Summary
holding that introduction of dirt onto land constitutes trespass
Summary of this case from Bradley v. Armstrong Rubber Co.Opinion
No. 41451.
April 11, 1960.
1. Trespass — peremptory instruction — railroad liable for invasion of plaintiffs' property.
Where fence around plaintiffs' land was set back from property line and railroad, when it filled low part of its adjacent land, mistakenly placed the dirt for the fill up to the fence, the railroad was liable for the invasion of plaintiffs' land up to the fence.
2. Waters and watercourses — evidence — raised jury question as to whether railroad fill materially changed natural flow of surface waters on plaintiffs' property.
In action against railroad which filled low place on its tract of land adjacent to plaintiff's land and which placed dirt for the fill up to plaintiffs' fence, which was set back from the property line, evidence raised question for jury as to whether the railroad fill materially changed natural flow of surface waters on plaintiffs' land and resulted in periodic flooding of parts of fenced part of plaintiffs' land.
3. Trial — peremptory instruction — on liability in toto, rather than in part — when and when not proper.
If one of two issues offered is established without dispute, but the other is not sufficiently established within the rules warranting a directed verdict, a peremptory instruction of liability on the whole case may not be directed in favor of the plaintiffs.
4. Waters and watercourses — measure and elements of damages — instructions — erroneous.
In action arising out of alleged discharge of excess surface waters on plaintiffs' property, instruction that plaintiffs were not required to prove their damages with mathematical exactness, and that jury should consider all the testimony touching the extent, kind and character of injuries and damages sustained, if any, by the plaintiffs, and fix the amount of plaintiffs' damages, if any, failed to furnish the jury with any guide pertaining to the well-established rules on measurement of damages in surface water cases.
Headnotes as approved by Ethridge, J.
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County; WILLIAM J. GUNN, JR., Judge.
O. Winston Cameron, Meridian, for appellant.
I. The trial court erred in directing verdict against appellant as to liability.
II. The trial court erred in the form and content of its instruction given to plaintiffs as to measure of damages. 15 Am. Jur., Secs. 109, 110 pp. 517, 519; 52 Am. Jur., Sec. 49 p. 874; 56 Am. Jur., Sec. 87 p. 571.
III. There is not sufficient credible evidence to support judgment against appeal in the amount of $10,000.
Morse Morse, Poplarville; Williamson Smith, Meridian, for appellees.
I. A witness may testify, even though the rule is invoked, after remaining in the courtroom, as this fact only goes to effect the credibility of his testimony. Ferguson Head v. Brown, 75 Miss. 214, 21 So. 603; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Ely, 83 Miss. 510, 35 So. 873; Taylor v. State, 30 So. 657; McElroy's Mississippi Evidence, Sec. 150.
II. The Court properly directed a verdict against the railroad as to liability in view of their admitted encroachment to the fence. Agnew v. Jones, 74 Miss. 347, 23 So. 25; Johnson v. State, 154 Miss. 512, 122 So. 529; Mississippi Valley Gas Co. v. Boydston, 230 Miss. 11, 92 So.2d 334 Teasley v. Roberson, 149 Miss. 188, 115 So. 211.
III. The instruction granted plaintiffs on matter of damages was proper. Archibald v. Mississippi T.R. Co., 66 Miss. 424, 6 So. 238; 56 Am. Jur., Sec. 87 p. 571.
IV. Mississippi rule for interference with water courses. Louisville N.R. v. Capdepon, 192 Miss. 28, 4 So.2d 544; Mobile O.R. Co. v. Campbell, 114 Miss. 803, 75 So. 554; Natchez S.R. Co. v. Crawford, 99 Miss. 697, 55 So. 596; City of Oxford v. Spears, 228 Miss. 433, 87 So.2d 914; Southland Co. v. Aaron, 221 Miss. 59, 72 So.2d 161, 49 A.L.R. 2d 243; Yazoo M.V.R. Co. v. Messina, 109 Miss. 143, 67 So. 963.
V. Even if we are mistaken in the foregoing, the defendant, railroad, obtained an almost identical instruction on damages, hence cannot be heard to raise the question here. Patterson v. State, 159 Miss. 882, 132 So. 558.
VI. There is sufficient creditable evidence to support the judgment of $10,000. Johnson v. State, supra.
This is a suit brought by appellees, doing business as United Salvage Company, against appellant railroad for damages to plaintiffs' property, allegedly resulting from a fill placed by defendant upon its land and the edge of plaintiffs' lot, which caused the discharge upon plaintiffs' tract of excess surface waters. The Circuit Court of Lauderdale County gave plaintiffs a general peremptory instruction on liability and submitted the issue of damages, with a resulting verdict of $10,000 for appellees. We reverse that judgment because the trial court erroneously granted the peremptory instruction on liability in toto, rather than in part, and because of an erroneous instruction granted plaintiffs on damages.
Appellees own a block of land in the City of Meridian which lies generally south of the railroad's property, which next to the north boundary of appellees' block is relatively low and approximately the same elevation as the north area of appellees' tract. However, a number of feet north of plaintiffs' lot the railroad tract has for many years been filled and raised. A railroad track was formerly upon it. Appellees' lot has a fence around it, which on the north side is set back from the property line from one to five feet, increasing from east to west. The railroad had dirt and debris hauled from an excavation some distance away to fill the low, south part of its land adjacent to the north line of appellees' lot. Its agents, mistakenly thinking that plaintiff's fence was on their property line, placed the dirt for the fill up to the north fence line of plaintiff's tract. The existence of this encroachment on the north edge of plaintiffs' property by the fill north of the fence was undisputed.
On the other hand, there was considerable dispute in the evidence as to whether the fill erected by the railroad on its own and plaintiffs' property changed or increased in a material way the flowage of surface waters upon the large fenced part of plaintiffs' lot, and whether plaintiffs had previously dug an east-west drainage ditch on the north line of its property which was covered by the fill.
(Hn 1) In this posture of the case, the circuit court gave plaintiffs a peremptory instruction on defendant's liability in toto, and submitted only the issue of damages. This was error. The suit was for the railroad's acts of raising the grade of its land and thereby increasing the flow of surface waters onto plaintiffs' property. Plaintiffs were entitled to a peremptory instruction on liability of defendant as to its placing the fill on their land north of the fence, and for that invasion of their property. The jury could then determine the amount of damages resulting from that act.
(Hn 2) On the issue of whether the railroad fill materially changed the natural flow of surface waters with reference to plaintiffs' block and resulted in periodic flooding of parts of the fenced portion of it, there was a substantial conflict in the evidence, which presented a typical question for the jury. The general peremptory instruction granted appellees on liability erroneously took from the jury that issue of fact. Appellees were entitled to a peremptory instruction only on liability as to the invasion of its land north of the fence, upon which the railroad placed its fill, but not as to whether the railroad's fill changed the flow of surface waters upon their tract south of the fence. (Hn 3) In short, if one of the two issues offered is established without dispute, but the other is not sufficiently establishd within the rules warranting a directed verdict, a peremptory instruction of liability on the whole case may not be directed in favor of the plaintiffs. 88 C.J.S., Trial, Sec. 257 (i), pp. 672-673. 1 Alexander, Miss. Jury Instructions (1953), Sec. 75; cf. Kramer Service, Inc. v. Wilkins, 184 Miss. 483, 496, 186 So. 625 (1939).
(Hn 4) Appellees were granted an instruction, the only one on damages, which told the jury that they were not required to prove their damages with mathematical exactness, "but it is for the jury to take into consideration all of the testimony introduced in evidence under the supervision of this court touching the extent, kind and character of the injuries and damages sustained, if any, by the plaintiffs, that is with reference to their property and property rights, and from such evidence fix the amount of such damages, if any, to be included in your verdict, according to the best judgment of the jury which should be based upon and controlled by a preponderance of the evidence."
This instruction failed to furnish the jury with any guide pertaining to the well established rules on measurement of damages in surface water cases. 56 Am. Jur., Waters, Sec. 87; Newton Coca Cola Bottling Company v. Murphrey, 212 Miss. 823, 55 So.2d 485 (1951); 93 C.J.S., Waters, Sec. 127 (h), pp. 833-834; see also Southland Co. v. Aaron, 221 Miss. 59, 72 So.2d 161, 49 A.L.R. 2d 243 (1954); City of Oxford v. Spears, 228 Miss. 433, 87 So.2d 914 (1956). As was said in Meridian City Lines v. Baker, 206 Miss. 58, 83, 39 So.2d 541 (1949), "by this instruction the jury was left to grope in the darkness, without any light to guide them . . ." It does not furnish the jury with a proper basis for extent of damages, or any criterion, guide, rule, method or standard. The "blue sky" is the limit insofar as this instruction is concerned. 15 Am. Jur., Damages, Secs. 369, 370; 25 C.J.S., Damages, Sec. 178; Yazoo Mississippi Valley Railroad Co. v. Christmas, 89 Miss. 686, 697-698, 42 So. 169 (1906); Sears-Roebuck Co. v. Creekmore, 199 Miss. 48, 63-64, 23 So.2d 250 (1945). This issue is not affected by such cases as Gulf Ship Island Railroad Co. v. Simmons, 153 Miss. 327, 121 So. 144 (1949), where there was no instruction in the record on the measure of damages. See also J.C. Penney Co. v. Evans, 172 Miss. 900, 160 So. 779 (1935); National Surety Corp. v. Vandevender, 108 So.2d 860, 863 (Miss. 1959). Defendant's instruction on plaintiffs' duty to mitigate their damages does not cure the unconfined generalities of the quoted instruction.
Reversed and remanded.
McGehee, C.J., and Kyle, Holmes and Gillespie, JJ., concur.