris for financial reasons and by an individual with no knowledge of the plaintiff's protected activity. Accordingly, the decision to terminate the trading activity could not have been motivated by knowledge of protected activity. Under these circumstances, the discharge of Alban-Davies after his function in the company was eliminated does not constitute retaliation. See, e.g., Coffey v. Dobbs Int'l Serv., Inc., 170 F.3d 323, 327 (2d Cir. 1999) (discharge of employee after closure of job site typically does not give rise to retaliation claim).
Although Alban-Davies argues that the cancellation of the trading limits was just a pretext that Pages used to terminate his employment, he has not identified any open position within CLS for which he was qualified at the time CL Paris eliminated his trading position. With respect to any job the plaintiff has identified in foreign offices, it is undisputed that CLS plays no role in the hiring for such positions. In addition, the plaintiff has not shown that there was any opportunity with any CLS affiliate in Brazil at the time Alban-Davies's job was terminated. Accordingly, the defendant is granted summary judgment on the termination of employment claim.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claim of retaliatory termination of employment is granted. The motion regarding the Demotion claim is denied. A scheduling order shall be issued with this Opinion.
SO ORDERED: