Opinion
A163388
07-28-2022
In re A.B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. C.B., Defendant and Appellant. ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent,
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Alameda County Super. Ct. No. JD-030571-01)
STREETER J.
C.B. (Father) appeals an order terminating his parental rights to A.B. (Minor) at a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing (.26 hearing). Minor is now age six. At the .26 hearing, the dependency court terminated both parents' parental rights and chose adoption as Minor's permanent plan.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Only Father appeals. The sole issue is whether the court erred in finding that Father failed to prove the applicability of the parental beneficial relationship exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). Both parties to this appeal, the Alameda County Social Services Agency (Agency) and Father, rely upon the Supreme Court's recent opinion in In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.), which was filed just before the court held the .26 hearing.
We will affirm. The trial court was within its discretion to reject Father's argument that Minor would suffer detriment from severance of the parent-child relationship. Minor only spent the first year of her life in Father's care. They visited in person on only three occasions during the pendency of this case. Father's visits with Minor were almost exclusively telephonic; he rarely made video visits. Their relationship, as it exists beyond Minor's infancy, is entirely the product of this case. Accordingly, we shall affirm the order terminating Father's parental rights.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual and Procedural Background Before the Section 366.26 Hearing
We assume familiarity with the factual background of this case up to the point of the combined 12- and 18-month review, as recounted in a previous nonpublished panel opinion, Alameda County Social Services Agency v. C.B. (Dec. 17, 2020, A159641), affirming an order denying a section 388 petition in which Father sought a change of placement to him during the pendency of these proceedings. We will review the early history of the case only briefly to set the context.
By an initial petition filed in January 2019, the Agency alleged that Minor and her half sibling, T.G. (we refer to T.G. and A.B., collectively, as Minors), had suffered, or were at risk of suffering, physical harm or illness due to J.G.'s (Mother) inability to provide regular care for the children as a result of mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse. According to the petition, Minors suffered from various forms of physical and mental trauma due to Mother's mental instability. At a detention hearing Minors were removed from Mother's care and placed with a maternal aunt. The court ordered reunification services to Mother, but she eventually made no progress on her case plan and services were ultimately terminated.
Although Father's whereabouts were unknown through the early phases of the proceedings, he surfaced in August 2019 when he placed a phone call to the Agency from Florida, where he was then living. As reported by the Agency in its first six-month review report, Father explained that he had been making child support payments to Mother believing that she still had custody; that he had just discovered Minor was in foster care; that he intended to appear at the next hearing in the dependency proceedings; that he was present at Minor's birth; that she lived with him for the first year of her life; and that he lost touch with her because he was incarcerated for a period of time until his release about a year prior when he apparently moved to Florida.
Father did not disclose his criminal history to the Agency, but in the later course of the proceedings, the Agency noted in an addendum report that Father had been arrested for domestic violence on 11 separate occasions in 1998, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2009, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016.
Father expressed his desire to take custody of Minor and bring her to live with him in Florida. The dependency court thereafter elevated Father to presumed father status and ordered that he receive reunification services. To facilitate bonding with Minor, the Agency made available plane tickets and paid lodging for Father to travel to California regularly for in-person visitation, but Father visited in person rarely. The pattern of Father's approach to visitation was established shortly after reunification services began. Virtually all of his contact with Minor was by telephone. His calls to her were sometimes frequent; sometimes infrequent; and sometimes came at times that were not compatible with the schedule of a young child in a different time zone.
In its next six-month review report, the Agency described Father as making limited progress towards achieving the goals set out in his case plan. The report noted, for instance, that Father had called Minor's therapist twice and hung up on her during one of those conversations. According to the therapist, Father called in an agitated state and" 'ranted and raved' . . . about what the Agency was requiring him to do." Father was uninterested in hearing about Minor's mental health problems. Father had also not started his parenting classes, nor had he provided the Agency with any documentation regarding substance abuse, as is necessary for it to make a substance abuse assessment. The Agency also reported a variety of volatile conduct on Father's part that, according to the social worker P.G., ranged from uncooperative, to rude, to falsely accusatory, to threatening.
Ultimately, the Agency's final status review report concluded that while Father had engaged in some treatment to address the Agency's concerns, the Agency remained worried about the consistency and frequency of Father's contact with his daughter. The report noted that Father had been unable to create a consistent routine for in-person or video visits (and even his phone visits were made at inappropriate times and lacked a schedule); and this was despite Father having been advised that such visits were important to Minor. The report stated that Father was unable to articulate what he had learned from his parenting or domestic violence classes without becoming angry at the Agency and remained unable to verbalize how he would manage conflict with Mother or others.
At a contested, combined review and disposition hearing that took place over two hearing days in August 2020 and February 2021, the court terminated Father's reunification services and set the matter for a section .26 hearing. Father subsequently filed a writ petition appealing various issues arising from the termination of his reunification services and the setting of section .26 hearing. We affirmed the court's order and denied the petition in an unpublished opinion in Alameda County Social Services Agency v. C.B. (May 27, 2021, A161964.)
B. The Contested 366.26 Hearing
Beginning June 7, 2021, the court held eight days of hearings on the section .26 hearing, during which it heard testimony from five witnesses: two social workers (A.W. and V.R.), Father, a relative of Father (L.B.), and caregiver (P.G.).
1. Social Worker, A.W.
Child welfare worker A.W. is a social worker for the Agency with 10 years of experience. A.W. characterized Father's visitation with Minor as "not consistent" and "sporadic," even though the Agency made frequent efforts to facilitate his travel. A.W. emphasized to Father the need to be sensitive to Minor's schedule, especially that she could not be called during school hours, but Father continued to call during such times.
A.W. further testified that P.G. and Father had agreed that Tuesdays would be the day that he would make video calls. Yet it "doesn't seem to [A.W.] that [Father] calls on Tuesdays at all." A.W. testified Father called 12 times between December 1, 2020 and June 1, 2021, speaking for about five to 15 minutes. Father did not call in either March or April. A.W. also testified that, according to what she had heard from P.G., that Minor has never referred to, or asked about, Father between phone calls. During his calls, A.W. testified Father "doesn't ask much about [Minor] or school." Sometimes Father would offer to buy Minor jewelry or a toy, but Father never followed through, leading to Minor being disappointed.
2. Social Worker, V.R.
Child welfare worker V.R. had worked for the Agency for three years. V.R. testified that although the Agency offered to fly Father out to California for in-person visits with Minor, Father was never able to create a routine for consistent in-person visits. The Agency's most recent attempt to help Father visit was in late 2020; Father demurred, stating he would have to check with his employer, but that visit never took place.
V.R. corroborated A.W.'s understanding of the infrequency of Father's calls with Minor, and their inappropriate timing relative to Minor's schedule and school-hours. V.R. testified that Father called Minor three times in the month of June 2021, sent Minor four messages in the month of April 2021, but did not contact Minor at all in the month of March 2021. V.R. testified that Father called Minor once and texted Minor once during the month of February 2021. V.R. characterized Father's visits as sporadic and inconsistent and that he and Minor lacked a parental connection.
3. Father
Father contested much of the above testimony concerning his contact with Minor and the other witnesses' characterizations of his relationship. He testified that Minor lived with him from the time of her birth until she turned one. Father explained that Minor did not live with him after turning one because he was incarcerated on a felony gun charge. Father testified that he called Minor "[a]bout 15 times" throughout the month of January 2021 but was only able to communicate with Minor "about seven times out of the 15," because he sometimes called while Minor was in school. Father described Minor's behavior at the beginning of phone calls as "very excited" and stated that she would scream, "Hey, daddy. How are you?" Father stated that Minor ended a January 1, 2021 video visit by saying, "Daddy, I love you." Father testified that during video calls, he and Minor "do a lot of activity together" and that he tried "to see what she like[s] and what she [doesn't] like" to "learn things about her . . . so I can understand her better."
Father described a February 3, 2021 visit, in which they "talked about everything, different little things she's doing in school," for between 30 and 40 minutes. Father testified he had a video visit on February 6, 2021, and he read a book to Minor and that she sang him a song. Father testified that he spoke to Minor five times in the month of April 2021: April 1, April 2, April 4, April 12, and April 27. He testified generally that he spoke to Minor "multiple times" in May of 2021. He said that he called Minor four times in June 2021: June 7, June 10, June 11, and June 30. Father denied that he had no visits with Minor during the months of March or April of 2021 (contrary to A.W.'s testimony), insisting that he made video calls "all the time."
According to Father's testimony, the calls with Minor all took on a similar quality: Minor was excited to see him at the outset of the call, she referred to him as "Daddy," they engaged in activities such as reading or discussing Minor's school, Minor would often show him drawings she had made, and she seemed sad when the calls were ending.
Father stated that he did not know the name of Minor's school or teacher and had never attempted to reach out to speak to Minor's teacher directly. Father also testified that he had been scheduled to travel to California for an in-person visit with Minor from July 5, 2021 to July 7, 2021, but was unable to make the trip due to deaths in the family.
4. The Caregiver, P.G.
P.G. testified that she had been Minor's foster parent since November of 2018. P.G. stated that, during the first phone call between Minor and Father, Minor "wasn't really saying very much," as she was in a period where she struggled with speaking. P.G. made written records of the tone and frequency of Father's contacts and testified that the first video call between Father and Minor took place on January 11, 2020; Minor "seemed like she was happy" to see Father, but did not have "a whole lot to say"; "most of the conversation was between [P.G.] and [Father]."
P.G. stated that while Father often told Minor that he loved her during phone or video calls, Minor would only say it back to Father when prompted to do so by P.G. P.G. further testified that Minor "doesn't . . . voluntarily say ['I love you'] when [Father] says it to her." P.G. also stated that Minor would only blow Father a kiss at P.G.'s prompting. P.G. estimated that, for the year 2020, Father called Minor roughly eight to 10 times a month and that the calls lasted, on average, five to 16 minutes in length. P.G. further estimated that, in the year 2021, Father called Minor roughly eight to 10 times per month. P.G. noted that when "it seems that . . . it's time for hearings" Father called more frequently.
P.G. testified that during his phone calls Father did not ask Minor questions about school or her health. P.G. stated that Minor never asked her about Father in between phone calls and never asked to call him of her own volition. P.G. described Minor as being "happy it's over" at the end of phone calls with Father. P.G. further stated that P.G. never seemed or appeared to look sad at the end of the calls and instead "just goes on her usual little way."
P.G. noted that Father would sometimes make Minor promises and then not follow through, such as promising to send her Christmas gifts, jewelry, and other items. Overall, P.G. described Minor as "doing a whole lot better" than when she was first placed into foster care: she is doing well in school, enjoyed a recent day camp, and is talking freely.
We omit a summary of L.B.'s testimony because it is not germane to this opinion.
5. The Juvenile Court's Order on the 366.26 Hearing
The court terminated Mother and Father's parental rights and found Minor adoptable. It rejected Father's assertion that the parental beneficial relationship exception should apply. It found his visits "sporadic," and was "not sure what to make of" the exaggeration of his phone calls and their quality to Minor. On several occasions the court stressed it found Father's testimony lacked credibility. The court rejected Father's excuses that he could not make in person visits in January and February of 2020 because the Federal Aviation Administration had cancelled air traffic because of COVID-19, as being false on their face. The court found credible P.G.'s testimony that Minor's purported outward affections toward Father, such as blowing kisses and expressing longing, were prompted. The court found that Father hardly attended Minor's individual education plan meetings; has no idea who Minor's teacher is; calls her during the day; and knows very little about her developmental progress.
The court observed that although Father "wants desperately to be involved in [Minor's] life, . . . he also wants someone else to do all the hard work." The court correctly emphasized that "[t]he beneficial relationship exception is from the child's perspective." The court further emphasized that its inquiry was not on whether Father "could be a good parent or bad parent." The court concluded that given the sporadic contact, and lack of authentic affection by Minor toward Father, Father had not carried his burden to show that the permanency of adoption is outweighed by the relationship he has with Minor, and therefore found Minor adoptable and terminated Father's parental rights.
Father timely appealed the court's judgment.
I. DISCUSSION
Father argues that the court abused its discretion in finding that the detriment to Minor in severing her relationship with Father did not outweigh the benefits of the permanency of adoption. Father further contends that the court erred in considering factors deemed improper by the Supreme Court in Caden C. and failed to make sufficient factual findings.
C. The Parent-child Beneficial Relationship Exception
The beneficial parent-child relationship exception to termination of parental rights under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) is to be utilized in" 'exceptional circumstances' "; only when the legislative preference for adoption is overcome by evidence that the child has such a strong attachment to the parent that it would be detrimental to the child to sever that bond. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 629-631.) The proponent of the exception must carry a burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence three elements: "(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child." (Id. at p. 631, italics in original, citing In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575-576 (Autumn H.).)
Although Caden C. clarified that a parent's continued struggles with the conditions that led to the dependency do not render the parent categorically ineligible for the exception, since he or she is by definition unfit for parental custody (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 637), it is still the case that a substantial positive emotional attachment must be shown at the second step of the analysis. Positive visitation, without proof of substantial attachment between parent and child, generally is not considered enough to establish the statutory exception. (See In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1316-1317; In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827; In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418-1419.)
The depth of the attachment shown between parent and child has significant bearing on whether, at the third step of the analysis, its severance will be so detrimental to the child as to outweigh the benefits of permanency. The parent must show that his or her relationship with the child "promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent's rights are not terminated." (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575; accord, Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 631-632, 636, fn. 5.)
D. The Standard of Review
In addition to the clarifications just noted, the Supreme Court in Caden C. also resolved a long-standing split within the Courts of Appeal as to which standard of review applies to the parental-benefit exception. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-641.) Some courts used the substantial evidence standard and some used abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 639.) In Caden C., the Supreme Court adopted a "hybrid" standard of review, already used by some intermediate appellate courts. (Id. at pp. 639, 641.) The first two Caden C. elements are primarily factual, reviewed for substantial evidence. (Id. at pp. 639-640.) As to the third element, the "court makes the assessment by weighing the harm of losing the relationship against the benefits of placement in a new, adoptive home." (Id. at p. 640.) Any factual determinations underlying the juvenile court's evaluation would also be reviewed for substantial evidence, but the court's ultimate balancing of the detriment of severing the parental relationship against the benefits of adoption is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Id. at pp. 640-641.)
E. Frequency of Parental Contact
Consistent with the testimony of both social workers and the caregiver, the court found Father's visits "sporadic." We observe that this first Caden C. element is an objective assessment: were there visits, how many, what was their nature? Father's physical distance from his child is here not an excuse which mitigates in favor of the first Caden C. element, but rather an explanation. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632 ["Courts should consider . . . whether parents 'maintained regular visitation and contact with the child' (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) but certainly not to punish parents or reward them for good behavior in visiting or maintaining contact-here as throughout, the focus is on the best interests of the child. [Citation.]".) We have already indicated that Father saw his daughter on three occasions in person after being incarcerated at some point following her first birthday. The advent of COVID-19, and its attendant impact on the safety and availability of air travel, do not in fact have a decisive bearing here. Father could have mitigated these factors-to the best of his ability-by ensuring his visits were video-based, and not merely phone calls, but here he fails again. Father frequently explained he could not attend video-based visits because of technical issues with his phone, and promised to resolve them, but often failed to do so. And his excuse for not visiting more than once in 2020 was untrue-the federal government did not shut down air travel as he claimed.
Father had counsel throughout these proceedings and presumably was advised of the importance of frequent contact. His briefing does not suggest otherwise. And because the parental beneficial relationship exception is, as the Supreme Court and dependency court rightly noted, a balancing inquiry made from the child's perspective alone, there is no guarantee that maximally frequent parental visits will ensure the availability of the exception-it simply may promote it. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632 .) The court noted it was puzzled by Father's desperate attempt to not lose his parental rights-evidently because he made frequent phone calls-but at the same time simply did not make it to Alameda County despite the financial burden of doing so being covered. Insofar as Father could not afford the time off from work, he failed to explain this to the social worker in charge; his explanation was rather than he would need permission but he then never followed up on the trip. The court ultimately concluded that Father wanted the benefits of parentage without carrying the burden of the "hard work."
This finding is supported by substantial evidence. Each Caden C. element must be carried to overturn a .26 hearing termination order-they are conjunctive-and so even at this first step, Father's appeal fails. The state has determined as a matter of public policy that if a parent does not "show up," they are legally disqualified from overturning a dependency court's considered opinion, made usually years into a multi-step, multiappealable process, that the child in question is better off being placed permanently with a legal guardian other than themself. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) Not giving up, as Father has evidently done through his repeated phone calls, is just not the same as showing up. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632 ["The first element-regular visitation and contact-is straightforward. The question is just whether 'parents visit consistently,' taking into account 'the extent permitted by court orders.' [Citation.]"; In re Andrea R. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1108 ["[T]o establish the [parental-benefit] exception . . ., the parents must do more than demonstrate 'frequent and loving contact' [citation], an emotional bond with the child, or that the parents and child find their visits pleasant."].)
On the whole, substantial evidence supports the court's finding that Father was not taking advantage of visitation to the extent permitted by court orders. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632; see In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 636, 647 [first prong not met where parent visited sporadically during the first 18 months, often cancelling visits that had been arranged, even though they were weekly during the six months prior to the 366.26 hearing]., disapproved on other grounds by Caden C., at p. 637, fn. 6)
F. Quality of the Parent-child Bond
Father argues that his relationship with Minor is a beneficial one because "he read books to her," "brought her snacks" when he visited in person, "stayed engaged throughout visits," and "would ask about her day." Father further contends that Minor was "happy" and "excited" to see him.
The court on several occasions found Father's testimony involving the reasons he missed in-person visits and the quality of his visits with Minor lacked credibility. The court also credited P.G.'s testimony as well as that of the two social workers. On substantial evidence review, we are in no position to reweigh the credibility of witnesses on appeal. (In re Marriage of Boswell (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1172, 1175 ["We do not judge credibility on appeal."]; see generally Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group Nov. 2021) ch. 1-B, ¶ 1:12.1 [appellate courts do not reweigh witness credibility on appeal].) We therefore disregard Father's testimony and credit the testimony of P.G. and the social workers in the substantial evidence review conducted below.
As an initial matter, we observe that "[i]nteraction between natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child." (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) But a beneficial relationship is more than just a loving relationship-it is a relationship that results from the parent's "attention to the child's needs for physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection and stimulation." (Ibid.) Because the focus of the beneficial relationship exception is the child, courts "often consider how children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their parents" when considering whether the child would benefit from continuing the relationship with their parent. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.)
In In re J.D., a First District, Division 2 panel applied Caden C. and found that the minor J.D. had a" 'substantial, positive, emotional attachment'" to his mother. (In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833, 855.) In so doing, the court considered visitation logs that showed how J.D. felt about, interacted with, looked to, and talked to his mother. (Id. at p. 850.) The court characterized these logs as reflecting the mother's attachment to J.D., shown through the mother "frequently telling [J.D.] she loved him, for example, and sometimes even calling him by a nickname . . . comfort[ing] him . . . apologiz[ing] to him for her mistakes . . . encourag[ing] him" and "within the constraints of their video interactions . . . set[ting] limits for him." (Id. at pp. 856-857.) But the court emphasized that its focus was on J.D.: J.D. "frequently exhibited affection toward mother during visits . . . frequently told her that he loved her . . . blew her kisses . . . told her she was pretty . . . [told her] that she was his 'favorite' and 'told her he missed her.'" (Id. at p. 857.) J.D. "frequently expressed a desire to go to mother's house" and "frequently sought mother's attention during visits." (Id. at p. 858.) The court ultimately found that the record reflected "countless moments in which he actively engaged with mother during their virtual visits, on matters both trivial and significant, was happy to see her, shared five-year-old intimacies with her, expressed love and affection toward her and a desire to see more of her, at her own home and in person." (Id. at p. 859.)
The record before us differs materially from the record in J.D. The evidence credited by the court shows that while Father frequently expressed affection to Minor by telling her, "I love you," Minor would not reciprocate on her own, but instead would only respond when prompted to do so by P.G. The evidence also showed that Minor would not blow Father a kiss without prompting. P.G. further described A.B. as being "happy it's over" at the end of phone calls with Father. P.G. further stated that Minor never seemed or appeared to look sad at the end of the calls and instead "just [went] on her usual little way."
At this second step of the Caden C. analysis, the court may also consider "a slew of factors, such as '[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody, the "positive" or "negative" effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child's particular needs.'" (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632 [quoting Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.].) This indirect factor also cuts against Father: Minor only spent the first year of her six-year life in Father's care; and has only seen him three times since then.
From all of this, we conclude the court's finding that Father failed to carry his burden of showing his relationship with Minor was a "beneficial" one within the meaning of Caden C. is supported by substantial record evidence.
G. Father Failed To Prove That Severance of the Parental Relationship Would Be a Detriment to Minor
The third element of the beneficial relationship exception is only examined if a parent succeeds in establishing the first and second elements. As discussed above, substantial evidence supports the court's findings rejecting the first two elements and thus examining this third element is unnecessary. (See In re A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 973, 995 ["In assessing the third component, assuming the parent establishes the existence of a beneficial parent-child relationship, the juvenile court must then determine whether the relationship 'constitutes a "compelling" reason to forgo termination of parental rights.' "
H. The Court Did Not Commit Reversible Error
Father advances two additional arguments. First, he argues the court failed to make the particular findings required by the multifactor Caden C. test. Specifically, Father argues that the juvenile court erred because it "combined its findings of benefit with whether it was detrimental to terminate parental rights." This argument is related to Father's second argument-that the court committed reversible error, apparently per se, by examining whether Father occupied a "parental role" in Minor's life.
We reject the first argument as unsupported by the face of the record. The court made numerous findings regarding the first Caden C. element, e.g., that Father made "sporadic" visits amounting to just "a few times." The court then rejected Father's characterization of his phone calls as "exaggerated," finding Father's testimony on the whole lacked "credib[ility]." The court found: "I feel that [Father] is exaggerating as to the tenure, the content, the [breadth] of those visits, and that was illustrated in large part by the reports, as well as by the testimony of [P.G.]." As to the second Caden C. element, the court wondered: "How can [Minor] have a beneficial relationship that outweighs permanency with someone who calls to interrupt her school day, or who doesn't know anything about her teaching or educational requirements. Or who is part of a conflict with her mental health provider such that earlier in this case that some of them stopped working on the child's case[?]" Together with the record, these findings are sufficient to support the court's conclusion that the first two Caden C. elements were not satisfied.
Father's second argument is a red herring. He cites In re L.A.-O. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 197, 202, and In re J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 865, for the proposition that a juvenile court's consideration of whether a parent occupies a parental role is reversible error, evidently per se. Father misreads these cases: it is only error if the court examines a "parental role" in a way that conflicts with Caden C.'s holding that such an examination in lieu of examining the three factors it established is erroneous. In In re L.A.-O., the trial court stated that "the parents 'ha[d] not acted in a parental role in a long time' and . . . the prospective adoptive parents 'ha[d] been acting in a parental role.'" (L.A.-O., at p. 202.) Thus, the appellate court could not determine whether the term "parental role" was used to mean that the parents "were not capable of taking custody, or had not been good parents, or had not been providing necessary parental care," which would be erroneous under Caden C. (Id. at p. 212.) Likewise, in In re J.D., the appellate court concluded an examination of "parental role" was error where the reviewing court "cannot be sure whether the juvenile court's determination that mother did not occupy a 'parental' role encompassed factors that Caden C. deems irrelevant." (In re J.D., at p. 865.) Here, by contrast, the court provided sufficient explanation for its conclusion that Father had not carried his burden of establishing the first two Caden C. elements; its observations at several places of the transcript that Father "has [not] played a parental role" did not supplant its otherwise correct analysis. Father provides no authority so holding.
II. DISPOSITION
The judgment terminating Father's parental rights is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Pollak, P.J., Brown, J.