Opinion
Case No. C-1-00-536
February 26, 2001
Memorandum and Order
Plaintiff, the union representing many of Defendant's employees, initiated this action for injunctive and declaratory relief on June 30, 2000. It alleges that Defendant unilaterally changed plaintiff's members' working conditions by altering disability insurance benefits and flight operations procedures without negotiating concerning the changes. Plaintiff claims that Defendant's actions violate 45 U.S.C. § 152, Seventh, and 156 and breach Defendant's obligation to maintain the status quo regarding working conditions during the existence of a collective bargaining agreement. This matter is before the Court upon Defendant's motion, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Doc. 3).
A. Background
The parties executed a collective bargaining agreement (the "CBA"), which became effective on January 25, 1997. Plaintiff alleges that, after January 1, 2000, Defendant distributed to Plaintiff's members a new summary plan description for various benefits. Included in that description, Plaintiff alleges, are items that are different from or in addition to the terms in the previous summary plan description. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the new summary plan description includes a new third party liability provision requiring members who receive short term disability payments from third parties to reimburse the Defendant's employee benefits plan to the extent of the paymentS received. Plaintiff alleges that that change, among others, constitutes a unilateral change in the working conditions of its members.
plaintiff also alleges that Defendant unilaterally changed working conditions by imposing a new requirement upon crewmembers in a revised Flight Operations Manual. specifically, plaintiff complains of the requirement that its members alert Defendant at least 24 hours before canceling a previously scheduled "deadhead" flight. A deadhead flight is a flight taken by a crewmember to put him or her into position for a flight to which he or she is assigned. It may be on one of Defendant's aircraft or on a commercial flight scheduled by Defendant. plaintiff alleges that the longstanding practice had been that crewmembers were not required to give Defendant notice of their intention not to take a scheduled deadhead flight.
Defendant contends that neither of the disputes resulting from the alleged changes in working conditions is a major dispute over which this Court may properly exercise jurisdiction. Accordingly, Defendant asks the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).
B. The Applicable Legal Standards
Where a defendant challenges subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving jurisdiction in order to survive the motion.See Moir v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 895 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing Rogers v. Stratton Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 913, 915 (6th Cir. 1986)). "[T]he court is empowered to resolve factual disputes when subject matter jurisdiction is challenged." Id. (citingRogers, 798 F.2d at 918 (contrasting analysis under Rule 12(b)(6) where existence of issues of material fact warrants denial of the motion to dismiss)).
The Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151, et seq., governs certain labor disputes, including those between Plaintiff and Defendant in this instance. See Consolidated Rail v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 301 (1989). The Supreme Court has articulated the following "shorthand" method of distinguishing between major and minor disputes under the Railway Labor Act: "major disputes seek to create contractual rights, minor disputes to enforce them." Id. at 302 (citing Elgin, J. E.R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945)).
The statutory bases for those disputes that are deemed major are 45 U.S.C. § 152, Seventh, and 156. Section 152, Seventh, states that no carrier "shall change the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions of its employees, as a class, as embodied in agreements except in the manner prescribed in such agreements" or by the mediation procedure established in § 156. See Consolidated Rail, 491 U.S. at 302. As described in Burley, 325 U.S. at 723, major disputes are those
over the formation of collective agreements or efforts to secure them. They arise where there is no such agreement or where it is sought to change the terms of one, and therefore the issue is not whether an existing agreement controls the controversy. They look to the acquisition of rights for the future, not to assertion of rights claimed to have vested in the past.
When a major dispute arises, the parties are required to undertake a lengthy process of bargaining and mediation. See Consolidated Rail, 491 U.S. at 302 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 155, 156) "Until they have exhausted those procedures, the parties are obligated to maintain the status quo, and the employer may not implement the contested changes in rates of pay, rules, or working conditions." Consolidated Rail, 491 U.S. at 302-03. This Court and other federal district courts have jurisdiction to enjoin a violation of the status quo pending completion of the required procedures, without a showing of irreparable injury as is generally required to obtain preliminary injunctive relief. See Detroit T.S.L.R. Co. v. Transportation Union, 396 U.S. 142 (1969) (upholding status quo injunction without discussing equitable constraints); Division No. 1, Detroit Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 844 F.2d 1218, 1220 (6th Cir. 1988)
Minor disputes, by contrast, are premised upon 45 U.S.C. § 152, Sixth, and 153, First(i), which set forth conference and compulsory arbitration procedures for disputes growing "out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions." A minor dispute
contemplates the existence of a collective agreement already concluded or, at any rate, a situation in which no effort is made to bring about a formal change in terms or create a new one. The dispute relates either to the meaning or proper application of a particular provision with reference to a specific situation or to an omitted case. In the latter event the claim is founded upon some incident of the employment relation, or asserted one, independent of those covered by the collective agreement, e.g., claims on account of personal injuries. In either case the claim is to rights accrued, not merely to have new ones created for the future.Burley, 325 U.S. at 723. Minor disputes are subject to compulsory arbitration, and the Court's jurisdiction is limited to the circumscribed review of arbitrators' decisions and to the injunction of strikes arising out of such disputes. See Consolidated Rail, 491 U.S. at 303-04.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has adopted the following standard for further distinguishing between major and minor disputes:
The test for determining if a dispute involves only the interpretation of an existing agreement, and is therefore minor, or involves a unilateral change in working conditions, and is therefore major, inquires whether the disputed action "can arguably be justified by the existing agreement" or, in other words, whether the construction of the agreement which would sanction the action is "not obviously insubstantial."Brotherhood of Railway Carmen v. Norfolk W. Ry., 745 F.2d 370, 375 (6th Cir. 1984) (quoting Local 1477, United Transp. Union v. Baker 482 F.2d 228, 230 (6th Cir. 1973)). See also Division 1, Detroit Brotherhood, 844 F.2d at 1221. In determining whether a dispute is susceptible to resolution by reference to an existing agreement, the Court does not restrict itself to the explicit terms of the agreement. Rather, the Court interprets the agreement as including those "established past practices that form the course of dealing between the parties." Brotherhood of Ry., Airline Steamship Clerks, Freiqht Handlers, Express Station Employees v. Atchison, T. and S.F. Ry. Co., 847 F.2d 403, 406 (7th Cir. 1988) (citingDetroit T.S.S. Line R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 153-54 (1969))
The burden upon the party who attempts to establish that a dispute is minor is relatively light. See Consolidated Rail, 491 U.S. at 320;McQuestion v. N.J. Transit R. Operations, Inc., 30 F.3d 388, 391 (3rd Cir. 1994). The dispute is minor unless the employer's claims of contractual justification are frivolous or obviously insubstantial. See Atchison, T. S.F. Ry., 847 F.2d at 406.
C. Analysis
1. The summary plan description dispute
The first dispute identified in Plaintiff's complaint is not major and may not even be a dispute. Uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that Defendant changed disability insurance providers on January 1, 2000. See Walling Affidavit, ¶ 8. In its summary plan description for the year 2000, defendant included the reimbursement of disability payments requirement that is at the heart of Plaintiff's first claim. While that requirement had not been included in previous summary plan descriptions, it was a provision of the insurance coverage at all times in question.See id., ¶¶ 14, 15. Defendant also revised the summary plan description in other respects, none of which reflected a change in the actual coverage or benefits provided. See id., ¶¶ 16-18.
The CBA provides that benefits provided under Defendant's health and welfare plans "shall not be reduced during the term of this Agreement." CBA, Art. 17, § E. Plaintiff has not offered a scintilla of evidence that tends to show that the identified changes in the summary plan description relate to reductions in benefits in violation of that provision.
Plaintiff raises a senseless argument that the change from one summary plan description to the next constitutes a change in benefits because the summary plan description is binding and governs over the terms of the underlying policy. While the terms of a summary plan description are binding, Plaintiff is not asking the Court to bind Defendant to the terms in either the current or the former summary plan description. See Edwards v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 851 F.2d 134, 136 (6th Cir. 1988). Rather, Plaintiff is asking the Court to limit the underlying policy to those terms contained in the summary plan description that existed prior to 2000. The terms in a plan description govern only when they are in conflict with the provisions of the underlying policy. See id. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that a conflict exists between the policy and the summary plan description. Accordingly, the provisions of the underlying policy govern. Absent a change in those provisions that reduces the benefits Defendant provides to Plaintiff's members, Plaintiff cannot establish that the parties' dispute is major.
Defendant's position that it is permitted to change the summary plan description so long as it does not reduce benefits is not frivolous and is arguably justified by the CBA. Accordingly, to the extent that an actual dispute concerning benefits exists between the parties, that dispute is not a major dispute, and the Court may not properly exercise jurisdiction over it. See Railway Carmen, 745 F.2d at 375. Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's first claim is, therefore, well-taken.
2. The deadhead flight dispute
Article 13, § F, of the CBA provides that "deadhead" flights are compensated as duty time. Regarding reporting for duty time, the CBA provides as follows:
It shall be the responsibility of a crewmember to report for duty not later than one hour prior to a scheduled departure time, and if he is unable to report for duty when required, to notify the Chief Pilot or his designee as far in advance as possible, giving the reason for his inability to report for duty when required.
Article 13, § J.
Prior to April 2000, Defendant advised crewmembers as follows in the bid package, which is submitted to crewmembers on a monthly basis for their use in bidding for flight assignments:
JUMPSEATS Reminder . . . You must contact your equipment scheduler and advise him/her if you are not going to use your deadhead seat. This is the only way scheduling knows that you are not a no-show. This should be done the day before you are scheduled to deadhead. We appreciate your cooperation in this matter.See Morgenfeld Affidavit, ¶ 13. Defendant has not introduced any evidence that tends to show that it has enforced previous-day notification through disciplinary measures against non-complying crewmembers.
In April 2000, Defendant added a 24-hour notification requirement to its Flight Operations Manual. For the first time, Defendant advised crewmembers that a failure to comply with the 24-hour notification requirement would result in a missed trip. See Morgenfeld Affidavit, ¶ 16. It further identified disciplinary measures Defendant may take against non-complying crewmembers.
The CBA does not address the issue of revisions to the Flight Operations Manual without prior negotiations. The evidence of record unequivocally indicates, however, that Defendant frequently modifies the Flight Operations Manual and that the parties to the CBA have not negotiated over those changes. See Gunning Affidavit, ¶ 3. Accordingly, the evidence suggests that the past practices and course of dealing of the parties has been to permit Defendant to make such changes unilaterally. Those past practices and course of dealing is considered part of the agreement between the parties. See Atchison, T. and S.F. Ry. Co., 847 F.2d at 406.
Defendant has not identified a previous change to the Flight Operations Manual that has added new rules for crewmembers and prescribed disciplinary measures for the violation of those rules. The Court is not pursuaded that the parties' past practices and course of conduct permit Defendant to make new rules and to unilaterally prescribe discipline for violations of those rules. The present change to the Flight Operations Manual is different in kind from the past changes identified by Defendant.
Certain changes to the Flight Operations Manual would require negotiation. For example, a change that would affect rates of pay, rules, or working conditions is prohibited except if enacted in accordance with the parties' agreement or the mediation procedure established in 45 U.S.C. § 156. See Consolidated Rail, 491 U.S. at 302. A dispute over a unilateral change that affects rates of pay, rules, or working conditions is a major dispute. See Railway Carmen, 745 F.2d at 375. Accordingly, to the extent that the 24-hour notification requirement constitutes such a change, the dispute over that change is a major dispute.
The CBA addresses the failure of crewmembers to report for duty as scheduled and includes deadhead flights as duty time. The CBA requires a crewmember to notify the Chief Pilot or his designee in the event that the crewmember will not report as scheduled. The CBA requires that the notification be made "as far in advance as possible." Article 13, § J.
The CBA does not define the phrase "as far in advance as possible." Defendant argues that the 24-hour requirement inserted in the Flight Operations Manual in April 2000 did not constitute a change in the requirements imposed upon crewmembers. It points to the bid package indicating that crewmembers "should" advise the equipment scheduler of an intention not to report for a deadhead flight "the day before you are scheduled to deadhead." The Court is not persuaded.
The Court first observes that the bid package includes the word "should" rather than "must," suggesting that Defendant was making a request rather than a demand. Moreover, in the following sentence of the bid package, Defendant states that it "appreciate[s]" the crewmembers "cooperation in this matter," reinforcing the Court's conclusion that Defendant did not require, but requested, 24-hour notice prior to the April 2000 revision of the Flight Operations Manual. Finally, the Court observes that the language in the bid package includes no reference to discipline for a crewmember's failure to comply with the 24-hour requirement. The CBA also lacks any mention of discipline for failure to notify the Chief Pilot as far in advance of a failure to appear for duty time as possible. See Article 13, § J. The 24-hour notification requirement, which appeared for the first time in Defendant's Flight Operations Manual in April 2000, constitutes a change in the rules Defendant imposes upon its crewmembers. ABX was not merely exercising "vested" or "accrued" rights when it imposed the requirement. See Burley, 325 U.S. at 723.
Defendant contends that the change in question relates to a disciplinary matter, and not a rule or working condition, and is, therefore, properly characterized as a minor dispute. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists Aerospace Workers, 915 F.2d 43, 50 (1st Cir. 1990). Various courts have recognized that controversies involving disciplinary matters are minor disputes. See id. (citing, e.g., Andrews v. Louisville and Nashville R.R., 406 U.S. 320 (1972)). Their decisions have arisen in the context of disputes over discipline actually imposed, rather than a change in the infractions for which the employer may impose discipline, however. The Court is persuaded that such changes, unlike those addressed by the other courts, affect rules and working conditions.
As the Court has stated, the parties' agreement, including their past practices and course of conduct, does not give Defendant the power to make unilateral changes affecting rules and discipline. Accordingly, the Court is persuaded that the parties' dispute arising from that change is a major dispute over which this Court may properly exercise subject matter jurisdiction. See Consolidated Rail, 491 U.S. at 310.
D. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss (Doc. 3) is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part. This matter will proceed on Plaintiff's claim arising from the April 2000 amendment of Defendant's Flight Operations Manual as it relates to the 24-hour notification requirement.
IT IS SO ORDERED.